

CONFLICT IN EAST PAKISTAN

BY EDWARD S. MASON • ROBERT DORFMAN • STEPHEN A. MARGLIN

Conflict in East Pakistan : Background and Prospects

1

Summary

The independence of East Pakistan is inevitable. What started as a movement for economic autonomy within the framework of a united Pakistan has been irrevocably transformed by the wholesale slaughter of East Pakistani civilians into a movement that sooner or later will produce an independent East Pakistan—"Bangla Desh" is a matter of time. A complete discussion of the Pakistani question would include an analysis of cultural, linguistic, and social issues, which along with economics and politics, are at the heart of the present conflict. This paper has a more limited goal : to assess the economic and political bases of disaffection in East Pakistan and to suggest the likely implications for international relations of the break-up of Pakistan.

In brief, the fact of a large and widening gap in the average standard of living between the two regions of the country is incontestable Even the West Pakistani-dominated Government admits that the average East Pakistani must make do with barely two-thirds the average income in the West, and he faces higher prices too. The East Pakistanis argue that income disparity is largely the result of a systematic subordination of the interests of the Eastern region to those of the West ; specifically, the East Pakistanis charge that allocation of foreign exchange—both that earned by the export of East Pakistani jute and that provided by foreign aid—disproportionately favors West Pakistan ; that allocation of domestic investment reinforces the income disparity ; and that high tariffs and import quotas raise prices to East Pakistanis in order to provide profits and jobs in West Pakistan.

We believe that in the main the facts support these charges. Pakistan Government policies have at the very least exacerbated the

...share ...ed to West Pakist... Sheikh Mujib's Awami Lea... ...ed by the people of East Pakistan in ..., sought to correct these disparities by transferri... ...ver economic policy from the Central Government to th... ...vinces. The response of the Yahya Khan's Government has been to unleash a reign of terror whose full dimensions are only gradually becoming known.

The West Pakistani Army can delay independence, but terrain and logistics, coupled with the implacable hostility of the East Pakistanis to what has become foreign domination, are on the side of "Bangla Desh". Apart from the elementary and overwhelming humanitarian interest in an end to further bloodshed, American interest lies with a quick rather than a slow realization of independence. Most important, tensions in South Asia will be reduced. Bangla Desh and India will develop mutually advantageous economic and cultural relations, a move long desired by both sides but frustrated by West Pakistanis who have refused to countenance any normalization of relations in the East as long as the Kashmir issue remains outstanding. The Kashmir issue too is likely to subside in importance, not because of any reduction in tension in the West—the Kashmir issue has never aroused much interest in the East—but because West Pakistan, without the economic support of the East, will be unable to sustain the level of pressure it has been able to mount until now. In short, Bangla Desh will be a ...uly independent state, ready and able to maintain normal relations ...th its neighbours and the powerful nations of both blocs, but a ...ellite or pawn of no one.

...he independence of Bangla Desh will be inimical to American ...s only insofar as American aid is used to delay the inevitable. ...ic aid to the Pakistan Government should be immediately ...d. The "one-time" exception made last year to the ...of arms sales and military aid (imposed after the Indo- ...ar of 1965) should be rescinded. American arms must ...lied to a government that makes war on helpless

II

U. S. Economic and Military Aid to Pak

Since 1951 Pakistan has been a major recipient of U. S. aid amounting to approximately $3 billion[1] by 1969. E food aid donated under Public Law 480, the bulk of his as has been used to support industrialization in West Pakista only a handful of projects undertaken in East Pakistan.

The quantum of U. S. military aid to Pakistan is a class figure but two estimates[2] put it between $1.5 to $2 billion for period between 1954 and 1965. The assistance has includ -104 Starfighters, Patton tanks, armoured personnel carrier tomatic and recoilless infantry weapons. This impressive array modern weaponry was given expressly[3] for defensive purposes. Pakistan an early member of SEATO and CENTO this military as intended to bolster the armed containment of the Communist the Dulles era of U.S. foreign policy but apart from the order war with India of 1965 the only active use of these ated weapons has occurred against the unarmed and s civilian population of East Pakistan.[4]

wth and maintenance of superstructure of the armed h was built up with massive U.S. military aid continued 65 when the United States decided to put an embargo of arms to both Pakistan and India. This was made verting resources from the much needed development Pakistan, poor and less powerful politically than more by irrational policy.

e United States has just recently (October 1970) o its embargo on military sales to Pakistan. formation available, the United States has stan the following items :

onnel carriers (approximately 300)
nnaissance aircraft (4)
s (6)

deliveries have yet bee
er, a move

...basic facts seem to support the East Pakistan charge of economic domination by the West. The economic disparities between East and West Pakistan have been so serious for so long that the Pakistan government's highest planning authority has been forced to take official note of them.

