

666

The
Issue:

Rule
by
Ballot

The
Answer:

Reign
of
Terror

A Grim Chronicle of the 72 Million People of East Bengal

THE
UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
OFFICE OF
PUBLIC AFFAIRS



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THEY WENT TO VOTE

PAKISTAN


Affairs

Vol. XXIV, No. 1

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
Pakistan went to the polls twice last month to elect its National and Provincial Assemblies.




AND THEY FLED FROM BOMBS



Associated Press
BEN-GALI REFUGEES crossing shallow of the Ganges River to escape Pakistan Government forces near Goaludogath.



Source: National Observer
April 5, 1971



East Bengal

Area: (Sq. miles) 55,127

Population: (in million) 72

Language: Bengali

Economy: Primarily agrarian

Historical: Part of British India till August 1947.

PAKISTAN

SPECIAL ISSUE

Affairs

"... The Armed Forces, located in East Pakistan have been subjected to taunts and insults of all kinds. I wish to compliment them on the tremendous restraint they have shown.... I AM PROUD OF THEM".

*President Yahya Khan
in a broadcast on
March 26, 1971*

Newsweek

"... Some (West Pakistani) soldiers called a kid over and hit him around the head and in the groin and then forced him to his knees. The kid was crying and begging, and the soldiers just watched him for a minute. FINALLY THEY JUST SHOT HIM OUT OF HAND AND WALKED ON".

*Fritz Blankenship, a crane
operator employed by an
American company in East Bengal
told NEWSWEEK, April 19, 1971
after his evacuation by air.*

Tragic History of Events

FROM MARTIAL LAW TO MARTIAL LAW

March, 1969: After months of political unrest, General Yahya Khan takes power from General Ayub Khan and declares martial law.

November, 1969: General Yahya Khan announces elections to the National Assembly for October, 1970.

September, 1970: General Yahya Khan postpones election to the Assembly until December, 1970.

December, 1970: Pakistan's first national general elections are held. *Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's Awami League wins absolute majority in National Assembly that is supposed to write new constitution.*

Mr. Mujibur Rahman demands that the constitution be based on his party's six-point programme:

1. Establishment of a federation "on the basis of the Lahore Resolution and the parliamentary framework of government with supremacy of legislature directly elected on the basis of adult franchise".
2. Federal government shall deal with only two subjects; that is defense and foreign affairs and all other residuary subjects should rest in the federating states.
3. There should be either two separate but freely convertible currencies for the two wings or one currency for the whole country, *provided that effective constitutional provisions were made to stop the flight of capital from East to West Pakistan.* There should be separate banking

reserves and a separate fiscal and monetary policy for East Pakistan.

4. It denies the centre the right of taxation and vests it in the hands of the federating states with the centre receiving a fixed share.
5. Foreign trade: Five steps
 - a. There shall be two separate accounts for foreign exchange earnings.
 - b. Earnings of East Pakistan shall be under the control of East Pakistan and the same for West Pakistan.
 - c. Foreign exchange requirements of the federal government shall be met by the two wings either equally or in a ratio to be fixed.
 - d. Indigenous products shall move free of duty within the wings.
 - e. The constitution shall empower the unit governments to establish trade and commercial relations with, set up trade missions in, and enter into agreements with foreign countries.
6. Setting up a militia or para-military force by East Pakistan.

February, 1971: General Yahya Khan fixes March 3 for the Assembly.

March 1, 1971: General Yahya Khan postpones the Assembly.

March 6, 1971: General Yahya Khan re-schedules the Assembly for March 25.

March 22, 1971: General Yahya Khan postpones the Assembly for the third time.

March 26, 1971: General Yahya Khan announces new Martial Law measures:

Bans all political activity;
Imposes complete Press censorship;
Closes all educational institutions;
Terminates all bank transactions and orders accounts frozen;

ORDERS ARMY TO MOVE AGAINST
UNARMED EAST BENGALIS.

Economic and Political Domination of East Bengal

... the Political Balance Sheet

After the military regime of Ayub Khan took power in 1958, the East has had little political representation in the Centre. Underrepresentation of Bengalis in the army was severe, believed to be 10% or less. Ayub Khan, against whom the Bengalis had voted heavily in 1965, was forced to resign because of widespread unrest in both East and West, culminating in demonstrations and strikes in 1969. Since taking power in the Spring of 1969, Yahya Khan's martial law regime has always spoken of itself as an interim government to be replaced after popular elections. In the economic and social spheres, the army made no innovations. However, the military did take one positive step: they held free and fair elections in December of 1970, both for a Constituent Assembly and for Provincial Assemblies.

These elections were based on "one man, one vote;" this meant that in the Constituent Assembly the East was allotted roughly 55 percent of the seats. Two parties dominated the elections. In the East, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's party, the Awami League, won 167 out of 169 seats for the Constituent Assembly; in the West, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's party won approximately 80 out of 140 seats. The Awami League actually had sufficient seats to be a majority in the Constituent Assembly.

The Awami League ran on a single issue, autonomy for East Pakistan. Until the shooting began on March 25, they did not seek independence but a loose union with the West. While on paper they had the votes to dominate a strong central government they presumably felt they could not, in fact, dominate, given that the military, the civil service, and the large businesses were all in the hands of West Pakistanis. Therefore, they opted for a form of government which would give them control over what they considered their essential interests. The established interest groups in the West, par-

ticularly the military whose budget was threatened and large businesses who stood both to lose markets and the foreign exchange earnings of the East, opposed autonomy for the East.

When it was clear that the East would not compromise on its demand for autonomy, President Yahya Khan postponed the Constituent Assembly scheduled for March 3, resulting in demonstrations in which hundreds of people died in army firing on March 1. Despite this provocation, Sheikh Mujib kept the door for negotiations open. **General Yahya Khan appeared to respond by holding talks for two weeks with the Awami League leadership. In retrospect this appears to have been a ploy to buy time for reinforcing the West Pakistani armed forces in the East. On March 25, the military authority outlawed the Awami League, arrested its leaders, and opened fire with tanks, artillery, and automatic weapons (much of its supplied by the U.S.) on the defenseless and unarmed civilians.**

Invasion by the Military

The military's approach appears to be to intimidate the urban population through a reign of terror. Killing and destruction apparently have been indiscriminate. Reports on the number killed in the first three days ranged from 15,000 up.

In the short run the army can intimidate the people of the major cities. *But it cannot even now control any substantial part of the countryside. In the long run the military position is untenable.* In a hostile environment and given the logistical problems, maintaining even the 60,000 West Pakistani troops now in the East, will be difficult. Moreover, the military cannot possibly guard the borders or prevent the Bengalis from acquiring arms with which to resist.

The Bengalis have now declared themselves independent and have the will to fight. *In the end, they will win;* the only question is time, how many deaths, and how much destruction must take place before they achieve their independence.

The recent elections provided East Pakistan with a political party capable of governing. Rather than a civil war, the present action is more of an invasion of one state by the military of another, with the aim of overthrowing a duly elected government and subjugating the people.

In many ways East and West Pakistan have never been one country. Even at its strongest, the bond between East and West Pakistan was somewhat tenuous. They are physically more than 1,000 miles apart, the people speak different languages, have different cultures and different economies.

Since the formation of the state of Pakistan 24 years back, the East Bengalis have derived little benefit from the association.

It has become increasingly apparent that the economic and political interests of the East Pakistanis have been systematically subordinated to those of West Pakistan.


A recent report by a panel of experts to the Planning Commission of the Government of Pakistan showed that, while average (per capita) income in the West was 32% higher than in the East in 1959-60, the disparity had almost doubled to 61% ten years later in 1969-70.

The Pakistan Government's instruments of tariffs, import controls, industrial licensing, foreign aid budgeting, and investment allocation have been used to direct investment and imports to develop high-cost industries in West Pakistan whose profitability is guaranteed by an East Pakistan market held captive behind tariff walls and import quotas.

Though 60% of all Pakistanis live in the East, its share of Central Government development expenditure has fluctuated between a low of 20% during 1950/51-1954/55 and a high of 36% in the period 1965/66-1969/70.

Historically, 50% to 70% of Pakistan's export earnings have been earned by East Pakistan's products, mainly jute, hides and skin. Yet its share of foreign imports (which are financed by export earnings and foreign aid) has remained between 25% and 30%.

WEST AND EAST —THE CONTRAST



Pakistan House, a hotel for MPs in the capital city Islamabad in West Pakistan, is built in green and white to symbolise peace and prosperity

Basically, the East's balance of payments surplus has been used to help finance the West's deficit on foreign account leading to a net transfer of resources, estimated by an official report to be approximately \$2.6 billion over the period 1948/49 to 1968/69.

The subordination of the East's economic interests has been accomplished by the overwhelming concentration of governmental authority in the hands of West Pakistanis.

... From a Paper Reviewed for The Ripon Society by J. Lee Auspitz, President, Ripon Society; Stephen A. Marglin, Professor of Economics, Harvard University; Gustav F. Papenek, Lecturer on Economics and former Director, Development Advisory Service, Harvard University.



A woman searches the debris of her village Goalunda, in East Pakistan, after an air-raid which killed her son and daughter

THE SUNDAY TIMES, APRIL 18, 1971

... the Economic Balance Sheet

The independence of East Pakistan is inevitable. What started as a movement for economic autonomy within the framework of a united Pakistan has been irrevocably transformed by the wholesale slaughter of East Pakistani civilians into a movement that sooner or later will produce an independent East Pakistan — "Bangla Desh" is a matter of time.

In brief, the fact of a large and widening gap in the average standard of living between the two regions of the country is incontestable. Even the West Pakistani-dominated Government admits that the average East Pakistani must make do with barely two-thirds the average income in the West,

and he faces higher prices too. The East Pakistanis argue that income disparity is largely the result of a systematic subordination of the interests of the Eastern region to those of the West; specifically, the East Pakistanis charge that allocation of foreign exchange — both that earned by the export of East Pakistani jute and that provided by foreign aid — disproportionately favors West Pakistan; that allocation of domestic investment reinforces the income disparity; and that high tariffs and import quotas raise prices to East Pakistanis in order to provide profits and jobs in West Pakistan.

We believe that in the main the facts support these charges. Pakistan Government policies have at the very least exacerbated the inequalities that arise from an uneven

distribution of natural resources between the two regions, and a disproportionate share of the benefits of economic development have accrued to West Pakistan.

The political program of Sheikh Mujib's Awami League, overwhelmingly endorsed by the people of East Pakistan in the recent elections, sought to correct these disparities by transferring control over economic policy from the Central Government to the provinces. The response of the Yahya Khan's Government has been to unleash a reign of terror whose full dimensions are only gradually becoming known.

East Pakistanis blame three instruments of central government policy for their plight:

1. Pakistan's scant investible resources, plus foreign aid, are directed unduly to the development of West Pakistan — to the comparative neglect of East Pakistan.
2. In particular, East Pakistan's foreign trade earnings are diverted to finance imports for West Pakistan.
3. Economic policy favors West Pakistan at the expense of the East. Specifically, tariffs, import controls, and industrial licensing compel East Pakistan to purchase commodities from West Pakistan which, but for the controls, they could obtain more cheaply in world markets.

We believe the East Pakistani claims to be largely justified. First, it is indisputable that the bulk of public investment has been in West Pakistan though the majority of the population lies in the East. With 60% of the population, East Pakistan's share of central government development expenditure has been as low as 20% during 1950/51-1954/55, attaining a peak of 36% during the Third Five Year Plan period 1965/66-1969/70. East Pakistan has received an even smaller share of private investment, less than 25%.

As for the second point, it is clear that foreign exchange has been allocated to the detriment of East Pakistan. Over the last two decades East Pakistan's share of total Pakistan export earnings has varied between

50% and 70%, while its share of imports has been in the range of 25% to 30%. Until 1962/63 East Pakistan has shown significant surpluses on foreign account, which has changed in recent years to small deficits. By contrast the West's foreign trade has shown a substantial and chronic deficit that has absorbed virtually all foreign exchange made available through foreign aid.

With respect to the third point, general economic policy has clearly favored West Pakistan. The West's preponderant share of imports and investments might have provided inexpensive necessities for all of Pakistan's people. In fact it has allowed the development of inefficient industries, which, ironically, have prospered largely because of tariffs and quotas that have made East Pakistan a captive market. 40% of all exports of West Pakistan are sold to East Pakistan; in 1968/69 the West sold 50% more to the East than it bought from the East.

An analysis of foreign trade data reveals that a net transfer of resources has taken place from East to West Pakistan. According to official reports, East Pakistan has transferred approximately \$2.6 billion to West Pakistan over the period 1948-49 to 1968-69.

In short, Pakistan's economic policies are harmful to East Pakistan. "Exploitation" may be a strong word, but it seems clear, all in all, that East Pakistan's economic interests have been subordinated to those of the West.

The economic domination of East Pakistan has been facilitated by West Pakistani dominance of the Central Government. The military regime in Pakistan since 1958, and decision-making authority rests with a well-entrenched civil service and their military bosses. All senior military members of the administration have been West Pakistani, and of the senior officers in the Central civil services, 87% were West Pakistani in 1960, and the proportion has not changed much since.

The location of the Central Government in West Pakistan has encouraged the concen-

tration of industry and the entrepreneurial class in West Pakistan.

U.S. Economic and Military Aid to Pakistan

Since 1951 Pakistan has been a major recipient of U.S. economic aid amounting to approximately \$3 billion by 1969. Except for food aid donated under Public Law 480, *the bulk of this assistance has been used to support industrialization in West Pakistan, with only a handful of projects undertaken in East Pakistan.*

The quantum of U.S. military aid to Pakistan is a classified figure but two estimates put it between \$1.5 to \$2 billion for the period between 1954 and 1965. The assistance has included F-104 Starfighters, Patton tanks, armoured personnel carriers, automatic and recoilless infantry weapons. This impressive array of modern weaponry was given expressly for defensive purposes. With Pakistan an early member of SEATO and CENTO this military aid was intended to bolster the armed containment of the Communist Bloc in the Dulles era of U.S. foreign policy but apart from the brief border war with India of 1965 the only active use of these sophisticated weapons has occurred against the unarmed and defenseless civilian population of East Pakistan.

The growth and maintenance of the superstructure of the armed forces which was built up with massive U.S. military aid continued even after 1965 when the United States decided to put an embargo on the delivery of arms to both Pakistan and India. This was made possible by diverting resources from the much needed development projects. East Pakistan, poorer and less powerful politically than the West, suffered more by this irrational policy.

Surprisingly, the United States has just recently (October 1970) made an exception to its embargo on military sales to Pakistan. According to the information available, the United States has offered to supply Pakistan the following items:

- a. Armored personnel carriers (approximately 300)
 - b. Maritime reconnaissance aircraft (4)
 - c. F-104 jet fighters (6)
 - d. B-57 bombers (7)
- ... From *Conflict in East Pakistan* By: Edward S. Mason, Lamont University Professor Emeritus, Harvard University (in 1954/55 directed an 8-man team that drew up the first development plan for Pakistan; Robert Dorfman, Professor of Economics, Harvard University (Concerned with Pakistan since 1961 when he became a member of the White House team to advise Pakistan); Stephen A. Marglin, Professor of Economics, Harvard University.

Feud Between the Two Pakistans Has Some Economic Roots

By Charles Smith
London Financial Times

New Analysis

East and West Pakistan are fighting in part at least, about economic problems. And the economic plight of the East, which places it among the eight poorest countries in the world, can be partially attributed to the very fact that it is part of Pakistan.

In 1947, when the two halves of the country started out on their hazardous course as a Moslem nation after partition from Hindu India, the East wing was actually better off than the West in a number of important respects.

Its jute crop, which to this day provides Pakistan with its biggest single source of foreign exchange, was at that time the only product of any importance which either wing of the country had to offer to world trade. The textile mills around Dacca and Chittagong in the East constituted virtually the only industry of which Pakistan could boast and, as

far as the future was concerned, East Pakistan's flat and well-watered countryside looked more promising for development than the relatively arid West.

What East Pakistan did not have, however, and has never possessed to any significant extent until today, was political power — and it was the exercise of power by the leadership in the West that started the rot.

The first blow to the East's economy was the cutting off for political reasons of trade between East Bengal (as East Pakistan had been called before separation from India) and the neighboring Indian state of West Bengal.

The cut meant that Pakistan's jute could no longer be shipped for processing in India, and that on both sides of the frontier steps had to be taken to build up self-sufficient industries.

By the time East Pakistan had finished developing its jute processing industry in the mid 1950s, it was starting to notice the loss of its biggest single market — India — for the raw product. By that time, too, it was feeling the effects of increasing industrialization in the West.

This was based on the transfer, under exceptionally favorable tax terms, of Moslem-owned industries from Bombay to Karachi, which soon began to overtake Dacca and other cities of East Pakistan as the commercial and economic heart of the divided country.

West Pakistan's industry exports its goods under a foreign exchange subsidy system which gave it a distinct advantage over agriculture — until the system was belatedly extended last year to East Pakistan jute. The West's products were dear by world standards, but they had a privileged market in East Pakistan which was thereby restrained from buying cheap manufactured goods from international suppliers.

By the end of Pakistan's first decade, this system had produced a 20 per cent disparity in the per capita incomes of the East and West wings (arising largely out of the fact

that there had been almost no increase during the 1950s in the income levels of Easterners). During the 1960s, attempts were made to correct the imbalance, or at least they were written into such documents as the revised 1962 constitution and the successive five-year plans.

