


CRISIS IN EAST PAKISTAN



HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

MAY 11 AND 25, 1971

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CHAPTER 1

1.1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the reader to the basic concepts and terminology of the subject. It is assumed that the reader has a basic knowledge of the subject and is familiar with the notation used throughout the book. The chapter is divided into two main sections: the first section deals with the general theory and the second section deals with the applications of the theory to specific problems.

The first section of the chapter is devoted to the general theory of the subject. It begins with a discussion of the basic concepts and terminology of the subject. The second section of the chapter is devoted to the applications of the theory to specific problems. It begins with a discussion of the basic concepts and terminology of the subject.

CRISIS IN EAST PAKISTAN

TUESDAY, MAY 11, 1971

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 2:05 p.m. in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Cornelius E. Gallagher (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. GALLAGHER. The subcommittee will come to order.

We are rather short on members, because we are knee-deep in the EAST debate on the floor. We will proceed as the members come in.

We are beginning hearings today into the situation in East Pakistan with particular emphasis on the related problems of refugees and famine.

I think it would be useful to briefly summarize events leading to what may be one of the worst human tragedies in modern times.

In November 1970 a cyclone and flood killed thousands in East Pakistan and crippled the main port of Chittagong. The recent fighting has prevented most crops from being planted. Because East Pakistan is a food deficit region in the best of times, as many as 30 million people may starve, according to reports said to have been submitted to the Agency for International Development and the World Bank. Right now, refugees are streaming from East Pakistan to India at the rate of 60,000 each day, swelling the already strained Indian food supply by an estimated 1.5 million new mouths to feed.

The refugees and the potential famine are the result of civil war which broke out on March 25, 1971. While the politics of Pakistan and the subcontinent are not the focus of this hearing, it is important to remember that in the election for a National Constitutional Assembly in December 1970, the Awami League captured 167 of the 169 seats contested in the East. This gave them an absolute majority of the 133 seats contested in all of Pakistan.

While the government of Yahya Kahn now is in apparent control of the cities, those who embrace autonomy for Bangla Desh claim the countryside. Factually, the countryside of East Pakistan is the equal of the countryside of South Vietnam in providing natural surrounding insurgency and the fighting thus far has produced reports of savage atrocities on both sides.

Putting this together, we seem to have a situation which is potentially equal, in terms of human misery, to a combination of Vietnam and Biafra. Because of our military aid to the central government it appears that our arms, in conjunction with those supplied by other governments, are being used to defeat the people who won the election.

While these and other questions are as important as they seem to be answerable at this point, our focus is the immediate threat to the

On people and the dimensions of the suffering and the impact of the humanitarian aspects of the East Pakistan situation must be considered by all the parties involved, and it will be a great pleasure to hear you this afternoon, Senator Kennedy, discuss the information developed by your subcommittee. On behalf of the members of the subcommittee, we welcome you here this afternoon.

STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD M. KENNEDY, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to express my very sincere appreciation to you, as the chairman, in providing this leadership, and in providing an opportunity for those of us who are concerned about humanitarian needs to explore them with you and the members of the subcommittee. I feel that there are too many times and instances in the past where we of the United States have tried to portray ourselves as being truly humanitarian, truly concerned about suffering and pain and hunger and malnutrition throughout the world, but we have been all too slow in responding to these needs.

I think you and I realize the very great sense of humanitarianism which exists within the American people, and I always feel that if the American people had a fair understanding of some of the great human tragedies that have existed throughout the world, they would demand of their Government the kind of response which I am sure you and I, and many others in the Congress and in the Nation, would like to see. But too often there is dragging of feet, failure to recognize a problem, and failure of an adequate response by our Government. I say that not only in terms of observing by this administration. It has been true of past administrations, in terms, for example, of responding to the Biafran situation.

So I truly appreciate the chance of being with you this afternoon, and of making some comments on a subject which so many of us are interested in. And I am hopeful that the hearings will underscore the urgent need to further encourage the initiatives underway to meet the needs of the Bengali people.

Official reports from our Government and elsewhere express very serious concern about the condition of the people in East Pakistan. These reports say that within a month the condition of the people will become acute. The precarious situation which exists today will involve into a nightmare of death for millions—unless immediate and concerted efforts are made to meet the needs of the people involved. Although reports from East Pakistan suggest that violence has subsided considerably, reports also indicate that feelings are tense between the people and the army of the central government. In fact, reports to our Government suggest that the great bulk of the population is alienated, perhaps forever. Regrettably, this can only indicate, and perhaps delay, the organizing of a meaningful relief

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am, and the solving of those political problems which generated recent violence.

Moreover, reports also indicate that the army effectively controls the cities and towns, and that throughout most of the country—government administration and services do not exist. The transportation and distribution of available foodstocks and medical supplies is at a standstill—even in the area struck by the cyclone last fall, conservative estimates say a million persons have been solely dependent for their survival on effective relief operations. Food—except that confiscated by the army—are very low. Food tragedy, finally, has now spilled over into India, which so far had it necessary to give asylum to nearly 2,000,000 refugees—at least 526,000 are in camps. The recent daily influx into is reportedly been some 50,000. The State Department informs the influx will continue at a high level, “at least until the of the monsoon in a few weeks, when both military operations travel will become more difficult.” The continuing heavy refugees into India is a stark reminder of how bad conditions are in East Pakistan.

Last month I have repeatedly communicated my concern matters to officials in the Department of State and elsewhere, to encourage and support reasonable initiatives by our and the international community to help meet the urgent humanitarian problems in East Pakistan. I have strongly these initiatives should be taken through the United Nations. Humanitarian problems, at least, some progress is being

Indian side of the border, and at the invitation of the Government, representatives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) are currently assessing relief and developing a plan of international action. According to a letter received from the Department of State this morning, it has “authorized up to \$2.5 million in food and other initial contribution to the international relief effort.” UNHCR effort is being organized, the U.S. is providing assistance for 237,000 refugees in West Bengal. The relief is being distributed by CARE, Catholic Relief Services, Lutheran Service/Lutheran World Federation.

Mr. Chairman, that while this interim U.S. aid to refugees is welcomed by all concerned, it falls far short of immediate need. It also falls short of India’s emergency aid, in order to tide them over until relief begins. This dragging of our feet over a simple emergency aid is distressing, to say the least.

The Indian authorities requested, over 2 weeks ago, help and assistance from our Government. The Government has been extremely slow in responding, and assistance, indicating that the prime help should be through international agencies.

In this view, and have strongly advocated it to the past few weeks. But until these agencies begin to play a direct role, a traditional and urgent to play in responding to the initiative is an extraordinary kind of burden.

As I mentioned, they have approximately 2 million refugees now. They can expect it at least to go to 3 million. There is even the possibility that it will go to five. And this does provide an extraordinary kind of burden on the Indian Government. And certainly, particularly in this immediate and critical relief period, we ought to be able to respond with a good deal more imagination and compassion than we have.

Far less progress in meeting relief needs is being made in East Pakistan. Initiating an adequate relief program is undoubtedly being hampered for a number of good reasons—but, on the basis of talks I have had, the primary cause may very well be simple lack of candor in recognizing the vast dimension of human need brought on by the conflict. Let us not quibble over how we label the situation. Whether we call it a minor disturbance, a disaster, or an emergency—the threat of mass starvation puts a heavy obligation for action on the Government of Pakistan and the international community.

In the name of neutrality, some in our Government say we must not be involved in East Pakistan today. But we are involved. Our weapons have been involved in the violence. Our aid has contributed to East Pakistan's development for more than a decade. And today, our Government, at the highest levels, is involved in discussions for even more aid. So we are involved. The only question is what this involvement will be. At this point it must be humanitarian—aid that will heal and rehabilitate, not further divide and destroy.

This reminds me, Mr. Chairman, of the attitude that we have toward refugees in Cambodia. We have got in excess of a million refugees in Cambodia. But not one dollar has been requested in terms of the administration's budget request. And in asking administration spokesmen about this, they say, "Well, this is a Cambodian question. The Cambodians want to handle it themselves. We don't want to interfere in any way in local affairs."

It seems we are always willing to interfere in terms of military or economic aid—but when it comes to humanitarian questions, we always say, "Well, this is an internal matter." It does seem to me that we do have a considerable leverage in terms of the Pakistani Government. Although I have not been one that has suggested a complete cutoff of all aid and assistance to Pakistan, I do think we have strong leverage in communicating a very true humanitarian concern. Very high priority should be given in terms of meeting the kinds of human problems that are suggested by the current tragedy.

In this connection, I strongly urge that our Government leave no stone unturned—especially this week when high level representatives of the Pakistani Government are present in Washington—in supporting current efforts by the United Nations to organize a relief program within East Pakistan. Since the last week in April representatives of UNICEF, the U.N. Development Program, and the World Food Program have traveled to Dacca to ascertain relief and logistical needs.

Moreover, representatives of the Pakistani Government have assured me of their Government's willingness to accept humanitarian aid and personnel through U.N. channels and private voluntary organizations. Thus there is nothing but inertia to prevent a meaningful relief effort.

Solving the political and humanitarian crisis in East Pakistan is, first of all, Pakistan's task. But in this effort, there is scope enough for

all the energy and charity that the emergency of the civil war has called forth, among Americans and peoples throughout the world.

And so today, as an individual concerned about the dignity and preservation of the ultimate resources on our planet, I appeal to the leaders of Pakistan, to the leaders of other countries, and to our own Government to support immediately a mercy mission and airlift into areas of need. And, hopefully, the appeal of the Indian Government for assistance to meet refugee needs within her borders will also receive the sympathetic response of all concerned.

We are conditioned in this world we have created to accept suffering and injustice—especially in our time when violent conflict and oppression are active in so many areas. But the newer world we seek will not evolve if we ignore these challenges to leadership, and take comfortable refuge in the mundane patterns and attitudes of the past.

In the case of East Pakistan—in the effort to help a people caught in the clutches of natural disaster and the passion of conflict—I cannot believe that governments stand paralyzed in the face of great tragedy. The situation must not be ignored. At stake are human lives—innocent lives—Pakistani lives—thousands, even millions of lives—whose destruction will burden the conscience of all mankind unless something is done to save them.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement, summarizing some of the thoughts that I have on this situation. I am extremely hopeful—as we look at the problem in India and Pakistan, and think back to the Nigerian-Biafran situation, to the other kinds of disasters which have taken place in Chile, Indochina, Tunisia, and so forth—that we consider the development of a Bureau of Social and Humanitarian Service in the State Department.

This was recommended in a report by our subcommittee back in 1969. Hopefully, a bureau of this kind would be able to focus in a more meaningful way on humanitarian concerns within the Department of State, and give some visibility, as well as responsible authority, at a high level of government, to matters of great concern to the American people. I don't really think that we have got any such office within the Department.

I would also be hopeful that we might be able to do more in developing a U.N. Emergency Relief Service, which I first recommended in 1969. Encouraging progress, as I understand, was made in terms of this idea last December, when the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution creating an Office of Inter-Agency Affairs under the Secretary General.

The purpose of this office is to organize international relief efforts in disaster areas. To expand and support this new office deserves high priority in the councils of Government. And I would hope, once again, that the kind of situation presented in India and Pakistan would add new impetus for our own Government at least.

I think that concludes my comment.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you very much, Senator, for your very concise and knowledgeable statement and for giving this subcommittee the benefit of information about the factual situation that your subcommittee has developed in connection with the humanitarian aspects of the tragedy that is now occurring in Pakistan.

I believe that your suggestion for a bureau focusing on humanitarian aspects in the Department of State is certainly worthy of consideration by the full committee here in the House.

I understand that you do have to return to the Senate rather promptly to take up a matter which I have been rather personally interested in: a national commitment to cure cancer in this decade. It is not our intention to detain you.

I would wonder, however, Senator, whether if fighting does break out, has your subcommittee considered or have you considered what additional steps, if any, the others should take?

Senator KENNEDY. Well, we haven't. We really haven't gotten into it. As I understand, there is continued conflict within East Pakistan. It is my further understanding that the Government has control of the more urban areas. In many of the communications centers, it does have control.

There is a need for transport facilities to move food. We've checked into this and found that air transportation could be used to a greater extent. There ought to be more direction in terms of even the equipment that has been provided to the area, and not utilized, in response to the cyclone needs last fall.

But you know, if there were increased armed conflict, obviously, this would present very extensive additional kinds of problems. However, I think even then, looking at past experiences in Biafra and even Vietnam, there are various relief groups that might be able to operate.

I am thinking of the Quakers, for example, in Quang Ngai, who have operated a small clinical hospital fitting prosthetic devices, and so forth—which has existed there untouched over a long period of time. It is risky, it is dangerous, and it is threatening to do this. But I think that there are individuals motivated in these various voluntary agencies that would be prepared, if they were given the kind of support that I think should be given to them—be prepared to assume those risks, if they thought they could make a meaningful humanitarian contribution in the conflict.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Senator.

Mr. du Pont.

Mr. DU PONT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator, I appreciate you spending your time with us today to bring us up to date on your thoughts on the problem.

I have two questions. Specifically, you stated that you thought that the United States had some leverage to be applied, perhaps, to persuade the Pakistani Government to take more action to help with this serious problem. Specifically, what do you have in mind there? What would you say?

Senator KENNEDY. I am thinking of the very critical financial situation that Pakistan finds itself in. It is on the verge of bankruptcy. They have a critical financial situation.

We are continuing, of course, our economic aid to Pakistan. We have withheld military aid, and it is my understanding that will continue for a period of time.

And in the last few days, in terms of a resolution reported out by the Foreign Relations Committee—they put a condition on military aid. It would be withheld, unless we get a normalization in East Pakistan and relief efforts of significant dimensions are started in there.

I would hope that we consider that latter question independently. But as we are providing economic aid and assistance, I do think that that provides a leverage in terms of our relationships with Pakistan,

in order to dramatize and emphasize the significance of the humanitarian aspect of the present conflict. We should put a very high priority, in terms of human life, and the humanitarian efforts of individual volunteer agencies, other international agencies.

Now, as you are well aware, there are those, perhaps over on this side, in the Senate as well, that feel that we ought to cut off all economic aid to Pakistan. I am not one that would support that proposal. But we do have some leverage and we ought to use it in the interest of getting an urgently needed relief program underway. Humanitarian relief should be very high on any agenda we have for talks with Pakistan Government representatives. If we really did this, I think a great deal more could be done.

Mr. DU PONT. Well, Senator, I tend to agree that one of the most appropriate ways we could bring relief in this type of a situation is through stronger action by the United States. The President, as I am sure you are aware, in his Foreign Aid Reorganization program, has suggested that we disassociate military and economic aid, and specifically, that we put humanitarian assistance in a special category by itself. Do you feel that adoption of this kind of a proposal would be advantageous to deal with a situation such as this?

Senator KENNEDY. I certainly do. I must say, with some satisfaction, we made that recommendation, our subcommittee, over two and a half years ago. I think it is a sound one. I hope we can get support for it. I think it makes a great deal of sense. And I hope not only we do that here within our own system, but that we would set up a similar program at the United Nations, and support that strongly as well.

Mr. DU PONT. Thank you, Senator. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. du Pont.

I might say in passing, Mr. du Pont, that it was very interesting to sit here and listen to a Kennedy and a du Pont discuss the possibilities of bankruptcy.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Murphy?

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Kennedy, I, too, would like to thank you for bringing to the attention of this subcommittee this problem in East Pakistan. I am wondering, Senator, do you or any members of your staff have any idea of an appropriate amount to aid East Pakistan with or give to India to take care of these refugees?

Senator KENNEDY. No, I wouldn't be prepared now to try and give you any dollar figure. I think it is more in terms—I don't know how to evaluate a C-130 and additional kinds of helicopter support that might be made available.

Our efforts have always been in support of governmental or international agencies that have made aid requests. We have never tried to say, well, we think that there is an overall kind of a figure.

What we have tried to do is work with the various voluntary and other agencies that say we can utilize so much food or tin roofing or certain kinds of transportation. Then what I and the subcommittee have always tried to do is to see if we can get a positive response, assuming, of course, that the agencies' request is valid.

The Indian Government has made some requests. They have only gotten two and a half million dollars, from the administration.

Now, what I would say is that two and a half million dollars is not an adequate response. If you were to say, well, "would \$20 million

...rather leave those specifics
the Government of India.
your statement, Senator, I know that you
the fact that U.S. arms are being used in this civil

Mr. KENNEDY. That is right.
Mr. MURPHY. Would you favor a cutoff of these arms?
Mr. MURPHY. Yes.
Senator KENNEDY. To East Pakistan?

agencies going. And then I really think we have gotten the relief
review of security questions in that part of the world. That ought
to be something which obviously this committee is interested in, but
I wouldn't begin to make a judgment on the outcome at this point.
But I do favor and have favored and urged in the early days that we
have a complete halt of arms to Pakistan at this time.
Mr. MURPHY. What assurances, Senator, do we have? I know on
Biafra, when we went to its aid, a lot of the supplies didn't reach the
people in question.