A recent report[5] by a panel of experts to the Planning Commission of the Government of Pakistan provides authoritative documentation of the widening of economic disparities in the two regions. The most striking fact in this report is the widening gap between the income of the average West Pakistani and his Eastern counterpart. In 1959-60, the per capita income in West Pakistan was 32% higher than in the East. Over the next ten years the annual rate of growth of income of West Pakistan was 6.2% while it was only 4.2% in East Pakistan. As a result, by 1969-70 the per capita income of the West was 61% higher than in the East.[6] Thus in ten years the income gap doubled in percentage terms; it increased even more in absolute terms.

East Pakistanis blame three instruments of central government policy for their plight :

1. Pakistan's scant investible resources, plus foreign aid, are directed unduly to the development of West Pakistan—to the comparative neglect of East Pakistan.

2. In particular, East Pakistan's foreign trade earnings are diverted to finance imports for West Pakistan.

3. Economic policy favors West Pakistan at the expense of the East. Specifically, tariffs, import controls, and industrial licensing compel East Pakistan to purchase commodities from West Pakistan which, but for the controls, they could obtain more cheaply in world markets.

We believe the East Pakistani claims to be largely justified. ...t, it is indisputable that the bulk of development expenditure ...been in West Pakistan though the majority of the population ...the East. With 55% of the population, East Pakistan's share ...l development expenditure (public and private) has increased ...low point of 20% during the period 1950/51-1954/55 to a peak of 36% during the Third Five-Year Plan period 1969/70. There has been a marked upward trend in East Pa share of public development expenditure from a little over period of 1950-1955 to around 45% in the Third Five-Yea period (over 50% of expenditure on the Indus replacement w is excluded). The share of East Pakistan in private investm however, has been low during the entire period, and has amoun only to a little over 25% in recent years. The allocation of dev lopment expenditure is summarized in Table 1.

It may be true, as defenders of Pakistan government policy claim, that the great bulk of worthwhile investment opportunities have been in the West, though the relative attractiveness of the West may be more the effect of overall government policy than a use. In any event, the fact remains that investments in the st have done little or nothing for the people in the East.

As for the second point, it is clear that foreign exchange has allocated to the detriment of East Pakistan. Over the last decades, East Pakistan's share of total export earnings has as high as 70% and has declined to the range 45-55% in years, while its share of import earnings has normally been range of 29% to 32%.[8] Until 1962/63 East Pakistan significant surpluses on foreign account, and in recent ll deficits. By contrast, the West's foreign trade has ubstantial and chronic deficit that has absorbed virtually exchange made available through foreign aid. Table 2 the foreign trade of East Pakistan and of Pakistan

t to the third point, general economic policy has West Pakistan. The West's preponderant share investments might have provided inexpensive of Pakistan's people. In fact, it has allowed the efficient industries,[9] which, ironically, have pros- use of tariffs and quotas that have made East market. In recent years, between 40% and 50% 's exports have been sold to East Pakistan. l 1949/50-1968/69 appear in Table 3. eign trade data, coupled with Pakistan's fair have been a proportion equal to its proportion of Pakistan's population, 55%, indicates that a sizeable net transfer of resources has taken place from East to West Pakistan. According to the official report referred to above, if allowance is made for the undervaluation of foreign exchange in terms of Pakistan's domestic currency, the total transfer from East to West over the period 1948/49-1968/69 was Rs. 31 billion. Using a scarcity value of Rs. 11.90 to the dollar, this works out to $ 2.6 billion.[10]

In short, Pakistan's economic policies are harmful to East Pakistan. "Exploitation" may be a strong word, but it seems clear, all in all, that East Pakistan's economic interests have been subordinated to those of the West, and that the East Pakistan have had good cause to resent that fact.