But the disparity has continued to grow and so, also, has the range of factors contributing to it. By the end of the decade there was a 47 per cent gap (according to East Pakistan figures) between the incomes of the two wings. East Pakistan's per capita income was still at the pathetically low level of around \$70 per head.

Officially, from 1965 onwards, the East became entitled to 52 per cent of public funds allocated for national development. But failures and delays in implementation meant that it was getting far less than this. Meanwhile there were other factors, such as military spending, the huge Indus Valley scheme (regarded a central government project but located in the West) and the continuing one-way flow of private investment which widened the gap still further.

In the last few years the only aspect of East Pakistan's economy which appeared healthier than that of the West has been its international balance of payments.

This has been kept under control largely by holding back imports. In 1967-68 East Pakistan, with a larger population, imported less than half as much as West Pakistan. However, East Pakistan's surplus has served as yet another subsidy for the costly industrialization of the West.

With a list of grievances like this, and with a claim that their country is in the most desperate economic plight in the world, it is hardly surprising that East Pakistan's leaders have consistently demanded economic autonomy from the West.

THE WASHINGTON POST
Friday, April 9, 1971

New York Post

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VOL. 61, NO. 121
TWO SECTIONS

EAST

WITH DAILY EVENING EDITION

In Dacca, Troops Use Artillery to Halt Revolt

ARTILLERY USED: Civilians Fired On Sections of Dacca Are Set Ablaze

By SYDNEY H. SCHANBERG
Special to The New York Times

DACCA Pakistan, March 27 — The Pakistan Army is using artillery and heavy machine guns against unarmed East Pakistani civilians to crush the movement for autonomy in this province of 75 million people.

The attack began late Thursday night without warning. West Pakistani soldiers, who predominate in the army, moved into the streets of Dacca, the provincial capital, to besiege the strongholds of the independence movement, such as the university.

There was no way of knowing how many civilians had been killed or wounded. Neither was any information available on what was happening in the rest of the province, although there had been

Mr. Schanberg was one of 35 foreign newsmen expelled Saturday morning from East Pakistan. He cabled this dispatch from Bombay, India.

reports before the Dacca attack of clashes between civilians and West Pakistani soldiers in the interior.

From the hotel, which is in North Dacca, huge fires could be seen in various parts of the city, including the university area and the barracks of the East Pakistan Rifles, a paramilitary force made up of Bengalis, the predominant people of East Pakistan.

Some fires were still burning and sporadic shooting was continuing early this morning when the 35 foreign newsmen were expelled from Dacca.

"My God, my God," said a Pakistani student watching from a hotel window, trying to keep back tears, "they're killing them. They're slaughtering them."

Homes Set Afire

On the ride to the airport in a guarded convoy of military trucks, the newsmen saw troops setting fire to the thatched-roof houses of poor Bengalis who live along the road and who are some of the staunchest supporters of the self-rule movement.

When the military action began on Thursday night, soldiers, shouting victory slogans, set ablaze large areas in many parts of Dacca after first shooting into the buildings with automatic rifles, machine guns and recoilless rifles.

When the foreign newsmen, all of whom were staying at the Intercontinental Hotel, tried to go outside to find out what was happening, they were forced back in by a heavily reinforced army guard and told they would be shot if they tried to step out of the building.

The fire began to increase in the vicinity of the hotel and at 1 A.M. it seemed to become very heavy all over the city.

At 1:25 A.M. the phones at the hotel went dead, shut down by order of the military guard outside. The lights on the telegraph office tower went out at about the same time. Heavy automatic-weapons fire could be heard in the university area and other districts.

Attack at Shopping Bazaar

At about 2:15 A.M. a jeep with a mounted machine gun drove by the front of the hotel, turned left on Mymensingh Road and stopped in front of a shopping bazaar, with its gun trained on the second floor windows. A dozen soldiers on foot joined those on the jeep, one group carrying some kind of rocket piece.

From the second floor suddenly came cries of "Bengalis, unite!" and the soldiers opened fire with the machine gun, spraying the building indiscriminately. The soldiers then started moving down an alley adjacent to the bazaar, firing into, and then overturning cars that were blocking the alley. The scene was lit by the soldiers' flashlights, and to the newsmen watching from the 10th floor of the Intercontinental, it was an incredible drama.

As the soldiers were firing down the alley, a group of about 15 or 20 young Bengalis started along the road toward them, from about 200 yards off. They were shouting in defiance at the soldiers, but seemed unarmed and their hands appeared empty.

The machine gun on the jeep swung around toward them and opened fire. Soldiers with automatic rifles joined in. The Bengali youths scattered into the shadows on both sides of the road. It was impossible to tell whether any had been wounded or killed.

The soldiers then turned their attention back to the alley. They set a spare-parts garage on fire and then moved on to what was apparently their main objective, the office and press of The People, an English-language daily paper that had strongly supported Sheik Mujib and ridiculed the army.

Shouting in Urdu, the language of West Pakistan, the soldiers warned any persons inside that unless they surrendered they would be shot. There was no answer and no one emerged. The troops then fired a rocket into the building and followed this with small arms fire and machine-gun bursts. Then they set fire to the building and began smashing the press and other equipment.

Moving farther along, they set ablaze all the shops and shacks behind the bazaar and soon the flames were climbing high above the two-story building.

Shortly after 4 A.M. the shouting eased somewhat, but artillery rounds and machine-gun bursts could be heard occasionally. Tracer bullets from a long way off flew by the hotel.

At 4:45 A.M., another big fire blazed, in the direction of the East Pakistan Rifles headquarters.

At 5:45, in the hazy light of dawn six Chinese-made T-51 light tanks with soldiers riding on them rumbled into the city and began patrolling main thoroughfares.

The intermittent firing and occasional artillery bursts continued through yesterday and early today, right up to the time the newsmen were expelled.

Helicopters wheeled overhead yesterday morning, apparently on reconnaissance. Four helicopters given to Pakistan by Saudi Arabia for relief work after last November's cyclone and tidal wave in East Pakistan were reported being used for the military operation in the province.

Yahya in West Pakistan

At 7 A.M. the Dacca radio, which had been taken over by the army, announced that President Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan had arrived back in West Pakistan and would address the nation at 8 P.M.

Shortly after 8 A.M., a black 1959 Chevrolet with an armed escort of troops in jeeps and trucks pulled up in front of the hotel. This convoy was to take Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his party to the airport to fly back to West Pakistan.

Mr. Bhutto, the dominant political leader of West Pakistan, opposed Sheik Mujib's demands for East Pakistan autonomy.

It is generally accepted that his opposition, supported or engineered by the army and business establishment in West Pakistan, was what forced the crisis. Mr. Bhutto, who

is aware that the Bengalis largely blame him for their present troubles, came into the lobby flanked by civilian and army bodyguards with automatic weapons. He looked frightened and brushed off all newsmen's questions with, "I have no comment to make."

At 10 A.M. the radio announced the new martial orders.

Every time newsmen in the hotel asked officers for information, they were rebuffed. All attempts to reach diplomatic missions failed. In one confrontation, a captain grew enraged at a group of newsmen who had walked out the front door to talk to him. He ordered them back into the building and, to their retreating backs, he shouted, "I can handle you. If I can kill my own people, I can kill you."

Crisis Reported Controlled

Shortly afterward, the military government sent word to the hotel that foreign newsmen must be ready to leave by 6:15 P.M. The newsmen packed and paid their bills, but it was 8:20, just after President Yahya's speech, before their convoy of five trucks with soldiers in front and back, left for the airport.

Just before leaving, the lieutenant colonel in charge was asked by a newsman why the foreign press had to leave. "We want you to leave because it would be too dangerous for you," he said. "It will be too bloody." All the hotel employees and other foreigners in the hotel believed that once the newsmen left, carnage would begin.

"This isn't going to be a hotel," said a hotel official, "its going to be a bloody hospital."

At the airport, with firing going on in the distance, the newsmen's luggage was rigidly checked and some television film, particularly that of the British Broadcasting Corporation, was confiscated.

Army Expels 35 Foreign Newsmen From Pakistan

BY GRACE LICHTENSTEIN

Military authorities expelled 35 foreign newsmen from East Pakistan yesterday after confining them to a hotel in Dacca for more than 48 hours.

Soldiers of the Pakistani Army threatened to shoot the newsmen if they left the Intercontinental Hotel in North Dacca, from which they could see troops firing on unarmed civilians who supported the East Pakistani rebels.

Before they were put on a plane to Karachi, the newsmen, including

The New York Times correspondent, Sydney H. Schanberg, were searched and their notes, films and files were confiscated.

They represented newspapers and other media in the United States, Australia, Britain, Canada, France, Japan and Russia.

While in Dacca, the newsmen were prevented from filing any dispatches or contacting diplomatic missions.

Mr. Schanberg reported that when the lieutenant colonel in charge of the area around the hotel was asked why the foreign press had to leave,

he replied: "We don't have to explain. This is our country."

Then as he turned away, smiling contemptuously, he added: "We want you to leave because it would be too dangerous for you. It will be too bloody."

A. M. Rosenthal, managing editor of The Times, protested in a telegram to the Pakistani Government.

The telegram said:

"Stunned by unwarranted and unprecedented expulsion of New York Times correspondent Sydney Schanberg and more than 30 other foreign correspondents from Dacca. Con-

trary to all principles of international press freedom, Mr. Schanberg and others were confined to the Intercontinental Hotel in Dacca under threat that they would be shot if they left the building in performance of their journalistic duties.

"They were subsequently expelled from the country after confiscation of their papers and film. Can only believe that this must have been error on part of military authorities. Trust that your Government will rectify this situation immediately."

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, MARCH 28, 1971

Sticks and Spears Against Tanks In East Pakistan, Sticks Against Tanks

BY SYDNEY H. SCHANBERG

Special to The New York Times

NEW DELHI, March 28— The people of East Pakistan, armed with sticks, spears and homemade rifles, are mounting a resistance movement against a military force from West Pakistan that is armed with planes, bombs, tanks and heavy artillery.

The resistance, which began after a surprise attack on the civilian population by the Government force three nights ago, sprang from a nonviolent drive for provincial autonomy.

The East Pakistanis tried to claim the majority political power they had won in the elections last December, and the army moved to prevent this.

Earlier this month, Maj. Saddiqui Salik, public relations officer for the martial-law administration in East Pakistan, was telling foreign newsmen about the role of the Pakistani Army in dealing with disobedient civilians.

"When you call in the army," said the tall West Pakistani officer, "it's a last resort. The army would shoot to kill."

The remark was prophetic. Two weeks later, starting last Thursday night, the Pakistani Army apparently began killing anybody who moved in the streets of Dacca or who shouted defiance from a window. The troops used artillery, machine guns, recoilless rifles and rockets against East Pakistani civilians to crush the Bengali movement for self-rule.

It seems certain that thousands of Bengalis will be killed, but their dedication to the self-rule movement and to their leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, is deep—so deep that it is questionable whether what is virtually a foreign army from a region 1,000 miles away can control East Pakistan indefinitely.

The army comes from the West, big business is concentrated there, the per capita income is higher, prices are lower. Everything is better for the 55 million West Pakistanis than for the 75 million East Pakistanis.

Many Bengalis, as the people of East Pakistan are known, had fled the city in the last few weeks for home villages in the interior.

Foreign newsmen, including this correspondent, were expelled from East Pakistan on Saturday. Their film and notebooks were confiscated in thorough body and luggage searches.

Most of the East's foreign exchange earnings and taxes went for development projects in the West and for the support of the army, which consumes more than 60 per cent of the national budget. Fewer than 10 per cent of the troops are Bengalis.

The army has acquired most of its weapons from the United States, the Soviet bloc and Communist China. So far, none of the major powers have criticized the army's action in East Pakistan.

Heavy secrecy surrounded the political talks in Dacca whose breakdown was followed by the army's surprise attack. But the bits and pieces that have come to light make it clear that the power establishment in the West never intended to let Sheikh Mujib win a significant measure of autonomy for East Pakistan.

President Aga Mohammad, Yahya Khan—whose image as a potentially decent general, sympathetic to the Bengalis' grievances, has changed drastically—said that the talks had broken down because Sheikh Mujib refused to let an agreement be negotiated at a session of the newly elected National Assembly. But Sheikh Mujib knew that he had to

get an agreement in writing before the Assembly met.

The talks dragged on for 10 days and the Bengali "bush telegraph" said that they were taking too long, that something was wrong.

During this time, Sheikh Mujib and his Awami League defied the martial-law administration by leading a nonviolent movement of non-cooperation with the virtually unanimous support of the population.

Sheikh Mujib's followers took over certain Government agencies, closed others and ignored directives, such as the one that ordered civilian defense employees to report to work or face 10 years "rigorous imprisonment."

The green, red and gold flag of Bangla Desh—Bengali for Bengal Nation was unveiled and militant

students and workers began demanding complete independence, not simply semiautonomy.

But those buoyant days for the Bengalis ended quickly. After initial reports of progress the talks slowed and fears of an army crackdown revived.

Troops were flown in daily from West Pakistan and many Bengalis began to believe that the negotiations were being deliberately prolonged to give the Government in West Pakistan time to get heavy reinforcements to the East.

Clashes between civilians erupted in several towns and a number of deaths were reported. Sheikh Mujib denounced what he called "a reign of terror" in a statement distributed last Thursday just before 7 P.M. Four hours later, the troops moved into the streets and began firing.

NEW STATESMAN, APRIL 16, 1971

Blood of Bangla Desh

If blood is the price of a people's right to independence, Bangla Desh has overpaid. Of all the recent struggles to bring down governments and change frontiers in the name of national freedom the war in East Bengal may prove the bloodiest and briefest. On this level alone, the East Pakistanis have achieved a record of suffering. But even if their movement is destroyed within a few days or weeks, it may only be a temporary defeat in a war of liberation which will eventually be recognized as just. In all such cases, establishment opinion is heavily weighted in favor of the status quo. The chances of any world power declaring support for Bangla Desh are minimal.

Piously required, as third-world countries always are by the West, to make their demands known through the ballot box—they did so. They

won an absolute majority in the all-Pakistan Assembly. It was the first general election the country had held, and the result came as a considerable shock. Given the long history of Bengali separatism, from the language and anti-constitution movements of the early Fifties until today, it should not have been so surprising. Loyalty became more important than ideology. A Bengali majority was the result.

Faced with this, the Islamabad government of Yahya Khan, whose strength is based on an army from which the Bengalis are excluded, panicked, Islamabad fidgeted. The result was carnage. We have glimpsed via television and the newspapers what the West Pakistanis call 'restoring unity'; the Easterners, genocide.

26-Hour Chronicle of the Dacca Drama

The following is a diary through the eyes of Robert Kaylor of UPI of what happened in Dacca when the Pakistani Army took control.

11 p.m. Thursday (March 25): I go downstairs to the hotel lobby with a cable I have just written about a statement by Sheikh Mujibur Rehman warning of "grave consequences" if action against the population by the army continues. I'm planning to take a taxi to the cable office to file it but I find a crowd milling around in the lobby. There are soldiers in battle dress; helmets and carrying weapons outside. The hotel staff is placing a blackboard with the notice, "Please do not go outside," chalked on it in front of the door.

Someone has left a copy of a statement by the Sheikh calling for a general strike on Saturday pasted to the blackboard. Other correspondents say they have been ordered back inside the building by the soldiers when they tried to leave. The captain in charge of the guards says that anyone who goes outside will be shot.

11:15 p.m.: Everyone is trying to figure out what is happening. One theory is that the guards are there to protect West Pakistani political figure Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who is hated in Bangla Desh and is staying on the top floor of the hotel. Another theory is that a military coup is under way because President Yahya Kahn has not taken a hard enough line to suit some generals. As time passes, it begins to look more like coup. Convoy's of troops are seen passing the hotel twice during the evening.

I have tried to call the personal number of a key aide to the President to check on rumours that he has left Dacca and someone has picked up the receiver on the other end and hung it up again without speaking. I call a local news agency and ask if they have any idea what has happened. They don't and cannot leave their office.

Bangla Desh Flag Burnt

Midnight: Some British diplomats arrive. They say they were on their way home from a party and were stopped by soldiers and then brought to the hotel. They have seen army road blocks at various places around the city. A Bengali who lives downtown telephones and says that hundreds of civilians are pouring into the area, some of them armed with wooden staves, iron rods and other makeshift weapons. I reach Asrar Ahmad, a Pakistani correspondent for UPI. He is also trapped in his hotel and cannot get to the cable office. Soldiers outside the hotel pull

down the Bangla Desh flag and burn it.

12:50 a.m.: After several tries, a phone call gets through to Sheikh Mujib's home and political headquarters. The unidentified person who answers the phone says the Sheikh is at the house and that the Awami League has road blocks on approaches to it. He says they have heard that two Awami League volunteers have been killed by soldiers at one roadblock. Calls to western diplomats show that they have been unable to find out what is happening either.

1 a.m.: The Bengali who called earlier calls back and says that he hears the sounds of machineguns in the downtown area. He has shut himself in his house. A short time later the telephones go dead. Sounds of automatic weapons fire begin to be heard clearly punctuated by heavier explosions. Later, I see some recoilless rifles mounted on army jeeps.