Mr. KENNEDY. That is right. That is very true.
Mr. MURPHY. What steps could we take, in your judgment, to
assure that if we do get involved in any substantial manner the aid
does reach the people?

Senator KENNEDY. This is always an enormously difficult problem.
We have it in terms of Vietnam too, where in excess of a third of the
piaster payments for refugees disappear between the time of allocation
and the time of receipt. This is something that is very real.
Now, I think the volunteer agencies record on this generally has been
enormously creditable. They have great kinds of problems, and they
are accentuated at the time of mass starvation, and one can readily
understand this.

But I think that the record of the volunteer agencies is creditable in
this area.
So I think this is an administrative problem. I think we have to be
somewhat understanding about this. And I think the nature of many
humanitarian problems is sufficient to compel us to respond in a posi-
tive way.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Murphy.
Mr. Whalley.

Mr. WHALLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your
statement, Senator Kennedy.
You say there are nearly two million refugees in India, with another
2,000 added every day. The United States has given \$2½ million in
assistance. What does it cost to keep 2 million refugees per week?
Senator KENNEDY. It is awfully difficult, Congressman. The Indian
rate is approximately 50 cents a day. I would think that would be
woefully inadequate.
But that is their estimate. I do feel that our \$2½ million contribu-
tion?

Mr. WHALLEY. Do you think these people will eventually go back
to India?
Senator KENNEDY. Well, there are some very serious, as I under-
stand, there is increasing relocation of West Pakistanis into

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4. Germany: 1,000,0
5. Ireland
6. Japan:
Milk powder
Rice
7. Luxembourg
8. New Zealand: COR
9. The Netherlands: 10
10. Norway:
Norwegian Red
Refugee Council
11. Philippines
12. Sweden: Swedish Red
13. U.S.S.R.:
8,640 sweaters (app
100,000,000 doses
50,000 tons of rice

1 Unknown.

Pakistan so as to move into the areas the refugees have left—and bring about settlements that will be more loyal to the central government.

There are enormous kinds of religious questions involving Moslems—Hindus, and other kinds of social questions.

Do people generally desire to return to their homes, when there is cessation of hostilities. There has been this tradition in other countries. I would generally think that that is true here. But I wouldn't want to add anything more to it than I have.

VHALLLEY. Your statement shows that 526,000 people are in camps about the other million and a half refugees? Do people want to go into their homes?

KENNEDY. Well, there are camps that have been set up. There are emergency kinds of facilities at best. The refugees not in camps are sort of setting up whatever kind of shelter that they can, around feeding areas and centers, and so forth.

I suppose, is just sort of a descriptive word. I don't think that what one would normally think of as a refugee camp, in terms of a supply, a school, latrines—in terms of the six or seven camps which are normally associated with a refugee center.

VHALLLEY. Is India contributing directly?

KENNEDY. They are paying the whole thing, outside of the fact that they are supporting the whole feeding process at the time to the extent they can. That is my understanding.

VHALLLEY. Are other countries volunteering help, financially?

KENNEDY. Well, there has been some contribution. I understand that rather of a minimum nature. I would like to be able to find it out. I would like to be able to submit a statement to understand there is some. It hasn't been of a significant day.

to be supplied follows:)

Countries and international agencies to relief for Pakistani refugees in India
(Source: Department of State)

Catholic Relief	
... and cash to UNHCR	\$5,000
... to UNHCR	11,333
	2,000,000
	300,000
	7,200
vitamin tablets (10,000,000)	1,390,000
	3,000,000
	453
guilders to ICRC and UNHCR	5,000
	28,000
stockfish	
	(1)
6.5 tons of medicines (245 tons of value)	60,000
	493
... vaccine	128,000

Contributions of other countries and international agencies to relief for Pakistani refugees in India—Continued

14. United Kingdom:	
CAFOD-----	\$10, 000
Government £1,000,000 (to the UNHCR)-----	2, 430, 600
15. Lieross: Red Cross Societies of Japan, Sweden, Denmark, Canada, Switzerland, Australia, Finland, United States of America, United Kingdom, Austria, Norway, West Germany—cash and food, medical supplies, clothing, tents-----	480, 000
16. Medico International: Food concentrates, tonics, antibiotics-----	16, 033
17. OXFAM:	
Cash-----	48, 000
OXFAM and War on Want: 35 tons, mainly tents and medicines-----	120, 000
18. UNHCR-----	500, 000
19. UNICEF:	
Drugs, food supplements, other supplies and domestic air freight-----	400, 000
41 jeeps-----	(¹)
20. World Council of Churches-----	37, 000
21. World food program:	
Existing stocks of oil and NFDM turned over to GOI-----	1, 100, 000
To UNHCR-----	2, 000, 000
Total-----	26, 077, 112
Unknown-----	

Mr. WHALLEY. What are the prospects of aid from the United Nations?

Senator KENNEDY. Well, I would think that there would be some positive response. The U.N. High Commissioner is there at the present time. He is well equipped, both by background and interest and experience, in making recommendations. He has significant influence in terms of the U.N. at the present time.

At other times, when he has been involved with dislocated peoples, and humanitarian concerns, he has been extremely effective in winning support. I think all nations have the kinds of budgetary problems which we have. The plan that he will submit, I am sure, will be one of considerable interest and of compelling nature. I would think it would receive a favorable response.

Mr. WHALLEY. Can the United Nations move fast enough?

Senator KENNEDY. This is always a problem. I think this is always a question, even though they have some very talented people in UNICEF and various other specialized agencies—I think some of the most dedicated people in the world. We have seen what they can do in many areas of the world.

Mr. WHALLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Senator, I understand you are wanted back on the Senate floor.

Mr. FULTON, do you have any questions?

Mr. FULTON. As a visitor to this subcommittee, a long-time friend of the witness, and members of his family, I wanted to be present and compliment him on his excellent statement first.

On the deliberations of your subcommittee, at the Senate level, I think it is very wise that the affirmative positions be taken, because historically it has been the Congress that has acted.

Senator KENNEDY. That is right.

Mr. FULTON. The various administrations through the years, have conformed to the recommendations of Congress in refugee and dis-

placed persons' problems. So that your coming here today is much to the advantage of these displaced people, and refugees, because first, they have lost their country, secondly, their citizenship, along with their homes, their assets. The majority of these refugees are women and children, are they not?

Senator KENNEDY. That is right.

Mr. FULTON. The men always fend for themselves, and can better survive these conditions.

Senator KENNEDY. That is right.

Mr. FULTON. So wouldn't you agree that as these are mostly women and children, therefore there is a double need for quick action?

Senator KENNEDY. That is right.

Mr. FULTON. One other point I would like to make is this: Senator Javits and I, ever since he was a Congressman, have both been specially interested in refugees and displaced persons. In fact, I was chairman of the original Displaced Person and Refugee Subcommittee of this House Foreign Affairs on which Congressman Javits and I both served, and went to most of the major displaced person and refugee camps in Europe. On our return we had written a subcommittee report on the whole field of volunteer agencies and U.S.-organized charities abroad, so that it was possible to get an overlook of these total activities.

I like your suggestion that we get such an overlook in this particular area, but I think such a program should be done in all of Southeast Asia.

Senator KENNEDY. Yes.

Mr. FULTON. Would you recommend that?

Senator KENNEDY. Yes, I think it would be of great value. There are a few of the volunteer agencies that are getting out of Southeast Asia now, Indochina, because they just think that it—it would be worthwhile to know the reasons why, the problems that they face.

Mr. FULTON. Well, your action is centering attention, as Mr. Javits and mine did. We were the only Congressmen that went aboard the refugee ship, *Exodus*, and came back and reported the terrible conditions of the refugees on the *Exodus*, and in their camps when they were taken off in the Netherlands. This appears to be a matter for special action by the U.S. Congress, making the push and taking the lead. Therefore, I want to say to you that I would be very glad to join with you and your subcommittee as well as Congressman Gallagher's subcommittee on helping on the refugee problem.

There is one point further, and that is, on the \$2½ million initial aid that is promised by the U.S. Department of State. That sounds as if it is the first of a series. Did they give you any idea about the second or supplemental funds or how much they might give?

Senator KENNEDY. No, I think that is a good question. I haven't gotten this. I think the administration ought to be able to provide that.

Mr. FULTON. I believe we in Congress ought to come up with some sort of an estimate on that.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I think we can probably do that.

Mr. FULTON. Thank you for sharing your thinking with our members. We are glad to have you here, and you have made a very good presentation.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you very much, Senator Kennedy, for your contribution, and for bringing such great understanding to the subcommittee here this afternoon.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Our next witness this afternoon is Professor Gidon Gottlieb. Professor Gottlieb is a distinguished professor of international law at New York University, and has studied the legal implications of situations like East Pakistan for many years.

Professor Gottlieb, before you begin, I might say that it appears that the East Pakistan region is not the only place where disasters have occurred. You are appearing here with a broken leg and a broken arm.

We will go right into discussing East Pakistan. I do, however, want to commend you for surmounting what must be a rather physically painful trip here this afternoon, and we will be very pleased to hear your testimony.

STATEMENT OF PROF. GIDON GOTTLIEB, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

Mr. GOTTLIEB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am delighted that you are clarifying the reasons for my peculiar appearance today. Indeed, I obtained these injuries and bandages in New York, and not anywhere else. It wasn't such a bad trip, thanks to the tremendously kind assistance I received from the staff of the subcommittee, and I am most grateful for it.

Mr. Chairman, reliable reports of "violence to life and person, murder of all kinds, mutilations, cruel treatment and torture" in East Pakistan were followed by the shocking news that the Islamabad Government had refused to allow into East Pakistan emergency assistance to the civilian population made available by the International Committee of the Red Cross. This news was all the more distressing in that it concerns a region already devastated by the worst natural disaster of the century only months earlier and for which a massive program of international assistance had been undertaken. The tragic events in Bengal touch us directly. They involve not only the direct moral responsibility of the United States, but its legal responsibility as well. This responsibility arises under our treaty commitments and is multiplied by our involvement with military and economic aid to the Government of Pakistan.

The Pakistan Government has chosen to use some of the aid made available to it in the Bengal civil war—it has thus made us politically at least a party to the events there. So we note the beginning of yet another U.S. involvement in a civil war in Asia just as we are trying to extirpate ourselves from Vietnam. But just as we had been prepared to pour massive military and economic aid into Pakistan it is now asserted that there is little that the United States can do for humanitarian purposes except offer to make assistance available if requested. This offer is made in the knowledge that international relief will most probably be delayed by the Government of Pakistan for a considerable period and that attempts will be made by that Government to channel all relief through its armed forces. The Government of Pakistan has already asserted that events in East Bengal are an internal matter and has denied the right of the international community to intervene in any manner, even for humanitarian purposes, in its domestic affairs.

These contentions, Mr. Chairman, are equally unsound:

The U.S. Government can do more than merely offer relief to East Pakistan; it can make acceptance of emergency assistance through international humanitarian agencies a condition for renewing and extending loans and economic assistance.

The Pakistan Government cannot claim that alleged practices involving violations of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions governing civil wars are a matter essentially within its own domestic jurisdiction.

Allow me to elaborate on the second point first. Pakistan is bound by the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war. Parties to the Conventions, including the United States, are not merely themselves required to respect the terms of the Conventions—they are also obligated to insure respect for their terms by other states in all circumstances. This obligation to insure respect for the Conventions includes the provisions of article 3 governing conflicts of a noninternational character. It is no intervention in the domestic affairs of other parties to the Conventions to insist on respect for the minimum terms of article 3. This is because all parties to the Conventions have implicitly agreed under article 1 that it is proper for all states to insure respect for their terms. The combined effects of articles 1 and 3 is to preclude the application of the general principle of international law governing the inadmissibility of intervention in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of states.¹ This is the view of Pictet in his authoritative commentary to the Geneva Conventions issued under the authority of the International Committee of the Red Cross which is the internationally recognized guardian of the Conventions. In this commentary he writes that if a state were to violate its obligations, the other high contracting parties are in duty bound by the terms of article 1 to lead that state back to full respect for the Conventions. There is no exception for situations under article 3, that is for civil wars.

The sovereignty of a state cannot be more sacred than the international law which constitutes that sovereignty. Where the Geneva Conventions are concerned, parties cannot raise the "no intervention" principle to resist humanitarian measures. The reported massacre "on orders" of the educated elite of Bengal and the generation of more than a million refugees is more than a mere local disturbance. In 1962, a Commission of Experts convened by the ICRC for the study of the

¹ Article 1: The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.

Article 3: In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:

1. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria; to this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:

a. Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;

b. taking of hostages;

c. outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;

d. The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.

2. The wounded and the sick shall be collected and cared for.

An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.

The parties to the conflict should further endeavor to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention.

The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the parties to the conflict.

...statements made by the powers and the ou
Pakistan has ceased to be under international law an internal matter in
for the Government of Pakistan. It cannot shield behind legal norms to
resist international humanitarian action; it cannot demand that
U.S. policy continue to be one of aiding the Government without
providing relief for its victims.

II

This takes me, Mr. Chairman, to the
makers. The political problem for
without stepping into the
ia. The humani
nt to

Mr. GOTTlieb. The only evidence that we have, it really was
 the fact that the Red Cross plane was turned back. This
 is an extremely serious thing to see happen.
 Indeed, the arrival of the UNICEF representative in
 the time an extremely serious thing to see happen.
 I do not now have further evidence that they are not prepared
 to not now have further evidence that they are not prepared
 to relief. Indeed, the arrival of the UNICEF representative in
 a most encouraging development. In all these matters, it
 perhaps appropriate to try and secure these agreements

3. Adequate financial resources.
The humanitarian such acuteness could Nations auspices.

with as little publicity, with as little public debate, and as little pressure as possible. From what we understand, there is no willingness to accept some relief and some international presence. After all, the presence of international personnel on the spot may be embarrassing in a situation where there has been considerable bloodshed and where innocent noncombatants have been massacred. Here again, all I have to base myself on are the numerous press stories that were coming out of the country.

Mr. GALLAGHER. That has been one of the matters that I find very troublesome and one of the matters we have been pursuing, I am with the feeling that the Government of Pakistan might not inhibit relief going into the area.

Mr. GOTTIEB. It would be, therefore—

Mr. GALLAGHER. I just wondered if you had any further information.

Mr. GOTTIEB. No, I have absolutely no further information. We have a statement, a recent statement issued by authoritative sources, objecting to interference in the domestic affairs of Pakistan in connection with the rather forceful tender of assistance. More fully, the United States should suspend all military aid, the shipment of parts and all other forms of military assistance to Pakistan. Congress shall have had an opportunity to review the situation before we cut off all economic aid—action that might further harm the civilian populations—Congress should require that in the agreement which economic aid and loans are made available, the United States stipulate that—

the Government of Pakistan allow forthwith the entry into the northern part of the country of medical aid and other forms of humanitarian assistance for the civilian populations of the area under the auspices of UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO, WFP, the United Nations and other appropriate voluntary organizations without the outcome of surveys, studies, and other measures leading to the postponement of relief efforts;

the Government of Pakistan allow forthwith the entry of international disaster relief units made available by the United Nations and of other international personnel and facilities to carry out the tasks of emergency relief;

the minimum rules of article 3 of the Geneva Conventions be applicable to the situation in East Pakistan in light of the fact that the status of the parties to the conflict; the Government of Pakistan agree to explore with the other bilateral measures of a humanitarian character for the population of East Pakistan not involving howsoever support be given for the care of the growing refugee problem now arising for the United States with the fact that it has been more easily managed under the United Nations Emergency Commission for India and Pakistan.

Service, with a mandate to operate in emergency situations of all kinds, including natural disasters and manmade disasters, the need for unilateral U.S. action would have been reduced. I first recommended the establishment of such an international instrumentality to the President's Commission for the Observance of Human Rights Year 1968 and to the Senate Subcommittee on Refugees. Senator Kennedy took the lead in advocating the establishment of such a service and his proposal was endorsed by the Senate subcommittee. President Nixon in his 1971 foreign policy message to Congress committed the Administration to support the establishment of an authority to assist victims of all disasters. In its otherwise excellent Resolution on Assistance in Natural Disasters, the General Assembly of the United Nations failed however to make provisions for humanitarian assistance in armed conflicts and despite efforts of the Swiss ICRC, no adequate international relief agency exists to make assistance available to the civilian victims of armed conflicts. The United States thus sent American humanitarian assistance personnel to Jordan during the civil war last fall and we now have to face our humanitarian responsibilities in the Pakistan conflict without being in a position to delegate that responsibility to an appropriate international agency.