The economic domination of East Pakistan has been facilitated by West Pakistani dominance of the Central Government. The military regime in Pakistan has existed, with modifications, since 1958, and decision-making authority rests with a well-entrenched civil service and their military bosses. *All* senior military members of the administration have been West Pakistani, and of the senior officers in the Central civil services, 87% were West Pakistani in 1960,[11] and the proportion has not changed much since. The Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission and the Central Finance Minister, key individuals in resource allocation, have always been West Pakistanis.

The location of the Central Government in West Pakistan has encouraged the concentration of industry and the entreprenneurial class in West Pakistan.[12] Such a concentration is to be expected in an economic system where direct allocational control of resources by the government makes direct access to government authorities a prime business asset.

TABLE 1

DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE IN EAST AND WEST PAKISTAN

(In Millions of Rupees)

Period	Development Plan Expenditures			Outside Plan Expenditure		Total Development Expenditure (1+4+5)	Total Expenditure	Development Expenditure in Regions as Percent of all Pakistan Total
	Total	Public	Private		Works Program			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
East Pakistan								
1950/51-1954/55	1,000	700	300	—	—	1,000	2,710	20%
1955/56-1959/60	2,700	1,970	730	—	—	2,700	5,240	26%
1960/61-1964/65	9,250	6,250	3,000	—	450	9,700	14,040	32%
1965/66-1969/70	16,560	11,060	5,500	—	—	16,560	21,410	36%
West Pakistan				Indus Basin Works Program				
1950/51-1954/55	4,000	2,000	2,000			4,000	11.290	80%
1955/56-1959/60	7,570	4,640	2,930	—	—	7,570	16.550	74%
1960/61-1964/65	18,400	7,700	10,700	2,110	200	20,710	33,550	68%
1965/66-1969/70	26,100	10.100	16,000	3,600	—	29,700	51,950	64%

Note : Public sector development expenditure of the Provincial Govt. plus that of Central Govt. on projects located in the Province mainly based on Planning Commission estimates. Private development expenditure as estimated by Planning Committee.

Source : *Report of Advisory Panels for the Fourth Five-Year Plan, Volume 1.* Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan, July 1971.

TABLE 2

EAST PAKISTAN'S SHARE OF EXPORTS AND IMPORTS

(In Millions of Rupees)

Year	Foreign Imports			Foreign Exports		
	East Pakistan	Pakistan	Percentage share of E. Pakistan (1÷2)	East Pakistan	Pakistan	Percentage share of E. Pakistan (4÷5)
	1	2	3	4	5	6
1948-49	282	1,459	19.3%	429	958	44.8%
1949-50	385	1,297	29.7%	629	1,194	52.7%
1950-51	453	1,620	28.0%	1,211	2,554	47.4%
1951-52	763	2,237	34.1%	1,087	2,009	54.1%
1952-53	366	1,384	26.4%	642	1,510	42.5%
1953-54	294	1,118	26.3%	645	1,286	50.2%
1954-55	320	1,103	29.0%	732	1,223	59.8%
1955-56	361	1,325	27.2%	1,041	1,784	58.4%
1956-57	819	2,335	35.1%	900	1,608	56.5%
1957-58	736	2,050	35.9%	988	1,422	69.5%
1958-59	554	1,578	35.1%	881	1,325	66.5%
1959-60	655	2,461	26.6%	1,080	1,843	58.6%
1960-61	1,014	3,188	31.8%	1,259	1,799	70.0%
1961-62	873	3,109	28.1%	1,301	1,843	70.5%
1962-63	1,019	3,819	26.7%	1,249	2,247	55.6%
1963-64	1,489	4,430	33.6%	1,224	2,299	53.2%
1964-65	1,702	5,374	31.7%	1,268	2,408	52.7%
1965-66	1,328	4,208	31.6%	1,514	2,718	55.7%
1966-67	1,567	5,192	30.2%	1,575	2,913	54.1%
1967-68	1,327	4,655	28.5%	1,484	3,348	44.3%
1968-69	1,850	4,897	37.8%	1,543	3,305	46.7%
1969-70	1,813	5,098	35.6%	1,670	3,337	50.0%
Preplan 1948/49-1954/55	2,863	10,218	28.0%	5,375	10,734	50.1%
1st Plan 1955/56-1959/60	3,125	9,749	32.1%	4,899	7,982	61.4%
2nd Plan 1960/61-1964/65	6,097	19,920	30.6%	6,301	10,596	59.5%
3rd Plan 1965/66-1969/70	7,885	24,050	32.8%	7,786	15,621	49.8%

Source : Monthly Statistical Bulletin, verious issues, Central Statistical Office, Government of Pakistan.