3 a.m.: Soldiers carrying torches are seen going toward the offices of "The People" newspaper near the hotel. There is some shouting and firing and the office is set on fire. "The People" is an English language newspaper which has been highly critical of the Government. Later, there are more sounds of firing near the hotel and what sounds like shouts and cheers but I cannot see what is going on from where I am. Heavy firing continues in all directions.

Columns of Smoke

Sunrise: The firing has quietened down and the streets are deserted. A huge column of smoke rises from the direction of the university. If troops have attacked there with heavy weapons, the carnage will be tremendous. The students at the university live in dormitories that hold about 400 each.

7 a.m.: Several of us go up to the 11th floor where Bhutto is staying. There are two of his bodyguards carrying assault rifles standing in the hallway. A member of Bhutto's party comes into the hall and says they have no idea what has happened. He says Bhutto is asleep and instructions are to wake him at 7:30.

8 a.m.: A radio broadcast carries a report from Karachi that President Yahya has returned to West Pakistan and will broadcast to the nation at 8 p.m. tonight. The coup theory appears to be debunked. The telephones are still out.

8:30 a.m.: Word passes that Bhutto is leaving as a car and a camouflaged military bus appear outside the lobby. Soldiers pour into the lobby. Bhutto appears, wearing

gray Suit and blue tie, but won't say anything. He keeps repeating "I have no comment to make" as he strides out to his car. His bodyguards get in on either side of him and stick the muzzles of their rifles out the window. The way they constantly keep their fingers on the trigger makes everybody nervous.

An aide to Bhutto says that when his advisers returned from a meeting at the Presidential residence at 5 p.m., the day before, they knew that chances for a political settlement were dead. It isn't clear whether this is because Bhutto doesn't agree with the agreement that Yahya and the Sheikh reached or whether Yahya has been getting pressure from the army. Bhutto's people probably want it thought that it was because their boss didn't agree.

We trail out onto the sidewalk as Bhutto departs and soldiers order us inside. A lieutenant colonel says we cannot leave the hotel. The captain in charge tells a staff member of the hotel in Urdu that he doesn't care whether we are foreigners or not. He will shoot us if we don't go inside. We go back inside. The captain tells the assistant manager of the hotel, a Pakistani, that he will be shot if a Pakistan flag is not raised within 15 minutes.

Then he leaves. Hotel employees produce a Pakistan flag and try to raise it, but are forbidden to go outside by soldiers. Apparently all armies are alike.

9 a.m.: A radio broadcast says that a 24-hours curfew is in effect and that anyone on the street will be shot on sight. It says a special announcement will be made at 10 a.m. The hotel manages to produce a cook from somewhere who makes coffee and breakfast for those who want it.

10 a.m.: The flag is raised on the hotel roof. The hotel manager, a German, grins and says, "We keep all kinds of flags handy." The special announcement turns out to be a series of martial law orders, but the curfew is not mentioned.

Firing at Random

Noon: From upstairs windows you can see patrols of jeeps and tanks moving through the deserted streets. They appear to be firing at random. As they go there are two more big smoke columns, one of them looking as though it is coming from the part of downtown where the Awami League office is. It is frustrating to see all this and not be able to communicate it to the outside world. Shortwave radio news broadcasts show that no word of the army's move has yet reached the outside

world.

12:30 p.m.: The lieutenant colonel who talked to us earlier comes back and decides that we can use the swimming pool to while away the time. He issues orders that foreigners only can use the pool and that Pakistanis must stay inside. He won't answer questions about what is happening in the city or at the university and says "relax, have a swim, enjoy yourselves." The afternoon passes quietly with occasional sounds of gunfire. A new column of smoke appears on the southern edge of the city. You can see flames billowing upward in this one as the sun goes down.

8:15 p.m.: I go down to the lobby after listening to Yahya's radio speech calling Sheikh Mujib's non-cooperation movement an "act of treason" and banning his Awami League and find the lobby deserted. Correspondents have been ordered to leave and bundled into army trucks for the airport as the speech was starting. Somehow I was missed. Troops at the hotel call for a patrol to take me to the airport. The patrol is a jeep driven by a mustachioed young lieutenant in a flat, world war I style helmet, followed by a weapons carrier filled with troops. They put my suitcase into the weapons carrier. The lieutenant asks his radio operator to go to the back seat of the jeep and I climb in next to him.

Houses Shuttered

I ask how long he thinks the situation will continue and he says that he just follows orders. Then, he adds suddenly, that "Everything will work out all right here." He turns to me and grins. "We will fix these people," he says.

1 p.m.: I get my customs check and the inspector tells me he is under "special orders" when I tell him that we were already checked in Dacca. He confiscates my notebooks, carbon copies of cables I have filed from Dacca, newspaper clippings and any scraps of paper he can find in my suitcase, including letters from my wife. He then seizes 14 rolls of unexposed film I have in my camera bag and puts everything in brown manila envelopes. When I ask about it, he says it will be sent to me by mail. I ask when, and he shrugs his shoulders. "Later", he says. He declines to issue a receipt.

1:45 p.m.: I catch my flight to Bombay and consider myself lucky that although I have lost my notebooks, I still have a story which I wrote before leaving Dacca in my hip pocket. One other correspondent on the plane was subjected to a personal search and lost the copy he had hidden.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, MARCH 29, 1971

Heavy Fighting Raids Reported in East Pakistan

TOLL CALLED HIGH: Deaths Put at 10,000—
Radio Says Army Is in Control

Special to The New York Times

March 27—Pakistani Government troops supported by artillery and air force jets were reported battling on many fronts today with the forces of Sheik Mujibur Rahman, the nationalist leader of East Pakistan.

According to one Indian press report, the Pakistani Army has killed more than 10,000 people, most of them by artillery and tank fire. The air force was reported to have bombed Comilla, a town of 50,000 people, which is said to be under the control of Sheik Mujib's forces.

THE EVENING STAR, THURSDAY, APRIL 29, 1971

E. Pakistan in Agony After the Storm

BY HENRY S. BRADSHIER
Star Staff Writer

HONG KONG — "The cyclone might not have taken its full toll yet."

This revealing remark was made by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto during a March 4 interview. It showed that West Pakistan's military-bureaucrat-landlord elite was willing to shed blood to keep control of East Pakistan.

Three weeks later—last Thursday—the bloodshed began.

The civil war between the two disparate parts of Pakistan is likely to be long and bloody, even though the government claims the fighting now is virtually ended.

The cyclone is believed to have killed between 400,000 and 500,000 persons. No one will ever know exactly.

Neither might anyone ever know how many are killed in the civil war. The Pakistani government is trying to hide the facts.

From the time election results were in, Bhutto began trying to deny to the East the right to get the kind of constitution it wanted.

Bhutto, a feudal landlord and former foreign minister with a brilliant but opportunistic career, had won in the West on socialistic promises to the poor. His obstructive maneuvers against Rahman served the interests of the Western elite, however, rather than the poor.

Because of his threat of a boycott, the National Assembly was postponed. Frustrated, Rahman called a general strike which grew into a takeover of most civil government powers in the East by his Awami League.

From the time of the general

strike in the East, there were continuous reports of soldiers being flown from West to East Pakistan. The government controlled the national airline and Dacca Airport.

These reports were well substantiated. Less solid were reports of ships being used to carry soldiers East also.

The government lacked control of the ports, where Awami League supporters refused to allow army supplies to be unloaded. Rahman had the army isolated and held to tight rations.

The best available estimates were that when the crisis began about 26,000 soldiers were in East Pakistan, a region of more than 75 million people. The number of troops had possibly risen to 30,000 or more when fighting broke out.

There were signs by last Wednesday that the army was getting ready to move.

A munitions ship had been sitting in Chittagong harbor for several weeks with dockers refusing to unload it. On Wednesday the Army began trying to unload it in defiance of the Awami League.

Unconfirmed reports from Chittagong told of clashes, of civilian blockades being thrown up to block army movements and of 14 tanks being brought into the city.

Several other clashes between the army and civilians were reported from other parts of East Pakistan. Rumored death tolls went up to 50.

THE SUN, TUESDAY, MARCH 30, 1971

Analysis

Yahya Planned Attack On East Pakistan

A Technicality Does Not Disguise
His Efforts to Snare Mujib

BY JOHN E. WOODRUFF
Sun Staff Correspondent

New Delhi, March 29—President A. M. Yahya Khan's West Pakistan military regime is offering the world a legal technicality as the reason for its Army's carefully co-ordinated surprise attack on East Pakistan.

Both President Yahya and key West Pakistani politicians have offered the same reason for their abrupt cancellation of the two weeks of political talks that preceded the Army's crackdown on East Bengal's nonviolent movement.

The reason, as expressed by President Yahya in his radio speech to the nation Friday night, was that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the Bengali leader of East Pakistan, demanded that power be turned over to elected civilians by proclamation before the proposed National Assembly met.

Same Explanation

Omar Kasoury, a member of the West Pakistan-based Pakistan Peoples party's delegation to the negotiations, offered an identical explanation to reporters who spoke with him Friday morning as he left the Dacca Intercontinental Hotel under heavy guard with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, head of the Peoples party.

Such a proclamation, General Yahya told the nation Friday night, "would not have been worth the paper it was written on, and he [Sheikh Mujib] could have done anything with impunity."

He did not explain how much a proclamation would have differed from the "legal-framework order"—a presidential proclamation with a longer title and the sole authority for last December's election and for the National Assembly that the Army never permitted to meet.

Instead, he said he had tentatively accepted the plan despite reservations—but on condition that all West Pakistani politicians give their "unequivocal agreement" to a plan that effectively would have put Sheikh Mujib's Bengali majority in charge of the country.

"Yahya has shown some surprising political naivete before," one of Pakistan's best-informed foreign newsmen remarked after listening to Friday's radio broadcast in an Army truck that was preparing to take all

foreign correspondents in Dacca to the airport for expulsion.

"But that condition is not naive, it's disingenuous. It will make the whole purpose of the talks look like a delaying action while they flew in more troops from West Pakistan."

Plan To Deceive Recalled

The comment was not the first serious suggestion that the talks were a delaying action. One well-connected traveler arriving in Dacca from Karachi shocked newsmen a week before the conflagration by reporting that two generals he regarded as highly reliable had told him that the Army's plan was to lull the Bengali leadership into believing the talks could succeed, then to crack down without warning.

No one wrote anything about it at the time, because there was no other equally reliable source to back the suggestion, and no one really wanted to entertain the idea that President Yahya would accept such a course after staking his reputation for two years on a plan to turn the government over to elected civilians.

There still is no way of having ironclad certainty as to the military regime's motives, but no one who witnessed the sequence of last Thursday's events can say with confidence today that it was not all planned in advance.

By the time Sheikh Mujib's statement calling for a general strike Saturday to protest clashes between troops and civilians in outlying areas was read to the press Thursday night, President Yahya had already left his heavily fortified house. There hardly had been time for him to pack his bags between the end of the last meetings of his and Mr. Bhutto's advisers and the time a Bengali newsmen said he saw the president leave.

By 7 P.M., soldiers were going up and down the elevator at the Intercontinental Hotel—to the 11th floor, which Mr. Bhutto had turned into a fortress complete with half a dozen automatic rifles in the lobby—at the rate of two a minute.

This activity continued for almost an hour until a large group of soldiers came down carrying a battered black cardboard suitcase, which was entrusted to a platoon of 20 or so troops who marched from the hotel to the president's house

where a few guards were still on duty.

What was in the black suitcase remains unknown.

An Inauspicious Time

Asked the whereabouts of the president's press aide, who had always been at the gate to greet correspondents, the guard said: "He is gone somewhere. I don't know when he is coming back. Please go ahead now. You come back 10 o'clock tomorrow."

Back at the hotel, only two blocks from the president's house, the guard appeared to be double its number on any previous night. None of the faces that had become familiar since the guard was thrown up Sunday to protect Mr. Bhutto were on duty that night.

The familiar faces were a contingent of East Pakistan Rifles, the Bengali home guard that technically was under Army command but believed sympathetic to the Awami League. The new troops wore uniforms with neither unit nor other identifying badges—only rank, insignia and battle ribbons. They were tall, like Punjabis, not short, like Bengalis.

Unfamiliar Faces

In front of the hotel, a captain said: "My orders for tonight are that if anyone tries to leave the hotel after 11 P.M. we are to shoot them. Please go inside. I don't want to do anything to you."

Inside the lobby, a sign had been posted saying "Please don't go outside."

After a few attempts to talk the captain out of it, no one went outside.

Then The Firing Began

Within minutes, sporadic automatic-weapons fire could be heard all over town. By 1 A.M. heavy machine guns and artillery had opened up, and the first fires were visible. The first night of shooting and burning had begun.

The events could be described only as a carefully co-ordinated, premeditated attack on a basically defenseless population in an attempt to crush a movement whose main tactic had been non-violent non-co-operation.

The attack was launched with no broadcast or published warning, although officers claimed the next day they had used loud-speakers to warn civilian crowds to clear the streets.

The first radio broadcast announcing a curfew was made in mid-morning, eight hours after foreign newsmen watched soldiers turn a jeep-mounted machine gun without warning on 15 empty-handed youths who walked toward them slowly, shouting defiantly.

Ten Hours Later

It was 10 hours after that curfew

announcement that President Yahya read his radio speech giving the legal technicality over which the talks broke down and denouncing the man with whom he had been negotiating the previous day for the "treason" of trying to separate East Pakistan from the West.

President Yahya's outline of Sheikh Mujib's bargaining position makes a plausible argument that the Awami League leader had pushed at the end for a degree of autonomy that would virtually have amounted to independence.

Given the pressures put on Sheikh Mujib by student nationalists and other more radical elements, it is possible that he had demanded as much as President Yahya said, though the president carefully avoided listing this as the obstacle that finally stopped the talks.

Not Always So Extreme

Whatever his demands were at the end, they had not always been so extravagant as the president now claims they had become.

For five years, the Awami League had put forth only one program: a constitution giving East Pakistan control of its own foreign aid, foreign trade and taxes. That program and the romantic tales of Sheikh Mujib's six imprisonments for his resistance to the country's succession of military dictatorships gave the Awami League enormous popularity throughout East Bengal.

For the appeal fell on political ground fertilized by two decades in which 55 million West Pakistanis had consistently used their control of the Army to dominate the 75 million Bengalis.

Most of the taxes, most of the foreign-exchange earnings, and most of the people came from East Pakistan.

Most of the taxes, most of the foreign-exchange earnings, and most of the foreign aid went into West Pakistan.

60 Per Cent of Budget

The Army that is now trying to bring Bengalis to heel consumes more than 60 per cent of a national budget that is supported mainly with Bengali tax money. It is a point that Bengalis never cease to stress.

Less than 10 per cent of the soldiers—and even fewer officers—are Bengalis, another point the Bengalis make repeatedly.

But the differences between Pakistan's two wings are not altogether economic. The West is dominated by tall Punjabis, who share their wing of the country with many other racial and language groups. The East is almost entirely Bengali in both language and racial stock.

The two ethnic groups have not only different languages but also different foods, different clothing, and strikingly different ways of practicing Islam, the national re-

ligion for which reason Pakistan was carved out of the British Indian Empire at independence.

Known For His Swagger

A typical Punjabi soldier is noticeable on the streets of Dacca by the swaggering way his arms swing as he walks among the shorter, dirtier and less erect Bengalis.

Despite these differences, and despite the racial unity of the Bengalis compared to the racial diversity in the West, the Army seems to have started its cautious moves toward elected civilian rule on the assumption that a united Western electorate could prevail over the multitude of parties with which the East has often been plagued.

"We believed that the old-line politicians in the West would easily carry the day and, whatever their local differences, prevail in the Assembly over a divided East," one key Western politician said two weeks ago.

"Instead, Bhutto came out of nowhere with a Socialist appeal and beat us all, and Mujib rode that damned cyclone in for a complete sweep in the East."

With the election imminent, not one major figure from the Islamabad government ever showed serious concern for the survivors of the cyclone and tidal wave late last fall that killed hundreds of thousands of Bengalis just before the election.

When other nations came flooding in with aid while West Pakistan kept its helicopters at home—in case of war with India, the government said—a major political turning point grew out of what might have been just another, though bigger, disaster in an area where disasters are a predictable part of the yearly cycle.

"Mujib had been a power, but the disaster made him unstoppable," an American analyst says. "That was what changed the course."

It Became Clear

When Sheikh Mujib won an absolute majority of the Assembly's seats, while Mr. Bhutto won a majority of the West's seats, the extent of the miscalculation became clear.

It was an understandable miscalculation: Pakistan had never before had a really free election on which to base predictions.

But it left the West in an impossible predicament, for West Pakistan's economy was based largely on its ability to drain profits from the East by various means, and the Awami League program would have put a dead stop to that.

Blamed The Sheikh

Mr. Bhutto threatened to boycott the Assembly and to call a general strike if Sheikh Mujib did not forswear in advance the Awami League's insistence on local control of foreign aid and foreign trade,

but the Bengali leader vowed to use his majority to enact the program that helped elect him.

Faced with a sure fiasco, President Yahya revoked the March 3 date he had set for the Assembly's opening and went on radio March 6 to blame Sheikh Mujib for violence that broke out when the postponement was announced.