The recurrence of situations in which we are likely to face humanitarian responsibilities for civil strife in countries receiving U.S. military and economic assistance and in which the United States is therefore already involved, is unfortunately very likely. Perhaps this is something the House Committee on Foreign Affairs may wish to look into in some greater detail.

The dimensions of this tragedy, Mr. Chairman, may be such that the President may wish to consider the appointment of a Special Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance to Pakistan-Bengal to assume responsibilities similar to those entrusted to Ambassador Clyde Ferguson during the Nigeria-Biafra civil war, to marshal humanitarian relief efforts through appropriate international and voluntary agencies for the population of Bengal.

The United States may further wish to encourage Secretary General U Thant to send a special representative to Dacca to keep him informed of the humanitarian needs of the civilian population in East Pakistan or preferably, to undertake a personal visit to that war-torn area which lies so close to his country of origin. Such an initiative by the Secretary General would be fully consonant with his authority in humanitarian matters and in keeping with his actions during the Nigerian civil war. In the East Pakistan case, however, much could be gained by a personal visit of the Secretary General to underscore that the humanitarian concerns of the international community which he represents extend to the peoples of Asia no less than to those of other continents.

No one knows better than the members of this subcommittee how unpopular it is in this Nation to spend U.S. tax dollars to aid foreign governments. Whatever backing from public opinion now remains for such programs, is likely to be further eroded unless the administration makes it absolutely clear that where we are involved with military and economic aid abroad, we are prepared to face up to our moral and legal responsibilities and help the victims of all conflicts. It must be made clear that we shall not content ourselves with aiding governments whose fidelity to the ideals of democracy and human

rights is dubious in the extreme and disregard the need of helpless populations to insure their survival. Mr. Chairman, in Pakistan the danger warnings are out; the threat of famine, of cholera, and the flood of millions of refugees from Bengal are immediate challenges. The situation in that part of the world is a clear and present danger.

In treading the difficult path between interventionism and isolationism, the administration should be careful not to ignore the minimum demands of compassion and humanity which make humanitarian assistance imperative and a responsibility we cannot shirk.

Unless a big power, like the United States, is willing to take a lead to see to it that humane and compassionate considerations are injected in foreign policy, this will not be done. The Pakistani disaster, like the Biafran situation, Mr. Chairman, provides a unique opportunity as well as a real test of our foreign policy.

Are we going to limit ourselves to being involved with arms only or are we going to see to it that innocent people do not suffer unnecessarily?

Mr. GALLAGHER. Well, if you come up with the solution to that dilemma, Professor, you should stay up on the Hill. That is the one answer we seek at all times.

Mr. GOTTLIEB. Mr. Chairman, I think that I understand that you have a debate going on elsewhere in the House and I would therefore be delighted to answer any questions now. That is all.

Mr. GALLAGHER. We have another humanitarian and compassionate issue up today on the floor: the SST; how to get from Harlem to Watts in 1 hour.

Mr. GOTTLIEB. I am prepared to answer any questions that the members may have, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Professor, I was interested in your comment with regard to the cutoff of aid. You are not advocating cutting off aid. Is that correct?

Mr. GOTTLIEB. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. I think the suspension of aid may frequently lead to cutting off some of the remaining essential services for civilian populations. We have seen in other situations, that the cutting off of aid may hurt innocent populations. There are already rumors emanating from high officials that even aid made available in connection with the natural disaster last fall has not been getting to the victims because of the recent emergency and the need—the urgent need—that the Government found itself in: to have cash. We may penalize the civilian population by cutting off aid, rather than by requiring acceptance of more aid.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Does that include all aid?

Mr. GOTTLIEB. No; economic aid only. I certainly feel that where military assistance is concerned it should be stopped. I think the point has been very adequately made by Senator Kennedy.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Professor, I want to commend you again on your willingness to come here today, despite the rather obvious obstacles. The extremely fragile nature of the entire area has been emphasized by a new cyclone which reportedly hit that area last Friday, fortunately not as serious as the other.

We have unofficially received rumors this morning of renewed hostilities in Dacca.

My first question is whether or not your testimony could be interpreted as advocating an independent unilateral American initiative?

the bullets are there, we, of course, have no effective control at all over their use.

Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Murphy?

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Professor, I agree with the chairman and my colleague, Mr. du Pont. I even take it a step further. Not only do we get involved in these wars in these countries by supplying arms, but is it not true that food substance itself is used as a lever by the controlling government, whomever it may be in these countries, but denying it to their opposition.

Mr. GOTTLIEB. I am afraid there is evidence that this may be the case. We did have that situation in Nigeria-Biafra, where statements were made by responsible persons, regarding the use of blockade as a legitimate means of warfare. Here again, I would have hoped that the United States may find its way to take the lead in seeking a convention for the prohibition of starvation as a legitimate means of warfare. As a matter of fact, the American Society of International Law is now preparing some models along these lines, to meet precisely that problem. What such a convention would do, and what the sanctions for such a convention would be, again we don't yet know. Except that is, in terms of negotiations for further arrangements with countries violating their provisions.

Mr. MURPHY. I think the chairman has a good point when he says that the Congress itself is becoming very leary of this type of aid, whether it be foodstuff or arms, because we always seem to find ourselves embroiled in a civil war. We are then accused of intervening and interfering with the legitimate government, whether de facto or de jure, and we always seem to come out the losers even when everything is done in the name of humanitarianism. The scorecard doesn't look too good as far as we are concerned.

I am sure that was the motivating force in our intervening in Vietnam, and now look what we have. So I think, professor, it is, as you point out, and my colleagues here point out, not an easy step for the United States to take. We should be aware of the ramifications of our actions, and I am not too sure that even being aware is the answer in and of itself. Our experience has shown that we usually end up the loser in this instance also.

Mr. GOTTLIEB. Sir, this is a very concise way of putting it. This is why my emphasis has been on making whatever aid we do make available, on making it available through appropriate international agencies. We don't want to go there ourselves. We don't want to see American personnel involved.

If volunteer services are willing to pick up the job, fine. We should support them. Senator Kennedy did refer to the extremely distinguished job that they have done in Nigeria-Biafra.

Here again, in the East Pakistan situation, we should try and encourage both volunteer agencies and United Nations multilateral agencies to do the assisting. The U.N. institutions would however need our support—financial and material. The U.N. institutions would need our diplomatic support to be allowed to get in. The Red Cross would need our diplomatic support to be allowed to get in. In that sense, we may be able perhaps to—I don't say solve, but to mitigate, the difficulties that you have just stated, by negotiating directly with a government like Pakistan for the receipt not of U.S. aid, but for the

receipt of Red Cross assistance, for the receipt of WHO and WFP—World Food Program—aid.

In that sense, perhaps we will avoid the fatal first step which has lead us into Vietnam.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Murphy. I recall one of the first fatal steps leading us unto Vietnam was a great many people saying that we should not supply arms or assistance or aid to the Diem regime, because they were repressive. However, I think if we could bring back Madam Nhu, and get off the hook in Vietnam, that the ADA today would give Madam Nhu an endorsement.

Mr. Halpern?

Mr. HALPERN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I wish to compliment our very distinguished and able witness on his superb testimony.

I noted with interest your observation about discontinuing economic assistance. You stated that it would only hurt those people who need help the most, and sort of right into that, you mention all assistance, and I am pleased you clarified that point in response to a question from the chairman, as you would apply military assistance, which obviously, in all likelihood, arms under that assistance program could be utilized by the central government of Pakistan, against the East Pakistanis, or the people of Bangla Desh, as they call themselves.

Now, in order for the United States to maintain strict neutrality in this matter, in my opinion, we should withhold any further deliveries under the October 1970 arms offers, and avoid further arms guides.

In my view, such action together with moral and diplomatic pressure, could bring an end to the hostilities, and help resolve the situation there. Now, if I heard correctly, when Mr. du Pont asked you about the cutting off of military assistance, you said that you thought that that should be an act that we should do, in the future.

Don't you feel that we should be withholding all deliveries, at the present time?

Mr. GOTTLIEB. Military deliveries.

Mr. HALPERN. Under, as I mentioned, the October 1970—

Mr. GOTTLIEB. Yes. I am wholeheartedly in agreement with you, sir. I think that the sooner this is done, the more complete the stoppage, the clearer our position is on that, the better. There is no question at all that by making our stand absolutely clear, we would be helping ourselves not merely in Pakistan, but in other future situations elsewhere.

After all, by taking a clear and resounding stand on matters like that, we really would be putting friendly governments on notice that "if you are going to wage an internal conflict, gentlemen, be quite sure that you wage it in a way that will not embarrass us as your helpers."

Mr. HALPERN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Halpern.

Mr. Wolff?

Mr. WOLFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I just would like to find out if Professor Gottlieb has had an opportunity of reading the hearings that this subcommittee held last year in September and October. Have you had an opportunity to read these?

Mr. GOTTLIEB. Candidly, I did not, sir.

Mr. WOLFF. Well, at some point in the testimony, two professors, Professor Wilcox and Professor Hinton, made statements relative to East Pakistan. The statement by Professor Wilcox.

In Pakistan, the most vigorous politician with foreign affairs experience is Ali Bhutto, and he has said in election campaigns that Pakistan's future hopes in foreign policy lie principally with closer ties with China.

This is especially true because the Soviet promises of military assistance to Pakistan have not been realized in any major degree. Moreover, Pakistan is a less stable political system and China might find opportunities in the domestic situation as well.

The statement made by Professor Hinton:

From the revolutionary viewpoint, Peking has long cherished the hope that luxuriant fissiparous tendencies in Southeast Asia would lead to Balkanization, and Communist seizures of powers in the resulting fragmenting. This hope probably is at least partly responsible for the fact that Peking has treated Pakistan with politeness and sometimes courtesy from the time of its emergence, which emergence certainly appeared to be a promising beginning of Balkanization.

Do you think the present situation is a result of some of the previous efforts that have been evidenced by these two statements on the position of mainland China that is responsible in some way for intervention in Pakistan?

Mr. GOTTLEB. The question you raise, sir, is a most difficult one to answer. The role of the Peking Government in the events in the Indian subcontinent is an ambiguous and obscure one. There is evidence that both in the role that China took during the Kashmir crisis and in the role they took in the lengthy and bloody incidents with India, they clearly wished to see to it that nothing would exist south of the Himalaya border, that could be considered as a strong and cohesive hostile military force.

Balkanization of the subcontinent from the standpoint of balance-of-power politics might certainly be in the Chinese interest. On the other hand, it doesn't mean that because it is in the Chinese interest, it is therefore necessarily adverse to the United States own interests.

I would hate to draw that inference automatically, and this is why, again, in this matter, I feel that the U.S. interest in the Indian subcontinent, the political interest, may be one worth clarifying by the subcommittee. That is where I would be most enlightened by your debates.

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Chairman, I would like to comment further. I support your idea, of international assistance, and the idea of international observation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you very much, Professor Gottlieb, for your fine contribution in bringing a better understanding to this subcommittee of this terrible tragedy in Pakistan. Because of the vote, the subcommittee will now stand adjourned until 2 p.m. on Thursday, when there will be an executive session with the State Department and at 3 p.m. on Thursday, when there will be a further open session. The subcommittee stands adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 3:35 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at 2 p.m., Thursday, May 13, 1971.)

CRISIS IN EAST PAKISTAN

TUESDAY, MAY 25, 1971

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 3:20 p.m., in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Cornelius E. Gallagher (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. GALLAGHER. The subcommittee will come to order.

We are in the process of a vote about to be taken on the floor. Some of the members had to leave, and I believe they will return.

We apologize for the delay in starting the public hearings.

Our next witness is Dr. Robert Dorfman, professor of economics at Harvard University.

We are pleased to see you.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT DORFMAN, PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Mr. DORFMAN. Thank you for giving me an opportunity to come here. My remarks will concern a somewhat different matter from what I gather you have been hearing in the previous testimony, but there is a close and tragic connection.

Senator Kennedy and the others have already called your attention to the terrible problems of feeding and caring for the millions of refugees, both in Pakistan and in West Bengal. I have nothing to add to that, except my personal sympathy and concern. But the distress of those millions of persons is just one aspect of the civil war that is now going on, and I want to devote my few minutes to America's role and attitude in that war.

Let me qualify myself. My name is Robert Dorfman. I am professor of economics at Harvard, a member of the Council of the American Economic Association, former president of the Institute of Management Sciences, and so forth. I have published a number of books, and I have all the usual academic credentials. I have been concerned professionally with the economics of the less developed countries, including Pakistan, for the last dozen years. My interest began in 1960 when I had the honor of serving as a member of a panel appointed by President Kennedy to advise the Government of Pakistan about the serious problems in the Indus Basin. I flatter myself that this Presidential panel made a substantial contribution to reversing the downward course of agriculture in that region. We proposed a sensible plan for increasing the yields of irrigated agriculture, while arresting the ominous progress of environmental decay, building on much excellent

work that the Pakistanis had already done. That plan, together with the introduction of high-yield Mexican wheat a few years later and with some essential economic reforms, laid the foundation for the so-called green revolution, which brought hope to communities where there had been only despair.

Subsequent to that work I retained my interest in Pakistan in various capacities, serving as a consultant for the Agency for International Development, the Development Advisory Service of Harvard University and most recently the World Bank.

In order to dispel any suspicion that I am biased in the current conflict between East and West Pakistan. I should mention that virtually my entire association with that country has been concentrated on the problems and development of West Pakistan. When I have occasion to criticize the policies that foster the economics of West Pakistan to the neglect of the problems of the East, I am criticizing myself among others. I was a party, a small party, to those policies. My attitude was typical of many others.

As an economist, I can speak to you really only about the economic aspects of the current crisis. But the economic aspects are peculiarly important, as is indicated by the fact that three of the six points in the program of the Awami League, which won a 10 to 1 majority in the recent elections in East Pakistan—half of their program, as I said, is devoted to economic and fiscal reforms. The current crisis, then, is largely economic in its genesis, economic in its objectives, and its resolution too will depend largely on economic factors. I should like to address my remarks first to the economic circumstances that lie behind the uprising and then to the economic factors that will determine its outcome. These latter factors are of a special concern to this subcommittee because, unfortunately, they imply that the attitude and actions of the United States will have a significant and perhaps decisive effect on the struggle. So our country has an incapable though unwelcome responsibility in the matter. I believe also that our national interests are involved.

There are a few crucial facts I am anxious to put before you, mostly relating to the poverty of East Pakistan and to the problem of income disparity between East and West Pakistan. The poverty of East Pakistan is so appalling that I may sound facetious. From an economic point of view East Pakistan is simply a mistake. There are more than 70 million people trying to wrest a living from about 22 million acres and very little else by way of natural resources. That works out to about an acre and a half per farm family, which is approximately one-half of 1 percent of the average size of an American farm. On top of that they have the cyclones, the floods, and the droughts.

Last year's cyclone which killed at least 300,000 people and devastated hundreds of thousands of acres was only an especially bad instance of a periodic catastrophe. The floods are not as lethal, but are more crippling economically. In each annual monsoon, approximately one-third of the land area of East Pakistan is inundated and its crops lost or severely damaged. Between the monsoons, in much of the land there is not enough rain to grow crops without irrigation, for which facilities are lacking. Farm yields and incomes are as low as this recital of difficulties would lead you to expect, and this is particularly grim in a country where about 60 percent of all income is derived from farming. The result is a per capita income of not much more than \$45 a year which is a figure so far below our experience that it is meaningless.

West Pakistan is poor also. Per capita income there is about \$75 a year, but low as that is, it is at least 60 percent higher than per capita income in the east. This great gap between the levels of income in the two parts of the country—or better, the degrees of poverty—is one of the main, longstanding economic problems of Pakistan as well as the principal underlying cause of the current crisis. The stated official policy of Pakistan has been to annihilate this gap and to achieve income equality, but absolutely no progress has been made in executing this policy. On the contrary, the discrepancy has been growing. Over the last decade, total national income in West Pakistan rose by about 6 percent per year while in East Pakistan income increased by only 4 percent a year, most of which was eaten up by population growth.

One of the most bitterly contended issues in Pakistan is whether the official policy of eliminating the income disparity has been implemented sincerely. No one contests that the policy has been completely frustrated. There are instances and shreds of evidence on both sides of the debate and I cannot resolve it in the few moments available to me. The best indication, in my view, is the allocation of investment between East and West Pakistan, because public investment is directly controlled by the Government while private investment is indirectly controlled by the systems of industrial licensing and foreign exchange allocation. Public investment in East Pakistan has never been as great as in West Pakistan, though 55 percent of the people live in the East. In the past half-dozen years public investment in East Pakistan has climbed from about half of what it is in West Pakistan to approximately 90 percent of the amount in the West. Private investment is even more disproportionate; it is about three times as great in West Pakistan as in East Pakistan. So all together more than 60 percent of investment occurs in West Pakistan where only 45 percent of the people live.