TABLE 3

WEST PAKISTAN'S REGIONAL AND FOREIGN EXPORTS

(In Millions of Rupees)

Year	Exports to E. Pakistan	Exports Abroad	Total	Exports to East Pakistan as a Percentage of West Pakistan's Total Exports (1÷3)
	1	2	3	4
1949-50	229	565	794	28.8%
1950-51	211	1,342	1,553	13.6%
1951-52	161	922	1,083	14.9%
1952-53	117	867	984	11.9%
1953-54	370	641	971	38.1%
1954-55	293	491	784	37.4%
1955-56	319	742	1,061	30.1%
1956-57	510	698	1,726	29.5%
1957-58	690	434	1,124	61.4%
1958-59	660	444	1,104	59.8%
1959-60	543	763	1,306	42.3%
1960-61	801	540	1,341	60 5%
1961-62	832	543	1,375	60.6%
1962-63	918	998	1,916	47.9%
1963-64	844	1,075	1,919	44.0%
1964-65	857	1,151	2,008	42.8%
1965-66	1,190	1,204	2,393	49.7%
1966-67	1,305	1,338	2,643	49.4%
1967-68	1,217	1,864	3,081	39.6%
1968-69	1,342	1,762	3,104	43.2%

Source : Monthly Statistical Bulletin, various issues, Central Statiscal Office, Government of Pakistan.

IV

Background to the Break-Up of Pakistan

The history of economic and political domination of East Pakistan by the West led naturally to increasing demands for provincial autonomy, spearheaded by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's Awami League. Its 6-point platform for autonomy sought to transfer control over foreign trade, foreign aid allocation, and taxation powers to the provinces so that no province could be dominated through disproportionate control of the Central Government's powers over resource allocation.[13]

At the polls last December this Awami League platform swept 167 of the 169 seats in the National Constitutional Assembly that were alloted to East Pakistan. The Awami League's 167 seats constituted an absolute majority in a chamber of 313. The political and military powers of West Pakistan tried to pressure Sheikh Mujib into compromising on his 6-point autonomy mandate. In particular Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, leader of the West Pakistani People's Party which had won 80-odd seats in the elections, demanded that control of trade and aid should remain with the Central Government. When Sheikh Mujib refused to compromise on these instruments of past economic domination, Bhutto announced a boycott of the Constitutional Assembly scheduled to meet on March 3. General Yayha Khan used this pretext to postpone the Assembly indefinitely. This arbitrary postponement provoked demonstrations in Dacca and other cities on March 1, which the military decided to control by force. The military authorities conceded 172 deaths in the disturbances (the Dacca correspondent of the *London Observer* put the figure nearer 2,000). Despite this bloody provocation the Awami Legue refrained from declaring independence. Instead they launched a campaign of civil disobedience to demand a return of troops to barracks and an enquiry into the firings. The campaign of non-cooperation effectively transferred civilian authority to Sheikh Mujib but even in the massive rally of March 7 Sheikh Mujib still spoke of a united Pakistan with autonomy for each province. His preparedness for negotiation and commitment to the unity of Pakistan was demonstrated by his continuation of talks for the next two weeks despite the well-advertised influx of West Pakistani troops. Indeed, in retrospect it would appear that the West Pakistani officials were never negotiating in good faith ; negotiations were a way to forestall an open break until sufficient numbers of West Pakistani troops could be brought on the scene to unleash a terror whose full dimensions are only now becoming known. The Awami League's commitment to a peaceful political settlement was convincingly demonstrated by the complete lack of prepartion of the civilian population to the onslaught[14] of military arms which was unleashed on them on the night of thursday March 25.

V

International Implications of an Independent "Bangla Desh"

From news reports now available it would appear that the use of massive military fire power has broken the Awami League and its supporters in most urban centres. But control of urban centres at gunpoint in a country where 90% of the population lives in rural areas hardly constitutes a framework for any effective government, let alone a popular one. The immediate prospect is for ruthless military rule in urban centres, with tenuous control over a countryside which is likely to become increasingly the base for armed guerilla resistance.