There was no evidence in East Bengal to back that charge, though the president, who came to East Pakistan only after nine more days, may have had no way of knowing the truth.

What actually took place in most areas was that police left the streets to the mobs, but Awami League volunteers, armed only with bamboo canes, brought the mobs under control in less than two days with the help of a widely publicized appeal by the Sheikh for nonviolence.

At A Standstill

By March 9, the Sheikh's non-cooperation call—issued in a speech during a massive rally two days earlier—had brought government and other public institutions to a standstill and thus deprived West Pakistan for the first time in years of its power to govern the East.

Gradually, the Sheikh began to open those offices and institutions that the Awami League high command felt it could control adequately.

The Awami League's control of many institutions was impressive, but there were those which it never felt sufficiently confident of to open. Schools and courts were among them.

Other basically civilian services—such as immigration and customs—never were seriously threatened, because the Awami League never questioned the Army's gunpoint control of the checkpoints.

But Awami League access to closely related services—road and rail transport and stevedores at Chittagong, for example—made the government's control of these customs and immigration checkpoints almost irrelevant.

After a week, the Awami League even started collecting many taxes, although it never got the income tax back into operation.

By the time President Yahya arrived in Dacca for negotiations with Sheikh Mujib—after first spending long hours with Mr. Bhutto in West Pakistan—the government's control was so thoroughly dissolved that even the new military governor had not been able to find anyone to swear him into office.

The new governor, Lt. Gen. Tikka Kahn, was regarded by Bengalis as a tough-minded hawk. They called him "the butcher of Baluchistan," a reference to his alleged role in suppressing a rebellion by Baluchi citizens of West Pakistan in the 1960's.

The Bengali clandestine radio is now gloating daily over reports that

a mob somehow got to General Tikka's house and killed him, but there is no way to know if the report is true unless a replacement is named without further explanation.

Left Without A Word

General Tikka's predecessor, a man known among Bengalis for his understanding of their movement, left Dacca and returned to West Pakistan with no public explanation. Bengalis who knew him say he resigned when he was ordered to make preparations for a military crackdown soon after the initial Assembly postponement was announced March 1. None of his assistants was replaced, as would have been done routinely in a normal transfer.

The president himself fared badly when he arrived in Dacca March 15. The normal delegation of top civil servants failed to go to the airport to greet him.

Faster Even Than Mujib

But the movement had also created a force that was running faster than Sheikh Mujib himself—a true Bengali nationalism such as no movement had ever produced before in East Pakistan.

Bengalis started telling each other to kill the "foreign" soldiers from West Pakistan and even burned the Pakistani flag and the picture of Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the "father of Pakistan," in the streets of Dacca.

On Pakistan Day, they raised the new flag of "Bangla Desh"—the Nation of Bengal—everywhere and tore down the Pakistan flag from the pole at the Chinese consulate general.

Even Then, Peace Possible

Yet most Bengalis agreed that Sheikh Mujib would still have been able to lead the movement back to the broad autonomy he had always demanded—and thus prevent a final split of Pakistan into two countries—if he could get the West to buy his formula.

Whether he could—whether a settlement could be reached on the basic political issues—became an academic question when the Army and Mr. Bhutto decided that the technicality of how power was to be transferred was more important than the substantive political questions.

Now the Army has provided a final answer to the question of how many Pakistans.

After the carnage of the last few days, there can be no hope left of ever achieving a truly united Pakistan again.

For the current fighting has only two possible outcomes: One is an independent nation of 75 million East Bengalis. The other is a totally subjected and sullen colony that would be East Pakistan only on maps.

NEW YORK POST, TUESDAY, MARCH 30, 1971

How Army Tanks Blasted a City

Associated Press photographer Michel Laurent was in Dacca, the capital of East Pakistan, when the Pakistani army cracked down on the Bengali independence movement. Newsmen were confined to their hotel. But Laurent evaded the ban and toured devastated areas of the city before being finally deported with other newsmen over the weekend.

By MICHEL LAURENT

DACCA, East Pakistan (AP)—The Pakistani army attacked the Bengali independence movement in Dacca without warning Thursday night and took the people by sur-

prise.

The army's American M24 tanks, artillery and infantry destroyed large parts of East Pakistan's largest city and provincial capital.

The chief targets were the university, the populous Old City where Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his Awami League were strongest, and the industrial areas on the outskirts of the city of 1.5 million people.

Perhaps 7000 persons were killed in the provincial capital alone.

Touring the still burning battle areas Saturday and yesterday, one found the burned bodies of some students still in their dormitory beds.

The tanks had made direct hits on the dormitories.

A mass grave had been hastily filled in at the Jaggernath College; 200 students were reported killed in Iqbal Hall. About 20 bodies were still on the ground and in the dormitories.

Troops reportedly fired bazookas into the medical college hospital but the casualty toll there was not known.

Thousands fled the city with only what they could carry. Some pushed carts loaded with food and clothes. Only a few persons returned to government jobs despite the orders of the military regime.

CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, TUESDAY, MARCH 30, 1971

Exclusive on-the-spot of Slaughter In East Pakistan

By SIMON DRING

The London Daily Telegraph

DACCA, East Pakistan—In the name of "God and a united Pakistan" Dacca is a crushed and frightened city.

After 24 hours of shelling by units of the Pakistan army as many as 7,000 people are dead, large areas of the city have been leveled, and East Pakistan's fight for independence has been put to an end.

Despite claims by President Agha Muhammad Yahya Kahn, head of Pakistan's military government, that the situation is calm, as late as Sunday thousands of people were fleeing to the countryside. The city streets were almost deserted and the slaughter was continuing in other parts of the province.

There was no doubt that the army was in control of all the towns and major population centers and that resistance was minimal and apparently ineffective.

As of Sunday, people were still being shot at what appeared to be the slightest provocation, buildings were still being destroyed, and the military appeared to be more determined than ever to assert its control over the 73 million Bengalese in East Pakistan.

Although an accurate estimate of civilian casualties is impossible, reports filtering in from outlying areas, including Chittagong, Comilla and Jessore, put the figure, including Dacca, at about 15,000 dead.

Death, Destruction Obvious

The extent of death and destruc-

tion in Dacca was obvious: Students dead in their beds, butchers in the markets killed behind their stalls, women and children burned to death in their houses, Pakistanis of Hindu religion shot en masse, bazaars and shopping areas razed by fire. By Sunday, the Pakistani flag flew over nearly every building in the city.

Military casualties are not known but at least two soldiers have been wounded and one officer killed.

The Bengali uprising seemed to be over for the moment. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was seen being taken away by the army and nearly all the top members of his Awami League faction have also been arrested.

Leading political activists were arrested, others were killed and the offices of two newspapers that supported Mujib's independence movement were destroyed.

The first target of army tanks that rolled into Dacca Thursday night was the students.

An estimated three battalions of troops were used in the attack on Dacca—one armored, one artillery and one infantry. They started leaving the barracks shortly before 10 p.m.

By 11 p.m., firing had broken out, and the people who had started to hastily erect makeshift barricades—overturned cars, tree stumps, furniture, concrete piping—became early casualties as the troops rolled into town.

Mujib was warned that something was happening, but he refused to leave his house. "If I go into hiding they will burn the whole of Dacca

to find me," he told an aide who escaped arrest.

The students were also warned, but those who were still around later said most thought they would only be arrested.

Led by American-supplied M-24 World War II tanks, one column of troops sped to Dacca University shortly after midnight. Troops took over the British Council library and used it as a fire base to shell nearby dormitory areas.

Caught by surprise, some 200 students were killed in Iqbal Hall, headquarters of the militantly anti-government Students Union as shells slammed into the building and their rooms were sprayed with machinegun fire.

Two days later bodies were still smoldering in their burned-out rooms, others were scattered outside, more floated in a nearby lake, an art student lay sprawled across his easel, seven teachers died in their quarters and a family of 12 were gunned down as they hid in an outhouse.

The military removed many of the bodies, but the 30 bodies still there could never have accounted for all the blood in the corridors of Iqbal Hall.

At another hall the dead were buried by the soldiers in a hastily dug mass grave, then bulldozed over by tanks.

People living near the university were caught in the fire, too, and 200 yards of shanty houses running alongside a railway line were destroyed during the attack.

Army patrols also razed a nearby market area. The soldiers ran down



The body of a man shot by the Pakistani army is left lying in the street. This picture was made by AP photographer Michel Laurent who toured burning Dacca with reporter Simon Dring and then managed to escape to Bangkok.

between the stalls killing their owners as they slept. Two days later, when it was possible to get out and see all this, some of the men were still lying as though asleep, their blankets pulled up over their shoulders.

In the same district the Dacca Medical College received direct bazooka fire and a mosque was badly damaged.

As the university came under attack, columns of troops moved in on the Rajabag headquarters of the East Pakistan police on the other side of the city.

Tanks opened fire first, and then the troops moved in and leveled the men's sleeping quarters, firing incendiary rounds into the buildings.

It was not known, even by people living opposite, how many died but out of 1,100 police based there not many are believed to have escaped.

Armored Car Arrives

As this was going on, other units had surrounded Mujib's house. When contacted shortly before 1 a.m. Friday, he said he was expecting an attack any minute and that he had sent everyone except his servants and a bodyguard away to safety.

A neighbor said that at 1:10 a.m. a tank, an armored car and trucks loaded with troops drove down the street firing over the house.

"Sheik you should come down," an officer called to Mujib in English as they stopped outside. He replied by stepping out on to his balcony and saying, "Yes, I am ready but there is no need to fire. All you need to have done is call me on the telephone and I would have come."

The officer then walked into the garden of the house and told Mujib: "You are arrested."

He was taken away along with three servants, an aide and his bodyguard, who was badly beaten when he started to insult the officer. One man was killed—a night watchman hiding behind the fence of the house next door.

By 2 a.m. fires were burning all over the city, troops had occupied the university and surrounding areas, were shooting at students still in hiding and were replacing Bengali independence flags with Pakistani national flags.

There was still heavy shelling in some areas, but the fighting was beginning to slacken.

Opposite the Intercontinental Hotel where foreign journalists were detained, a platoon of troops stormed the empty offices of The People newspaper, burning it down along with most houses in the area and killing a night watchman.

Shortly before dawn most firing had stopped and as the sun came up an eerie silence settled over the city, deserted and completely dead except for noise of the crows and the occasional convoy of troops or tanks rumbling by on mopping-up operations.

Fired into all the Houses

But the worst was yet to come. At midday Friday, again without warning, columns of troops poured into the old section of the city where more than a million people live in a sprawling maze of narrow winding streets.

For the next 11 hours they proceeded to systematically devastate large areas of the "Old Town" as it is called where Mujib had some of his strongest support of the people in Dacca.

"They suddenly appeared at the end of the street," said one old man, "then they drove down it firing into all the houses."

The lead unit was followed by soldiers carrying cans of gasoline. Those who tried to escape were shot. Those who stayed were burned alive. About 700 men, women and children died there that day between noon and 2 p.m.

The same was repeated in at least three other areas, all of them covering anything up to a half mile or more.

As they left, the soldiers took those dead they could away with them in trucks and moved on to their target. Police stations in the Old Town were also attacked.

"I am looking for my constables," a police inspector said on Saturday morning as he wandered through the ruins of one of the bazaars. "I have 240 in my district and so far I have only found 30 of them—all dead."

One of the biggest massacres of the entire operation in Dacca took place in the Hindi area of the Old Town. There the soldiers made the people come out of their houses

and then shot them in groups.

This area, too, was eventually razed.

Newspaper Office a Target

Meanwhile, troops of the East Bengal regiment were being used in the suburbs to start moving out toward the industrial areas of the city—Tongi and Naranganj—both about 10 miles from the city center and both areas of leftist support for Mujib.

Firing continued in these areas until early Sunday morning, but the bulk of the operation in the city was completed by Friday night.

One of the last targets was the daily Bengali language paper, Ittefaq. More than 400 people had taken shelter in its offices when the fighting started.

At 4 p.m. Friday four tanks appeared in the road outside. A half hour later the building was an inferno. By Saturday morning only the charred remains of a lot of corpses huddled in back rooms were left.

As quickly as they appeared the troops disappeared off the streets. On Saturday morning the radio announced the curfew would be lifted from 7 a.m. until 4 p.m.

It then repeated the martial law regulations banning all political activity, announcing press censorship and ordering all government employees to report back for work and for all privately owned weapons to be handed in to authorities.

Panic Sets In

Magically the city returned to life Saturday and panic set in. By 10 a.m., with palls of black smoke still hanging over large areas of the Old Town and out in the distance toward the industrial areas, the streets were packed with people leaving town.

By car, in rickshaws but mostly on foot carrying their possessions with them, the people of Dacca were fleeing.

By midday they were on the move in the tens of thousands.

TIME, MAY 3, 1971

Dacca, City of the Dead

Within hours after launching a tank-led offensive in Dacca and other East Pakistani cities on the night of March 25, the Pakistan army imposed a virtual blackout on the brutal civil war in Bangla Desh (Bengal State) by expelling foreign newsmen. TIME Correspondent Dan Coggin, who was among them, recently trekked back from India by Honda, truck, bus and bicycle to become the first American journalist to visit Dacca since the fighting started. His report:

Dacca was always a fairly dreary city, offering slim pleasures beyond the Hotel Intercontinental and a dozen Chinese restaurants that few of its 1,500,000 people could afford. Now, in many ways, it has become a city of the dead. A month after the army struck, unleashing tank guns and automatic weapons against largely unarmed civilians in 34 hours of wanton slaughter, Dacca is still shocked and shuttered, its remaining inhabitants living in terror under the grip of army control. The exact toll will never be known, but probably more than 10,000 were killed in Dacca alone.

Perhaps half the city's population has fled to outlying villages. With the lifting of army blockades at road and river ferry exists, the exo-

dus is resuming. Those who remain venture outdoors only for urgent food shopping. Rice prices have risen 50% since the army reportedly started burning grain silos in some areas. In any case, 14 of the cities 18 food bazaars were destroyed. The usually jammed streets are practically empty, and no civil government is functioning.

"Kill the Bastards!" On every rooftop, Pakistan's green-and-white flags hang limply in the steamy stillness. "We all know that Pakistan is finished," said one Bengali, "but we hope the flags will keep the soldiers away." As another form of insurance, portraits of Pakistan's late founder Mohammed Ali Jinnah, and even the current President Agha Mohammed Yahya Khan, were displayed prominently. But there was no mistaking the fact that the East Pakistanis viewed the army's occupation of Dacca as a setback and not a surrender. "We will neither forgive nor forget," said one Bengali. On learning that I was a *sangbadik* (journalist), various townspeople led me to mass graves, to a stairwell where two professors were shot to death, and to scenes of other atrocities.

The most savage killing occurred in the Old City, where several sec-

tions were burned to the ground. Soldiers poured gasoline around entire blocks, igniting them with flamethrowers, then mowed down people trying to escape the cordons of fire. "They're coming out!" a Westerner heard soldiers cry. "Kill the bastards!"

One Bengali businessman told of losing his son, daughter-in-law and four grandchildren in the fire. Few apparently survived in the destroyed sections—25 square blocks—of the Old City. If they escaped the flames, they ran into gunfire. To frighten survivors, soldiers refused to allow the removal of decomposing bodies for three days, despite the Moslem belief in prompt burial, preferably within 24 hours, to free the soul.

Next Prime Minister. The tales of brutality are seemingly endless. A young man whose house was being searched begged the soldiers to do anything, but to leave his 17-year-old sister alone; they spared him so he could watch them murder her with a bayonet. Colonel Abdul Hai, a Bengali physician attached to the East Bengal Regiment, was allowed to make a last phone call to his family; an hour later his body was delivered to his home. An old man who decided that Friday prayers were more important than the cur-

few was shot to death as he walked into a mosque.

About 1:30 on the morning of the attack, two armored personnel carriers arrived at the Dhanmandi home of Shiek Mujibur ("Mujib") Rahman, 51, the political leader behind the campaign for Bengali independence. Mujib first took refuge beneath a bed when the Special Security Group commandos began to spray his house with small-arms fire. Then, during a lull, he went to the downstairs veranda, raised his hands in surrender and shouted, "There is no need for shooting. Here I am. Take me."

"LE MONDE"

"Pakistan has clearly entered into period of civil war which is likely to be long. Far from looking for compromise even one which would be favourable to Central Government with Bengali automomists, Yahya Kahn is stopping up repression which has now reached such degree of brutality that one wonders if it was not premeditated."

"If any case prolonged breach between two parts of Pakistan will open way to internationalisation of conflict".

THE SUN, BALTIMORE, SUNDAY, APRIL 4, 1971

Pakistan is Exterminating The Bengalis

BY JOHN E. WOODRUFF

Less than four months ago, the West Pakistan Army said it could not send soldiers and helicopters to East Bengal to save survivors of the cyclone that took hundreds of thousands of lives in the mouth of the Ganges. If troops and helicopters were moved from West Pakistan, India might attack, the Army said. By the time the Army Statement was issued, India was increasing its offers of relief aid for the cyclone victims.

"DOMINION" Newzealand Daily

"Newzealand should quickly appeal to Pakistan to stop bloodshed. In all conscience scale of killing demands we do something.

"Reports filtering out of East Pakistan suggest slaughter to unprecedented degree as President Yahya Kahn army seeks to mend with savage indiscriminate force fracture that has sundered nations. . . . urgent need is to stop killing and get relief supplies in and Newzealand should say so."