This distribution of investment appeals to me as a strong indication that the day-to-day activities and programs of the Government have not implemented the announced policy of closing the income gap. There are other indications too, as well as some contrary ones. At any rate, the East Pakistanis find the results disheartening and are convinced that the great preponderance of Government programs favor the West and at their expense, almost as if they were an economic colony. I have to say that I personally agree with them.

It should be mentioned in extenuation of the foregoing data that the bulk of promising investment opportunities, both public and private, are located in West Pakistan. The United States and other donor nations have tended to allocate their funds in accordance with the normally sound principle of supporting the projects which promised to contribute most to economic development. So West Pakistan received a disproportionate share of foreign aid. We rarely asked whose economic development the projects contributed to. But that is a critical question in a bifurcated country such as Pakistan since projects in one part of the country make virtually no contribution to the advancement of the other part. By following this normally sound principle, we have contributed to the economic deprivation of East Pakistan. We can see now that that policy was a grievous mistake and bears some of the responsibility for the current crisis—so much for history.

I mentioned in my opening paragraph that we cannot avoid heavy responsibility for the course and outcome of the current struggle. In

principle, of course, this is an internal Pakistani affair and the United States ought to try to avoid intervening, however we may feel about the rights and wrongs. The problem is that we are so heavily involved already in the economy of Pakistan that whatever we do in our efforts to maintain neutrality will affect the balance of forces to a significant degree. To make this clear, I have to digress from economics for a moment to summarize the current state of military affairs.

The pitched battles are now over for awhile, and West Pakistan's tanks, planes, artillery and disciplined soldiers have won all of them. The troops now occupy Dacca, Chittagong and all the principal cities and towns, and all they now have to do is subjugate the rest of the countryside where most of the people live. But we know that can be quite a task. It requires them to maintain an expeditionary force of upwards of 50,000 troops at the end of a supply line 3,000 miles long and they are already a poor country in deep financial difficulties. In the past year, their foreign exchange reserves have been drawn down from over \$300 million to less than \$170 million. Their annual foreign trade deficit, even without the expenses and disruptions of warfare, is over \$500 million, so that their current reserves are less than a third of their annual requirements or scarcely an adequate working balance. In fact, at the moment it appears that Pakistan is desperately seeking a moratorium on its debt installments that fall due this month. This means that if the war is to go on for more than a few months and essential imports are to be procured, outsiders are going to have to provide the resources, and the United States is the principal traditional source of external funds for Pakistan. By and large, American grants and loans have amounted to about \$250 million a year, not counting our contributions to IDA and UNDP. This covers about half of Pakistan's adverse balance of trade. Therefore, the continued flow of American grant and loans is the most important immediate objective in West Pakistan's strategy, more important by far than any military operation.

So part of America's dilemma in this tragic moment is how to follow a neutral course, when continuing the flow of aid dispersements will provide indispensable support to the suppressive efforts of the Government of Pakistan, while discontinuing the flow will interrupt a traditional relationship on which the Government of Pakistan has come to rely. Since either policy is consequential we are involved inexorably no matter how earnestly we wish we could stand apart. Besides, our own national interests are engaged.

East Pakistan is in the corner of the Indian subcontinent and what goes on there is of vital concern to Pakistan, India, mainland China, and Burma at least. It affects political alignments and the balance of power throughout South Asia. Our national interest in South Asia is principally to maintain peace and tranquility. I don't say that out of high-minded or of humanitarian motives. A protracted struggle in East Pakistan will engage the attentions of both India and Pakistan, will weaken both of them, will inflame their animosities to a dangerous degree, and will divert their energies from the peaceful solution of their political and economic problems. It will in short, endanger the stability of the whole subcontinent with consequences that cannot be foretold.

Second, the longer the struggle goes on the more likely it is that it will take a sinister as well as a tragic turn. At the moment, the movement toward autonomy in East Pakistan is led by a Western-

educated, Western-oriented middle-class. It is confined to a sectional struggle with only slight ideological overtones. But experience teaches that it is very hard for moderates with democratic aspirations to keep control of an inflammatory, hate-breeding struggle. In such struggles, the leadership tends to gravitate into the hands of extremist factions who feel no constraints against exploiting the hatreds that the struggle engenders. Such factions are already present in East Pakistan, notably certain elements of the National Awami Party and the "Naxalites," an illegal West Bengali party with Maoist connections. The danger that these elements will take control of the rebellion if it continues unresolved for very long is much more than 50-50. You can picture for yourself the implications of a Maoist-led rebellion in East Pakistan.

So America's overwhelming concern must be to restore peace in East Pakistan as promptly as possible. We cannot intervene nor should we even want to. But we have already seen that we are in a position in which we cannot avoid influencing the course of events. We should use our influence to work toward a compromise rather than military suppression. We can do this by refusing to finance the military operations.

I do not believe that neutrality obliges us to make our funds and resources available for prosecuting an internal war, funds and resources that can be used properly only for fostering economic development and defending the country against external aggressors. We ought to make it perfectly clear that our policy is that no American funds should be diverted from development purposes to military purposes. To this end we should attach effective safeguards to all future American disbursements in order to assure that they will not be used directly or indirectly to further the war effort. In addition, of course, we should discontinue military assistance forthwith. Of course we should nonetheless stand ready to provide food and medical relief to East Pakistan, where the disruption is virtually certain to cause a famine of serious proportions. Such relief also should be safeguarded against diversion to military purposes.

Those are the objectives that I strongly recommend that we pursue. I have not thought through the ways and means for attaining them. They probably entail a virtual cessation of commodity and program aid to Pakistan and a substantial restriction of project aid. The crucial difficulty is that almost any commodities or funds that we might provide to Pakistan for development purposes can be used to meet requirements for military support that otherwise would have to be met by foreign exchange purchases. So, in effect, giving development aid in such forms is an indirect way to finance the war effort. Any substantial reduction in development support would have unfortunate consequences, but continued development aid would be largely fruitless anyhow until a political settlement is reached and attention can once more be concentrated on economic development.

I believe that if this policy is followed the Government of Pakistan will be under irresistible pressure to seek a political settlement, and one that will assure to East Pakistan genuine equity in the pursuit of democracy and economic development. It would contribute to the stability of the entire continent, and be in everyone's interest.

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...MAN. I think that both contending parties will have
think that the East Bengali could be persuaded to remain legal
part of a united Pakistan, provided that they are given the substance
of the demands of six points of the Awami League, and that the West
Pakistani troops are withdrawn.

I think in West Pakistan the strains of continuing the conflict
will be so severe that they could reconcile themselves to almost any
settlement that leaves the East part of the country. The thing they
have to avoid is separation.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Do you feel that it is in the interest of both wings
of Pakistan to have a political settlement and remain a viable nation?
Mr. DORFMAN. I don't know how long a political settlement would
stick. The hatreds that have grown up are substantial. The countries,
of course, were widely separated geographically, culturally, ethnically,
even by language previously, so that people have long been predicting
that the union would fall apart sooner or later. How violently, rather
pose no one anticipated. But I think under the circumstances, rather
than have a fight to the finish now, they should try for a compromise
and try to make it work.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Do you see any possibility of it working, in view
of your long experience?

Mr. DORFMAN. Yes, I do, though it will require more good will on
both sides than they have displayed so far. There is no conflict of
interest. If the West were able to allow the East to follow an economic
policy that was not in the West's favor but in the East's, and if the
other nations repented, as I am sure they could stay together.
with West Pakistan, I am sure we do, of their excessive obsession
Mr. GALLAGHER. I note in your statement that "nevertheless we
should stand ready to provide food and medical relief to East
Pakistan." How do you feel the distribution should be made?

Mr. DORFMAN. In East Pakistan at present?

Mr. GALLAGHER. I mean should the Government of the United
States make that distribution bilaterally into East Pakistan?
Mr. DORFMAN. I think we should not. Supervisory administration
by the U.N. or the International Red Cross would be needed.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Wouldn't that be the only real effective way of
doing it?

Mr. DORFMAN. That way, plus an informal recognition that relief
supplies sent to the nearby regions of India are likely to leak across the
border also. It is quite a long and open border.

Mr. GALLAGHER. How would distribution be made, if we did it in
that way?

Mr. DORFMAN. Very little information—
channels of distribution are disrupted?

Mr. DORFMAN. I believe the autonomous regime does have some-
thing like a government structure in large areas of the India border
ons.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Do you think it would be feasible for the United
States to deal with East Pakistan?

DORFMAN. Not officially.

Mr. GALLAGHER. But if we deal directly with them, would we not be doing the opposite of what you feel should happen in a political accommodation between both?

Mr. DORFMAN. I would not deal directly with them, no.

Mr. GALLAGHER. If there were a real separation, do you feel, with its limitations of resources that it would be economically possible for East Pakistan or Bangla Desh to survive economically?

Mr. DORFMAN. I am engaged in studies of the economic future of East Pakistan right now. You must understand that their affiliation with West Pakistan has not helped make them a viable country in the past. On the contrary, they have been probably contributing capital to West Pakistan. So they would be better off than they are now. Whether they are viable or not is another matter. In my testimony, I said they are a mistake, and in a sense they are. How that country can support so many people is very hard to conceive. But separation in the form of either an autonomous economy or a legal separation would do no harm.

Mr. GALLAGHER. If an accommodation were reached, would not it mean American assistance for both wings? What would your estimate be of the expense involved in aiding both wings of Pakistan? Mr. DORFMAN. I should hope that we would continue to contribute to Pakistan as a whole, at least on the level of the past, which I estimated as an ongoing level of about \$250 million a year. But I would like to see the distribution changed and to give a larger share to East Pakistan than to West Pakistan.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Bingham?

Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You have actually asked most of the questions I had in mind. But I do have one other question.

Mr. BINGHAM. You mentioned that if the unity is to continue, a political settlement had to be arrived at between East and West Pakistan; that East Pakistan should discontinue an economic policy in East Pakistan which works in favor of West Pakistan and not in the interest of East Pakistan. Would you develop that a little further? What are the specific things that illustrate this point?

Mr. DORFMAN. One of the specific types of measure I mentioned in my statement is the allocation of both public and private funds in Pakistan, which up to the present has been controlled by the central government. That certainly should be changed so that a reasonable allocation of foreign resources is made to East Pakistan and the administration is done by the East Pakistani Government, either independently or as a component of the Pakistani Government.

Mr. DORFMAN. The procedures now are centralized 1,000 air miles and 3,000 air miles from East Pakistan. The structure of the subsidies which, again, is part of the central government is very heavily slanted in the direction of protecting the East Pakistani, nearly all of which is concentrated in West Pakistan rather than from the outside world, a policy which is required in our own history before the War of Independence and similar ties with the manufacturing industry of India and many of the same reasons.

...be permitted to import w
...a number of a substantial burden.
...to be something that is very hard to pin down exactly, because
the West Pakistani Government is discreet enough not to publish al
the figures you want. But it does appear that about \$90 million a
year has been transferred from the dreadfully poor East Pakistanis
to the not-so-poor West Pakistanis as a result of these policies, a
substantial drain.

Mr. BINGHAM. That certainly is a very striking statement. Without
that element, I am not totally impressed with the statement by itself,
that public investment has been disproportionate in West Pakistan
over East Pakistan. If the investment comes from West Pakistan
resources. If the investment comes from West Pakistan resources,
then you can't criticize it too much if it is allocated in that proportion.
But if it comes from the transfer of capital resources, that is a very
different matter. What is the nature of those transfers? What resources
are there in East Pakistan that are capable of being transferred? Is it
tax moneys?

Mr. DORFMAN. Partly taxes, partly profits on this kind of trade that
we have mentioned. Those are the two main machineries. And partly
also some repatriation of profits from industries that are located in
East Pakistan and owned in West Pakistan.

It is a very peculiar situation that most of the foreign exchange
that Pakistan as a whole earns comes either from jute in raw form or
jute in manufactured form. Both of those originate in East Pakistan
rather than in West Pakistan, so that the poorer part of the country
is also the larger foreign earner. It is this transfer of funds
that has put the jute earnings at the disposal of West Pakistan;

Mr. BINGHAM. These factors, then, would tend to explain why the
Government of Pakistan is so determined to hold on to East Pakistan;
is that right?

Mr. DORFMAN. Partly, yes. And partly also, I think, it is the natural
obligation of all governments not to see part of their provinces taken
away. You know what Churchill said, and every responsible govern-
ment leader feels the same way, not wanting to see the country
dismembered.

Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you.
Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Dorfman, in view of the long lines of supply
and the large number of troops involved in the occupation in the key
cities, based on your observations, how long do you think that the
central government can continue to financially support their actions
in East Pakistan?

Mr. DORFMAN. Well, a desperate government can keep going a long
time, as we all know. I should expect that by any normal standards
they will be bankrupt before the summer is over, as far as international
things are concerned. They are already according to—I guess—reliable
sources that I can't testify to firsthand, planning to renege on some
payments next month, or effectively to do so to pay several tens
of dollars in blocked rupees instead of hard currency, be-
cause they just are running out of the money they need to pay for
oil, petroleum, and all their other imports. They are in a very
tight.

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Mr. GALLAGHER. Is the resumption of U. S. economic aid, in opinion, essential to the continuation of Pakistan's activities in East?

Mr. DORFMAN. It is. They cannot continue unless they get the for- exchange that they need in view of this impending exhaustion of their reserves.

Mr. GALLAGHER. If they did not achieve that economic assistance how long do you feel they would be in a position to continue the activity in the East?

Mr. DORFMAN. They have taken no extraordinary measures that know of to economize on foreign reserves outside of expressing their intention of not paying debts in hard currency. If they continue at this rate, I cannot see that they will have any money left by the end of August. Then your conjecture is as good as mine as to how long a country like Pakistan can keep going when it has nothing but its credit to go on by way of buying petroleum, by way of buying spare parts, by way of buying ammunition, and all the other things that they must import.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Incidentally, my information is that there have been no deliveries of military assistance since March 25.

Mr. DORFMAN. I think actually as far as the United States goes, there were no other deliveries either, or just a very small leakage. On whole, our policy up to now is much in line with what I recommended. What I am recommending is we keep on this course.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Assuming that President Yahya requested the United Nations to come in and give assistance, what do you think should be the policy of the United States?

Mr. DORFMAN. The United Nations?

Mr. GALLAGHER. Yes.

Mr. DORFMAN. I think we should oppose it. Do you mean economic assistance in the matters of East?

Mr. GALLAGHER. Economic assistance in the matters of East?

Mr. DORFMAN. There, I think we should cooperate. I would have all continued that can not be diverted to military purposes, so the projects on the Indus River and elsewhere in West which require imports of specialized tools and equipment, that can be used on those projects and not elsewhere, I see no continuing.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Of course, if it were through the international arm we can do is by providing aid that can be used to military activity.

Mr. DORFMAN. Of course, if it were through the international arm sure there would be observers to make certain that did not in fact happen.

Mr. GALLAGHER. That would be satisfactory.

Mr. DORFMAN. Thank you very much, Professor Dorfman, for fits of your broad experience and for being with us.

Mr. GALLAGHER. The subject stands adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.

4 o'clock p.m. the subcommittee adjourned.

APPENDIX

AN AMERICAN RESPONSE TO THE PAKISTAN CRISIS

BY HON. CORNELIUS E. GALLAGHER OF NEW JERSEY IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THURSDAY, JUNE 10, 1971

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to discuss the situation in East Pakistan generally and to report specifically on my recent trip to view the refugee camps in India.

Let me say that the situation is the worst I have seen abroad during my 12 years of service on the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. My Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs held 2 days of hearings into the situation during May and I must confess that I had felt the reports of genocide, brutality, and unparalleled human misery were overstated.

I can now report to my colleagues that, if anything, these reports were understated. I do not believe I could be called a "bleeding heart" or a "professional dogooder," and I share the reluctance of many of my fellow House Members to embrace eagerly every cause which promises "instant celebrity" for its leaders and "instant humanitarianism" for its adherents. I have learned to distrust sweeping generalizations and to discount inflated rhetoric.

The crisis in East Pakistan, as disastrous and as horrifying as it is, is not a matter solely for the Government of the United States to solve. But, neither is it solely an internal matter of Pakistan. It now threatens the peace of the Indian subcontinent, provides a rich and fertile breeding ground for communist inspired movements, challenges whatever is good in human nature, and poses a dreadful moral choice for mankind.