The base for such a movement clearly exists. The otherwhelming support for the Awami League's demand for autonomy was clearly shown in the election results of December when 167 out of 169 seats allotted to East Pakistan were won by the League. As reports of military massacres[15] are carried by urban refugees to the rural areas, the democratically expressed sentiment for autonomy is likely to be converted to a militant desire for independence. It is possible that a West Pakistani army of occupation can suppress the Bengali nation for two months, six months, or a year, but the American experience in Vietnam illustrates only too painfuully the impossibility of holding an entire population captive by force of alien arms alone.

The emergence of an independent Bangla Desh appears to be inevitable in the long run. What remains in question is how much blood will flow before it occurs. Politically it is clear that the longer it takes to achieve independence, the more likely it is that control of the independence movement will slip away from the moderate leadership of the Awami League to the more leftist National Awami Party (which did not contest the December elections).

Assuming that the independence movement succeeds while under Awami League control, certain predictions may be made about its relations with neighbours and super-powers. As expressed in public statements of Sheikh Mujib, an independent Bangla Desh will establish friendly relations with India and set up economic trade to their mutual advantage. Up to now such trade—and a cultural ties—have been frustrated by the West Pakistanis who dominate the Central Government. They believe that, short of war, their only lever to force a settlement of their Kashmir claim is the economic interest of India in trade with East Pakistan. By contrast, East Pakistan has never been aroused by Kashmir, and in the 1965 war no military activity took place within its borders. Strong linguistic and cultural ties with the state of West Bengal in India are likely to help cement durable good relations between the two countries and reduce tension in the area. Unable to share the burden of military expenditures with the East, West Pakistan is bound to tone down its policy of confrontation with India, a confrontation which for the past 24 years has diverted scarce resources of both these poor, populous countries from much needed economic development to defense.

As an independent nation Bangla Desh might conceivably establish marginal economic contacts with Communist China. But these are unlikely to be any greater than the current scale of trade and aid between China and Pakistan, and will certainly be less than the likely range and depth of East Bengal's economic ties to neighbouring India. As long as India is the main trading partner (and both pronouncements of Awami League leaders and the economic geography of the region support this possibility), it is unlikely that Bangla Desh will become a satellite of Communist China.

The U.S.S.R has in the past three years become an active patron of the military clique that controls Pakistan. Soviet aid has included considerable economic aid (including agreements for a steel mill in West Pakistan) and some military aid. The Soviet initiative has been largely a response to growing Communist Chinese ties with Pakistan. This competition between rival giants has rebounded to the benefit of West Pakistan where the central government and military establishment are based. The U.S S.R. has not been sensitive to aspirations of East Pakistanis in the past, and is unlikely to make a new Bangla Desh an arena for superpower competition for influence.

A major goal of U.S. foreign policy in this area has been the reduction of the debilitating confrontation between India and Pakistan. This goal will surely be advanced by the existence of an independent Bangla Desh friendly to India. Most observers believe that the Awami League leadership will follow a neutral foreign policy, particularly if the U.S. and multilateral aid agencies like the World Bank are the major aid donors.

Bengali independence will be inimical to American interests only if by following short-sighted policies we drive East Pakistan into the arms of another power—the U.S.S.R. or China. To the extent that Bengali independence is delayed by means of American arms, the image of the United States will suffer, and rightly so. The offer of arms to Pakistan by the United States Government in October 1970, whatever its ostensible purpose, will, if implemented, oil a Pakistani military machine that is making war on its own citizens. The United States Government must rescind this offer forthwith. No further military aid, or economic aid—which directly or indirectly provides foreign exchange that makes it possible to buy weapons abroad—should be given to West Pakistan until it withdraws its occupation force from East Bengal and recognizes the independence of the Bengali nation.

Notes

1. Stern, J. J. and Falcon, W. P., *Growth and Development in Pakistan 1955-69*. Occasional Paper No. 23, Harvard Center for International Affairs, April 1970 ; M. A. Sattar, *United States Aid*

and Pakistan's Economic Development, unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Tufts University, 1969.

2. *New York Times*, September 28, 1964 ; Frank N. Trager, "United States and Pakistan," *Orbis* Vol. IX, Fall 1965, No. 3.

3. Formal agreement signed May 1954, reported in Department of State Press release, *Department of State Bulletin*, May 31, 1954, pp. 850-851.