Today, that same West Pakistan Army shows every sign of being prepared to send its last soldier to more populous East Bengal, if necessary, in an all-out effort to shoot to death the results of last December's elections.

No room remains for doubt as to the Punjabi-dominated Army's determination to go the whole distance.

For the only justification that could ever emerge for the grisly scenes of a week ago Thursday and Friday would be a total victory of bullets over the nonviolent attempts of the Bengalis to put in power the men they had elected in polling sanctioned by the Army.

Newsman Toured Carnage

Correspondents interned last week at the plush Dacca Intercontinental Hotel could see only fragments of what was taking place outside—a few soldiers shooting into civilian buildings, a machine-gun opening up on a dozen empty-handed youths, the Army setting fire to civilian business places.

But two European newsmen evaded the Army and stayed be-

hind a few extra days and they managed to tour some of the carnage before they were found out and expelled.

Their reports have confirmed the worst fears of those who were only able to surmise the meaning of cannon reports and prolonged bursts of machine-gun and automatic-rifle fire coming from the new campus of Dacca University, where two burning buildings lighted the sky for hours with their flames.

Slum Residents Killed

Hundreds of students were burned up in their beds and hundreds more were buried in a mass grave, according to reports filed by the two newsmen who said they toured the scene.

They also confirmed previous reliable diplomatic reports that large stretches of bamboo slums were surrounded and set afire, their residents shot when they tried to flee.

The only bond between West Pakistan and East Bengal—other than the West Pakistan Army itself—is the Muslim faith, for which the divided country was created as a haven against Hindu-Muslim religious murders when India was partitioned.

Even today, the Army exercises its authority in the name of "the Islamic state of Pakistan." Yet

burning a human being, alive or dead, is unequivocally forbidden by the Mohammedan faith. It is also a favorite crime charged to Hindus by West Pakistani Muslims.

Such attacks upon fellow Muslims in the name of an Islamic state can be vindicated, even in the eyes of other Mohammedan countries from which West Pakistan is apparently already seeking aid, only by a total military victory. And any military victory will require growing, not diminishing, bloodshed as the Bengalis—unified to a man for the first time in decades—struggle to resist.

Clues as to how coolly the West Pakistanis had calculated their plan to shoot and burn the Bengalis into submission are provided by the personal actions of some West Pakistani politicians at the Hotel Intercontinental on the night the holocaust started.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the former foreign minister who won a majority of West Pakistan's seats in the Constituent Assembly in last December's election but had only a minority nationally, substantially increased the guard on his 11th-floor fortress and had his gunmen put their Communist-bloc automatic rifles on slings around their necks, for the first time hours before the shooting started.

Lost Their Cool

He was seen, awake, by a newsman well after the shooting started. But he was so unshocked by what was going on directly under his hotel window that he soon went to bed and, according to his aides, slept the night until 7:30 A.M. when he was awakened according to prior instructions.

But his aides and his Punjabi-hired guards—some of whom had encountered problems when they couldn't work the self-service elevators in the hotel when they arrived—lost their coolly professional demeanor twice before they could get past the crowd of inquisitive newsmen in the lobby the next morning.

At one point, a Bhutto aide started screaming at a newsman who asked a question the aide apparently thought impertinent.

At another, one of the toughest-looking guards tripped up when he discovered that the hotel's main doors were locked and he would have to use the revolving door. After several attempts to push open the curved glass panels that formed the door's outer cylinder, he somehow wound up stuck in the same quarter of the door with S. A. Kasoury, a top Bhutto aide who was already crowded there by his own bullies and his own bags, which he had to personally carry to the waiting Army bus. Mr. Kasoury spoke some sharp words in Urdu when he found the gunman's automatic rifle pressed against his but the two finally managed to take enough steps in tandem to get outside the building.

SINGAPORE

The New Nation

Eye-witness accounts given by foreign residents evacuated from East Pakistan revealed gruesome pictures of carnage inflicted by the West Pakistani troops. . . . It is clear that action of the army has surpassed anything which may be taken as legitimate use of force.

HONGKONG

The South China Morning Post

Unarmed people are being killed by a mighty army in East Bengal.

The Daily Star

West Pakistan Army is attempting to suppress the people of East Bengal who only want a government of their own.

THE SUNDAY TIMES, APRIL 4, 1971

Sunday Times reporter, Nicholas Tomalin, who first revealed the slaughter of Punjabis in East Pakistan to the world in a despatch to The Times last week, now tells the full story of the mid-day murder

It was around midday on Thursday—April Fool's day—at the Jessore headquarters of the East Pakistani Rifles who are, of course, fighting on the rebels' side in this civil war. In a confusion of hysteria, enthusiasm and sudden waves of terror, the local population was mustering with shotguns, bamboo staves, long spears straight from a Kipling tiger hunt and elaborately patterned sabres.

In busload after busload these supporters of the East Pakistan leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, were arriving from the surrounding countryside to join the cause, loosely controlled by half a dozen officers of the East Pakistani Rifles who were trying to plan an offensive against the Government's Punjabi troops based in their cantonment four miles away.

I was there with Alan Hart of BBC Panorama and a Bengali-speaking photographer, Mohammed Amin. We thought the troops and local citizens were about to attack but they then got other ideas. Among each contingent arriving at HQ were tall, usually bearded Punjabis. Their hands were tied and they were being brutally pushed along by rifle-butts. These men from West Pakistan were the hated usurers and bosses at the local jute mills who, in the words of a captain in the East Pakistani Rifles, were "bleeding us dry for years and years and now killing our wives and children." They were all "spies," said their captors who had picked them up in their homes during the past few days. And as we watched they were marched off into town.

We then spent an hour being driven round the town under the guidance of a nervous politician of Sheikh Mujib's Awami League until eventually we happened to arrive at the market place.

A large crowd of the same enthusiastic local soldiers we had seen earlier dashed into hiding as we drove up. We thought the West Pakistani soldiers were attacking and scattered similarly, only to discover on a grass patch beside the road men freshly stabbed and bludgeoned, lying in still flowing pools of blood. Four of them were still just alive, rolling over and waving their legs and arms. But none of them made any noise.

At this moment our Awami League guide became hysterical and tried to rush us back to the local Rifles HQ. He said it was not safe, the West Pakistanis were attacking. He tugged us away from the bodies. But suddenly Alan Hart, myself and Mohammed realised who these dead and dying men were. They were not Bengali, they were—we are convinced—the Punjabi prisoners we had seen bound and under guard an hour before.

The victims could not have been killed by anyone but local Bengali irregulars as these were the only people in central Jessore that day. The terror and behaviour of the Awami politician and the crowd is circumstantial evidence and our photographer, Amid, who knows his Pakistani types, is certain the victims were Punjabis.

Even as the locals began to threaten us and we were forced to drive away, we saw another 40 Punjabi "spies" being marched towards that same grass plot with their hands above their heads.

Obviously the citizens of Jessore—facing terrible threat and suffering innocent casualties—have an excuse for their retaliation. Our introduction to Jessore, a city of some 50,000 was the sight of a dozen village huts on the outskirts burned to the ground. We were then escorted by Bengali soldiers to an old British police station to be shown the victims.

There they dragged out five bodies to the courtyard to be filmed. One old man with a beard, three girls and a baby.

A Punjabi patrol had passed through the area during the night, said our guides. They had blown up the electricity sub-station, burned down the huts at the direction of Punjabi informers, caught and raped the girls, then killed the entire group. Other bodies lay elsewhere.

Jessore is typical, it is said, of many areas in East Pakistan, control of which is contested between the local population and the West Pakistani troops. It was, therefore, useful to check on conflicting propaganda and news reports on the position in that city.

Until about Thursday the West Pakistani garrison, which is about battalion size, was in some kind of control of Jessore. They had patrols moving through the streets and no-one opposed them. But these troops started killing people for no discernible reason. The local hospital is filled with 35 wounded men, women and children who claimed that Punjabi troops fired indiscriminately.

On Tuesday a curfew was imposed by the West Pakistani soldiers. When it was broken—through ignorance and defiance—the shooting and killing increased. Lt. Col. Abdul Jallid, the commander of

the only regular army unit in the area with Bengali troops, detachments of the First Bengali Regiment, was arrested by the West Pakistanis and his troops disarmed and dispersed.

That left only the East Pakistani Rifles, who carefully refer to themselves not as the hated army but as special police to oppose the West Pakistanis. The East Pakistani Rifles have only small arms, rockets, mortars and rocket-propelled grenades. The West Pakistanis have heavy artillery.

Nonetheless the West Pakistanis, faced by a hostile population and small in numbers, retired to their cantonment to await developments.

It was, therefore, not true to say—as the Government in Karachi was saying—that East Pakistan was peaceful and under Western control. Not in Jessore, anyway. Nor elsewhere if Jessore was typical.

The situation in Jessore is similar to Vietnam six years ago. The Western forces could, at any time they like, overwhelm the disorganised locals but they would then be faced by a totally hostile population engaged in guerrilla warfare without end. Therefore, like the South Vietnamese and Americans, the West Pakistanis have retired to a defended position.

The prospect of spear-bearing locals confronting besieged troops with only heavy guns is terrifying and if Jessore is typical, East Pakistan is in for a terrible time in the next months and Karachi's great gamble—to crush all opposition by one big attack—has failed.

WEST GERMANY

The Frankfurter

Allgemeine Zeitung

The attempt to solve by military means a conflict which can only be solved politically has often failed. It will fail this time, too. If not today, then tomorrow or the day after.

"OTTAWA CITIZEN"

"By expelling foreign correspondents from East Pakistan, country's military rulers have made certain that no one gets to know what is happening in that tragic land.

"Where will this lead to? To more massacres of civilians by Pakistan army? To more massacres of West Punjabi civilians by East Pakistanis in rural areas? . . . to economic collapse of Pakistan followed by hunger in both parts of the country."

Pakistan: 'All Part of a Game'—a Grim and Deadly One

New Delhi—"All of it's necessary, absolutely necessary," a West Pakistani stewardess lectured some expelled foreign newsmen about the Pakistani Army's offensive to crush the independence movement in East Pakistan. "If this happened in your country, you'd do the same thing. It's all part of the game."

A game? To foreign newsmen in Dacca, it looked like a surprise attack with tanks, artillery and heavy machine guns against a virtually unarmed population—a population using tactics of nonviolence, mostly strikes and other forms of non-cooperation, to claim the political majority it had won in last December's elections. And by this week-end enough credible reports of indiscriminate killings had filtered out to leave little doubt, even in the minds of many dispassionate Indian officials and Western diplomats, that the Army of West Pakistan was under few restraints in putting down East Pakistani thoughts of autonomy.

The attack began on the night of March 25, after 10 days of political negotiations in which the army and the rest of the West Pakistani power establishment had lulled the East Pakistani nationalists into thinking their demands for greater self-rule would be granted.

It is clear now that the West Pakistanis never meant the talks to succeed, that they dragged them out only to buy time to get enough troop reinforcements over from West Pakistan to launch the attack. But while the talks went on, nearly every observer, from newsmen to diplomats, resisted the ugly thought that this might be true. The signs were all there—troops coming in by air and sea, the dismissal of a martial-law administrator who was too lenient and the uncharacteristic silence of the army while the East Pakistanis boycotted the military regime and followed instead the directives of their leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

The newsmen reported these signs but when talk of "some progress" came out of the negotiations, they grasped upon that, because it was what should happen. They were wrong. Instead, the military mind prevailed.

But in turning to force, the West Pakistani leaders apparently misjudged both its limitations and the depth of feeling of 75 million East Pakistanis.

"They thought that a few bullets would scare the people off," said Ranjit Gupta, the police commissioner in Calcutta, just across the border in India. "It is silly—it shows you how little the West Pakistanis

know about East Pakistanis."

Instead of the first shooting spree terrorizing the population into submission, it now seems apparent that while the army may be able initially to establish a hold on the cities and major towns, it will face widespread guerrilla activity in the primitive riverine countryside. This could so undermine the supply lines and mobility of the West Pakistani troops that the independence movement would succeed.

In India, many sympathizers with the East Pakistani cause were quick to compare West Pakistan's military actions in East Pakistan with those of Hitler. "Pak Army's Inhuman Torture," was the headline in one Calcutta newspaper. "Butchery," said another, adding: "The vandalism unleashed by the occupying Pakistani army in Bangla Desh (Bengal Nation) is darker than even the darkest chapter of Nazi terror." The Indian Parliament has called it "a massacre of defenseless people which amounts to genocide."

Governments Silent

Most of the other governments of the world have remained silent. "Why doesn't your country condemn this outrage?" one official in

Calcutta asked an American. "This is no tidal wave, this is no act of nature—it is people slaughtering people."

The Bengalis, as the people of East Pakistan are called, have stepped across a crucial line—a line that separated grumbling about their exploitation to fighting against the exploiters. The line may have been crossed on March 25, the night of the attack. Or perhaps it was crossed earlier, on March 1, when President Yahya Khan, Army Commander in Chief, postponed a session of the National Assembly that was to have convened two days later to begin drafting a Constitution returning the nation to civilian rule. That Assembly, elected in December, was dominated by Sheikh Mujib's Awami League party, which wanted a large measure of provincial autonomy—leaving the Central Government with power only over defense and foreign policy, but not foreign trade and foreign aid.

These terms were anathema to the West Pakistani power establishment—the army, the big-business interests and the politicians. In the political negotiations over the crisis, they started off by making conciliatory sounds and then brought in the

monkey wrench, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the dominant political leader of West Pakistan. When he objected that the Awami League wanted too much autonomy—"bordering on sovereignty"—the talks began to stall. Then, suddenly, came the army attack.

The morning after the attack, Mr. Bhutto and his aides, under heavy military protection, were flown back to friendly territory in West Pakistan, where the political leader promptly announced: "Pakistan has been saved by the grace of the Almighty."

But it will take more than religious oratory to save Pakistan as a united Moslem country. Religion was the social glue that was supposed to have held the two wings together, but it was never enough.

It may take a long time, but none of the witnesses to the recent upsurge of Bengali nationalism and to the barbarism of the army attack doubts that it will happen. In the meantime, as Sheikh Mujib was fond of chanting with the adoring crowds that thronged to his now razed house: "Sangram, sangram. Cholebe, cholebe." "The fight will go on. The fight will go on."

—SYDNEY H. SCHANBERG

THE TIMES (LONDON) FRIDAY, APRIL 2, 1971

Political and Intellectual Leaders Being Wiped Out in War of Genocide

By LOUIS HEREN

The Pakistan Army is alleged to have waged a war of genocide in East Pakistan. The objective is said to be the elimination of the political and intellectual leadership, and it might well have been achieved.

Old religious enmities are also said to have been revived. Thousands of Hindus are alleged to have been slaughtered by Muslim troops.

This and other charges were made in London yesterday by a young man who left Dacca earlier this week after spending the past two years there. For many reasons his name cannot be revealed, but I know him to be a level-headed and responsible man.

He confirmed that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the East Bengal leader, escaped the carnage, but 11 members of his bodyguard were killed.

The Shaikh was arrested by troops last Thursday, held in the Adamju school for two days, and then flown to West Pakistan. He is believed to be held in Multan.

According to this informant, a systematic pattern of physical and

psychological destruction became apparent even during the first night of fighting on March 25. Soon after, it became clear that certain groups had been selected to be the victims of completely unrestrained brutality.

These included Awami League leaders, students (who are the most radical members of the League), professors and their families, and any Hindu who could be found.

The Army commanders had apparently concluded that the students were the nucleus of a future Bengali independence movement. The professors represented the East Pakistani intelligentsia, vital for the administration of a future independent Bengal.

The reason for killing the Awami League leaders was self-evident. As for the Hindus, my informant is convinced that the troops were led to believe that they were the malign force behind the secessionist movement.

No single observer could possibly have observed all that went on during the five days of fighting, but what follows was actually seen.

At the University of Dacca, the

residential dormitory Jangarnath Hall, was reserved for Hindu students. Tank tracks led to the wall of the compound, which had been blasted down.

Outside the building there was a fresh mass grave. Inside blood streamed from every room which had also been looted. There were bodies of six savagely-killed men in the servants' quarters near by.

In the apartments of the faculty staff, children were seen shot dead in their beds. The dead bodies of what appeared to be the entire family of a senior professor, were found in another apartment.

Outside were seen the bodies of students still clutching lathis, or bamboo staves, in their hands. There were bloody footprints on the central staircase, and splashes of blood trickled down the outside wall of the building.

In two of the old city's largest bazaars, one entirely Hindu and the other predominantly so, the stench of dead and burning bodies was so overpowering that the survivors walked about with cloths over their noses. At least seven or eight bodies

were seen in the rubble of ruined buildings and on refuse dumps.

In one house, my informant saw the still-warm corpse of a man who had been shot to death minutes before. It was surrounded by his wailing wives.

This is what was actually seen. What follows is an account of what happened during the five days of the fighting. Parts of it are reports received by the informant from friends before he left Dacca.

The Army moved in, in force, to occupy key points of the town shortly before midnight on March 25. President Yahya Khan had departed for Karachi only a few hours before, and the assumption was that the troops acted on his personal instructions.