However, a simplistic search for heroes and villains in creating the torrent of tragedy sweeping over the 75 million inhabitants of East Pakistan is doomed to failure. Much of my speech today will be critical of the actions undertaken by the army of Pakistan after its initial actions on the evening of March 25, 1971. But it is true that supporters of the Awami League promoted work stoppages earlier; it cannot be denied that Bengalis themselves butchered members of other populations within East Pakistan; and the world community has not ennobled itself by its response.

While I hesitate to repeat what I regard in other contests as a mind-numbing cliché, in a very real sense we are all guilty of promoting the climate of unconcern and in acquiescing in policies which, given the crystal clarity of the vision of hindsight, led inexorably to the truly appalling situation now confronting East Pakistan, West Pakistan, and India. And the United Nations, the United States, and virtually every other nation in the world is either an active or reluctant partner.

BACKGROUND

Let me try to briefly sketch the political background. East and West Pakistan are divided by some 1,100 miles of Indian territory and we now know that they are socially, intellectually, and spiritually worlds apart. The Awami League in East Pakistan was the clear winner in the elections held last December for a National Constituent Assembly to write the constitution which would provide for non-military rule. The Awami League captured 167 seats of the 169 contested in East Pakistan and this gave them an absolute majority of the seats contested in both wings. Candidates of the Awami League won at least 80 percent of the popular vote in East Pakistan in an election which was run by the Military Government of Pakistan.

We must never forget that the leaders and supporters of the Awami League successfully worked within the system by gaining an absolute majority in both wings of Pakistan. Therefore, they should not now be regarded as secessionists or rebels in the usual sense of those terms.

Indeed, because of the victory of the Awami League, the leader of the League and a man who President Yahya once said was the next premier of all of Pakistan, could have established a government immediately after the election in December. It is a fact that he did not; it is a fact that he depended on the word of President Yahya to effect an orderly transfer of power; and it is a fact that he never spoke of secession, only of democratic autonomy within a loose federation of all of Pakistan. Perhaps the world will never know the exact reasons for the breakdown in the talks in which the Awami League placed such faith, but the facts just cited show that the leaders did not insist upon "Bangla Desh" until after the army took its action.

Testimony before the Asian and Pacific Affairs by Dr. Robert Dorfman of Harvard University is very revealing about the economic background. He points out the disparities in resource allotment and in economic development between the two wings and he testifies, in a very graceful manner, to the widely shared but tragically short-sighted attitude that West Pakistan provided the most promising opportunities for investment, including American aid. East Pakistan came to regard itself as a colony of West Pakistan, further exacerbating tensions.

ACTIONS OF UNPRECEDENTED VIOLENCE

Spokesmen for the central government of Pakistan claim that the army sweep of March 25 was necessary to restore law and order and that it was a quick, clean, almost surgical incision. They claim that all that remains now is for the East to again return to its normal place in a united Pakistan.

Two simple facts speak powerfully against that argument: First, the sheer number of refugees is irrefutable evidence of the brutal policies pursued by the Government of Pakistan to crush the people who won the election; and second, the sharp increase in Hindu refugees in the past weeks shows the undertaking of a "Holy War." There are now some 5 million refugees in India with thousands more crossing the border each day. Based on interviews I conducted with a cross-section of the refugees, I now believe that a calculated attempt to crush the intellectual life of the Bengali community occurred, because of mass killings of professors, students and everyone of any distinction by the Army. This, in my judgment, gives credence to the charge of genocide.

In addition, the sudden emergence of a majority of Hindu refugees has resulted from a calculated reign of terror by the army to inspire and inflame communal tensions. These tensions naturally existed, because the 10 million Hindus in East Pakistan were a small minority and it would be foolish to contend that Bengalis took no action themselves against non-Bengalis in the region. However, I believe that the long stored passions were ignited by the thwarting of the will of the people and, as terrible as the stories of Bengali violence may be, they cannot be used to justify any actions of the central government.

AN INTERNAL MATTER OF MANKIND

The argument has been advanced that the world community cannot and should not take action to alleviate the suffering, because it is an internal matter of Pakistan.

At the risk of repetitiveness, let me again refer to the refugees. The latest reports from Indian sources—the only sources who can really speak with any authority—say the figure has now reached some 5 million. It cannot be argued that a policy which generates sufficient terror to cause 5 million people to flee into a neighboring country is strictly an internal matter. It is semantic nonsense to call a policy internal only which continues to create refugees at the figure of some 100,000 a day. It cannot be argued that the incredible strain this situation puts on India is not the legitimate concern of the world.

Quite obviously, Mr. Speaker, the situation in East Pakistan is not an internal matter of Pakistan.

In addition, let me quote the testimony of Senator EDWARD KENNEDY before the Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee on May 11. We had asked Senator KENNEDY to appear, because of the outstanding work being done by his Subcommittee on Refugees of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary in describing the impact of policy on people and in disclosing the humanitarian demands of people living in areas where wars have been conducted. The Senator testified:

"In the name of neutrality, some in our government say we must not be involved in East Pakistan today. But we are involved. Our weapons have been involved in the violence. Our aid has contributed to West Pakistan's development for more than a decade. And today, our government, at the highest level, is involved in discussions for even more aid. So we are involved."

Since the Senator's statement the conflict has spilled over the borders of East Pakistan into India by the 5 million refugees now there. Testimony before my subcommittee revealed that American aid had assisted in the economic exploitation of the East by the West. Our aid—some \$5 billion—has contributed to the unspeakable agonies now occurring in the region.

For example, American boats supplied last winter to bring relief supplies to the victims of the hurricane and flood, are presently being used to carry troops on murderous raids throughout the countryside.

I contend that these and many other facts demolish the concept that it is solely an internal matter of Pakistan. Rather, it has now become an internal matter for mankind, and the world community must not retreat behind queasy legalisms.

ALL AMERICAN AID TO THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT MUST STOP

Mr. Speaker, in light of the dimensions of the tragedy, it may appear heartless and cruel to insist on no more American aid to the military government. Many informed and concerned people are fully aware of the unspeakable agonies in East Pakistan and their natural response is to continue and expand economic aid to the central government. It is, after all, still the legal government of a sovereign nation and while it is understandable to castigate that favorite whipping boy by calling for a continued and absolute suspension of military aid, economic aid and even food assistance is not seen in the same light.

But the war being waged in the East is costing the central government some \$2 million a day. They do not have adequate foreign reserves even in the best of times and, therefore, economic aid from America or from the World Bank is essential for the continuation of the slaughter. General Yahya has been making some conciliatory statements recently and I understand he is inviting the United Nations to assist. However, we must be neutral in deed as well as in word and we cannot finance or subsidize the actions of the military in East Pakistan. American aid, according to Professor Dorfman's informed testimony before my subcommittee, is a prerequisite for any continuation of military activity. It must, therefore, stop and remain stopped until independent outside observers confirm a change in policy by the central government. This has, as yet, not occurred.

CHOLERA EPIDEMIC SPREADING

The cholera epidemic now sweeping through the Indian refugee camps came to India along with the refugees. The bodies of thousands of people killed in the violence were thrown into rivers and thus fouled much of the drinking water and created cholera.

And now that dreaded disease is spreading even to the native Indian population living near the refugee camps. Quite understandably, but very horribly, Indian natives are becoming fearful of the refugees. I refer to a report in the Washington Star of June 8, 1971. It says, in part:

"India's West Bengal State is short of police because so many are guarding the rivers to keep the bodies of cholera victims from being thrown in."

The Star report from Krishnagar, India continues with these ominous paragraphs:

"Rumors spread daily that Pakistani agents from across the border 20 miles away are emptying bottles of cholera germs into local water supplies to make the epidemic spread faster."

"A crowd of 500 persons beat a Moslem to death yesterday at the Krishnagar railway station after a report that he had emptied a small bottle into a roadside well."

Mr. Speaker, I doubt if those rumors are true, but the point is that they exist and are undoubtedly believed on the scene. It is, however, an undeniable fact that cholera is increasing and so we must not only help to combat the disease, but we must do all we can to pacify the source of the disease and allow the refugees to return to their homes.

This, of course, cannot be done unilaterally by the United States, but it is further evidence against the resumption of any form of American aid to the Government of Pakistan. Rather than diminishing, the numbers of refugees are increasing, offering a powerful counterargument to claims that the situation in East Pakistan is returning to normal.

Further, it must be recognized that the size of the cholera epidemic inside East Pakistan must be immense. I believe we are only seeing the tip of the iceberg when we see the cholera in India.

Indeed, because of the victory of the Awami League, the leader of the League and a man who President Yahya once said was the next premier of all of Pakistan, could have established a government immediately after the election in December. It is a fact that he did not; it is a fact that he depended on the word of President Yahya to effect an orderly transfer of power; and it is a fact that he never spoke of secession, only of democratic autonomy within a loose federation of all of Pakistan. Perhaps the world will never know the exact reasons for the breakdown in the talks in which the Awami League placed such faith, but the facts just cited show that the leaders did not insist upon "Bangla Desh" until after the army took its action.

Testimony before the Asian and Pacific Affairs by Dr. Robert Dorfman of Harvard University is very revealing about the economic background. He points out the disparities in resource allotment and in economic development between the two wings and he testifies, in a very graceful manner, to the widely shared but tragically short-sighted attitude that West Pakistan provided the most promising opportunities for investment, including American aid. East Pakistan came to regard itself as a colony of West Pakistan, further exacerbating tensions.

ACTIONS OF UNPRECEDENTED VIOLENCE

Spokesmen for the central government of Pakistan claim that the army sweep of March 25 was necessary to restore law and order and that it was a quick, clean, almost surgical incision. They claim that all that remains now is for the East to again return to its normal place in a united Pakistan.

Two simple facts speak powerfully against that argument: First, the sheer number of refugees is irrefutable evidence of the brutal policies pursued by the Government of Pakistan to crush the people who won the election; and second, the sharp increase in Hindu refugees in the past weeks shows the undertaking of a "Holy War." There are now some 5 million refugees in India with thousands more crossing the border each day. Based on interviews I conducted with a cross-section of the refugees, I now believe that a calculated attempt to crush the intellectual life of the Bengali community occurred, because of mass killings of professors, students and everyone of any distinction by the Army. This, in my judgment, gives credence to the charge of genocide.

In addition, the sudden emergence of a majority of Hindu refugees has resulted from a calculated reign of terror by the army to inspire and inflame communal tensions. These tensions naturally existed, because the 10 million Hindus in East Pakistan were a small minority and it would be foolish to contend that Bengalis took no action themselves against non-Bengalis in the region. However, I believe that the long stored passions were ignited by the thwarting of the will of the people and, as terrible as the stories of Bengali violence may be, they cannot be used to justify any actions of the central government.

AN INTERNAL MATTER OF MANKIND

The argument has been advanced that the world community cannot and should not take action to alleviate the suffering, because it is an internal matter of Pakistan.

At the risk of repetitiveness, let me again refer to the refugees. The latest reports from Indian sources—the only sources who can really speak with any authority—say the figure has now reached some 5 million. It cannot be argued that a policy which generates sufficient terror to cause 5 million people to flee into a neighboring country is strictly an internal matter. It is semantic nonsense to call a policy internal only which continues to create refugees at the figure of some 100,000 a day. It cannot be argued that the incredible strain this situation puts on India is not the legitimate concern of the world.

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THE WORST MAY BE YET TO COME

But East Pakistan simply must return to some stability or else the worst is yet to come. I speak of the distinct possibility of famine, a famine unimagined in modern times. Should the flow of refugees continue, it will be extremely expensive for the world community to feed them. For not only must food be provided, but also housing, jobs, sanitary facilities, and some basic amenities.

However, if food could be gotten to the people inside East Pakistan, relief efforts would not be as expensive. That is, unfortunately, a very real consideration and, in my judgment, is yet another reason for mounting an extensive effort controlled by international agencies.

The specter of famine and the death of as many as 30 million people from starvation hangs heavy over the region and virtually compels the prompt resumption of normal life in East Pakistan.

In addition, Mr. Speaker, we must consider what the political climate inside East Pakistan would be if the normal flow of life does not return. Obviously, the army is now in control of the population centers—described in reports from East Pakistan as being virtual “ghost towns”—but the countryside is ideal territory for insurgency. Any sort of aid in any form now to the military government of Pakistan would be seen as assisting it in its thwarting of the will of the majority in East Pakistan. This would undoubtedly cause Communist-inspired groups already existing in East Pakistan to gain adherents.

From what I have learned of the leadership of the Awami League, it is moderate, and they scored electoral success on a program of gaining a fair share of economic resources and political power. They made democracy work.

The military government of Pakistan showed during its inadequate attempts to alleviate suffering caused by the flood and cyclone and proved conclusively by its bloody policy of destruction after March 25, 1971, that it is not to be trusted with control over relief supplies.

To allow American aid to be utilized by the still intransigent military government would merely exacerbate passions and probably assure the end of any opportunity for people who cherish democracy and who are friendly to the free countries of the world to exercise their electoral mandate.

INDIAN RESPONSE HAS BEEN MAGNIFICENT

Mr. Speaker, the response of the Indian Government to the crisis created by the actions of the Government of Pakistan has been magnificent. They have demonstrated almost unbelievable restraint in view of the provocative effects of the army's brutal sweep and they have shown inspiring compassion to the refugees. If it can ever be said that any government is truly moral and humanitarian, the Government of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi has earned that distinction in the weeks since the first refugee crossed the border.

But India obviously cannot continue to accept 100,000 refugees each day. The regions of India surrounding East Pakistan, particularly West Bengal, are not richly endowed with resources or with wealth. The indigenous Indians have little to call their own and, while they have shared what little they have with some of the refugees, it cannot be expected that any human beings would not begin to resent massive waves of foreigners. Coupled with the fact that there are no jobs for the refugees, we also now understand that cholera is being brought in by those forced to flee East Pakistan. I have learned that for the past several days there has been a 5-mile-long line of refugees waiting to cross the border.

Of course, the United States is correct to radically increase its aid to these refugees but even the recently announced \$15 million will only feed these people for 3 or 4 days. To avoid a wholly understandable reaction by India to these incredible facts, the situation must return to normal inside East Pakistan, as soon as possible.

WHAT IS REALLY HAPPENING INSIDE EAST PAKISTAN

Mr. Speaker, I have tried to indicate what must be occurring inside East Pakistan today. One thread ran through the hundreds of interviews I held with all types of refugees—rich, poor, educated, ignorant, healthy, mutilated. The common story was something like this:

“The ‘Peace Committee’ came, they poured petrol on our homes, and when we ran out they robbed us of our valuables and, if we resisted further, we were shot by the Punjabi soldiers.”

What is the “Peace Committee”? Apparently, these are bands of local hoodlums which are sent by the army as an advance guard to burn and loot. The Govern-

ment of Pakistan has said it was necessary to take action against "miscreants," yet it seems that the army is encouraging the worst elements in each community to be shock troops.

Arguing further against the stated resumption of normal life in East Pakistan is the fact that the new wave of refugees is almost entirely Hindus. Here again we find it difficult to avoid using the term "genocide," for once the army established what it has told the world is "law and order," it then selected the Hindus for extinction or for expulsion.

When one speaks of the eventual normalization of East Pakistan, I trust we do not intend to be deluded by the facade of a "Quisling" government. A government established must truly represent the people of the region and must be responsive to their wishes. The Awami League is now outlawed, and one can only urge the Government of Pakistan to allow that duly elected party to take its electorally mandated control.

Frankly, Mr. Speaker, it does not appear within the range of rational hope that a reversal of the bloody policies of the past months will occur. As a brief example of the cast of mind of the army, consider Martial Law 148—the text of which appeared in the pro-government newspaper, Pakistan Observer, of April 27. A brief excerpt follows:

"MLO 148. Death Penalty for Damage to Government Property.

"1. Any person or groups of persons causing damage, tampering with or interfering with working of the roads, railways, canals, aerodromes, telegraph, telephone, wireless installation or with any government property will be liable to legal action under MLR-1414, which prescribes the maximum punishment of death.

"2. Inhabitants of the surrounding area of all or any such affected place or places will render themselves liable to punitive action collectively . . ."

Mr. Speaker, such collective responsibility for actions against the government troops is all too reminiscent of similar tragedies in Europe. It is hard not to say that the Government of Pakistan has tried to create a desert so they can call it peace.

Is it any wonder that the control over the distribution of food in East Pakistan must also be severely questioned and in my judgment, must be done exclusively by international agencies? The calculated reign of terror destroyed the civil government inside East Pakistan and it is unlikely that the army could, or would, distribute food on an equitable basis. Indeed, there is considerable doubt in my mind whether the terrorized populace inside East Pakistan would accept food if it were offered by the army. After the devastating flood and cyclone last November, there were reports that Bengalis would not take relief from the army. A recent private report, dated May 24, 1971, contains this quote by a Bengali:

"Please do not have your country send any aid to this country, not even food. The food will only go to the Army and prolong our agony."