4. *Washington Post*. March 30 ; *New York Times*, March 29 and March 30. These contain eyewitness accounts by correspondents of use of U.S. supplied tanks.

5. *Reports of the Advisory Panels for the Fourth Five Year Plan 1970-75*, Vol. 1 ; Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan, July, 1970.

There were, in fact, two reports, one from the panel of East Pakistani economists and one from a West Pakistani panel. The figures used in this document are drawn from the more detailed and, in our view, more reliable discussion of the East Pakistan Report. The West Pakistan panel agrees that the disparity in per capita income between East and West Pakistan is large and has been increasing. They emphasize, however, the growing share of total, and particularly public, investment that has been flowing to East Pakistan and express the hope and belief that in the course of time this may correct the per capita income disparity.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 2, Table 1. As the report notes these estimates of disparity are understatements because of a lack of adjustment in the basic official data for the generally higher prices which prevail in East compared to West.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 6, Table 2.

8. Total foreign exchange available for imports is made up of export earnings and foreign aid. All data on trade are complied from official statistics issued by the Central Statistical Office, Government of Pakistan.

9. Lewis, Stephen R., *Pakistan : Industrialization and Trade Policies*, O.E.C.D., Oxford University Press, 1970.

10. The major conceptual difficulties inherent in such a calculation have been indicated : (1) A fair allocation of foreign aid

as a benchmark ; and (2) conversion of domestic into foreign currencies. The allocation of foreign aid according to population appears to us reasonable, and the use of scarcity values rather than the official exchange rates for converting foreign exchange into rupees does, too. *Report of the Advisory Panels*, op. cit., Appendix 3 presents the results in rupees terms. Our conversion to dollars at the exchange rate Rs. 11.90=$1.00 is based on a simple average of the scarcity prices used by the Advisory Panel (Table 2 of Appendix 3), plus a 10% margin to allow for error.

11. Rahman, A., *East and West Pakistan : A problem in Political Economy of Regional Planning*, Occasional Paper No. 20, Harvard University Center for International Affairs, 1968. By 1966, among all Class 1 officers in the Central Government East Pakistan's share was only 20 percent.

12. Papanek, G. F., *Pakistan's Development : Social Goals and Private Incentives*, Harvard University Press, 1967.

13. The Six Points are :

(1) Establishment of a federation "on the basis of the Lahore Resolution and the Parliamentary framework of government with supremacy of legislature directly elected on the basis of adult franchise."

(2) Federal government shall deal with only two subjects, that is, defence and foreign affairs, and all other residuary subjects should rest in the federating states.

(3) There should be either two separate but freely convertible currencies for the two wings or one currency for the whole country provided that effective constitutional provisions were made to stop the flight of capital from East to West Pakistan. There should be separate banking reserves and a separate fiscal and monetary policy for East Pakistan.

(4) Denial to the Central Government of the right of taxation ; vesting of tax provisions in the hands in the federating states with the Central Government receiving a fixed share.

(5) Foreign trade ; Five steps shall be taken :

a. There shall be two separate accounts for foreign exchange earnings.

b. Earnings of East Pakistan shall be under the control of East Pakistan and the same for West Pakistan.

c. Foreign exchange requirements of the federal government shall be met by the two wings either equally or in a ratio to be fixed.
d. Indigenous products shall move free of duty within the two wings.
e. The constitution shall empower the unit governments to establish trade and commercial relations with set up trade missions in, and enter into agreements with foreign countries.

(6) Set up a militia or para military force by East Pakistan.

14. Preplanned according to reports by foreign correspondents, e.g., Sydney Schanberg in *New York Times*, March 26-29.

15. The eyewitness account of a British correspondent in *Washington Post* March 30 leaves no doubt about the appropriateness of the word "massacre".

About the authors . . .

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Robert Dorfman is professor of economics at Harvard University. He has been concerned with the problems of Pakistan development since 1961, when he became a member of the White House-Interior Team appointed by President Kennedy at the request of the then-President of Pakistan, Ayub Khan, to advise the Government of Pakistan on problems of water-logging and salinity. Mr. Dorfman has recently been a consultant to the World Bank on the development of the Lower Mekong River Basin.

Stephen A. Marlin is professor of economics at Harvard University. He has advised governments in Asia, Africa, and Latin America on problems of economic development, as well as the United States Government, the World Bank, and the United Nations.