According to official spokesmen, the Army had been warned of a plot to barricade all the approaches to the cantonment shortly after the President's departure. Barricades had certainly gone up throughout the city, and from midnight until noon the next day, Dacca echoed with the sounds of firing from heavy artillery, heavy machine-guns and other automatic weapons.

Throughout the night, there was the glare of large fires and tracer bullets.

By dawn, a large pall of smoke covered much of the city and drifted slowly northwards towards the wealthy suburb of Gulshan. Fires were also seen in the Bihari area, the scene of communal friction earlier in the month.

A "shoot to kill" curfew was imposed upon the city on March 26. Soldiers were seen firing with automatic weapons at the house of Colonel Osmani, a retired Bengal Army officer.

Shooting and fires continued through the night, but less violently, and the curfew was relaxed for five hours on Saturday March 27.

During a walk through the newer part of the city, destroyed barricades and squatters' huts were seen everywhere.

In the older part of the city, near the police lines, there was complete destruction everywhere. It was understood that the only strong resistance to the Army took place here, with the help of policemen and troops of the East Pakistan Rifles. They were said to have been massacred for their temerity.

Refugees were already beginning to leave the city. Most of them carried only a small bundle of clothes.

The curfew was again lifted on Sunday to allow families to buy food, but the New Market was almost completely destroyed.

At the Ramna racecourse, the two small villages and shrines of Hindu herdsmen were burnt and utterly destroyed. Many bodies were seen in the rubble, and the few remaining villagers were dazed and

SYDNEY MORNING HERALD: AUSTRALIA

Yahya Khan 'Committed to Chaos'

The leading Australian newspaper, Sydney Morning Herald, has said that President Yahya Khan "appears committed to chaos."

In an editorial, it said: "President Yahya, blind to some of the bloodiest lessons in history, to the British in Ireland, the French in Algeria and many more, is trying to restore solidarity by armed force. His ambition would be ludicrous if its consequences were not bound to be tragic."

"He is attempting to impose loyalty to an always artificial Pakistan dominated by the West Pakistani minority upon the 75 million Bengalis who have already shown by an overwhelming vote in democratic elections that their loyalty is to Sheikh Mujib and his demand for an autonomous East Pakistan."

"Sheikh Mujib, having won a majority of seats in the stillborn constituent assembly, having demonstrated his authority by virtually establishing his own civil government after the declaration of martial law, has been remarkably moderate in the interests of a feasible confederation. Only after the breakdown of his talks with the President did he call for independence."

"The blame for breakdown rests with the President. He has repudiated the result of a democratic election in the interests of minority West Pakistan supremacy."

"President Yahya Khan has power—tanks, artillery and planes—to win temporary victories in East Pakistani cities. But in the long run, with his army 1,000 miles from its bases, how can he hope to subdue guerilla warfare fuelled by Bengali nationalism which can be expected to continue indefinitely in notoriously difficult rural terrain of the east? . . .

"Only second thoughts by President Yahya Khan can prevent a prolonged tragedy. And he appears to be committed to chaos."



Dacca youngsters looking at the body of a person shot dead by Pakistan army personnel when they moved in to crush the independence movement of Bangla Desh. — AP radiophoto.

"Worse than in Hitler's Germany"

London, March 31: A Pakistani law student said yesterday that he saw Pakistani troops shooting women and children in Dacca "like boys playing with toy guns."

"It is genocide and a massacre. People are being butchered. It is worse than what happened in Hitler's Germany. Hitler didn't kill his own people."

terrified.

The conclusion drawn was that East Pakistan would be without political and intellectual leadership for at least a decade, and perhaps a generation.

The student, Mr. Shamsul Alam, flew from the smouldering East Pakistani capital to London via Amsterdam.

Mr. Alam, 31, former President of the Pakistan Youth Federation in Britain, claimed that he was carrying a message from the Awami League leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman appealing to the British public.

Describing the chaos in Dacca, Mr. Alam said: "The military set the houses on fire and when the people ran out they shot them. In the streets there were tanks and armoured cars and I could hear sten guns, machine guns, rifles and can-

non fire. They were firing aimlessly, no matter whether at women or children.

"On the way to the airport, I saw about 100 decomposing bodies collected together and the birds were eating them."

Mr. Alam said one-third of the staff at Dacca University were dead and students were killed in their beds. He estimated 1,000 East Pakistani police officers were "butchered with sten guns."

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, he said, had asked him to tell Britain "and the whole world of the terrible situation the Bengalis are facing."—AP.



THE TIMES TUESDAY, MARCH 30, 1971

'At Dacca University the Burning Bodies of Students Still Lay in Their Dormitory Beds... A Mass Grave Had Been Hastily Covered...'

FROM MICHEL LAURENT

An Associated Press photographer who evaded the Army in Dacca and toured the devastated areas.

Dacca, March 29. In two days and nights of shelling by the Pakistani Army perhaps 7,000 Pakistanis died in Dacca alone.

The Army, which attacked without warning on Thursday night with American-supplied M24 tanks, artillery and infantry, destroyed large parts of the city.

Its attack was aimed at the university, the populous Old City where Shaikh Mujibur, the Awami League leader, has his strongest following, and the industrial areas on the outskirts of this city of 1,500,000 people.

Touring the still-burning areas of

fighting on Saturday and Sunday, it was obvious that the city had been taken without warning. At the university burning bodies of some students still lay in their dormitory beds. The dormitories had been hit by direct tank fire.

A mass grave had been hastily covered at the Jagannath College and 200 students were reported killed in Iqbal hall. About 20 bodies were still lying in the grounds and the dormitories. Troops are reported to have fired bazookas into the medical college hospital, but the casualty toll was not known.

Despite claims by the central Government in West Pakistan that life is returning to normal in Dacca, thousands are fleeing the city with only the belongings they could carry. Some pushed carts loaded with food and clothes. Only a few

persons have returned to Government jobs, despite the orders of the military regime.

Resistance to the Army has been negligible. Pakistanis are obeying military orders to turn in weapons.

The Pakistan national flag is again flying from most Government buildings. It had been replaced in the past 10 days by the green, red and yellow "Bangla Desh" (Bengal Nation) flag of independence.

In the Old City, large parts of which were destroyed, elderly men and women poked among the smouldering ruins of their homes.

Army lorries and armoured cars patrolled the almost deserted streets. Cars were pasted with Pakistan flags to avoid drawing fire from Army patrols.

Bodies still lay sprawled in the streets where they had been caught

in the Army cross-fire. Shanty towns by the railway had been burnt down.

The people still appeared stunned by the shooting and deaths.

The Government went to extreme lengths to prevent a large contingent of foreign journalists from witnessing the Army's intervention and the subsequent violence.

Thirty-five foreign correspondents were detained in the Dacca Intercontinental Hotel, and only this reporter and a British correspondent evaded the Army cordon and subsequent deportation of newsmen to Bombay. Later the Army at Dacca airport frisked me and seized film and notes on Dacca.

At Karachi, the police forced me to strip, my luggage was searched again, and film was seized.—A.P.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, APRIL 7, 1971

Foreign Evacuees from E. Pakistan Tell of Grim Fight

BY SYDNEY H. SCHANBERG

Special to The New York Times

Calcutta, April 6—More than 100 foreign evacuees arrived here today after a 34-hour voyage from Chittagong, East Pakistan's major port, bringing the latest eyewitness reports about the Pakistani army's attempt to suppress the independence movement.

"It's a massacre," said John Martinussen, a Danish student.

"We saw the army shooting civilians," said Neil O'Toole, an American from New Rochelle, N.Y. "I don't want to say too much because I'm afraid of reprisals against our organization." He asked that the name of his organization not be mentioned.

The 119 foreigners, who arrived at the Calcutta docks this afternoon aboard a British cargo vessel that had been sitting in Chittagong harbor unable to unload because of the fighting, were of 17 nationalities. The two largest groups were 37 Americans and 33 Britons.

As they came down the gangplank of the vessel, the Clan MacNair, they were met by diplomatic officials and a crowd of Indian and foreign newsmen.

Though some of the evacuees were reluctant to talk, others painted a grim picture of Chittagong, East Pakistan's second-largest city. Until now little has been known of how that city of 400,000 inhabitants has fared in the fighting.

The foreigners said that after

several days of fighting, the army—all West Pakistani troops—had pushed the East Pakistani resistance forces out of the city.

But, they added, the army's control ends five miles outside the city, at the banks of the Karnaphuli River.

Everything from the river south, they said, is in the hands of the "liberation army," which consists of civilians and members of the East Pakistani police, the East Pakistani Rifles and the East Bengal Regiment who have come over to the independence movement.

The foreigners said that they could hear shooting on the outskirts of the city even as they were leaving for Calcutta yesterday morning. Most of the residents have fled the city and gone into the countryside, they said.

Army Burns Slums

In the city, where fighting broke out early Friday morning, on March 26, the foreigners said the army had burned to the ground many of the flimsy slums of the poor, the staunch supporters of independence.

The ashes of the bamboo huts in these neighborhoods were still smoldering, the foreigners said, as they were taken to the docks under military escort yesterday morning to be evacuated.

The Pakistan Radio, speaking for the Pakistan Government, contends that all of East Pakistan is calm and that life is returning to normal.

"Nothing is calm, and nothing has come back to normal," said Mr. Martinussen, who came to Chittagong seven months ago with his wife Karen to study Pakistani politics as part of his master's degree program at Aarhus University in Denmark.

"They systematically burned down the districts of the poor people, apparently because they felt they couldn't search them thoroughly," he went on. "They seemed to be enjoying killing and destroying everything."

"Many Bengalis have been killed," the 23-year-old student went on. "In the river just four days ago, you could count 400 bodies floating in one area."

Mr. Martinussen, who related several accounts of civilians being gunned down in shops and on the street, forecast eventual victory for the 75 million East Pakistanis, who have long protested their exploitation by West Pakistan, which is situated more than 1,000 miles away across Indian territory.

Independence Movement

"So many Bengalis want their Bangla Desh," said the slim student, "that I'm sure they will get it."

Bangla Desh is Bengali for Bengal nation. It is the independence movement's name for East Pakistan.

His views were echoed by Mr. O'Toole, who is 26 years old. "Chittagong is controlled by the army," he said. "It is controlled by

brute force and terror. The army kept coming in. They were shooting civilians. We saw dead bodies. We smelled the stench of death."

"There was a lot of harassment and beating," he added, "and there was indiscriminate looting and burning by outsiders."

Vengeance Reported

Mr. O'Toole did not explain what he meant by "outsiders"—but he apparently was talking about West Pakistanis living in East Pakistan.

Other refugees reported that some Bengalis had taken vengeance by killing non-Bengali businessmen.

The foreigners said that a 7 P.M.-to-5 A.M. curfew prevails in Chittagong, that electric power, cut for three days, has been restored only in some areas of the city, and that the port was virtually shut down since there were no Bengalis to work there.

Some of the evacuees left their homes during the heavy fighting and took refuge in the Hotel Agrabad, away from the center of the action.

They said that soldiers had visited some of their homes while they were away.

"The army was very polite," Edward J. McManus, an American engineer from Montrose, N. Y., said with sarcasm. "They drank all my whisky, but they gave me all my glasses back. Very honest."

Editorial Opinion

A Massacre in Pakistan

"Only now are we getting Pakistani facts to abet fears. President Yahaya Khan has written to suppress these facts, filling his air waves and press with evasive propaganda, deporting every journalist he could find. But a few independent reporters escaped this net and their stories—just emerging—reek with horror: crowds indiscriminately machine-gunned, student hostels razed by shells, shanty towns burned and bombed, civilians shot dead in their beds. We do not yet know the fate of those arrested in East or the true level of resistance through the province. But we do know first-hand and reliably that many unarmed and unready Bangalis have died.

From this point the whole complexion of the crises changes. Before troops moved, many leaders shared responsibility, and blame Sheikh Mujib and his wilder henchment among them. But Yahaya Khan's licensed mayhem has swept all this toward irrelevancy. While he negotiated with Mujib, his generals planned carnage. His vaunted bluff sincerity (and sincerity of Pakistan's brief return to democracy) lies tattered. Henceforth, the country must be regarded as particularly brutal and insensitive military dictatorship, its elected political leadership in prison majority party obliterated by decree. Guardian, with many others, has long believed

that balance of advantage lay with united Pakistan. But unity can never come through murder and is not worth the price of innocent lives. East Pakistan survives today only as occupied and exploited territory, a living proof of every Bengali suspicion of years. Bhutto, who purports to be national leader, "thanks God" for this miserable carnage. Yahya Khan hears none of Pakistan's friends who counsel mercy and morality even at this late stage.

But he must be made to hear. In contrast with Biafra, rights and wrongs of East Pakistan are easily determined. Those—like America—who stock the Pakistan army, must realize to what uses their weaponry is put. Those—like China and Ceylon—who permit forces to ferry from West must realize that acts and purposes those forces pursue. Those—like Britain—who retain some prestige of influence in the area, should spend it openly and forcefully. The fate of Dacca is a crime against humanity and human aspirations: no one should stand mealy-mouthed by."

EDITORIAL, *THE GUARDIAN*
MARCH 31, 1971

THE WASHINGTON POST, MARCH 30, 1971

Tragedy in Pakistan

The eastern wing of Pakistan, much the more populous, won national elections last December and began moving peaceably to take over national power. The western wing, which has dominated and exploited the East since Moslem Pakistan was carved out of British India in 1947, correctly perceived the threat and—rather than surrender power—stalled. Talks were begun to see if a constitutional formula could be devised to allow the East autonomy within an all-Pakistan federation. It is not clear whether the power brokers of the West feared that the talks were failing, or succeeding; at any rate, without notice or armed provocation, last Friday they opened fire with machine guns, recoilless rifles and tanks against the largely unarmed—or heavily outgunned—citizenry of East Pakistan. Evidently thousands were killed; the number can only be estimated because the government at once imposed censorship and expelled all foreign correspondents, confiscating their notes and film.

The government of West Pakistan claims control of Dacca in the East; there is no reason to doubt that it does control in a military sense the territory within the firing range of its high-powered guns. However, for it to claim any meaningful measure of political loyalty

among the 75 million people of East Pakistan has become absurd. Previously, moderate opinion in Dacca seemed inclined to regional autonomy within a Pakistan federation. Now it appears that moderates have been stilled and political sentiment has swung behind demands for full independence for "Bangla Desh"—the words mean Bengal nation. Already separated from the Bengalis by a thousand miles of Indian territory and a distinct culture and language, the Punjabis of the West have widened the gulf with blood. At this point the form of Bengali resistance cannot be predicted with any certainty; the fact can.

For outsiders, the spectacle in Pakistan affords further evidence of the essential irrelevance of the anti-Communist impulses which led the United States to arm and aid Pakistan for so many years. Clearly, the real threat to such a country lies within: in the ancient antagonisms of its people and in the toils of modernization. American arms are again being used by a recipient government against what it claims to be its own citizens. That is deplorable. But the real tragedy is Pakistan's own.

Civil Strife in East Pakistan

It is regrettable, indeed, that Pakistan's President Yahya Khan has had to resort to military action against East Pakistan, especially after the majority vote the latter had won in the December elections.

Even though Pakistan is, titularly, a democracy, the military influence in government has always been strong.

Sadly, heavy casualties are reported amongst the unarmed East Pakistani civilian population. The crushing blow which President Yahya has apparently administered may well return a thousandfold in guerrilla-type warfare. The East Pakistanis, fighting in support of their leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, against the West's Soviet tanks and United States planes, are poignantly

reminiscent of the Minutemen of the American Revolution.

Though the West has the weaponry advantage, the East Pakistanis possess the knowledge of their terrain, interlaced with rivulets, creeks, swamps, rivers, and bays in which heavy Western equipment would find difficulty in maneuvering.

The logistic and geographic difficulties of operating from West Pakistan bases 1,000 miles away distinguish the Pakistan civil war from that of Nigeria. Humane relief operations may encounter the same harassments they did in Nigeria where humanitarian supplies were often interpreted as aid to the enemy.

LONDON TIMES, APRIL 3, 1971

The Slaughter in East Pakistan

The more the news from East Pakistan accumulates, the more harrowing it becomes. Senseless murder, hysterical cruelty, and what must be a creeping fear run like a current throughout this packed mass of human beings. All this the distant observer may assume despite the protests of the Pakistan Government at some of the stories that have been given circulation. They have a case—or had in the first days following the orders given to the Pakistan army to restore order. When authentic first-hand accounts are not to be had the temptation to report anything that comes from any hearsay source is rarely resisted. And when western reports—news agencies, broadcasts, and newspapers—become the source of information for so many parts of the world, the objections

are all the stronger. Figures for those killed in the first days of shooting were often wildly beyond anything one person could possibly have observed or calculated. In the period of negotiation between President Yahya Khan and Sheikh Mujib expectations of a united East Bengal standing to arms had grown so strongly that they led to battle lines being drawn where none existed.

By now the picture is a little more clear and a great deal more gruesome. Enough first-hand reports from Dacca itself and from some of the major towns have come in to confirm that what is happening is far worse than what might have been expected in a war of East Pakistanis resisting the forces of the central government in their demand for independence.

NEW YORK TIMES, MARCH 31, 1971

In the Name of Pakistan

Acting "in the name of God and a united Pakistan," forces of the West Pakistan-dominated military government of President Yahya Khan have dishonored both by their ruthless crackdown on the Bengali majority seeking a large measure of autonomy for their homeland in the country's eastern region.