Based on the interviews I had with the refugees and the discussions I have had here in America with people familiar with East Pakistan, I am very afraid that that attitude is widely shared by the people of East Pakistan.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Speaker, the nations of the world must make a great effort to avert other great tragedies from being piled on top of the flood and cyclone and the barbarity which has already occurred in East Pakistan. I am convinced that all of our aid should be through international agencies and that we must do nothing at this point to provide economic assistance to the government in West Pakistan. There are now reports that West Pakistan is feeling the effect of its barbarous policy in the East wing and if we were to alleviate the problems in the West we would intensify the problems in the East. It is as simple, and as complex, as that.

I will introduce legislation to put those principles into policy. At this point, however, I would implore those in our Government who have the responsibility to shape our response not to yield to ordinary solutions which will, in my judgment, have extraordinarily disastrous results. I would urge that every single dollar which could now go to the Government of Pakistan be diverted to international agencies. I would urge the people of the world to insist that their governments do the same. Any other course, in my judgment, would subsidize slaughter and spread pestilence.

This may well be an ultimate testing ground for world responsibility, humane belief, and international effectiveness in dealing with crises. I hope and pray that we can, collectively, have an ennobling action rather than one which could only debase us as fellow members of mankind's fragile community.

Mr. Speaker, I include several reports and editorials in the RECORD at this point:

[From the New York Times, May 12, 1971]

THE VULTURES OF BENGAL

Fat vultures brood over the ravaged towns of East Pakistan, grim testimony to the slaughter which took place during the Pakistan Army's savage crackdown on Bengali separatists. The fighting has died down for the time being, with the Bengali resistance largely routed, but what may become known as the year of the vulture in East Bengal is not ended. Famine now stalks this tragic land of chronic disaster.

As a result of the dislocations of the civil war, the devastation of floods and cyclones last fall and of persistent food shortages in this heavily overpopulated region, at least 10 and perhaps 30 million of East Pakistan's 75 million inhabitants face starvation within the next few months. Contrary to bland assurances which continue to emanate from West Pakistani spokesmen, the situation is unquestionably desperate and will require a large-scale international relief effort if a tragedy of major proportions is to be averted.

The groundwork for some relief operations is already being laid with a promise of American food aid and a visit of United Nations officials to India, where refugees from East Pakistan are already pouring across the border at the rate of 60,000 a day—to a current total of over 1.5 million, according to Indian officials.

The larger effort, however, must be made in East Pakistan itself. A report that the Pakistani Government is preparing to allow UNICEF to begin relief operations in the strife-torn province is encouraging. But there is little evidence so far of the kind of concern in Islamabad and preparation abroad that will be required to meet the needs of East Pakistan in time.

Because of this country's unique capacity to furnish needed relief supplies and essential logistical support, the United States has a special responsibility to take the lead in organizing the relief effort. Because of the heavy dependence of Pakistan's military regime on American economic and military support, the United States Government also is in a unique position to prod Islamabad to abandon its policy of repression in the East and to cooperate more fully in the international effort to deny the vultures of Bengal further human prey. Moves in Congress made represent the kind of firm policy in the Pakistani crisis that the Administration should have adopted long ago. Although Administration spokesmen have said that Pakistan aid programs are "under review" and that no arms have been shipped to that country since the beginning of the crackdown, no general suspension of aid has been announced and, in fact, it appears that some aid has been continuing.

[From the New York Times, June 9, 1971]

DISEASE, HUNGER, AND DEATH STALK REFUGEES ALONG INDIA'S BORDER (By Sydney H. Schanberg)

KARIMPUR, INDIA, June 8.—Sickness, hunger and death are common scenes now along India's 1,350-mile border with East Pakistan. Millions of Bengalis—unofficial figures put the number over five million—have fled East Pakistan to escape the Pakistani Army, which since late March has been trying to crush the movement for autonomy, and later independence, in East Pakistan.

The Bengalis have brought cholera with them. Official figures put the death toll here in West Bengal state at 3,600, but reports indicate that it is much higher—probably well over 5,000. A thousand or more others have died in the three other border states where the Bengalis have taken refuge.

Here in this Indian town near the border, a mother had died of cholera an hour before, but the infant, less than a year old, continued to nurse until a doctor came upon the scene and pulled him gently away.

A few feet away on the cold cement porch of the health center, another person had just died—a 70-year-old grandfather, Abinash Malakar.

His son sat, crumpled and crying, beside the stiffening emaciated body. Flies had begun to gather. A granddaughter hung, wailing, in the arms of an aunt. This family, from the Jessore district in East Pakistan, had walked for 13 days to reach India.

The toll rises steadily and with new waves of refugees pouring into India daily, there is no way to predict when the epidemic will end.

Along the roadsides lie the bodies left by those too frightened of the disease themselves to take the time for burial. Vultures, dogs and crows fight. Skeltons already picked clean bleach in the sun. A few bodies have been buried in shallow graves, but the vultures have torn the graves open.

The roads leading from the border are a trail of clothes and bones. A body floats in a marsh or stream. The stench is acrid and villagers cover their faces as they hurry past.

Mass graves in some areas
In some towns, attempts have been made to bury the bodies in mass graves. Here in Karimpur, which is 120 miles north of Calcutta by road, five relief workers buried several hundred in a 24-hour period. But even at these sites, packs of stray dogs dig in the earth.

In many ways, the scene is a repetition of the horror of the cyclone that killed hundreds of thousands in the Delta area of East Pakistan last November—leaving bodies for days in marshes, streams and bays.

The tiny, jammed health center at Karimpur—it has 20 beds and over 100 cholera patients—is typical of the overworked health stations along the border. The sounds of the epidemic—coughing, vomiting, groaning and weeping—echo through the small brick building and across the lawn, also crowded with victims.

Shatish Matabbar—the father of the infant who had gone on nursing after his mother died—stood on the porch in tattered clothes, sobbing out his tale. "No words can describe what has happened to me," the 45-year-old rice farmer wailed. "My wife is dead. Three of my children are dead. What else can happen?"

Two children survive
The infant and an 8-year-old have survived, although the older almost died of cholera. He sat on the floor near his father—naked, staring blankly, underfed. The family came to India a month ago from their farm in the Faridpur district of East Pakistan.

Why had he left East Pakistan? a visitor asked. "Why, you ask?" he said, crying again. "Because the Pakistani soldiers burned down my house."

In the last day or two, the death rate in some areas declined a little. This is apparently because foreign medical and relief supplies have begun arriving in sufficient quantities—saline solution to treat the victims and syringes for mass inoculations. Hundreds of thousands have been vaccinated.

But doctors are reluctant to say that the epidemic will be under control soon. For one thing, though India's army medical corps has been called in, medical facilities and personnel are inadequate.

The epidemic is apparently much worse in East Pakistan than in India. Medical facilities in East Pakistan, even in normal times, are meager. In an average year, 150,000 die there of cholera, most of them because they never get any treatment. In a bad year, the toll sometimes runs as high as 300,000.

Dr. M. A. Majid, the chief medical officer of the Nadia district, the worst-hit area, said today that he expected the death rate to start climbing again. The cholera vaccine, he said, gives only 30 percent to 90 percent protection.

The weakened condition of the refugees helps explain the virulence of the epidemic. Many are on the verge of death when they arrive.

In addition, living conditions are little short of desperate. Though the Indian Government has marshaled all available resources to provide shelter and food, it is impossible to keep up with the influx.

Many live in the open
Relief camps—even just tents made by throwing tarpaulins over bamboo frames—cannot be erected fast enough. It is estimated that 3.5 million refugees are either living in the open or in crude thatched lean-tos of their own making. The monsoon rains have arrived and many refugee towns are mudholes.

There are water shortages and sanitation facilities have virtually broken down. The main streets of border towns are avenues of garbage and flies.

Food lines stretch for hundreds of yards and it sometimes takes hours for a refugee to get his rations.

More refugees are moving toward Calcutta as the other camps become choked. New camps are springing up on the edges of the city—just past the airport and in the Salt Lake area.

About 50,000 to 60,000 refugees have entered the fringes of the city, and at least 60 deaths have been recorded in this group.

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In many ways, the scene is a repetition of the horror of the cyclone that killed hundreds of thousands in the Delta area of East Pakistan last November—leaving bodies for days in marshes, streams and bays.

The tiny, jammed health center at Karimpur—it has 20 beds and over 100 cholera patients—is typical of the overworked health stations along the border. The sounds of the epidemic—coughing, vomiting, groaning and weeping—echo through the small brick building and across the lawn, also crowded with victims.

Shatish Matabbar—the father of the infant who had gone on nursing after his mother died—stood on the porch in tattered clothes, sobbing out his tale. "No words can describe what has happened to me," the 45-year-old rice farmer wailed. "My wife is dead. Three of my children are dead. What else can happen?"

Two children survive
The infant and an 8-year-old have survived, although the older almost died of cholera. He sat on the floor near his father—naked, staring blankly, underfed. The family came to India a month ago from their farm in the Faridpur district of East Pakistan.

Why had he left East Pakistan? a visitor asked. "Why, you ask?" he said, crying again. "Because the Pakistani soldiers burned down my house."

In the last day or two, the death rate in some areas declined a little. This is apparently because foreign medical and relief supplies have begun arriving in sufficient quantities—saline solution to treat the victims and syringes for mass inoculations. Hundreds of thousands have been vaccinated.

But doctors are reluctant to say that the epidemic will be under control soon. For one thing, though India's army medical corps has been called in, medical facilities and personnel are inadequate.

The epidemic is apparently much worse in East Pakistan than in India. Medical facilities in East Pakistan, even in normal times, are meager. In an average year, 150,000 die there of cholera, most of them because they never get any treatment. In a bad year, the toll sometimes runs as high as 300,000.

Dr. M. A. Majid, the chief medical officer of the Nadia district, the worst-hit area, said today that he expected the death rate to start climbing again. The cholera vaccine, he said, gives only 30 percent to 90 percent protection.

The weakened condition of the refugees helps explain the virulence of the epidemic. Many are on the verge of death when they arrive.

In addition, living conditions are little short of desperate. Though the Indian Government has marshaled all available resources to provide shelter and food, it is impossible to keep up with the influx.

Many live in the open
Relief camps—even just tents made by throwing tarpaulins over bamboo frames—cannot be erected fast enough. It is estimated that 3.5 million refugees are either living in the open or in crude thatched lean-tos of their own making. The monsoon rains have arrived and many refugee towns are mudholes.

There are water shortages and sanitation facilities have virtually broken down. The main streets of border towns are avenues of garbage and flies.

Food lines stretch for hundreds of yards and it sometimes takes hours for a refugee to get his rations.

More refugees are moving toward Calcutta as the other camps become choked. New camps are springing up on the edges of the city—just past the airport and in the Salt Lake area.

About 50,000 to 60,000 refugees have entered the fringes of the city, and at least 60 deaths have been recorded in this group.

A few thousand refugees have moved into the heart of Calcutta and are camping in the Sealdah Railway Station.

Indian officials are worried that the refugee epidemic may spread to the people of Calcutta—an overcrowded, tense city of eight million that has its own fairly serious cholera problem.

[From the New York Times, June 7, 1971]

MEASURING THE TRAGEDY

(By Anthony Lewis)

LONDON, June 6—Imagine the entire population of New Jersey, seven million people, fleeing the state and taking refuge in New York City and the counties nearby. That thought gives some idea of the dimensions of what is happening now in East Pakistan—except that the refugees are much poorer and the area of India into which they are fleeing is infinitely more desperate than New York.

British sources estimate that between four and five million East Pakistanis have crossed into India and that 100,000 more are leaving every day. Before long the total could be seven or eight million.

The refugees are in a country that already has difficulty feeding itself, one afflicted by overpopulation and unemployment. There are no jobs for the refugees, and there is no farm land. They are starting to filter into Calcutta, a city where one million people regularly sleep on the pavement and more millions have no running water or sewage systems.

Public opinion in the West has certainly been slow to react; only now is one beginning to feel a sense of urgency in the calls for action from relief agencies and charities. Yet the root elements in the tragedy, the death and destruction in East Pakistan, have been known for many weeks.

Civil and communal war has killed many thousands of civilians. No one will ever know exactly how many, but disinterested observers have put the figure as high as several hundred thousand.

People have killed each other because of animosities of race, politics and religion; no community is entirely free of guilt. But the principal agent of death and hatred has been the Pakistani Army. And its killing has been selective: according to reliable reports from inside East Pakistan, the army's particular targets have been intellectuals and leaders of opinion—doctors, professors, students, writers.

The economy of East Pakistan has been hard hit. The planting cycle for food grains is disturbed. The transportation system, already badly hurt by the flood disaster last fall, has been crippled. Many boats are sunk. The main railway line will take six months to repair, assuming uninterrupted peace.

The human and economic dislocation now threatens to lead to a terrible famine. The Financial Times of London, which is not given to exaggeration, has published an estimate that up to four million people in East Pakistan may die in the coming months unless emergency relief and reconstruction measures are undertaken.

What can Western countries do to help East Pakistan out of this disaster? As has so often been the case, notoriously in the Nigerian civil war, humanitarian instincts are complicated by politics.

Western governments must naturally want to give assistance in a politically helpful way—one that will hopefully calm the hatreds in East Pakistan, restore the society, open the way for refugees to return. But that surely means an external presence in the area, the handling of relief by someone other than the Pakistani Army—a program not likely to please President Yahya Khan.

The United States and other concerned countries have not put pressure on Yahya Khan publicly. But there are indications that they have been using privately their leverage as his main sources of central economic aid. Reports suggest that Yahya Khan will accept some kind of United Nations presence in East Pakistan.

But the West may find its greater task, its greater responsibility, lies in the long run in India. For in a sense this may become more an Indian than a Pakistani crisis.

The immediate challenge to India is to feed the refugees, protect them from the coming monsoon and prevent epidemic such as the cholera now spreading in the refugee camps. The huge economic cost of these needs can be met in part from outside, but the social and political costs will be borne by India.

Even without the refugees, Calcutta and that whole area of India has been politically troubled, driven by left-wing factions and violence. The refugees must add appalling strains to an impoverished and tense society. Mrs. Indira Gandhi,

who at best faced a profound task in giving India any hope of progress in the next few years, must now divert much of her energy and her Government's to the refugee problem. She must worry also about an extremist-led guerrilla movement developing across the border in East Pakistan if the military occupation continues.

In these circumstances, not only conscience but political wisdom commends Western help and support for Mrs. Gandhi. The Indians may often be trying to the West, but Mrs. Gandhi's Government is the best hope for stability in South Asia.

[From the Washington Star, June 9, 1971]

UNITED STATES PLANS MORE AID FOR REFUGEES IN INDIA

The U.S. Government is adding \$15 million to the crash program for aid to the estimated 4.5 million East Pakistani refugees now in India.

Frank L. Kellogg, the State Department official in charge of the American effort, said yesterday that \$10 million in food and \$5 million in cash for medicine and equipment would be channeled to India, mainly through the United Nations High Commissioner for refugees.

The United States has already committed \$2.5 million of an international total which before the latest American contribution reached \$26 million. The U.S. contribution will go through an airlift which, if the advance trials now in process work out, will begin early next week with three C-130 military transports.

Kellogg said the highest priority is being given to collecting one million doses of anticholera vaccine to combat an epidemic which has broken out in the West Bengal state where most of the refugees are centered.

According to Kellogg, refugees are still coming into India from East Pakistan at a rate of 50,000 to 100,000 a day. According to World Health Organization figures, 10,000 in West Bengal have been hospitalized with cholera and 3,000 have already died.

Britain has already sent one million doses of anti-cholera vaccine. But given the number of refugees in the area, and the poor sanitary conditions there, officials here are worried that enough vaccine exists to stop the epidemic.

[From the Washington Star, June 9, 1971]

PAKISTANIS, NEAR PANIC, DUMPING PAPER MONEY

(By Malcolm W. Browne)

New York Times News Service

KARACHI.—Pakistan citizens, close to panic tried to jam into banks yesterday to trade huge amounts of paper currency which are suddenly without value by government decree.

The decree Monday night demonetized all 500 rupee and 100 rupee notes, respectively worth \$106.25 and \$21.25 at the legal exchange rate. These two types of bills represent approximately 60 percent of Pakistan's circulating currency.

According to the government, militant Bengali separatists who briefly controlled the administration of East Pakistan in March and April left the banks of East Pakistan empty when the army reoccupied the province. The amount of money that disappeared represented about one-tenth of the nation's circulating currency.

Taken to India

The government is seeking to undercut the economic resources of Bengali separatists who are believed by the government to have taken a large part of the East Pakistani currency into clandestine camps in India.

The demonetization measure also is aimed at crippling the vast currency black market that has developed as the result of the disparity between the legal exchange rate of the rupee and the rupee's real value in international markets. The differences between these rates is nearly three to one.

Customs inspection at all ports of entry into East and West Pakistan were instructed today to conduct rigorous searches of all arriving passengers who might be bringing Pakistani currency into the country, especially from neighboring Afghanistan and India and from Hong Kong.

Given receipts only

As citizens brought their 500 and 100 rupee notes to banks, they are given merely bank receipts.

There was no indication when currency would be given to citizens. Some bankers speculated it might take a month or more.

Serial numbers of all bills are being checked against a list of bills taken from the East Pakistani banks. Anyone seeking to exchange such a bill is likely to be arrested.

The government, which is facing an economic crisis and the probability of having to default on foreign debt obligations, stands to gain as estimated \$200 million as the result of demonetization.

[From the Washington Star, June 8, 1971]

INDIA POLICE TRY TO HALT RIVER CHOLERA BURIALS

KRISHNAGAR, INDIA.—India's West Bengal State is short of police because so many are guarding the rivers to keep the bodies of cholera victims from being thrown in.

According to conservative official estimates, the week-old epidemic among refugees from East Pakistan has taken at least 4,000 lives, half in the Nadia district surrounding Krishnagar.

The 200,000 residents of Krishnagar, 60 miles northeast of Calcutta, are tense. Rumors spread daily that Pakistani agents from across the border 20 miles away are emptying bottles of cholera germs into the local water supplies to make the epidemic spread faster.

Moslem fatally beaten

A crowd of 500 persons beat a Moslem to death yesterday at the Krishnagar railway station after a report that he had emptied a small bottle into a roadside well.

D. K. Ghosh, the district magistrate of Krishnagar, said the rivers are being polluted but by the bodies of cholera victims thrown in by relatives for quick burial.

He said that so many police were now deployed to guard the rivers against this that there is a shortage of police to enforce law and order. With the state's population increased by at least 4½ million refugees from East Pakistan and with hundreds of thousands more coming across the frontiers each week, the West Bengal government asked other states to lend it at least 20 battalions of police.

Normally cremated

Most of the cholera victims have been Hindus, who normally are cremated. But a shortage of firewood and fuel makes the traditional rituals impossible.

The district magistrate said he had ordered mass burial for at least 1,600 persons. Hindus and Moslems have been buried together in three mass graves in the Nadia district.

The biggest is at Badadurpur, in a government forest seven miles from Krishnagar, where 511 bodies have been buried in a pit.

Ghosh estimated that by last Sunday, 1,079 persons had died of cholera in hospitals in the Nadia district and an equal number had perished along the roads and in villages.

About 75 new victims are admitted to hospitals each day, but with 4,800 cholera patients already under treatment, there is a shortage of hospital space.

Cholera ward flooded

At one Krishnagar hospital, a special cholera ward was built of tarpaulin and bamboo outside the main building. When the afternoon monsoon rains came yesterday, all the beds were flooded.

There also is a shortage of saline water—cholera cases need at least eight quarts a day for three days—and of cholera vaccine.

Ghosh said he needs more medical personnel as well, that about 1,000 government employees are caring for approximately 500,000 refugees in the district. "Normal administrative work in the entire district has been collapsing," he added. "More than 1,000 officials working round the clock attending to refugees get no time to do office work."

The inoculation drive got a boost yesterday with the arrival of two jet inoculation guns sent from London by the Oxfam Group. Each can give 700 inoculations an hour.

[From the New York Times, May 2, 1971]

BENGAL: A THREAT OF FAMINE

To the Editor:

The exclusion of the foreign press and observers from East Pakistan has meant the loss of vital information on the course of events there and will deprive us of the dramatic facts that rouse individuals and governments to action. But there is enough conclusive evidence from past and recent history to predict the result of the present conflict on the food position of the province.

The food grains that sustain a large part of the Bengali population come from abroad. Their distribution depends on the effective functioning of the port of Chittagong and on internal transportation and administrative services. East Pakistan, with a population of more than seventy million, expected 2.5 million tons of imported food grains this year. That is about one-sixth of the total food requirements for the province, enough to feed twelve million people. However, a far greater number is actually affected by an interruption in the steady flow of food. For the 50 per cent of the population living barely at subsistence level, these supplies maintain the balance between life and death.

Bengal has always been extremely susceptible to famine. The last such disaster occurred in 1943 when food expected from Burma did not arrive because of the Japanese occupation of that country. At that time military demands on the Indian transportation system prevented the timely distribution of the food that was available. The food deficit that year was 6 percent; this year it is 16 per cent. Deaths in 1943 numbered 1.5 million, and the famine left social problems from which Bengal has yet to recover fully.

A crisis was imminent in 1965 when the Indo-Pakistani war stopped imports. It was avoided when the great powers used their influence to bring that conflict to a speedy close. Recovery was aided by normal internal supply activities, which had been unaffected by the war.

Today, in contrast, not only has the import of food been cut off, but the internal administrative and transport services have ceased to function normally. In addition, military action at planting time will reduce the coming harvest. The regular import of food has been interrupted since February. Even if the conflict were to end today, the months required to return the system to normal would probably exceed the time during which the food reserves could sustain the population. The factors that determine mass famine are irreversible after a certain point.

When the first stories and photographs of starving families are published, it will be too late to protect thousands of others. International action, immediate and strong, is perhaps the only defense the people of East Bengal now have.

DANIEL C. DUNHAM.

NEW YORK, April 20, 1971.

[From the Washington Star, May 19, 1971]

READY TO FIGHT, MRS. GANDHI TELLS PAKISTAN

NEW DELHI.—Prime Minister Indira Gandhi warned Pakistan yesterday that India, whose eastern frontier regions have been inundated with 2.8 million refugees from the civil war in East Pakistan, "is fully prepared to fight if the situation is forced on us."

It was Mrs. Gandhi's strongest warning yet to the Pakistan federal government to stop its eight-week offensive against Bengali secessionists in East Pakistan. "Unending exodus"

Simultaneously, Indian ambassadors were reported to have alerted Great Britain and France that India may be forced to act in its national interest in the face of the "unending exodus of refugees from East Bengal."

India already has appealed for international help in handling the Bengali refugees. A United Nations panel that toured the refugee camps reported Monday that India has a "monumental" problem that may last for another three to six months.

Mrs. Gandhi said in a speech yesterday at the Himalayan hill station of Ranikhet, in Uttar Pradesh State, that the refugees have created "a major problem which will severely affect the nation's economic, social and political life."

She said if Pakistan's claim that East Pakistan has returned to normal is really so, then it should invite the refugees back to their homes.

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The world should "see for itself how democracy is being murdered in East Pakistan," Mrs. Gandhi said.

"Threat to peace"

India sent a note to Pakistan on Saturday—its strongest since the East Pakistani crisis began March 25—saying the growing tide of refugees is "leading to a threat to peace in the region."

There has been little love lost, politically, between India and Pakistan ever since the subcontinent won independence and was partitioned in 1947, with Hindu-majority areas becoming part of India and Moslem-majority areas part of Pakistan. The two countries fought a brief and indecisive war in late 1965 and have been on the verge of war many times before and since.

[From the Washington Daily News, June 9, 1971]

UNITED STATES UPS BENGAL REFUGEE AID

(By R. H. Shackford)

The East Pakistan refugee problem is skyrocketing so drastically that the United States is increasing sevenfold its financial assistance program for Pakistani refugees in India.

The Bengali refugees who have fled the Pakistani army into India now total about five million. Each day between 50,000 and 100,000 new refugees arrive. A dangerous epidemic of cholera has broken out with at least 3,000 dead already plus some 10,000 hospitalized.

The World Health Organization is scouring the world for millions of shots of anticholera vaccine.

The United States originally authorized \$2.5 million for East Pakistan refugee relief earlier this spring. Of this amount \$500,000 was in cash to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

Yesterday the State Department announced an additional authorization of \$15 million, of which \$10 million will be spent for food and the other \$5 million will be made available in cash to the U.N. High Commissioner.

The United States is also trying to mount an airlift to remove large numbers of refugees in the Tripura area of India, east of Dacca. It is an isolated area, difficult to supply and will be dangerous during the forthcoming monsoon season when much of the area—including the only road to it—will be flooded.

An American C-130 plane took off last Saturday from Pope AFB near Fayetteville, N.C., bound for Tripura. If the plane makes the trip in and out without difficulty, three other C-130 planes will join in an around-the-clock project to airlift refugees out of that area to higher ground.

Neither the United States, India nor the U.N. High Commissioner has had much luck in efforts to get Pakistan to cease the repressions that provoke the continued flow of refugees into India.

If the present rate of refugees entering India continues, another 1.5 million to three million refugees will have fled Pakistan by the end of June.

India appealed to U.N. Secretary General Thant for help. U Thant in turn appealed to all U.N. members. Thus far, other countries have contributed \$26 million.

The second largest contributor was the Soviet Union—100 million doses of smallpox vaccine valued at \$2 million and 50,000 tons of rice worth \$10 million.

Japan has contributed \$3 million worth of rice and \$1.4 million in milk powder and vitamin tablets. Canada has contributed \$2 million in food, medicine and cash, and the United Kingdom \$2.4 million in cash.

East Pakistanis in the cholera-stricken refugee camps in India, explain the noted absence of women aged 15 to 30, this way: They were taken by West Pakistan troops for purposes of rape or killing.

[From the Washington Evening Star, Apr. 22, 1971]

ARMY HAVOC IN EAST PAKISTAN CAN BE EXPLOITED BY REDS

(By Henry S. Bradsher)

HONG KONG.—The army from West Pakistan has created conditions in the smoking ruins of East Pakistan which will benefit Communist extremists.

But it will be some time before it becomes clear which of the various factions of Communists in East Pakistan will grow strongest in the guerrilla warfare there. Moscow has endorsed one faction by letting it use the Soviet Communist party newspaper, Pravda, to denounce the president of Pakistan, General M. A. Yahya Khan.

Maoist element ignored

Another faction which has espoused Maoist ideas has been publicly ignored by Peking. The Chinese are backing Yahya Khan's use of the army to suppress the eastern region of Pakistan.

It seems premature to observers here to suspect secret Chinese support for East Pakistani guerrillas. But if the struggle goes on as long as many expect, China might decide to take out private insurance against a guerrilla victory by giving help.

The army, representing the minority of Pakistan's people in its western section, has been trying to crush the effort of the eastern majority to escape the west's domination. The army is reportedly winning the towns, but these can be illusory victories.

Much of the middle-class leadership of East Pakistan reportedly has been shot by the army. Some leaders, including Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, whose Awami League won 72.6 percent of the province's vote last December, are under arrest. This has created a vacuum for Communist leaders to move into.

Tougher, harder men than Rahman's band of lawyers, the communist leaders have been conditioned by years of illegal activity for the kind of violent life now forced on East Pakistani nationalists.

Test of fitness

So the government's terrorism has given the Communists a chance to prove they can survive as the fittest for guerrilla warfare.

Bengal, the region divided in 1947 between East Pakistan and the Indian state of West Bengal, has a strong Communist tradition. At the time of partition an estimated 10,000 Communists were in the eastern part.

Their party was banned, however, and some 3,000 of them were jailed in the first five years. Others went to India when Moslem-Hindu riots broke out in 1950. Some estimates are that only 3,000 Communists remained in East Pakistan, operating underground.

The public home for some of them became the National Awami party, headed by a radical peasant leader, Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani. Bhashani, now 87 years old, sympathized with Mao Tse-tung's ideas of rural revolution, although not himself a Communist.

Communists divided

His Communist associates splintered into three or four factions. The main ones identifiable today are headed by Mohammed Toaha and Abdul Matin.

Toaha, a well-educated man in his 40s, appears at the moment to be the main Communist guerrilla leader. He was general secretary of the National Awami League until last May 30, when he broke with Bhashani. His chief aide, Abdul Huq, was general secretary of Bhashani's peasant movement, the Krishak Samiti.

An unidentified spokesman for the pro-Moscow Communist party of East Pakistan criticized these "Peking-ites" last year in the "World Marxist Review," a Soviet-controlled journal. There is no love lost among the various Communist factions.

Toaha seems, however, to have the support of the Naxalites, the Maoist-inspired Communist revolutionaries operating in the West Bengal state of India. They could provide a channel for weapons and knowledge of how to use them. The Naxalites have been praised in the past by Peking. But the situation now in East Pakistan is awkward for the Chinese. They have strongly backed Yahya Khan's government, which is their most important diplomatic friend in Asia.

The Soviets, on the other hand, have been critical of the bloodshed in East Pakistan. They have showed more concern about cementing a future friendship with the East Pakistanis than protecting their present ties to Yahya Khan. Soviet President Nikolai V. Podgorny announced that the East Pakistani Communist party—which is illegal at home—was attending the recent party congress in Moscow. Then Pravda published the speech of the unidentified delegation head.

After praising the Soviet Union, the speaker thanked his hosts for their concern over "the massacre of thousands of unarmed, innocent people by the reactionary military government" of Pakistan.

The world should "see for itself how democracy is being murdered in East Pakistan," Mrs. Gandhi said.

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The United States is also trying to mount an airlift to remove large numbers of refugees in the Tripura area of India, east of Dacca. It is an isolated area, difficult to supply and will be dangerous during the forthcoming monsoon season when much of the area—including the only road to it—will be flooded.

An American C-130 plane took off last Saturday from Pope AFB near Fayetteville, N.C., bound for Tripura. If the plane makes the trip in and out without difficulty, three other C-130 planes will join in an around-the-clock project to airlift refugees out of that area to higher ground.

Neither the United States, India nor the U.N. High Commissioner has had much luck in efforts to get Pakistan to cease the repressions that provoke the continued flow of refugees into India.

If the present rate of refugees entering India continues, another 1.5 million to three million refugees will have fled Pakistan by the end of June.

India appealed to U.N. Secretary General Thant for help. U Thant in turn appealed to all U.N. members. Thus far, other countries have contributed \$26 million.

The second largest contributor was the Soviet Union—100 million doses of smallpox vaccine valued at \$2 million and 50,000 tons of rice worth \$10 million.

Japan has contributed \$3 million worth of rice and \$1.4 million in milk powder and vitamin tablets. Canada has contributed \$2 million in food, medicine and cash, and the United Kingdom \$2.4 million in cash.

East Pakistanis in the cholera-stricken refugee camps in India, explain the noted absence of women aged 15 to 30, this way: They were taken by West Pakistan troops for purposes of rape or killing.

[From the Washington Evening Star, Apr. 22, 1971]

ARMY HAVOC IN EAST PAKISTAN CAN BE EXPLOITED BY REDS

(By Henry S. Bradsher)

HONG KONG.—The army from West Pakistan has created conditions in the smoking ruins of East Pakistan which will benefit Communist extremists.

But it will be some time before it becomes clear which of the various factions of Communists in East Pakistan will grow strongest in the guerrilla warfare there. Moscow has endorsed one faction by letting it use the Soviet Communist party newspaper, Pravda, to denounce the president of Pakistan, General M. A. Yahya Khan.

Maoist element ignored

Another faction which has espoused Maoist ideas has been publicly ignored by Peking. The Chinese are backing Yahya Khan's use of the army to suppress the eastern region of Pakistan.

It seems premature to observers here to suspect secret Chinese support for East Pakistani guerrillas. But if the struggle goes on as long as many expect, China might decide to take out private insurance against a guerrilla victory by giving help.

The army, representing the minority of Pakistan's people in its western section, has been trying to crush the effort of the eastern majority to escape the west's domination. The army is reportedly winning the towns, but these can be illusory victories.

Much of the middle-class leadership of East Pakistan reportedly has been shot by the army. Some leaders, including Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, whose Awami League won 72.6 percent of the province's vote last December, are under arrest. This has created a vacuum for Communist leaders to move into.

Tougher, harder men than Rahman's band of lawyers, the communist leaders have been conditioned by years of illegal activity for the kind of violent life now forced on East Pakistani nationalists.

Test of fitness

So the government's terrorism has given the Communists a chance to prove they can survive as the fittest for guerrilla warfare.

Bengal, the region divided in 1947 between East Pakistan and the Indian state of West Bengal, has a strong Communist tradition. At the time of partition an estimated 10,000 Communists were in the eastern part.

Their party was banned, however, and some 3,000 of them were jailed in the first five years. Others went to India when Moslem-Hindu riots broke out in 1950. Some estimates are that only 3,000 Communists remained in East Pakistan, operating underground.