Any appearance of "unity" achieved by vicious military attacks on unarmed civilians of the kind described by correspondents and diplomats who were in the East Pakistani capital of Dacca when the crackdown began cannot possibly have real meaning or enduring effect. The brutality of the Western troops toward their "Moslem brothers" in the East tends only to confirm the argument of the outright secessionists in Bengal who argue that differences between East and West Pakistan are irreconcilable.

Although this is a domestic dispute, the struggle in Pakistan could have dangerous international consequences, especially if a prolonged period of guerrilla warfare ensues. The least the world community can do at this stage is to call on President Yahya, in the name of humanity and common sense, to stop the bloodshed and restore Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to his rightful role as elected leader of his people.

The United States, having played a major role in training and equipping Pakistan's armed forces, has a special obligation now to withhold any military aid to the Yahya Government. Economic assistance should be continued only on condition that a major portion be used to help bind up East Pakistan's grievous wounds.

NEW YORK TIMES, APRIL 7, 1971

Bloodbath in Bengal

Washington's persistent silence on recent events in Pakistan becomes increasingly incomprehensible in the light of mounting eye-witness evidence that the Pakistani Army has engaged in indiscriminate slaughter of civilians and the selective elimination of leadership groups in the separatist state of East Bengal.

A State Department spokesman conceded yesterday that "we would be concerned if American weapons were used in circumstances such as these." But he insisted the United States has no first-hand knowledge that such is the case. This is sophistry. Only last month the Secretary of State, in his annual foreign policy report, noted that this country had agreed to sell additional equipment to the Pakistanis "for their largely U.S.-equipped army."

'EL MERCURIO' CHILEAN DAILY

"The hundred dead in My Lai massacre shook deeply the conscience of the whole world and caused an internal crisis in the United States because the free press in the United States published and broadcast these events. 300,000 or 20,000 (although the difference is large the fact remains the same) dead bodies in the streets of East Bengal cities do not shake up world opinion because there are no moving pictures or versions of these past events."

TURKISH PAPER 'AKSHAM'

"Apparently relations between West and East Pakistan are of the colonial type. The two wings have nothing in common but religion. East Pakistanis are fighting a national liberation war against Pakistani colonialists..."

BALTIMORE, TUESDAY, MARCH 30, 1971

Pakistan Storm

Radio Pakistan is nothing if not official, and its claim that the situation in East Pakistan is returning to normal may be noted with that in mind. In fact with the expulsion of foreign reporters from Dacca there is no trustworthy source of present information. The official channels say what they are told to say. A rebel radio speaks of continued fighting in Dacca, Chittagong and elsewhere, but the authority of that source is not established. Intelligence by way of India is in large part rumor.

One thing does seem clear, however. The observations of the foreign reporters before they were expelled give a picture of the events of late last week quite at variance with the government's picture. The army, which is to say the West Pakistani army, did not act to suppress an uprising. It struck calculatedly, dealing death beyond all immediate provocation.

John E. Woodruff of *The Sun*, one of the reporters expelled, writes today from New Delhi of earlier rumors, received with some skepticism at the time, that President Yahya Khan's regime was deliberately prolonging the recent Dacca talks, to lull East Bengal into believing

On any basis, the United States would have a humanitarian duty to speak out against the bloodbath in Bengal, as the Soviet Union already has done. Washington, as Pakistan's chief arms supplier, has a double obligation: to declare its disapproval of the tactics employed and to make clear that no additional American arms—including spare parts—will be sent to Pakistan until this savage repression in the East is stopped.

America's own interests call for it to do everything possible to help bring a speedy end to a civil conflict that could touch off a chain reaction of communal strife throughout the Indian subcontinent, with grave international implications.

'SALZBURGER NACHRICHTEN' (AN AUSTRIAN DAILY)

"No matter whether the Republic of Bengal survives or not . . . If Bengalis were to be crushed by Pakistani bayonets, we will have the absurd phenomenon of a majority of population in a State hating it more than anything else. In Biafra and Southern Sudan, the majority was oppressing the minority. In East Pakistan just the contrary is true."

a compromise imminent, and then would attack without warning.

True or not, that reading is given credence by the regime's curious explanation that the crisis was brought to a head, and the brutal crackdown justified, on a legal technicality—that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the Bengali leader, had demanded a turn-over of power to elected civilians before any meeting of the projected National Assembly. That the Pakistan People's party led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto offers the same story indeed suggests a scheme and a connivance not of recent date.

If the government's notion of normality is ruthless military oppression, it may be that East Pakistan can be made to appear normal, after a while and for a while. Even that is doubtful; and it may be taken as certainty that the divisions between the two Pakistans have now been widened beyond repair, and that the East Bengalis will not permanently endure physical rule by troops who in looks and habits and language are, after all, foreign troops.

THE GUARDIAN, MARCH 27, 1971

"The President appears unable to stomach the fact that Sheikh Mujib has for the past few weeks effectively been ruling Bengal independently of the central Government. He has abandoned compromise and now seeks to restore an unnatural order by force. The immediate outcome will be a bloody reaffirmation of the East's worst suspicions of the West's intentions. But the problems do not stop there. Can Sheikh Mujib, a congenital compromiser cast in the role of revolutionary, sustain his position against the more militant members of his Party, or against the leftist National Awami Party,

NEW YORK TIMES, APRIL 15, 1971

Bullets or Bread?

Washington's pretense of non-intervention in Pakistan's tragic internal conflict has been shattered this week by State Department acknowledgment that the United States has been selling ammunition and other "nonlethal" military equipment to the repressive Pakistani Government and by the Administration's persisting refusal to impose a ban on such sales. As long as these sales continue, the United States places itself alongside China on the side of the military regime in Islamabad and, in effect, makes itself a party to the continuing slaughter of Pakistan's Bengali majority and to the suppression of the recently elected majority party in Pakistan's still unconvened National Assembly.

Three weeks after President Yahya turned loose his army on the mostly unarmed Bengalis, the State Department says it does not know when the last United States arms deliveries were made to Pakistan, what is now en route or what is being prepared for shipment. Even if this incredible admission of bureaucratic incom-

petence were true, it would be no excuse for the Administration's failure to order an immediate embargo on all arms shipments to Pakistan in the face of overwhelming evidence of misuse of earlier aid.

In the cruelest blow of all to the miserable Bengalis, Washington has suspended wheat shipments to Pakistan, having determined with remarkable speed that there are already more shipments on hand than can be landed through devastated East Pakistani ports. This may be temporarily true, but surely the need for food relief in East Pakistan in the coming months will be greatly increased. The focus should be on breaking down the logjam caused by the military actions, the incompetence and the indifference of the western-dominated Pakistani Government. **Under no circumstances can neutrality stand as an excuse for failure to make the most vigorous effort to promote humanitarian relief for the victims of conflict regardless of political persuasion.**

THE EVENING STAR, SATURDAY, APRIL 17, 1971

Death in East Pakistan

It is, by every reasonably reliable account, all over in East Pakistan. All over, that is, except the agony, the scorched earth policy, the wanton killing, the selective slaughter of potential Bengali leaders and the indestructible dream of independence.

The bid for autonomy has been, for the present, effectively suppressed. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the secessionist leader and president of Free Bengal, is reported to be in prison in West Pakistan, awaiting trial for treason. The remnant of the rebel army, short of arms, ammunition, food, transportation and shoes, stages progressively weaker guerrilla raids on the well-equipped West Pakistani army of 80,000. In reprisal, the government forces have killed tens of thousands of Bengali civilians—and some reports put the figure in the hundreds of thousands. A New York Times correspondent, who crossed from India into East Pakistan, reported that government troops, acting on orders from Karachi, have killed engineers, doctors, professors and students in an attempt to eradicate the future Bengali leadership. The army has tried to lay waste the future economy of East Pakistan by destroying the meager physical wealth of the area—food supplies, natural gas fields, jute mills.

Even making generous allowance for the exaggeration that usually accompanies a military defeat, the story from East Pakistan is one of atrocity and heartbreak. No one, however far removed from the devastation, can remain untouched by it.

For East Pakistan, the defeat brings another dimension of horror to a people who have, in recent months, borne the scourge of flood, disease and famine. For West Pakistan, the victory brings with it the assurance of eventual defeat, for the bloody repression of the secessionists assures the Punjabis and the Pathans of the lasting enmity of the Bengalis.

The government of the United States can, for the moment, play no overt role other than that of anguished spectator. It can and should, however, use the channels of quiet diplomacy to persuade the West Pakistanis to stop the killing, which is approaching the proportions of genocide. And it should prepare now for the moment when the fighting ends, the time when supplies of food, clothing and medicine will be needed in quantity by the destitute survivors of the slaughter.

Pakistan: A Time to Speak Out

In the last two issues of The Sunday Times, we have published graphic despatches from our special correspondent in East Pakistan. These have borne out, and added to, the mass of evidence from other sources, all of it suggesting that a terrible, communal bloodbath has been the result of the West Pakistan decision to quell with bullets the democratically expressed wish of the East Pakistan Bengalis for a wide measure of autonomy. On the opposite page, the same correspondent, after visiting West Pakistan, describes the influences and ideas at work there. **What emerges, with a force that leaves no room for doubt, is that an appalling error has led to an appalling tragedy. The Indian sub-continent has, unhappily, been witness before now to mass killings by one race of another. But there is no modern precedent in the sub-continent, or elsewhere, for what can only be regarded as the deliberate intention on the part of the central Pakistani Government to wipe out, by killing, as many as possible of the adherents, present and future, of Bengali nationalism.**

General Yahya Khan, to do him justice, had a very difficult situation on his hands. It was due to his own, laudable, desire to see democracy restored in Pakistan that general elections took place last autumn, from which Sheik Mujib and his East Pakistani Awami League emerged triumphant. Faced subsequently with the swelling tide of Bengali separatism, Yahya Khan's duty, as Head of State, was clearly to seek to preserve the unity of the State. But Mujib, in the negotiations which preceded the final break, had never proposed secession, whatever his more fiery followers were shouting.

Nor was it ever conceivable, whatever the present successes of West Pakistani forces, that a display of military strength could snuff out (and keep snuffed out) years of

Bengali grievance and longing for a new deal. The one certain result of Yahya Khan's fateful decision—other than the bloodshed—is that the way has now been opened, in East Pakistan, to Maoists. Naxalites and other fishers in troubled waters, besides whom Mujib stands out as the epitome of reasonableness.

A deplorable cloud of complacency now seems to be hanging over Islamabad. It is the duty of other governments, the British Government included, to help to dispel it. To say that the East Pakistani drama is an "internal affair," as Sir Alec Douglas-Home has done, is not enough. Internal affairs can become, as this one has, crimes against justice and humanity. Besides, with India, China, and Russia all with an iron in the fire, it is ludicrous to pretend that East Pakistan is a little local difficulty.

The time has come, it is indeed overdue, for the British Government publicly to express its disgust, in far stronger terms than it has yet done, at the course of events in East Pakistan. Using the more traditional, and private, diplomatic channel, it needs to let Yahya Khan know (if it has not already done so) just how dangerous and mistaken his policies are. If necessary the possibility of concerted action among the suppliers of foreign aid to Pakistan should be considered—even if it is rough justice to make the people of West Pakistan suffer for the follies of their own non-elected military rulers. In the end, some sort of discussion between the central Government in West Pakistan and the popular representatives in East Pakistan is going to have to take place. The sooner General Yahya realizes this, and sends Mujib back to Dacca so that there shall be someone responsible to talk to, the better.

Pakistan's Made-in-U.S.A. Arms

By CHESTER BOWLES

BRIDGEPORT, Conn. — The appalling struggle now going on in East Pakistan is a further testimony to the folly of handing out arms to "friendly governments" with little regard for whom they are to be used against or for what reasons.

The billion-dollar military equipment program for the Government of Pakistan (meaning West Pakistan) between 1954 and 1965 enabled and encouraged the Pakistanis to attack India in 1965. Now (along with some Soviet and Chinese equipment) it is being used by the West Pakistan Government to beat down their fellow countrymen in East Pakistan who recently voted overwhelmingly for greater independence.

It is a particularly shoddy spectacle because there is no indication that our Government feels the slightest responsibility for how our weapons are being used. Indeed it has done its best to sweep the whole situation under the rug.

Even when the International Red Cross was refused entry into East Pakistan, when all foreign correspondents had been hurriedly ushered out of the country, and when daily on-the-spot reports from our Consulate General in Dacca had described in detail the massive military action by the West Pakistan Army against East Pakistan civilians, our Government persisted in saying it did not know what was going on and therefore was in no position to comment.

It was only when some 500 American refugees from East Pakistan began to give accounts to the press that our Government offered even a mild protest to the West Pakistan Government.

Two actions, it seems to me, should be taken at once. First, we should lodge a strong protest with the West Pakistan Government over the misuse of U.S. military equipment and all aid except medical supplies and food should promptly be stopped. Second, we should call for a meeting of the Security Council of the United Nations to consider appropriate steps to deal with the threat to the peace of Asia which this conflict clearly has become. U.S. Government spokesmen have already ignored the first suggestion and rejected the second on the ground that the fighting in East Pakistan is an "internal question" in which we have no right to interfere. But what about U.S. action in the Congo? What about South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Cyprus?

When peace is threatened on such a massive scale the United Nations has an overriding obligation to do everything possible to settle the conflict before it gets out of control. This obligation is particularly clear when the "internal problem" is created by the efforts of a well-armed minority to subdue the overwhelming majority constituting more than one-half of a divided country,

separated by more than 1,000 miles of alien territory, speaking different languages and with deep built-in cultural conflicts and differing economic interests.

If we assume leadership in mustering world opinion to stop the fighting, the Soviet Union, which has limited its reaction to a mild plea for restraint, will almost certainly support our position. This is particularly so since China has seized upon the situation to stir up trouble between India and Pakistan even though this puts them in bed with the rightist military dictatorship of West Pakistan.

The upheaval in East Pakistan came at a moment when there was new hope for political stability and economic progress in South Asia. In December, the overwhelming victory of Sheik Mujibur Rahman and his Awami League in the first free election ever held in Pakistan had opened the door not only for the first genuinely democratic government but for greatly expanded trade with India and the easing of the conflict between the two nations.

Two months later, Mrs. Gandhi's landslide election in India provided her with a mandate not only for an all-out effort to ease the poverty of the Indian masses but also to improve India's relations with its neighbors.

Tragically, the action of the West Pakistan Government has destroyed for some time to come the hope for a politically stable, united Pakistan living at peace with its neighbors. In all likelihood, the West Pakistani forces in East Pakistan ultimately will be driven out. Although their military superiority is substantial, the movement of food and military supplies in the coming monsoon through the aroused countryside will be extremely difficult. An independent East Pakistan appears to be in the cards.

But if the United States and the U.N. combine to look the other way and the present struggle is allowed to continue to its inevitable bloody climax, East Pakistan will become a political vacuum with 70-million embittered people convinced that the only hope for support is from the most extreme elements in India. This is particularly likely if, as many observers believe, Sheik Mujibur Rahman, who has been deeply committed to the democratic process, is already dead.

As this danger grows, Mrs. Gandhi's Government will be increasingly diverted from its programs of economic development to raise the living standards of the Indian people, instead turning to the political and military problems of securing its northern and eastern borders.

Chester Bowles, Ambassador to India from 1963-1969, just returned from a ten-week visit to the subcontinent. He is author of a new book, "Promises to Keep."

The New York Times Magazine

MAY 2, 1971



Victims. The bodies of East Pakistani refugees caught, while sleeping, by

West Pakistani flame throwers lie on the ground of the Dacca race course. Such scenes of carnage became common as civil war engulfed East Pakistan.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, APRIL 11, 1971

*“... Radio Pakistan and the controlled West Pakistan press
use India for a whipping boy ...”*

India Being Made Scapegoat

By Selig S. Harrison Washington Post Foreign Service

NEW DELHI, April 13 — Prime Minister Gandhi said today that Pakistan is seeking to use India as "a scapegoat," for its difficulties in East Pakistan and declared that "any country situated as we are always has to be fully prepared for any contingency." Asked during a 50-minute interview whether she saw any chance of a political formula for cooling off the conflict in East Pakistan in response to the appeal by Soviet President Podgorny, she replied that "it doesn't seem very likely, does it, as things are developing, although anything is still possible."

Then she added sharply, "Is there any desire to cool it off on the other side? This is obviously not a step they have taken because of some sudden provocation. It was well-thought out and well-planned, and before undertaking such a step they must have thought out all the likely consequences."

Mrs. Gandhi answered questions relating to East Pakistan slowly and reluctantly, observing several times that "the situation is very delicate" and that "anything I say will be misunderstood by Pakistan."

The demand for an independent East Pakistan "would not have arisen if Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and President Yahya Khan had gone on with their negotiations" on a confederation agreement, she observed.

"It was only when Mujibur was driven to the wall that there was a turn in that direction."

But she said in reply to a question that she "does not know" whether nearly three weeks of fighting has led to a change in Bengali attitudes ruling out negotiations on a political compromise with Islamabad short of full independence. "We can only say that no matter what the outcome, there will be increased bitterness with the East Bengalis. Things can never be normal."