The public home for some of them became the National Awami party, headed by a radical peasant leader, Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani. Bhashani, now 87 years old, sympathized with Mao Tse-tung's ideas of rural revolution, although not himself a Communist.

Communists divided

His Communist associates splintered into three or four factions. The main ones identifiable today are headed by Mohammed Toaha and Abdul Matin.

Toaha, a well-educated man in his 40s, appears at the moment to be the main Communist guerrilla leader. He was general secretary of the National Awami League until last May 30, when he broke with Bhashani. His chief aide, Abdul Huq, was general secretary of Bhashani's peasant movement, the Krishak Samiti.

An unidentified spokesman for the pro-Moscow Communist party of East Pakistan criticized these "Peking-ites" last year in the "World Marxist Review," a Soviet-controlled journal. There is no love lost among the various Communist factions.

Toaha seems, however, to have the support of the Naxalites, the Maoist-inspired Communist revolutionaries operating in the West Bengal state of India. They could provide a channel for weapons and knowledge of how to use them. The Naxalites have been praised in the past by Peking. But the situation now in East Pakistan is awkward for the Chinese. They have strongly backed Yahya Khan's government, which is their most important diplomatic friend in Asia.

The Soviets, on the other hand, have been critical of the bloodshed in East Pakistan. They have showed more concern about cementing a future friendship with the East Pakistanis than protecting their present ties to Yahya Khan.

Soviet President Nikolai V. Podgorny announced that the East Pakistani Communist party—which is illegal at home—was attending the recent party congress in Moscow. Then Pravda published the speech of the unidentified delegation head.

After praising the Soviet Union, the speaker thanked his hosts for their concern over "the massacre of thousands of unarmed, innocent people by the reactionary military government" of Pakistan.

BACKGROUND TO THE FAILURE OF THE NEGOTIATION BETWEEN SHAIKH MUJIB AND THE LEADERS OF WEST PAKISTAN: SECRET CATALOGUE OF GUILT AND DISASTER OVER EAST PAKISTAN

Within the space of a few short weeks both East and West Bengal have suddenly become international trouble spots. Millions of people have been uprooted by civil war, thousands have been killed, famine and disease are already beginning to stalk the countryside and a full scale war between India and Pakistan threatens to break out at any moment.

World leaders are, of course, talking glibly about the hope that East Bengalis and the West Pakistanis will come to a "political settlement." But even the most naive student of Pakistani affairs knows that a political settlement is out of the question now.

In the coming months the legal aspects behind this man made holocaust will be hotly debated in the capitals of the world and on international platforms. But many of the issues which precipitated this convulsion have been clouded by the cries of "secession" or "genocide" and other accusations have been clouded by the cries of "terrorism". Accusations and counter accusations have been levelled. Accusations and if an accusing finger is to be pointed at any single Pakistani leader then one must, at this juncture, take a judicious look at the chronological sequence of events leading up to the rift.

It is worthwhile picking up the threads in January, 1970 when President Yahya Khan, who had promised to hand over power to a popular government, lifted the ban on political activity in both East and West Pakistan as the prelude to election of a constituent assembly. To hasten the constitution making process and to assuage the fears of West Pakistanis who believed that integration process and might be jeopardized by imagined East Bengali separatists the President had earlier issued a legal framework order (LFO) which gave him the right to reject the constitution.

It was already obvious that the former Foreign Minister, Mr. Bhutto, would emerge as the most popular leader in West Pakistan and the fiery East Bengali leader, Shaikh Mujibur Rahman had already demonstrated his strength in the streets of East Pakistan.

Political activity began in earnest the moment the ban was lifted and as both of the leaders began to barnstorm their respective provinces Pakistanis began, for the first time, to look forward to their first taste of democracy.

But as the 1970s leaders launched their campaigns it soon became clear that they would be hardly any on rigid and diametrically opposed grounds and that whose whole political basis is essentially founded in the militant Punjabis' obsession over the Kashmir dispute, began stamping up and down the western province his voters that he stood for a strong central government, a strong arm offensive to liberate Kashmir.

As millions of Pakistanis went to the polls in the country's first free elections last year General Yahya Khan and his aides waited for the results with bated breath. President Yahya certainly intended to hand over power but he had hoped that the results would force East and West Pakistani leaders into an alliance which would preserve the integrity of the country. But the generals had not counted on two factors. At the last moment the Awami League's major political opponent, the left wing National Awami Party, decided to boycott the elections leaving the field open to the Awami League. At the same time the West Pakistani administration's alleged failure to come to the timely assistance of cyclone victims was used to conjure up more votes for the Awami League and in terms of preserving the integrity of the country the results were disastrous.

But Mr. Bhutto, who knew that he could never become Prime Minister of an undivided Pakistan was thinking of the future within hours of the election. He suddenly discovered that he had a vested interest in the President's legal framework, which gave the President the right to veto or reject the laws which gave the Punjab its veto.

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assembly would sit in Dacca had relaxed. The mood in the house and the mood in Dacca had relaxed. Independence was raised and no one was talking of independence. At first he tried to oppose the early sitting of the Assembly but Mr. Bhutto had other ideas. On February 13 President Yahya announced that the Assembly meet on February 13. This precipitated the present crisis came two days later. The Assembly met on March 3. It was decided that his party would boycott the Assembly.

The actual point of no return which precipitated the present crisis was the announcement by Mr. Bhutto that he would meet on March 3. The actual point of no return which precipitated the present crisis was the announcement by Mr. Bhutto that he would meet on March 3. The actual point of no return which precipitated the present crisis was the announcement by Mr. Bhutto that he would meet on March 3.

In the meantime several West Pakistanis had defied Mr. Bhutto's threat and had travelled to Dacca in the last week of February to participate in two thirds of the representatives of two thirds of the country had congregated in Dacca.

On Saturday 28 Mr. Bhutto flew to Rawalpindi to remind President Yahya Khan of a constitution which he had ratified a constitution which was being imposed by the Punjab army.

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But one thing was clear at this juncture: the union of Bengal's demands with India (as the Bengalis advocated) and opposed all of effective power. He would certainly not compromise the central government of an inbuilt majority for autonomy which would strip the Bengalis had been allocated an inbuilt majority. The Punjab sighed with relief. The Bengalis had their large population but every Punjabi believed they had found a leader who could stand up to the Shaikh.

The speech was stronger than anything the Soviet government had said, but not much stronger, and by publishing it in the newspaper of the party which controls that government the speech was officially endorsed.

The Kremlin might well hope that its supporters among East Pakistan's splintered Communists will assume leadership of the leftist forces fighting the army.

This seems doubtful, however. The Maoists are stronger at the moment. And they can get help across the Indian border, whereas pro-Moscow Indian Communists have little strength in West Bengal.

[From the London Times, Friday June 4, 1971]

BACKGROUND TO THE FAILURE OF THE NEGOTIATION BETWEEN SHAIKH MUJIB AND THE LEADERS OF WEST PAKISTAN: SECRET CATALOGUE OF GUILT AND DISASTER OVER EAST PAKISTAN

Within the space of a few short weeks both East and West Bengal have suddenly become international trouble spots. Millions of people have been uprooted by civil war, thousands have been killed, famine and disease are already beginning to stalk the countryside and a full scale war between India and Pakistan threatens to break out at any moment.

But even more disturbing is the fact that the situation can only deteriorate. World leaders are, of course, talking glibly about the hope that East Bengalis and the West Pakistanis will come to a "political settlement." But even the most naive student of Pakistani affairs knows that a political settlement is out of the question now.

In the coming months the legal aspects behind this man made holocaust will be hotly debated in the capitals of the world and on international platforms. But many of the issues which precipitated this convulsion have been clouded by the cries of "secession" or "genocide" and other accusations and counter accusations and if an accusing finger is to be pointed at any single Pakistani leader then one must, at this juncture, take a judicious look at the chronological sequence of events leading up to the rift.

It is worthwhile picking up the threads in January, 1970 when President Yahya Khan, who had promised to hand over power to a popular government, lifted the ban on political activity in both East and West Pakistan as the prelude to election of a constituent assembly. To hasten the constitution making process and to assuage the fears of West Pakistanis who believed that integrity of Pakistan might be jeopardized by imagined East Bengali separatists the President had earlier issued a legal framework order (LFO) which gave him the right to ratify or reject the constitution.

It was already obvious that the former Foreign Minister, Mr. Bhutto, would emerge as the most popular leader in West Pakistan and the fiery East Bengali leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had already demonstrated his strength on the streets of East Pakistan.

Political activity began in earnest the moment the ban was lifted and as both of the leaders began to barnstorm their respective provinces Pakistanis began, for the first time, to look forward to their first taste of democracy.

But as the two leaders launched their campaigns it soon became clear that they were fighting the elections on rigid and diametrically opposed grounds and that there would be hardly any common meeting ground in the assembly. Mr. Bhutto, whose whole political base is essentially founded in the militant Punjabis' obsession over the Kashmir dispute, began stomping up and down the western province talking of a thousand-year war with India. And to maintain this attitude he assured his voters that he stood for a strong central government, a strong army and a new offensive to liberate Kashmir.

As millions of Pakistanis went to the polls in the country's first free elections last year General Yahya Khan and his aides waited for the results with bated breath. President Yahya certainly intended to hand over power but he had hoped that the results would force East and West Pakistani leaders into an alliance which would preserve the integrity of the country. But the generals had not counted on two factors. At the last moment the Awami League's major political opponent, the left wing National Awami Party, decided to boycott the elections leaving the field open to the Awami League. At the same time the West Pakistani administration's alleged failure to come to the timely assistance of cyclone victims was used to conjure up more votes for the Awami League and in terms of preserving the integrity of the country the results were disastrous.

Almost every Bengali endorsed the Shaikh's six point programme which turned the election into a referendum. The Awami League swept the polls and claimed 167 of the 169 Bengali seats and with the support of the anti-Punjabi regional parties in the western province, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was confident of obtaining the support of more than two-thirds of the 313 members of the Constituent Assembly. In West Pakistan Mr. Bhutto and his People's Party won 82 of the 138 seats allocated to the western wing. The Punjab recoiled in horror for it became blatantly obvious that the Bengalis would be able to draw up their own constitution at the moment the assembly met.

But Mr. Bhutto, who knew that he could never become Prime Minister of an undivided Pakistan was thinking of the future within hours of the election. He suddenly discovered that he had a vested interest in the President's legal framework order. The clause which gave the President the right to veto or reject the Constituent Assembly's document had become the Punjab's veto.

On the night after the elections the flamboyant lawyer revealed part of his plan to me: "What do you think I will do. The Shaikh will push his constitution through with his brute majority and the responsibility will lie on the President's shoulders. I doubt whether he will sign a document which is unacceptable to West Pakistan."

In other words Mr. Bhutto had a vested interest in keeping the LFO in force but he had told me that he had heard disconcerting reports that the Shaikh was planning to declare that the Constituent Assembly was sovereign body the moment it met. In other words the LFO and the Punjab's veto would disappear. In the meantime the Bengalis were in a festive mood and there had been no moves towards secession. On December 24 President Yahya had described Mujibur Rahman as "our future prime minister" and had agreed that the constituent assembly would sit in Dacca. The Bengalis began to decorate the city and assembly house and no one was talking of independence.

But Mr. Bhutto had other ideas. At first he tried to oppose the early sitting of the Assembly but on February 13 President Yahya announced that Assembly would meet on March 3.

The actual point of no return which precipitated the present crisis came two days later on February 15. Mr. Bhutto announced that his party would boycott the Constituent Assembly and at the same time he threatened any other West Pakistani politicians who were planning to travel to Dacca. In short Mr. Bhutto began to pile up pressure on President Yahya.

At the same time Mr. Bhutto had met several of President Yahya's generals who were considered hawks on the subject of East Bengal. They included the present governor of East Pakistan, General Tikka Khan. Mr. Bhutto's threat and the fact that several West Pakistanis had defied Mr. Bhutto in the framing of the constitution. In terms of arithmetic the representatives of two thirds of the country had congregated in Dacca.

But on February 28 Mr. Bhutto flew to Rawalpindi to remind President Yahya of the consequences he would have to face if he ratified a constitution which was unacceptable to the Punjab and subsequently to a Punjabi army.

The President made his first mistake. He succumbed to Punjabi pressures and without consulting Shaikh Mujib, as the leader of the largest party, he postponed the Constituent Assembly on March 1.

The Bengalis who saw the move as a conspiracy went wild and the Army was called out to quell disturbances in Dacca. The Bengalis had lost their faith in the President and the first cries of Bangla Desh were heard on the streets of Dacca. Hawks in the Awami League began to call for independence and announced Dacca. Hawks in the Awami League began to call for independence and announced Dacca. Hawks in the Awami League began to call for independence and announced Dacca. Hawks in the Awami League began to call for independence and announced Dacca.

On March 6 the President attempted to retrieve the position and announced that the Assembly would meet on March 25. But things had gone too far. On the next day the Shaikh, staving off militant cries for independence, announced four preconditions for future talks. The most important was the withdrawal of martial law itself (this would eliminate Mr. Bhutto's veto in the form of the LFO). But one thing was clear at this juncture: the Shaikh, facing tremendous pressure, was still prepared to participate in the union of Pakistan. He would certainly not compromise the Kashmir issue by resuming trade ties with India (as the Bengalis advocated) and opposed all of all effective power. for autonomy which would strip the central government of an inbuilt majority. The Punjab sighed with relief. The Bengalis had been allocated an inbuilt majority in the Constituent Assembly by virtue of their large population but every Punjabi believed they had found a leader who could stand up to the Shaikh.

...the fiery Bengali leader a
...of autonomy he did not mean secession. "I want constitu
...which will end this economic exploitation forever. We have the
...population so how can a majority secede from a minority", he told me at the
...me.

To give weight to his demand for the immediate withdrawal of martial law the
Shaikh launched a massive civil disobedience movement. Life in the entire
province was disrupted and as the cries of Bangla Desh became louder the Presi-
dent flew to Dacca on March 16 with two alternative offers. (1) He said he was
willing to restore power to the elected representatives of the people immediately
if the Shaikh was willing to form a provisional national government at both
centre and at provincial level or (2) He would restore power to provinces and an
interim government led by the President himself would administer the day-to-day
needs of the country until a constitution was framed.

At the time the two leaders said there was room for optimism. But in the mean-
time Mr. Bhutto had heard of the proposals and had publicly declared that West
Pakistan would go up in smoke if the People's Party was not included in the
proposed coalition Government. To prove his point he launched a massive and
violent campaign in the Punjab and flew to Dacca on March 21 to join the
talks with other West Pakistani leaders.

When President Yahya asked the Shaikh whether he was prepared to take
Bhutto, the leader of the largest West Pakistani party, into a central coalition
government, the Shaikh cited democratic precedents and said that as the leader
of the single largest party he must be allowed to select his own partners. Again
his willingness to participate in the central affairs of Pakistan does not suggest
that the Shaikh was planning secession.

But the President succumbed to Mr. Bhuttos strident threats again and the
proposal for a national government was dropped.
As time began to run out the Shaikh and Yahya Khan agreed to the second
compromise formula: immediate restoration of power at provincial level. The
Shaikh asked the President to issue an immediate proclamation withdrawing
martial law, and restoring power to East Pakistan and the four provinces of West
Pakistan. The Shaikh agreed to the suggestion that the President could continue
to administer an interim central government until a constitution was framed.

But in the meantime Pakistan's future was being decided by other forces. Mr.
Bhutto had met the hawks in the army, and mass movement on the streets of
Bengal had slipped out of Mujib's control.
As the soldiers slipped into battle dress in the barracks angry and frustrated
Bengalis began to raise the flag of Bangla Desh in Dacca. It was Bhutto who
finally brought the President to take the decision which set East Bengal on fire.
When the President put the Shaikh's proposal to the West Pakistan leader
Mr. Bhutto pointed out that if martial law was withdrawn Pakistan would be
broken up into five sovereign states the moment the President restored power to
the provinces. He expressed the fear that Mujibur Rahman was trying to liquidate
the central government. Because the President withdrew martial law he had no
sanction to carry on as the head of state.
Half convinced the President went back to Mujibur Rahman and expressed
these fears. He promised Mujib that he would withdraw martial law the moment
the National Assembly met and gave a central government some form of validity.
Shaikh Mujib reiterated his demand for the immediate withdrawal of martial
law and President Yahya, now fully convinced that he was dealing with a traitor,
rned to his generals.
Taking events to their logical conclusion there is no doubt that the present
caust was precipitated by President Yahya Khan when he postponed the
mbly without consulting the Bengalis, but even more so by Mr. Bhutto's
erate decision to boycott the Assembly on March 3.



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