Held for release today, the interview took place two days ago, prior to Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai's letter to Yahya Khan declaring "firm support should Indian expansionists dare to launch any aggression upon Pakistan" and prior to the declaration by East Pakistan rebels launching an independent Bengali Land last night.

Guarded Response

Mrs. Gandhi was guarded in her response to questions concerning the possible extent of Chinese backing for Islamabad and the impact of the East Pakistan situation on the reported plans of some officials here to seek a gradual moderation of Sino-Indian tensions following the route of ultranationalist elements in the election.

She noted that Peking had broadcast "the West Pakistani version of things" in Bengal but said that "we do not close the door" on improved relations with the Chinese as "they have not been as provocative

lately as they used to be, though we cannot say yet whether this means anything."

Declining comment on the U.S. reaction to the East Pakistan fighting, she stated that it is "not for us to say how other countries should react. So far as we are concerned we are in a very special position and whatever happens will have a tremendous impact on our security. It is not only what is happening but the region where it is happening. That whole area is an explosive sort of area."

When I called attention to widespread speculation here that Pakistan might seek to use India as the scapegoat for its troubles in Bengal, posing the danger of war, Mrs. Gandhi replied that "they are already trying to make us the scapegoat, aren't they? Any country situated as we are always has to be prepared for any contingency. It is very difficult to say what will actually happen. But our people are perhaps understandably in a highly emotional state. We are trying to keep them occupied with civilian humanitarian works."

The problem of pre-election violence in West Bengal reflected both the strength of "anti-social elements" and the realization of Communist groups "that they were losing ground," she said. Asked whether the powerful Marxist Communist Party could be stopped from sending "volunteers" into East Pakistan, she said, "We are trying to stop them," adding, "so far they are only making all kinds of announcements."

She reacted with irritation to a question concerning the possible value of some form of bold post-election initiative on Kashmir and other issues outstanding between India and Pakistan designed to reverse the present drift toward conflict and strengthen moderate elements in West Pakistan favoring disengagement from the eastern wing.

My use of the phrase, "new start," and a reference to the maneuverability resulting from her unusually strong domestic political position brought the quick retort that "we have been suggesting new starts all along, and we have worked in the belief that there should be no difficulty in normalizing relationships, but their whole attitude seems so far from ours and so hostile. I have been pursuing the course I felt to be right all along and we have never got any response to our feelers. The election doesn't make any difference. This is why Indian opinion has hardened, because all parties feel that we have been the ones who have made all of the offers, who keep giving in."

Despite their election set-back, Hindu right wing groups continue to represent a greater political challenge than the Communists, she contended, because their position is "irrational. You cannot argue about it, and that is why it is dangerous, because it is so emotional. The others are talking about the conditions people live in, and if people see you are going in a certain direction and are doing certain things or trying to do them you can combat their appeal."

ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, APRIL 29, 1971

Crumbling Dream In Pakistan

While the future of Pakistan remains far from clear, it is evident that the old order has passed. The dream of Mohammed Ali Jinnah, one of the three great Indian leaders who emerged in the years preceding the withdrawal of the British in the mid-1940s, is dissolving in civil war between the eastern and western segments of the country. The wonder is that it did not happen sooner.

Given Hindu-Moslem antagonisms it can hardly be argued that Gandhi and Nehru were right, and yet the fact is that for a generation India has been a stable democracy; it has just demonstrated its maturity in a re-

markable vote of confidence for Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Pakistan has long since turned to military authoritarianism; the regime had the means to send warplanes and tanks to attack civilian dissidents in East Pakistan.

India, fortunately, has shown no disposition to involve itself in its neighbor's struggle, though it was natural for Mrs. Gandhi to speak in support of East Pakistan. It has been the militaristic West that has been at odds with India for more than 20 years.

NEW YORK TIMES, PAKISTAN:

In This Case 'War Is Hell' For One Side Only

AGARTALA, East Pakistan — War is hell, everyone says, but it is usually hell for both sides.

Yet, in the three-week-old war between the Pakistani Army and the outgunned resistance fighters of East Pakistan, there has been only one hell so far — that of the tens of thousands of East Pakistani civilians who have been massacred by the army in its drive to terrorize, intimidate and crush the Bengali independence movement.

Having gained control of most of the major cities and towns, the army troops — all are West Pakistanis, many of whom harbor deep racial hatred for the Bengali population of East Pakistan — are now making forays into the countryside. They hope to extend their control before the monsoon rains become heavy in a few weeks and make movement for a regular army difficult.

"They flounder and die in knee-deep water," said a Bengali officer. "We will use country boats. We will make misery for them."

The prospect is for a long, sullen war. Most diplomats and foreign observers believe that the Bengalis, by hanging on, will eventually make life untenable for the West Pakistanis, who are more than 1,000 miles from their home and their supply bases.

But these observers also agree that, unless foreign powers put an economic squeeze on the Pakistani Government, it could be years before the 75 million Bengalis finally win their freedom and end West Pakistan's exploitation of their province — the exploitation that gave birth to the independence movement.

There are usually two sides to every story, every argument, every conflict. But it is difficult, after witnessing what is taking place in East Pakistan, to imagine some justification for the army's action. This is because the army, from all the available evidence, has set out to kill the leaders and potential leaders of East Pakistan and

to destroy the economic base of the region.

"They want to drag us so far down that we will be reduced to eating grass," said one Bengali soldier. "They want to make sure that no head will ever be raised against them again."

The West Pakistani troops are killing Bengali students, intellectuals, professors, army officers, engineers, doctors and others of any leadership potential.

Using tanks, jet fighter-bombers, heavy artillery and gun-boats, all mostly supplied by the United States, the Soviet Union and Communist China, the Pakistani Army is also destroying food-storage houses, tea factories, jute mills and natural gas fields — the economic infrastructure of East Pakistan.

The Pakistan Government, often through its official radio, is accusing its old enemy India of virtually everything in this war: of sending arms and soldiers to the independence army, of harassing Pakistani ships, of setting up a clandestine radio station, of inspiring the Indian press to print exaggerated accounts of massacres and atrocities. These charges, all of which India has repeatedly denied, have received wide play in the world press, mainly because there is no Bangla Desh radio to counter-balance them.

India is probably providing assistance to the independence movement, but there has been no evidence yet of any arms, ammunition or men.

Radio Pakistan and the controlled West Pakistan press, in addition to using India for a whipping boy, also continues to issue daily reports describing conditions in East Pakistan as "returning to normal." It characterizes the popularly supported independence movement as "a handful of miscreants" and says that the East Pakistan economy is on the mend, with jute being exported again. All are bald fabrications.

SYDNEY H. SCHANBERG

Bengalis Form a Cabinet As the Bloodshed Goes On

The following dispatch is by the New Delhi correspondent of The New York Times, who has just completed a four-day trip through the border region of India and East Pakistan, as well as inside East Pakistan.

By SYDNEY H. SCHANBERG
Special to The New York Times

AGARTALA, India, April 13—Although large numbers of East Pakistani secessionist leaders have been reported killed and with wholesale bloodshed continuing, several members of the movement's high command are alive and have formed a cabinet.

They include Tajuddin Ahmed, second in command to Sheik Mujibur Rahman, whose Awami League took the steps for independence that brought West Pakistan's military crackdown.

In an East Pakistani border area visited by this correspondent, at least six secessionist leaders met to name Mr. Ahmed Prime Minister and Defense Minister of the state they call Bangla Desh, or Bengal Nation. They proclaimed Sheik Mujib their President, although privately the secessionist leaders acknowledged that he was in prison in West Pakistan.

While the central Government, which is dominated by West Pakistan, continues to announce that the situation is calm in the East and conditions are returning to normal, a far different picture emerges on the scene.

Daily Battles Reported

Daily battles are reliably reported in many sectors. Hordes of East Pakistanis have fled the cities to seek refuge or join the secessionist army, and thousands of refugees, carrying their meager belongings in cardboard suitcases and sacks, are crossing into India for temporary haven.

This correspondent saw Pakistani soldiers burning villages to deny the resistance forces cover or hiding places. As the smoke from the thatch and bamboo huts billowed up on the outskirts of the city of Comilla, circling vultures descended on the bodies of peasants, already being picked apart by dogs and crows.

There is no way of knowing exactly how many of East Pakistan's 75 million Bengalis the army has killed, but authoritative reports from many sources agree that the figure is at least in the tens of thousands; some reports put it much higher.

The central Government officially bars all foreign newsmen from East Pakistan. But from the evidence available in secessionist-held rural areas—some of which are occasionally contested by the army—the Pakistani armed forces have killed leaders and potential leaders of East Pakistan and shattered the economic base of the region in their effort to crush the independence movement.

On orders, the army—now consisting entirely of West Pakistani troops—has killed students, intellectuals, professors, engineers, doctors and others of leadership caliber—whether they were directly involved with the nationalist movement or not.

Both in military attacks and in executions, the central

Government's forces killed East Pakistani Army officers and soldiers who were unable to break out and join the guerrilla forces when the army offensive began on March 25. Most of the officers' families have been killed; only a few escaped into hiding.

With the aid of air and naval bombardment, the army has destroyed food supplies, tea factories, jute mills and natural-gas fields—the economic basis of East Pakistan.

"This has already set the country back 25 years," said a Scottish tea-estate manager who fled to India from his plantation in the northeast. "The liberation army, trying to stop the army, is blowing the bridges, railroad lines and roads. Even if they eventually win independence, they'll have to start completely from scratch again."

This man and two other estate managers who escaped with him asked that their names not be used because of their fear of reprisals against British families still in East Pakistan.

Attack on 'Empty' Trucks

The three evacuees reported that a convoy of nine trucks that the Pakistani radio contended had been carrying arms and ammunition from India and had been destroyed by Pakistani planes was in fact a collection of empty trucks in the yard of a tea estate.

Authoritative reports indicate that perhaps 20 to 25 per cent of the people are left in such towns as Dacca, the capital, and Chittagong and Comilla. Smaller centers are also largely deserted. Dacca had a population of about 1.5 million, Chittagong about 400,000 to 500,000 and Comilla about 100,000.

In the eastern part of East Pakistan the thump of artillery fire can be heard every day in virtually every sector. After every guerrilla attack or harassment by the outnumbered and outgunned resistance troops, the Pakistani Army appears to be inflicting reprisals on the civilian population.

"The bloody cowards!" said a young Bengali lieutenant who escaped the army attempt to annihilate his battalion of the East Bengal Regiment at Comilla. "We give them fronts to shoot at. We are in uniform. But they attack civilians instead."

The secessionist army is desperately short of trained officers, arms, ammunition, vehicles and basic supplies. Some of the men are barefoot.

The heaviest weapon the secessionists have in any number is the 3-inch mortar, although they have captured a few heavy guns. The Pakistani military are using jet fighter-bombers, heavy artillery and gunboats—mostly supplied by the United States, the Soviet Union and Communist China.

Pakistani charges that the Indian Government has been sending troops and weapons to East Pakistan are not borne out by this reporter's observations. No Indian troops were seen in the East Pakistani units.

Before the political crises began to mount, the Pakistani Army had about 25,000 troops in East Pakistan. Large numbers of reinforcements have been flown over from West Pakistan, which is separated from the Eastern

province by over a thousand miles of Indian territory.

Some estimates put the number of West Pakistani troops in East Pakistan at 60,000 to 80,000, most of them Punjabis and Pathans. The Punjabis in particular have traditionally held the Bengalis in disdain though both are predominantly Moslem.

The Bengalis are bitter about the failure of the United States to take a strong stand against the Pakistani Government; most of the leaders of the independence movement are pro-Western and were hoping for support from Washington. They are even more bitter about the American weapons being used against them.

'We Were Expecting Help'

"Do you know, they are using your planes, your rocks, your tanks, to kill us?" a Bengali soldier, his voice tense and his eyes narrowed, asked the American correspondent. "We were expecting help, not this." Similar remarks were made repeatedly by others.

The Bengalis are not so surprised by the Chinese weapons the army is using because they apparently ex-


pected Peking to support the Government. Some Bengali officers, contending that the army offensive was worked out in advance with the Chinese, insist that the army would never have embarked on such a venture without assurances of full support from Peking.

Even before the offensive, the Bengalis wondered why the Western powers and others did not support their cause. Now their disillusionment is complete.

"This is genocide, and people are just standing by and looking," a Bengali student remarked. "Nobody has spoken out. Has the world no conscience?"

The bitterness does not include India, which has condemned the Pakistani military action and is trying to persuade other governments to put pressure on Pakistan to stop the killing.

Indian civilians and officials in border areas are providing assistance to refugees and others, but this correspondent saw no arms being transported across the border—as the Pakistani Government has charged and New Delhi has repeatedly denied.



NEWSWEEK, APRIL 26, 1971

Pakistan: Vultures and Wild Dogs

For more than two weeks, the Pakistani Army of President Mohammed Yahya Khan had played a curious waiting game. Sitting tight in their well-fortified cantonments in the rebellious eastern wing of their divided country, the federal troops virtually ignored the taunts of the secessionist "liberation forces." But then early last week, the lull came to a sudden end. Springing from their strongholds, the Punjabi regulars simultaneously staged more than a dozen devastating attacks from one end of beleaguered East Pakistan to the other. And when the blitzkrieg was over, it was clear that the less-than-one-month-old Republic of *Rangla Desh*. (Bengal nation) had been delivered a stunning blow.

In a civil war already marked by brutality, the lightning attacks were notable for their savagery. In the port city of Chittagong, Pakistani troops reportedly forced Bengali prisoners to ride on the front of a truck, shouting "Victory for Bengal"—an independence slogan. When other Bengalis emerged from their hiding places, the Pakistanis opened fire with machine guns. And in the cities of Sylhet and Comilla along the eastern border, West Pakistani firepower routed the followers of nationalist leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and left the bodies of scores of dead peasants to be picked apart by vultures and wild dogs.

All in all, the bitter campaign seemed to suggest that the West Pakistanis had more than purely military objectives in mind. In city after city, in fact, the soldiers

were apparently determined to shatter the economic base of East Pakistan in order to crush the independence movement. On orders from the Islamabad high command, troops systematically gunned down students, engineers, doctors and any other persons with a potential for leadership, whether they were nationalists or not. "They want to push us back to the eighteenth century," said one Bengali soldier, "so that there will be famine and we will be reduced to eating grass. They want to make sure that no head will ever be raised against them again."

"That let-someone-else-do-it attitude, combined with the absence of effective central leadership, did not augur well for Bangla Desh. But one big question mark remained: the reaction of the neighboring big powers—China and India. Almost from the beginning of the conflict, the West Pakistanis have charged that arch-rival India was an active participant on the side of East Pakistan. And last week Islamabad officials claimed to have wiped out two companies of Indian border-security forces allegedly operating within the eastern province.

For its part, New Delhi stoutly denied any direct involvement. And most observers on the scene supported that contention. Moreover, it seemed certain that President Yahya Khan was trumpeting the charges at least in part to unite his own people—many of whom had gotten queasy about the reports of full-scale slaughter in the east.

India's Stability Allows Moderation on Pakistan

By Selig S. Harrison Washington Post Foreign Service

NEW DELHI, April 12 — In a striking historical juxtaposition, Indira Gandhi won her landslide election victory just two weeks before the start of the bloodbath in Bengal, dramatically underlining the contrast between the torment of Pakistan and a hopeful new phase of political stability in India.

The emergence of Prime Minister Gandhi to a position of authority even her father failed to achieve was

News Analysis

not only an event of great promise for this country in domestic terms.

At a moment when the entire South Asian subcontinent could slide abruptly into a chain reaction of conflict, the fact that power in New Delhi is in strong hands has also made it possible for India to act with notable caution and moderation in the East Pakistan crisis.

Islamabad, the Pakistani capital, has reacted bitterly to the Indian parliament's resolution expressing "sympathy and support" for the Bengali resistance fighters in East Pakistan, pointing to swollen army strength in West Bengal as evidence of interference in Pakistan's internal affairs. But the Indian response appears restrained when measured in the light of the political pressures here and of what New Delhi, with its easy access to East Pakistan along the lengthy West Bengal frontier, could have done.

Army Presence

The army presence in Calcutta was enlarged to three divisions a full month before the fighting started, to

cope with election turbulence.

The parliament resolution was designed to offer verbal psychological release in place of substantive action and was accompanied by a series of private meetings with opposition leaders in which Mrs. Gandhi successfully appealed for a free hand.

By all accounts, she neutralized the issue without making firm commitments on either military aid or recognition of an independent East Pakistan regime.

Both the reports of foreign correspondents who have visited border areas and the best information available here suggest that so far there are no systematic or large scale supplies of Indian weaponry going across the border. On the contrary, the greatest fear of some officials is that Indian profiteers and smugglers in Calcutta will gravitate toward the affluent West Pakistani authorities in Dacca rather than toward the hard pressed Bengalis, making the most of acute food and fuel shortages.

The cautious Indian response has been governed not only by the self-evident dangers of military escalation inherent in the situation but also by domestic political factors and fear of getting caught up in a power struggle between contending Bengali factions through extending premature recognition.

One of the immediate reasons for the cautious Indian government reaction to date is that Awami League leaders in East Pakistan have indicated their desire to avoid excessive identification with India, which would play into the hands of West Pakistani propagandists, until Indian help can be blended with a larger international assistance effort.

May 3, 1971

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The Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations.