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WORLD REFUGEE AND HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS

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HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE PROBLEMS
CONNECTED WITH REFUGEES AND ESCAPEES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS

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WORLD REFUGEE AND HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS

THURSDAY, JULY 22, 1971

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON REFUGEES AND ESCAPEES
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:40 a.m., in room 6226, New Senate Office Building, Senator Edward M. Kennedy (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Kennedy, Fong, and Mathias.

Also present: Dale S. deHaan, counsel; Jerry M. Tinker, staff consultant; Mrs. Dorothy Parker, assistant to Senator Fong; and Mr. Samuel Goldberg, assistant to Senator Mathias.

Senator KENNEDY. The subcommittee will come to order.

Today's hearing opens the subcommittee's public inquiry into world refugee and humanitarian problems, and United States programs of assistance.

All over the world people are on the move. The troubles of our time are taking a rapidly growing toll in the flight of people from conflict and oppression—from famine and natural disaster.

Especially today, we must think of the continuing flow of refugees from East Pakistan into India. The latest official figures put the influx at some 34,000 per day. The cumulative total since early April is at least 7,022,000.* According to press reports, an equal number of Bengalis are displaced within East Pakistan itself. And millions more, by every account, are faced with the threat of starvation and death. Regrettably, there is no end in sight to this tragedy—a nightmare unequalled in modern times.

In Indochina, the flow of refugees and the occurrence of civilian war casualties continues.

In Vietnam, nearly all indicators—including official reports to our Government—document that the situation among the people continues to deteriorate. For them the war is not winding down. The monthly flow of refugees continues at a high level—some 100,000, by official count, moved during the first 5 months of this year. Civilian casualties are also on the increase. Hospital admissions, alone, accounted for at least 10,172 cases during the first 3 months of this year. More than 4,000 of these cases were admitted during March.

In Laos, where heavy warfare has been occurring in many areas, refugee numbers on official rolls have climbed to at least 316,000. No

*The total has since increased to 9,544,012, according to Government of India records as of October 25, 1971.



current record is available on civilian casualties. And in Cambodia, the situation also continues to deteriorate.

The regional crises of people in India/Pakistan and in Indochina have been a source of major concern to this subcommittee and the American people.

As if these situations were not enough cause for concern, other "people problems" continue throughout the world. Especially distressing, for example, in Africa, are the long-standing problems of refugees from southern Africa and the Portuguese territories—and the festering problem in southern Sudan. And problems continue, as well, in the Middle East, in Europe, in Latin America, and in Hong Kong. And always interspersed with the special needs of refugees and victims of conflict and oppression, are the emergency needs of those struck by natural disaster—and the long-standing needs of many others who are simply disadvantaged.

By failing to assist the world's 15 million refugees—and millions more in distress—the United States and the world community compound the difficulties in many countries already in political and social and economic ferment. We undermine their welfare and security as well as our own. The effectiveness of our foreign policy in a given area is often directly related to our leadership in assisting that area's refugees. Nowhere is this clearer today, than in the routine approach of our Government to the deteriorating situation among the innocent millions affected by the Pakistan civil war.

I firmly believe the refugee situation in 1971—and what we can anticipate over the next several years—requires a greater national concern on the part of all Americans. It requires new approaches by our Government. It requires new methods and kinds of assistance by the international community. It requires new and creative thinking on the part of all.

This hearing—the first in a series—is designed to gather accurate information on the scope of today's humanitarian problems, and to help determine alternatives open to the United States in better responding to human need throughout the world.

To this end, the subcommittee places great importance on the following items:

First, the creation of a Bureau of Social and Humanitarian Services within the Department of State;

Second, the creation of a United Nations Emergency Service to better mobilize world resources to assist the victims of natural disaster and armed conflict; and

Third, a more forthright national policy of humanitarian concern for all victims of disaster, including those of armed conflict and oppression.

Clearly, our humanitarian traditions must keep pace with the shape of the future. We must reinforce high-sounding official rhetoric with a more active concern that has institutional and program priority within the highest levels of our national leadership.

Senator Fong?

Senator Fong. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This hearing on the general worldwide refugee problem is of particular importance at this time. There are, I understand, almost 15 million refugees scattered throughout the world.

Among these refugees, created by many causes over a varying period of time, are persons from many countries and all walks of life. There are the 7 million who recently fled from East Pakistan to India; 2 million refugees who fled from communism in Europe and China; 1.7 million Palestinian refugees in the Middle East; 225,000-odd Cuban refugees; about 1 million African refugees, as well as over 2 million persons who are refugees within their own country, such as the Vietnamese displaced in South Vietnam. There are Hindus who fled from Pakistan to India since 1963, and Moslems who fled from India or Kashmir to Pakistan in this period. And, let us not forget the unhappy plight of the Soviet Jews.

The scope and magnitude of the problems of these people and the nations giving them refuge are incredible and hard for the mind's eye to conceive, let alone accept.

The Chairman, Senator Kennedy, should be commended for his humanitarian concern, which we all share, and for his dedication in keeping the image of these unfortunate millions before the public so that we as a nation and as a people do at least our share in the international effort to better the condition of these pawns of fate.

I want to welcome the Under Secretary of State and the other representatives of the Department of State to these hearings.

I look forward to learning from them what part we as a nation have taken in alleviating the suffering of refugees scattered throughout the world.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much Senator Fong, I appreciate your generous words.

It is a pleasure to welcome here this morning the Under Secretary of State, John Irwin, accompanied by Mr. Francis Kellogg, Special Assistant for Refugee and Migration Affairs and the other representatives from the executive branch.

We want to welcome you this morning and discuss with you our mutual concern over refugees and humanitarian questions throughout the world.

Mr. Secretary we welcome you. We understand you have traveled on a very brief but important trip abroad and have only recently returned. So we particularly want to express our gratitude for you adjusting your schedule to be with us this morning.

STATEMENT OF JOHN N. IRWIN II, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. IRWIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am happy to be here and to appear before this subcommittee. There is no easy solution to world refugee problems, but I welcome this hearing and its purpose of finding some better means of making the world more bearable for the disinherited and the dispossessed.

As you are well aware, Mr. Chairman, few things bring the imperfection of our world into such sharp focus as does the fact that there are millions upon millions of both old and newly-created refugees in today's world. In April, this subcommittee looked closely at the situation in Indochina where hundreds of thousands of refugees from South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos have been driven from their homes by the ravages of war. In June the subcommittee held hearings on the East Pakistani refugees in India.

Looking at the total refugee picture, it cannot be too often stressed that the alleviation and solution of refugee problems have long been a matter of basic importance to us as a nation—both because of our heritage of humanitarianism and because refugee situations, in their origin and in their solution, are closely related to our fundamental foreign policy objectives. Thus, it is on pragmatic political as well as basic humanitarian grounds that we approach the world's refugee problems in a manner consistent with our national heritage and purposes, and deal with them in a manner that will help bring about effective and permanent solutions.

These hearings provide a means of bringing home to us all the sad, unhappy lives of so many of our fellow human beings. We cannot transform their situation from one day to the next, but we can try to do better, and we must.

The establishment of the position of Special Assistant to the Secretary for Refugee and Migration Affairs has resulted in improvement in the formulation and coordination of policies and programs for assisting refugees. Through the Special Assistant the Secretary has been able to keep in touch with the world's refugee problems—great or small, all of them important. The Special Assistant provides overall leadership for U.S. refugee assistance programs, and direct supervision of such programs where, in the judgment of the Secretary and of himself, this is the most effective means of realizing our objectives. In other instances he has furnished guidance to other areas of the Department and Government in policy formulation and in the implementation or coordination of refugee assistance programs.

These arrangements have promoted understanding throughout the Government, and in the private sector (especially with our voluntary agency contractors) of the importance which the administration attaches to the refugee problems; and have enhanced our continuing effort to improve the quality and effectiveness of our humanitarian assistance for refugees.

Refugee problems are nearly always conspicuous and controversial and in recent years, the rapid advances in communications, particularly television, have acted to enlarge both the visibility and the controversy. For example, millions of American television viewers were aware of the recent exodus of East Pakistani refugees into India almost as soon as were the officials of the Government of India.

The neglect or deterioration of refugee problems can lead to exacerbations and distortions in both U.S. domestic and international policy, impeding in many cases the solutions of broader issues. Prompt and effective action, therefore, becomes necessary.

As stated earlier, there is no single, simple formula by which refugee problems can be solved. Each problem presents separate—and sometimes unique—considerations in the development of U.S. policy or action. Thus our overall policy must remain flexible. Others, however, must share in the effort, and we must always bear in mind that the basic responsibility for helping refugees lies with the sovereign government of the country of asylum. No outside assistance can or should be undertaken except upon request of such government and then only to supplement the resources of that country.

While our policy approach must be flexible if it is to be effective, it must also have a continuity of purpose if it is to have meaning. I

think we can be proud to recall that every administration since the end of World War II has attached high priority to our leadership in helping refugees and that during the same period, the Congress has repeatedly authorized far-reaching programs for assistance to refugees and for their immigration into the United States. This continuity of purpose and policy has been given a firm legislative base by the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962 (Public Law 87-510) which authorizes U.S. action on an indefinite and flexible basis—including participation in international action—in the provision of assistance to refugees. The act is in a sense unusual both in its latitude and in the fact that it is a permanent authorization for effective U.S. action to deal with refugee developments. In addition to providing the continuing authority to request whatever appropriations are required to fund refugee programs, the act also includes a provision for the transfer of up to \$10 million in foreign assistance funds in any one fiscal year to provide assistance in the event of an emergency involving unexpected and urgent refugee and migration needs. The act, in effect, is a testament to the continued determination of our Government and our people that we shall continue to assist refugees and help in the solution of their problems.

The United States provides its assistance to refugees both through direct Government programs and through the United Nations and other intergovernmental organizations. We give strong support to the program of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, whose office provides legal and political protection for refugees and serves as a catalyst in mobilizing the interest and resources of the international community in assisting asylum countries to meet refugee problems. In the past several years, the major portion of the UNHCR assistance program has been concentrated in the developing countries, particularly in Africa. Our assistance to the Palestine-Arab refugees is channeled through the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. We also support the activities of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration in moving refugees from asylum countries to overseas resettlement destinations. The work of this agency, in expediting the flow of refugees to their ultimate homes and in preventing their accumulation in first-asylum countries, makes it possible for those countries to continue to offer haven to new refugees. Direct U.S. programs provide assistance to refugees from European Communist countries and to Chinese refugees from the People's Republic of China. Additionally we make contributions to some refugee programs through our foreign assistance program—as for example in South Vietnam and in India.

Any discussion of the American role in refugee and humanitarian assistance would be incomplete without a recognition of the large and very important role played by the American voluntary agencies.

The agencies represent the conscience of the American people—reflecting the collective concern of their constituents throughout this country who support and contribute to their work.

A relatively recent example of how the agencies collectively and effectively register their views and influence the Government may be cited in connection with the U.S. accession in 1968 to the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. Eighty-six American agencies interested in assisting refugees abroad and the successful assimilation of

immigrants into American life, including several national labor unions, voiced their support of U.S. accession to that international treaty through petitions sent to the Members of the Congress and to the highest levels of the executive branch. The voice of the voluntary agencies was noted and constructively discussed at the hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee shortly before the Senate gave its advice and consent for U.S. accession to the protocol.

In the refugee field, a solid pattern of cooperation and partnership between government and voluntary agencies has developed over the years, and the pattern is being extended rapidly to other fields. From the first day of refugee assistance after World War II, the U.S. Government, both independently and as a participant in international organizations, has called upon the voluntary agencies for refugee assistance. We contribute supplemental financial support through contractual arrangements with several of these agencies.

The voluntary agencies help bridge the no man's land between impersonal bureaucracy and the refugee as an individual and as a human being.

No listing would be complete, of course, without a reference to the significant contributions made by many other governments toward resolving refugee problems. The countries of asylum, especially, have incurred heavy expenses. In some cases, as in Hong Kong, these costs to the local government are staggering, and continue over an indefinite period. Finally, many countries have admitted large numbers of refugees for permanent and resettlement. While Australia and Canada have played a leading role in this respect, along with the United States, many others, including our good neighbors in Latin America, have provided asylum and a new life to refugees.

In speaking of the actions and contributions by other governments it is worth emphasizing that, as noted in the President's Report to the Congress on U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, the era of American prescriptions and "made in America" solutions is now past—in refugee as well as in other matters. While in most cases our participation, our assistance and our leadership will be necessary to help in resolving the problems, we feel that others must increasingly share in the effort and, especially, in the decisions—individually and through the international community. This is not to indicate a lessening of American interest, attention or assistance to refugees, but rather to emphasize a change in style necessitated in large part by the nature of international developments, with more stress on international participation and on our leadership by example instead of by dominance. By this, we firmly believe everyone, including the refugees, will benefit.

The international relief effort organized in behalf of East Pakistani refugees in India is a good case example. This effort, requested by the Government of India and coordinated by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is, I believe, the single largest such program mounted since World War II. Its size of course is directly related to the size of the refugee situation itself. According to the Indian Government's latest count there are about seven million refugees from East Pakistan now in India—making it the single largest refugee situation in the world today. Size and numbers aside, I believe it would be relevant to trace briefly the development of this effort and the actions of our Government.

In late March 1971, shortly after the outbreak of violence in East Pakistan and at the first reports that refugees were beginning to flee into India, the Department of State began contingency planning on a refugee program. We encouraged the Government of India to request international assistance. When India did request such assistance and when the United Nations Secretary General made his international appeal for assistance on May 19, our Government was able, literally within hours, to make an immediate cash contribution of \$500,000 to the UNHCR to help initiate the international relief effort coordinated by his office. Even before this, in mid-April in fact, U.S. voluntary agencies operating in India—CARE, Catholic Relief Services and Church World Services/Lutheran World Relief—began feeding programs for refugees, using Public Law 480, title II commodities released for this purpose. While the food portion of the U.S. relief assistance is given for refugee feeding, the value of these commodities is credited toward the overall U.S. contribution to the international effort.

The initial U.S. contribution, both in food and nonfood, totaled \$2.5 million and was designed as an emergency measure to help insure that food and other necessities would be provided to the refugees while the larger, international relief effort was being mounted. Subsequent authorizations have brought the total of U.S. contributions for East Pakistani refugees to \$70.5 million, of which \$40 million is in food and \$30.5 million in cash grants for urgently needed nonfood items.

As the numbers of refugees in India grew, the Department's contingency planning group became, in mid-May, a formal Interagency Committee on Pakistani Refugee Relief, incorporating elements of the Department, AID, DOD, Agriculture, Peace Corps, OMB, and USIA. This Committee, chaired by Frank Kellogg, the Secretary's Special Assistant for Refugee and Migration Affairs, not only plans and coordinates U.S. relief activities but maintains an active and constant dialog with the Indian and Pakistan Governments, the UNHCR, other international agencies, and other governments in order to help insure that not only U.S. assistance but all assistance is being effectively utilized in relieving the misery and suffering of the refugees.

Mr. Kellogg has personally visited the refugee camps in India where he met with Indian and international officials dealing with the refugee situation. He also visited Pakistan, and in particular East Pakistan, to inspect the situation there in order to assess the longer range prospects for a return of the refugees to their own country.

The relief effort for the East Pakistani refugees is by no means an exclusive U.S. "show." To date, overall contributions to this relief effort from governments and international agencies total over \$128 million. We are strongly supporting United Nations efforts to secure additional contributions from the international community and are ourselves prepared to increase our contribution as the need arises.

We believe the High Commissioner, as the U.N. focal point for the relief effort, has done a highly commendable job—particularly since early June when he, in conjunction with the World Health Organization, moved decisively and swiftly to assist the Indian Government in controlling the cholera epidemic which broke out among the refugees.

During the April hearings, Ambassador William E. Colby, testified at length on the refugee situation in Vietnam and I shall not go over

the same ground which he covered. The all important effort to return refugees to their home villages as soon as security conditions permit is continuing. During the first 5 months of 1971, 91,000 refugees have returned to their homes and received all their return-to-village benefits; another 300,000 have also gone home, although benefit payments to them have not yet been completed.

Mr. Chairman, although we should take pride in the fact that our Nation, in conjunction with other free nations and international organizations, has contributed so much in helping refugees during the past 25 some odd years, we are not and must not become complacent or relax our efforts so long as there are still refugees in need and so long as new refugees are being created. I assure you this administration, like past administrations will continue to give a high priority to refugee matters.

As you are aware, the administration has recently introduced legislation on foreign assistance which, among other goals, would further consolidate operational and policy responsibilities in the field of refugee and humanitarian affairs. Your own very constructive suggestions along these lines, Mr. Chairman, have been of great value in our preparation of this proposal.

We believe that the proposed Bureau of Humanitarian and Social Affairs, under an Assistant Secretary of State, will enable our Nation to better and more quickly respond to humanitarian needs throughout the world and to provide the flexible and imaginative leadership necessary to marshal international cooperation in order to reduce the scope and duration of refugee problems.

We would welcome this committee's support of the proposed legislation.

Mr. Kellogg and I will be happy to answer questions.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much. Let me first ask you this: We saw a UPI report this morning, printed in the Washington Post, directing our attention to the question of the India/Pakistan situation, which said that the number of refugees is expected to swell.

I was wondering—and the article indicated at the end that no figures were available—whether you could give us the latest information on what you anticipate, in terms of the dimension of that flow of refugees, for the next few weeks or months?

I know this is enormously complex and involves all kinds of other considerations; but simply in terms of the information you have now on the flow of refugees, what do you anticipate over the next several months?

Mr. IRWIN. As you say, Mr. Chairman, it is very difficult to anticipate what will be the flow of refugees. As you know, it was enormous in the early days of the fighting in East Pakistan and has come down to some 45,000 to 50,000 in the past few weeks. I notice that today it is down to perhaps 34,000. Whether it will continue below this depends on the extent of the fighting and its continuation in East Pakistan, and on the degree to which conditions, even after fighting ceases, can be settled in such a way that the refugees will be willing to return. It also depends on the degree to which the United Nations will be able to assist on both sides of the border to facilitate the return.

Pakistan claims 50,000 refugees have already returned. We really have no way of checking that figure or the continued flow figure from

East Pakistan so I am afraid we cannot give you any precise answers, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Kellogg visited both countries and perhaps he would like to add some thoughts of his own.

Senator KENNEDY. We would be very happy to hear from Mr. Kellogg.

Mr. KELLOGG. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. The latest figures that we have that are similar to your chart on the wall are that the refugee flow from July 12 through July 20 was 21,000, as a daily average.

With regard to the question you asked as to where this may end, I think perhaps I could give you some information which, of course, is not very definitive but it comes from the Government of India officials with whom I personally spoke on my trip. There was a great deal of variation in the numbers that they estimated might continue to come in, but I did hear the figure of 2 million more refugees as an estimate. And this 2 million might come in as the monsoon conditions taper off and make it easier to travel and also if famine conditions occur in East Pakistan.

Senator KENNEDY. Can you give us a progress report on the role of the United Nations in responding to the initiatives of the administration in trying to establish a presence in East Pakistan?

Mr. IRWIN. The United Nations sent out its High Commissioner for Refugees to make a visit and assessment in both areas.

The High Commissioner recommended that the United Nations be permitted to put a United Nations presence on both sides of the border. The Pakistan Government has welcomed that suggestion. The Indian Government has not consented to it on the grounds that it would be in their minds equating the Indian position in this whole question with the Pakistani position.

Senator KENNEDY. Could you elaborate further on that point, in terms of the response of the Indian Government?

Mr. IRWIN. As I understand it, the Indian Government has not consented to the suggestion of the Secretary General to have a U.N. presence on the Indian side of the border, feeling that would imply India was equally at fault for the problem of the refugees and the Indians thought the presence should be on the East Pakistani side but not on the Indian side of the border.

Aside from what the United Nations has tried to initiate on the refugee side, it has put a disaster relief official in East Pakistan with a very small staff to try to coordinate disaster relief.

Perhaps again if I could ask Mr. Kellogg to speak to this he could respond on the basis of his recent trip.

Mr. KELLOGG. Going back historically, Mr. Chairman, in late April the United Nations asked the U.N. High Commissioner to send a mission to India to ascertain the extent of the problem and to make a decision with respect to his participation as the "focal point" in India for the relief of the refugees.

The mission returned early in May and on May 19 the Secretary General issued an appeal to the international community to support the High Commissioner in an effort to alleviate the growing refugee problem in India.

Since that time in India the High Commissioner has had a small staff, which is now being augmented, to coordinate the requests of the

Indian Government for food, shelter, medicine, and other requirements. That may have been slow in starting, but I think it is improving daily and it is becoming quite effective. That is on the Indian side.

In East Pakistan there is a slightly different setup. The Secretary General has a representative of the United Nations whose concern and responsibility is for relief assistance. The High Commissioner has just sent an individual to represent his efforts towards the rehabilitation and the return of the refugees from India.

Senator KENNEDY. Has this request of the Secretary General, has it developed into a formal plan? Has he suggested a plan or a program to both the Pakistan Government or to the Indian Government, in terms of establishing some presence?

Mr. IRWIN. I am not certain whether it was a specific program or plan or whether it was a broad based suggestion as to a presence which, if they were agreeable, would be developed into a plan.

Senator KENNEDY. I suppose within that suggestion it provides some description as to the number of people that would be involved, and the kinds of roles that these individuals would have. As I understand it, this would be at the suggestion of the Secretary General, for humanitarian needs, is that not correct?

Mr. IRWIN. That would be our understanding.

Mr. KELLOGG. I believe I could elaborate to a certain degree. In East Pakistan, President Yahya Khan has openly welcomed the High Commissioner's presence and has specifically in a recent public announcement said that he encouraged representatives of the High Commissioner to be at the reception camps which have been established. And he went so far as to say that he visualized the High Commissioner's representatives crossing the border at specific points to encourage the return of Pakistani nationals or refugees to East Pakistan.

As I mentioned before, the High Commissioner has at present a staff in New Delhi and is currently establishing one in Calcutta at this moment on purely the humanitarian or relief effort.

Senator FONG. Mr. Chairman?

Senator KENNEDY. Yes?

Senator FONG. Mr. Secretary, some of the people in Pakistan have talked to me and have propounded some ideas which I would like to present to you. If you wish you may comment on them.

There is a general feeling that there is very poor rapport between Pakistan and India. The figures that have come out on refugees I have been told are strictly Indian figures. These are figures issued by Indian sources and not Pakistan sources. And, these figures have not been verified.

So, whatever numbers that have been stated as refugees actually are from Indian releases. I have been told there is a constant flow of people from India to Pakistan and from Pakistan to India. Many of these people have been counted in the figures as refugees.

Second, I have been told that there are guerrilla camps along the eastern border of India; that there is a feeling that there will be warfare or guerrilla warfare raids by these guerrilla bands across the border. These refugees, knowing the situation and knowing they will be caught in a crossfire should there be this guerrilla fighting, have been reluctant to return.

There is a report that President Yahya Khan is willing to have U.N. representatives in Pakistan to review the situation for the in-

ternational community; that he is willing to let anyone come in to relate what is happening there; and that many of the stories coming out relative to what is going on concerning the affairs of the East Pakistani refugees have not been verified.

You have just returned from that area. Are you in a position to discuss this matter?

Mr. KELLOGG. Senator, may I answer you in the same sequence that you asked your questions.

With respect to the number of refugees, this is obviously almost impossible to check. The Indian Government obtained its figures two different ways. As the refugee crosses from East Pakistan into India, he passes through checkpoints at which the representatives of the Indian Government record statistics about each refugee and, of course, at the same time add him to the total tally.

This represents one method by which they arrive at their figures.

The second count is when they issue ration cards to all refugees in the refugee camps. These ration cards have to be used daily by the refugee to draw the food allowance permitted by the Indian Government.

It is a combination of these two that gives the Indian Government its total. I am not saying for a moment that they are necessarily completely accurate but I can tell you that the Indian Government has complete faith in them and is making all its plans in accordance with these numbers.

On the other side you mentioned the flowback, that is, the return of nationals to East Pakistan. From my own observations I concluded that although the President himself and other Pakistan officials give a figure of about 45,000 to 50,000 returnees, in my own judgment this number is even harder to check than in India because the returnee does not come back by a main road but rather filters across the border at night or along country paths returning directly to his village and home. In my opinion, therefore, Pakistani returnee numbers are even harder to verify than the number of refugees in India.

With respect to the second part of your question, I think there is no doubt but that the continued presence of the army on both sides of the border, and whatever raids may occur, is a very strong deterrent to the return of the refugees.

Third. You mentioned President Yahya Khan's willingness to have the High Commissioner's representative in East Pakistan and this is, of course, a matter of public record.

Senator FONG. Now, this person who saw me goes further. He said that since the world community is helping India with relief for these refugees and since India is receiving sympathy from the world community and opprobrium is heaped upon Pakistan, that India would like to see this continue.

Of course, it would difficult for you to comment on that statement.

Mr. IRWIN. I think this would depend a great deal upon the point of view of the speaker, Mr. Senator, though I would say that I would look with skepticism on the thought that the Indian Government wished to see this continue because of the tremendous burden that this number of refugees puts on India.

Senator FONG. Yes, I would subscribe to your opinion that India does not wish to continue having these refugees.

Mr. IRWIN. They anticipate that India will have to spend possibly \$600 million or \$700 million a year and maybe higher. The rest of the world has given something like \$128 million. So whether their figures are accurate or not as to the costs, there is a tremendous burden on the Indian Government and the Indian people far and above the actual amount of help given by other countries.

Senator FONG. As long as there is a possibility or probability that there will be open conflict between the two sides, how are we going to get the refugees to go home, even if Yahya Khan wants them to come home?

Mr. IRWIN. I think under those circumstances, Mr. Senator, probably many of them will not return home.

I think there will have to be a situation that the refugees recognize as one where they can return in peace to East Pakistan.

Senator FONG. So, actually, insofar as the refugees returning to Pakistan is concerned, it will depend largely upon what these two governments do with respect to each other?

Mr. IRWIN. Yes, sir. It certainly will. And let me say again it depends somewhat on the interpretation. The Pakistan Government now says that the fighting has ceased but yet there are continued acts. Whether they are purely guerrilla acts or terrorist acts or activities by the Pakistani Army, there are enough rumors or possibilities of them or the actuality of them that not many refugees have now returned.

As Mr. Kellogg says, it is particularly difficult to evaluate even the number of 50,000 that Pakistan estimates have returned home.

Senator FONG. Have you an idea or an evaluation as to how strong these guerrilla bands are, or the number of guerrilla bands, or the possibility of conflict between these bands and the soldiers in Pakistan?

Mr. KELLOGG. Senator Fong, on the basis of my own observations, which were made both on the ground and from the air, by flying over a fairly substantial portion of East Pakistan and traveling along the roads, I saw no direct evidence of open fighting nor did I see any guerrilla activities. There are many rumors and many stories of activities on both sides with both countries at fault. But where the exact truth lies is extremely difficult to judge.

Mr. IRWIN. I think it is impossible really to say, Senator Fong, and I think the fact that Mr. Kellogg has made certain flights and has been certain places cannot really be taken as indicative of what the situation is. There are no observers on either side of the border that can indicate what is happening. So we really have no definite information.

Senator FONG. Would you say you expect that we will be called upon to continue our aid for some indefinite period of time?

Mr. IRWIN. Yes, sir.

Senator KENNEDY. I would like to get back, if I could, to the conditions of potential starvation and famine in that area.

In the early part of July there was a publication concerning the potential danger of starvation. We have had a number of reports and have been following the situation closely; we have been concerned that there are real problems of food, particularly in the areas of the cyclone, and that the World Bank Report has substantiated our concerns.

The Department of State has stated, or it was reported in the newspapers, as saying, that they could find no evidence in the Department's field reports that would bear out the prediction of widespread famine by August 1.

Now I understand that reports have been received—various communications from our field representatives—suggesting that contrary to what the Department has stated publicly, that field reports bear out predictions of famine in East Pakistan. One cable suggests that “perhaps the Department has not been apprised of recent field reports which indicate famine as a real possibility.”

It continues, saying they “are taking a hard line with the Government of Pakistan in an attempt to get them to face up to dealing with the possibility of famine. In our view public statements inconsistent with this line might impair the effectiveness of our representations here.”

Then it continues further by saying that “further public statements regarding this subject should reflect recent field reports.”

In an earlier field report, this was dated July 6, it says, in summary, that “the specter of famine hangs over East Pakistan; the prospects for averting hunger and perhaps starvation are not, repeat not, good. * * * The United Nations is moving far too slowly. * * * The transportation situation is worse than estimated, purchasing power is very limited. * * * It is our view that famine conditions involving widespread hunger and suffering and perhaps starvation will probably prevail in much of East Pakistan over the coming year.”

Then it goes on to quote a high government official, they indicate the name but I am not going to mention it, of East Pakistan and he talks about the prospects of famine and starvation. As a consequence of the official attitude, he says there has been “no sense of urgency” about this problem on the official level and “consequently no plans are being made nor action being taken to avert the probability of famine.”

He points out that in addition to the problem created by fear, “the Government of East Pakistan's organization and staff dealing with food problems are very weak.” The reporter expresses the view that the U.N. role “not helpful to date and the prognosis is not hopeful.”

And then the report goes on to say that transportation is a major problem in food distribution, and it points out three elements for meeting the problem: the importation of more food, logistic capabilities to distribute the food, and a system for assuring that needed food can be purchased and made available to the people. It goes into considerable detail about bridges being knocked out and railroads being disrupted, with only a marginal effort to reconstruct these roads and bridges. And it talks about the failure of the rice crop.

All this suggests to me, Mr. Secretary, that there is indeed a very real possibility of famine and starvation and for some reason or another the Governments of East Pakistan and Pakistan are not particularly aware of the nature and dimension of the problem.

I would like to ask Mr. Kellogg, who has been there recently, whether these field reports were substantiated by his own observations? These are from July 6 and 9, 1971.

Mr. IRWIN. Mr. Chairman, if I could speak briefly and then turn it over to my more knowledgeable colleague. We share your concern that is expressed in many of the facts that you presented. If one looks

at just the prediction of famine by August 1, I feel there has not been evidence to show that there has been famine to date and will not be within the next week or so. But certainly the potential is there, and all of us share this deep concern that you expressed, and I am sure many others do, not only in our country but elsewhere.

The reason for the danger of famine is not the lack of availability of food, at least that is our impression at the present time. We understand that there may be a very poor rice crop. We think there will be a lesser crop than the East Pakistan Government estimated. We think that its estimates are high so we have that concern too.

On the shipments of food, in the early days of the fighting we diverted 105,000 tons that were scheduled to land in East Pakistan to West Pakistan because there was not the ability to land it at the port in East Pakistan. That is now on its way back to East Pakistan. We have ordered recently 100,000 tons of wheat. We have authorized but deferred, which will be coming in the future, 260,000 tons of grain.

So that is 105,000 tons actually en route there now and 360,000 more tons available that will be shipped in the coming months.

So the belief is that the problem will be more of a distribution one—the ability to distribute in East Pakistan perhaps rather than the actual availability of food. In addition to the figures I gave of just our own help, there will be food made available by other countries who are helping, and there have been shipments already as I understand.

But the bridges are out, the railroads are out, and many of the local boats that were used on the rivers are not available. They are not to be found. The road conditions are difficult. For that reason \$2 million of the \$6.7 million the United States made available for East Pakistan has gone to charter boats that can use the rivers.

We are doing all we can to urge both the West Pakistan Government and those who are in East Pakistan representing the government to recognize this possibility of famine because of the difficulty of distribution, and we are doing all we can to see to it that they move towards improving the situation so that they can head off the real potential of famine of which you spoke.

Now, I would like to ask Mr. Kellogg or Mr. Rees, both of whom have much more detailed knowledge than I, to add anything they wish.

Mr. KELLOGG. Mr. Chairman, I think the Under Secretary has outlined the real concern of the U.S. Government that there is a definite potential for famine. The major problem is twofold. One is to work with and to impress upon a demoralized civilian government the need for quick and immediate action and the fact that the United States and other foreign governments have to play a secondary role, that is to say—

Senator KENNEDY. Is there a civilian government there or is it military now?

Mr. KELLOGG. The civil government is demoralized and under the control of the army. It is rather skeletal I would call it.

Mr. IRWIN. It would be a civilian bureaucracy that remained in East Pakistan that is under the martial law administration.

Senator KENNEDY. As pointed out in the USAID report, the transportation of the country is in a shambles; the rails can operate at no

more than 20 percent of capacity, the trucking system can operate at no more than 30 percent, and the available river transportation is totally inadequate.

The reports from the field indicate that there is a very real potential for famine and starvation, and we see so little apparently being done to meet the problem. There's no sense of urgency among the military operating in East Pakistan. I am just wondering again what influence we have available, and what steps we are taking, to insure that this prognosis will not happen. Because it seems to me that unless we have this sense of urgency, unless we understand the dimensions of the problem—and I think we are getting fair warning about this—unless we understand this, then I don't know why we are not going to see one of the greatest disasters of modern times—if not by August 1, then sometime in the immediate future.

Mr. IRWIN. We are doing two things, Mr. Chairman. One, as I indicated, we are furnishing grain, large imports of grain as is Canada and some is coming from Europe and some from Japan and some from China. The second part is a more difficult part, as you pointed out. That is the distribution system and includes, as a first step, imparting a greater sense of urgency than perhaps we have seen to date by the East Pakistan administration.

We have urged this upon the Pakistan Government through our ambassador. The President of Pakistan has told our ambassador that he was appointing a special representative to represent him in the East and he would take these reports into account.

But the potential clearly remains. The concern that you expressed remains.

I might ask Mr. Rees who has more detailed knowledge than I to respond. Mr. Rees is from AID.

Senator KENNEDY. Good morning, sir.

Mr. REES. We certainly do share the concern and have been expressing the concern you voiced at all levels. Immediately on the receipt of the report you referred to, another round of representations were made both here and in Islamabad and Dacca. As you put it yourself, there is a real possibility. That is different from making a prediction. We are wary about making predictions.

The World Bank Report, which has been referred to, also declines to make predictions. It makes projections of what might happen unless some things change.

Senator KENNEDY. I thought it said "what will" happen if things don't change, not "what might" happen?

Mr. REES. What will happen if things do not change, things on the administrative front and such things as the movement of foods from the two ports where an adequate supply continues to be available. The movement of that food into the provinces where the people are is still substantially within the capabilities of the Government of Pakistan if they put the resources that are available to the task.

The Ryan Report that was referred to suggests ways and means both by using equipment and by streamlined procedures and a little bit more of an urgent administrative approach that would enable Pakistan to move more food into the interior of the provinces monthly than is now being used in the public distribution systems so that some stocks would be built up.

Now, our belief is that in the short run a good deal more than that should be moved in because of the potential of further crop reductions in the coming crop this fall. The projections of what might happen to that crop and what therefore might be the gap that is needed to be filled by imports could be as much as twice the normal load and if in December and January and next spring the rails and roads are not functioning at full efficiency, water transportation would have to take a much larger role than it has to date.

Senator KENNEDY. Based upon these steps which have been taken, and I think most of them are over a more generous time period than is necessary, how would you categorize the response that you are getting now from the Government of East Pakistan, and the Government of Pakistan, in responding to these initiatives—to attempt to insure that famine won't happen?

Mr. IRWIN. I would say that they have concern, that they wish to try to improve their transportation system. They were appreciative of the \$2 million for chartering boats, et cetera, but we do feel that they have had an unrealistic assessment of their ability to distribute and an unrealistic assessment of the crops that they expect. And we feel that they have not had the sense of urgency that you and the Department have.

Senator KENNEDY. Have they had similar difficulty in moving military equipment around in East Pakistan?

Mr. KELLOGG. I don't believe I could answer that, Mr. Chairman, on the basis of personal observation. I did see the army, of course, along the border but I did not observe the army moving equipment on the roads from my air trips.

Senator KENNEDY. Do any of these reports indicate that any of the troops of the army are in danger of either starvation or famine? Do any of your field reports indicate that?

Mr. IRWIN. No reports would indicate that and I think the big difference, of course, is that it is a well organized institution versus a pretty disorganized countryside.

Senator KENNEDY. Yes. But the question that has to come is that if they are sufficiently organized to move military equipment, couldn't at least some of that governmental structure be utilized to insure or protect the people against the dangers of famine and starvation?

Mr. IRWIN. I am sure it could be. I imagine at least in the early time period that the military would have to take a major part in the distribution.

Senator FONG. Mr. Secretary, as I understand it, East Pakistan is no larger in size than North Carolina, is that correct?

Mr. IRWIN. That is a comparison I haven't heard, Mr. Senator.

Senator FONG. East Pakistan is about as large as North Carolina, with about 75 million people, and bordered on three sides by India, is that correct?

Mr. IRWIN. Yes, sir.

Senator FONG. Then when we talk about starvation or possible starvation, what part of this territory are we talking about? Do you have any idea as to what part of East Pakistan we are talking about or if we are talking about the whole of East Pakistan?

Mr. IRWIN. We are talking about the whole of East Pakistan but the distribution concern would be more with the countryside rather than, of course, the port cities or the capital.

Senator FONG. Is it very difficult to get into the interior of this small country? It is a small country in area, correct?

Mr. IRWIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. REES. Senator, perhaps I can offer some information. Transportation throughout East Pakistan is quite difficult. It is a delta area and is divided by winding rivers with tidal action quite a long way up, and roads and railroads are few and far between even when they are functioning.

As an area it has generally a deficit in food grain of about one and a half million tons in the past. In recent normal years this is filled in part by the movement of grain from West Pakistan and by imports from elsewhere around the world. That grain generally goes to the middle part of East Pakistan which is the area in which there is the largest concentration of the growing of cash crops, jute being the predominant cash crop.

Those imports of about one and a half million tons of grain feed effectively something like 8 million people. The rest of East Pakistan including the cyclone area, and may I digress there to indicate food has been moving into the cyclone area. The last report we have is only through June 22. We have not received any reports since, but we have the assurance by the Government of Pakistan that they are moving food there.

As I was saying, the rest of East Pakistan, other than the center core of the province, is a food surplus area and tends to produce enough to market some to the Dacca area. At the present time we have reports that this is not the case. There is another problem created by the movement of people out of the northwestern part of the province. This is where probably the largest flow of refugees that has moved to India had originated and we have reports of large acreage not planted or from the last crop not harvested because the people are no longer there. And this, since it had been a surplus area, will make the problem that much more difficult.

Senator FONG. How much in the way of relief have we provided for East Pakistan?

Mr. REES. In relief food that the Secretary just referred to that is now moving to East Pakistan or is available to move, might be estimated to be worth \$27 to \$30 million, just below \$30 million in value.

Senator FONG. For East Pakistan?

Mr. REES. For East Pakistan. We have authorized \$2 million for the charter of coastal vessels. These are vessels in the 600-, 800- or 900-ton range with shallow draft so they can navigate the main rivers.

This \$2 million will result in the charter of 17 such vessels the first one of which is expected in East Pakistan momentarily.

In addition we have authorized \$4.7 million for the construction of cyclone shelters, cyclone proof houses and repair of the coastal embankments in the cyclone area.

Senator FONG. The total relief effort to East Pakistan to date is approximately \$40 million?

Mr. REES. \$35 to \$40 million.

Senator FONG. Is that sufficient as far as food is concerned to stave off starvation?

Mr. REES. Yes, at this time with the delivery of the 100,000 that has been ordered shipped. The reason we did not authorize more

than 100,000 from the 360,000 that has been deferred is that the ports cannot receive any more than that amount because they are full. The storage in the two port areas is almost completely jammed. This is, of course, desirable in the sense that there is 6 to 8 weeks food there on hand on the ground in East Pakistan at any one time.

So, we are phasing our 360,000-ton movement just as fast as the ports can handle it. The first 100,000 tons of that will arrive in East Pakistan in late September or October. We expect within the next 2 weeks to make a decision on further shipments as the port situation becomes clear.

Senator FONG. And you expect to continue to actively furnish supplies from America?

Mr. REES. Yes.

Senator FONG. So, if there is any problem, it is an internal problem of distribution?

Mr. REES. That is absolutely correct.

Senator FONG. Do you know what problems they are facing?

Mr. REES. Well, they are facing—

Senator FONG. Before you answer that question may I ask you, what is the area of your responsibility? You know this committee's concern when the suffering people of East Pakistan are involved. Do you feel that that is within your province?

Mr. REES. It is very much within the concern or should be within the concern of the United States. We are interested in the welfare of the people and this is an area of poverty that we have been seeking to assist in helping out of that poverty. It has now twice in a 6-month period been afflicted by a tremendous tragedy and we wish to not see a third one added on top.

Senator FONG. So, we are assuming responsibility for helping?

How much are we able to do with the present distribution system in East Pakistan?

Mr. REES. Well, I won't say that we have taken the responsibility for the security and peace of the area within East Pakistan.

As far as the transportation in East Pakistan, yes bridges are out but also the roads themselves are insecure, there is mining and blowing up of trucks on the roads. This is something that we can't do anything about. Even with the bridges out, a good deal of road traffic could go forward using ferries or some other method to cross the waterways but our responsibility, it appears to me, can only go as far as making every assurance that the supplies are available, making every assurance that the intelligence and perspective that we can bring to the problem are pressed on the officials of Pakistan and then standing ready with others to provide equipment such as the coastal vessels that would help Pakistan meet its problems.

Senator FONG. Do you know of any other nation that has contributed in the amount that we have contributed to East Pakistan?

Mr. REES. No, sir. No other nation has done as much. We have reports of seven other nations that have made contributions for, in part, East Pakistan. The only significant one is the United Kingdom which has made a cash grant of 1 million pounds to the United Nations. We have the belief that many other nations were withholding or awaiting the report of the United Nations on the relief operation in East Pakistan and the formation of an effective group by the United Nations

in East Pakistan to assure that relief goods would be addressed to the purpose intended.

The Secretary General did last Friday issue a report on the U.N. teams that have examined the situation in East Pakistan and has endorsed a number of requirements including things that we are already doing, food and coastal vessels, and has made a general appeal to the other nations of the world for support.

We have every expectation that that now will bring forth increased contributions.

Senator FONG. As of now, the United Kingdom has supplied around two and a half million dollars?

Mr. REES. Yes, sir.

Senator FONG. And it is the largest contributor outside of the United States?

Mr. REES. Yes.

Senator FONG. What has the Soviet Union contributed?

Mr. REES. Nothing to the best of my knowledge.

Mr. IRWIN. I think we should make clear that the Soviet Union has given money to the refugee problem in India.

Senator FONG. Yes, but I was talking about East Pakistan. What has Communist China contributed to East Pakistan's relief?

Mr. REES. Some of the grain now moving into East Pakistan ports is rice from China. We don't know the terms of the arrangements between China and Pakistan but an average of 12,000 to 14,000 tons of grain this month and next month are expected from China.

Senator FONG. Now, how much has the United Nations contributed to East Pakistan?

Mr. REES. It has contributed the organization on the ground to study the problem. There are currently representatives of the Secretary General and of UNICEF, a total of 11 people now in East Pakistan but the United Nations has also had two specialized teams visit and recently report.

One, a team from the World Health Organization and a second from the Food and Agriculture Organization and World Food program.

Senator FONG. How much has been contributed or appropriated for East Pakistan assistance?

Mr. REES. They have no direct UN appropriations other than, of course, providing and taking care of the salaries of personnel.

Senator FONG. So as of now, the United States is almost the sole nation that has spent some money in East Pakistan outside of Great Britain's two and a half million dollars?

Mr. REES. Yes, sir.

Senator FONG. As far as India refugee relief is concerned, you have stated we spent \$70 million already, is that correct?

Mr. IRWIN. We have authorized \$70.5 million to date. How does it break down in actual expenditures?

Mr. KELLOGG. I believe I can supply that figure, sir. The value of goods and services delivered amounts to just over \$3.5 million and the value of goods and services in the pipeline amounts to approximately over \$2.5 million for a total of \$6,100,000. In addition pending, that is to say obligated but awaiting an expenditure plan, is an additional \$5 million. At this moment uncommitted is \$19,400,000 for a total of \$30.5 million.

That is the cash portion of our assistance program as it currently stands for East Pakistan refugee relief in India. In addition, \$40 million has been made available for food for the refugees. This grant is feeding at the present time approximately half of the refugees in India.

Senator FONG. Out of the \$40 million, how much has been expended?

Mr. KELLOGG. The entire amount has been allocated to the relief of refugees in India. The Indian Government therefore knows that it has grains and food stocks which will arrive now or in the future and consequently it can use an equivalent amount from its own stocks on hand knowing that they are going to be replaced.

Senator FONG. This is an outright grant, is that correct?

Mr. KELLOGG. That is correct.

Senator FONG. Now, the figure is \$128 million contributed by all donors, how much did the Soviet Union contribute?

Mr. IRWIN. If my memory serves me correctly, it is something like \$11 million to date but I would like to get more exact figures.

Mr. KELLOGG. The current figure for the U.S.S.R. is \$11 million.

Senator FONG. And Communist China?

Mr. KELLOGG. Nothing, sir.

Senator FONG. The United Kingdom?

Senator KENNEDY. Could we get all of this for the record? I would like you to submit all of what the other countries contributed.

Mr. IRWIN. Yes.

(Subsequently, the following information was received:)

Contributions of Countries and International Agencies to Relief for Pakistani Refugees in India (denominated in U.S. dollars) as of July 20, 1971

Australia:		
Government.....		1, 176, 000
Voluntary agencies.....		669, 600
Austria.....		100, 000
Belgium:		
Government.....		11, 333
Government.....		250, 000
Botswana.....		7, 000
Canada:		
Food, medicine, and cash to UNHCR including 8,000 tons of rapeseed.....		2, 000, 000
British Columbia.....		125, 000
Ontario, 4 ambulances, shipping, etc.....		100, 000
Saskatchewan, 642 tons of rapeseed.....		100, 000
Voluntary agencies.....		144, 000
Ceylon: Clothing valued at.....		336, 100
Chile: \$6,000 for relief of refugees and in East Pakistan.....		3, 000
Cyprus.....		4, 800
Denmark: 5 million kr. cash to UNHCR and 2,575,000 kr. reserved for Government for refugees in India or repatriation.....		1, 010, 000
Finland: \$475,000 in cash and \$80,800 through the Finnish Red Cross and other channels.....		555, 800
France: 10,000,000 fr.....		2, 000, 000
Germany:		
Caritas.....		1, 685, 600
		42, 700
Malteser Hilfsdienst.....		100, 000
Greece: Through Greek Red Cross, tents, canned meat, bandages....		170, 000
Guyana: Rice valued at.....		5, 000
Iceland.....		2, 850
Iran:		

1 million units of cholera vaccine-----	60, 000
Other-----	123, 600
Ireland: Subject to Parl., £50,000 to be divided: £10,000 to Irish Red Cross, £20,000 to UNICEF, £20,000 to UNHCR-----	120, 000
Jamaica (through WHO)-----	10, 000
Japan:	
Milk powder (61 t.). vitamin tablets (10,000,000)-----	1, 390, 000
Rice: 16,000 tons through WFP-----	2, 500, 000
Korea: Medicines valued at-----	5, 000
Liberia-----	20, 000
Libya-----	100, 000
Liechtenstein-----	2, 900
Luxembourg-----	453
Mauritius: 500 tons sugar-----	50, 000
Monaco-----	300
Nepal-----	2, 500
The Netherlands:	
1,600,000 guilders, half to UNHCR, half to ICRC-----	451, 900
UNICEF Committee-----	141, 200
Committee for Refugees, 19 million guilders-----	5, 358, 000
Other-----	14, 100
New Zealand-----	56, 800
CORSO-----	170, 500
Norway:	
Norwegian Red Cross—stockfish-----	14, 300
Refugee Council-----	140, 000
Government-----	1, 000, 000
Philippines: 1,000 tons of sugar, plus \$493 in cash-----	100, 493
Senegal-----	7, 200
Spain: Medicines-----	42, 900
Swaziland-----	1, 200
Sweden:	
Swedish Red Cross—6.5 tons of medicines, 245 tents, 8,460 sweaters-----	128, 000
Govt. \$4.5 million through UNHCR and \$500,000 to Red Cross and Swedish Church Aid for LICROSS and World Council of Churches-----	5, 000, 000
Switzerland:	
6,123 tons of wheat-----	490, 400
Other-----	240, 000
Uganda-----	14, 000
U.S.S.R.:	
Portion of 100,000,000 doses smallpox vaccine-----	1, 000, 000
50,000 tons of rice-----	10, 000, 000
United Arab Republic: 1 million units of cholera vaccine-----	60, 000
United Kingdom:	
CAFOD-----	10, 000
Govt. £750,000 in food through WFP and other supplies valued at £250,000-----	2, 400, 000
Government £2,000,000-----	4, 800, 000
Civil and military air transport £48,500-----	116, 400
Government donation to volags-----	600, 000
Volag donations-----	1, 750, 000
United States-----	70, 500, 000
Volags-----	1, 109, 050
Viet-Nam: 200,000 doses of cholera vaccine valued at-----	20, 000
Yugoslavia: Tents, etc-----	35, 000
Caritas Internationalis-----	35, 000
LICROSS: Red Cross Societies of Japan, Sweden, Denmark, Can- ada, Switzerland, Australia, Italy, Finland, USA, UK, Austria, Norway, West Germany—cash and food, medical supplies, cloth- ing, tents-----	1, 250, 000
Lutheran World Federation: Member churches-----	718, 000
Medico International: Food concentrates, tonics, antibiotics-----	16, 033
OXFAM:	
Cash-----	48, 000

OXFAM and War on Want: 35 tons, mainly tents and medicines -----	120, 000
Pope Paul VI -----	20, 000
UNHCR -----	500, 000
UNICEF: Drugs, food supplements, other supplies and domestic air freight, plus 41 jeeps -----	600, 000
World Council of Churches -----	775, 200
World Food Program:	
Existing stocks of oil and NFDM turned over to GOI -----	1, 100, 000
To UNHCR -----	2, 000, 000
World Health Organization -----	155, 000
Other donors -----	102, 200
Total -----	128, 194, 412

¹ Approximate value.

² To the UNHCR.

Senator FONG. I want to know are we the largest donor to Indian relief?

Mr. KELLOGG. By far.

Senator FONG. So we are the largest contributor to both India and Pakistan relief?

Mr. KELLOGG. That is correct.

Senator FONG. Are we committed to see to it that there is no starvation?

Mr. KELLOGG. That is correct.

Senator FONG. That would be correct?

Mr. KELLOGG. Yes.

Senator FONG. Has the administration the funds or the authority to transfer whatever money there is to help in this regard?

Mr. IRWIN. We would do our best within the two frameworks: one, of making food grains available and, two, of doing all we could to influence the East Pakistan Government in their distribution operations and helping, to the extent we can, by such means as furnishing equipment or, as has been brought out, furnishing boats.

Senator FONG. In our plan, has there been a fault?

Mr. IRWIN. Pardon?

Senator FONG. Where in our plan, in our proposals, in what we project for the Indian refugees or for the East Pakistan displaced persons is there any weakness? Where is the food not really getting to the people or where will they be faced with possible starvation or where will we not be able to do the humanitarian things we would like to?

Mr. IRWIN. Well, as I think we have tried to bring out, and as you and the chairman have brought out, the one weakness is the distribution system in East Pakistan. I think that seems to be the principal weakness.

Another weakness is the extent to which the Government of Pakistan feels it might rely on the rice crop in East Pakistan and that might not be up to what it anticipates.

On the Indian side, taking care of the 7 million refugees, if that is the correct figure and we have no reason to doubt it, I think the weakness is just that that is a tremendous number of people. It will take a great amount of money over a period of time, and it will obviously be sometime before the problem is solved, even if the best of worlds existed and no matter how quickly conditions improve in East Pakistan.

If it does cost \$600 or \$700 million a year, as the Indians believe it will, then it means that a great deal of funds will have to be made available and food will have to be made available from not only the United States but many other countries of the world.

So, it is a persistent problem, I think, and not a weakness. It will require persistence on the part of the rest of the world in assistance to India.

Senator FONG. Do you contemplate that you will come back to Congress for more money?

Mr. IRWIN. We might well.

Senator FONG. What will you do as far as the transportation system is concerned in order to get these provisions to the areas they are not now reaching?

Are you doing anything to solve this problem? Are you trying to get the Pakistan Government to do something on that score?

Mr. REES. Yes; we are sir. We do hope that Pakistan will divert back to civil use more of the equipment that had previously been used in normal times for movement of civil cargoes and foods and we are urging that they do so as soon as they can. We are expressing the possibility in support of that that we are prepared to provide additional funds if needed for additional rivercraft.

We have been suggesting to other nations that they do the same. We have not received any formal word that others are going to but with the U.N. report now out and the urging by the Secretary General that others join, we have every expectation that some other nations will also charter rivercraft for use in East Pakistan.

Senator FONG. Mr. Secretary, I would like to commend you and your staff for a very fine program for the humanitarian relief of all of these suffering people.

I think you have done a good job. Of course, much more has to be done. The other nations and the United Nations should be called upon to contribute more. It seems that we are carrying the largest part of the burden; a much larger part of the burden than our share. I think the other nations should be asked to contribute and help. But, I feel that we have done a very fine job and hope we continue.

Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Secretary, I have a couple of final questions on Pakistan.

There have been some reports of requests for USAID Public Safety Teams to go to East Pakistan.

Can you tell us what the attitude of the administration is on this? Are you familiar with it? Is there any possibility of it?

Mr. REES. Our personnel who have been engaged in public safety training activities in East Pakistan obviously were withdrawn. We are considering the suggestion for a temporary visit by an experienced person there to attempt, from prior contacts, to establish some factual basis for our understanding of the condition of things and the shape and the nature of the present public safety forces in East Pakistan.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, let me just get it a little clearer if we could. Is the Department considering sending public safety teams into East Pakistan?

Mr. REES. No, there is no such consideration. As I said, it was the suggestion of sending, on temporary duty, a man who had previously been stationed there.

Senator KENNEDY. Why would you send a person if there is no request? Has there been such a request?

Mr. REES. No.

Senator KENNEDY. Is this an initiative by the Department?

Mr. REES. This is an initiative on our part to ascertain, if nothing else, the present state of the grant equipment that we had previously provided in the earlier program.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, do you need a public safety expert to go over and review what grant equipment was provided under earlier programs?

Do you foresee any possibility that public safety teams would be sent?

Mr. REES. No, I do not.

Senator KENNEDY. Do you, Mr. Ambassador?

Mr. IRWIN. I am not familiar with it, Mr. Chairman. But I would be glad to furnish anything further we have for the record.

Senator KENNEDY. Could you do that?

(Subsequently, the following information was provided:)

The Department of State has no further information. There are no plans for public safety teams to go to East Pakistan.

Mr. IRWIN. I think in the past there have been public safety programs in Pakistan.

Senator KENNEDY. There was one in Vietnam too, a long time ago. If you could let us know what the thinking is on this.

Would you consider sending over a nutritional team to follow up on the work that has been done by the Ryan Report? We have had such teams elsewhere—doctors that went over to Vietnam on civilian war casualty needs, social welfare teams, and the Department sent a nutritional team at the end of the Biafran War. I am just wondering what the current thinking is on getting a distinguished group of experts that would go and give us some kind of evaluation on the nutritional needs and deficiencies of Pakistan.

I think it has been noted that there is probably food in the various harbors, but the obvious difficulty is getting it distributed. So it would be important to have this kind of evaluation also.

Mr. REES. Mr. Chairman, the World Health Organization Team that has just finished its report on East Pakistan made a special effort to look at the nutritional situation.

Senator KENNEDY. Do you have that report?

Mr. REES. No; we have not gotten it yet.

Senator KENNEDY. Has it been filed yet?

Mr. REES. I am not sure. We have a cable summary of their verbal account as they were leaving. It does stress the very point that you are making.

I don't know whether they had nutritionists on the team. The FAO World Food Program Team is also attempting to take a look at nutritional aspects. We have been moving with UNICEF and with or mission to think through food fortification and use of processed food of high food value in part because of the nutritional impact, and in part in view of the logistics problem, the high density foods may be easier to move around.

The first shipment of such high density food is due to be on the water this week.

Senator KENNEDY. We have a vote, Mr. Secretary, we'll recess briefly and then I just have one or two more questions.

Senator Mathias, do you have any more questions?

Senator MATHIAS. I would be willing to forego questions on this, Mr. Chairman, rather than call the Secretary back and if I have any questions in looking over the transcript, we can submit them.

Senator KENNEDY. Will you excuse us briefly, Mr. Secretary?

(Recess.)

Senator KENNEDY (continuing). The subcommittee will come to order. I had hoped, Mr. Ambassador and Mr. Secretary, to stay in touch in terms of the development of a nutritional team.

As I said, I was unfamiliar with the team that was being sent to the World Health and the FAO and I was unaware of their makeup and their complexion.

I think it would be of enormous value to all of us who are trying to follow this closely to have the input of a trained nutritionist.

But we are not interested at the taxpayer's expense to duplicate the work of these international organizations, the World Health and the others; they have, of course, very great resources in terms of trained people, but I hope that we could continue a dialog on that issue because I think it could be extremely helpful.

Mr. IRWIN. Mr. Chairman, we would be very happy to keep a dialog and keep you informed of what we know in this area. As you indicate, this truly is an international effort. It may be that we have given most of the money and time. Perhaps because of our wealth and size we always will give the most. But it is an international effort in which we are trying to engage all of the other nations, at least insofar as we can.

It started with India asking the United Nations as far as the Indian side of it is concerned. So, I would just like to emphasize that, while we are anxious to move ahead, we are part of an international effort.

Senator KENNEDY. I would like to ask you finally, has the Defense Department had a role in terms of the refugees and if so, could you tell us about it?

Mr. IRWIN. The Defense Department has not had any sort of a general role, although it has furnished four C-130's to help in the relocation of refugees from where they first were assembled to other areas where India thought they could be better cared for.

Senator KENNEDY. Just limited to transportation?

Mr. IRWIN. There were four C-130's there for a month. I will let Mr. Kellogg elaborate.

Mr. KELLOGG. Mr. Chairman, I saw the U.S. Air Force in the midst of this very humanitarian effort and I think I could give you a first-hand brief report if you would permit me to do so.

The Government of India requested the airlift through the high commissioner and the reason for the request was that there was an enormous overcrowding of refugees into the Tripura State. The numbers reached 1,100,000 refugees as compared to the total local population of 1,500,000.

Therefore, there was almost one refugee to one local resident, and this caused tremendous dislocations and pressures. As a result, the Interagency Committee, which I chair, approved the airlift and the U.S. Air Force sent an original C-130 to test the possibilities and

capabilities as well as the technological problems. The initial run proved that it was indeed feasible, and the airlift was approved for a 2-week period and subsequently for an additional 2 weeks.

What it accomplished was a very tangible evidence of the concern of the U.S. people and the U.S. Government's interest in the refugees' plight and it also demonstrated to the local population that the U.S. Government was trying to move refugees out of an overcrowded area.

While the numbers moved were small in relation to the total, the airlift was a definite recognition of the problem caused by the tremendous influx of refugees. In addition, and I think this is important to stress, the airlift on its return trips from Assam to Tripura carried a very substantial load of rice.

This was a vital effort because the rice transported by the four airplanes provided the refugees one-half of the food that they were consuming. The difficulty here was that the rail terminated some 400 or 500 miles away from the refugee camps and there was only one road, a single dirt strip, and in the monsoon it becomes almost impassable; so without the airlift the refugees would have had a very serious problem with respect to food.

Senator KENNEDY. You have no other plans to utilize them other than for transportation?

Mr. IRWIN. There have been no other plans at least to date.

Senator KENNEDY. Senator Mathias?

Senator MATHIAS. I have no questions on this, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KENNEDY. Could we then move to Southeast Asia, Mr. Secretary?

We had some hearings on April 21 and 22 in terms of some of the refugees' problems in Southeast Asia and I see Mr. Doolin of the Defense Department.

I wrote to the Secretary of Defense on May 10. In this letter [see text in Appendix V] we included an exchange before the subcommittee with Mr. Doolin; he indicated that the Department would prepare a report on the rules of engagement guiding U.S. Forces in Southeast Asia. We have had no reply thus far.

I also want to welcome Mr. Sullivan here. It is like old home week.

During the time of the hearings, Mr. Secretary, we had several different exchanges with Mr. Sullivan and expressed different views on the creation of refugees in Laos—and we spent some time in expressing our different views on this question.

Now, I see a report that was prepared by a young IVS volunteer, Walter Haney, on the creation of refugees in Laos. It is one of the most complete and thorough reports I have seen. He has gone into considerable detail. He has pictures of different families, names, villages, dates, and I understand it has been made available to the U.S. Embassy in Vientiane.

He got a nice note back from them, but I would like to submit this to you, Mr. Secretary, and perhaps to Mr. Sullivan, to get the Department's reactions to it. The principal conclusion was that aerial bombardment by the United States was the primary cause of refugees from the Plain of Jars in 1969.

I would be terribly interested if you could take it and have your people review it and have Mr. Sullivan, who is familiar with it, review it. This young IVS volunteer spoke fluent Lao and spent a

great deal of time in the development and preparation of this report. I must say it is an enormously thorough effort on his part. It is very well documented. [See Appendix II for complete text and the Department's reply.]

Mr. IRWIN. Mr. Chairman, I am not familiar with it but perhaps Mr. Sullivan is.

Mr. SULLIVAN. I have read the report and Walter Haney came in to see me and I have sent it out for comment to Laos.

The preliminary comment I have received is that this group of refugees he interviewed, and I think as you say extremely well, constituted the same group that had been the subject of the investigation that we had carried out through our mission because they were people that did represent an extraordinary experience; people who had been in our judgment subject to some action by Air Force planes or by air action as rather an exception than the rule.

This was the group on which I testified earlier—

Senator KENNEDY. I remember your report very well. My initial impression was that it is more broadly based than the USIS report, but if you could submit whatever reaction that you do have, it would be extremely helpful.

I would like to, if I could, since Mr. Sullivan is here, to ask if there is anything new in terms of the Cambodian situation.

I remember your testimony last time was of rather modest dimensions on the Cambodia refugee problem, and you hadn't any specific figures.

We have some independent evaluations in terms of newspaper reports about a significant increase of refugees.

I was wondering if there is anything new on that, Mr. Sullivan?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Since those hearings, Secretary Irwin and I have been out to Cambodia and one of the things that we sought to clarify was the statistics concerning refugees. I have just told Mr. deHaan that I think we have to admit a fairly complete failure to elicit an exact figure on what the refugee statistics are.

The figures that are available through all of the Cambodian Government agencies are pretty vague and they don't give us anything in the way of a firm foundation for a clear understanding of the problem. However, we did look at the actual situation in Phnom Penh and there are only a few thousand still in a refugee status.

We found a great deal of difficulty in getting any clarification of the numbers of refugees that have actually come into Phnom Penh itself or of any increases in the size of the population of the city. In fact, we couldn't really get a clear picture of what the population in the city was. We did go up, or at least I did, to some of the places where the fighting had taken place and it is quite clear a number of those towns along Route 66 and Route 7 have been demolished.

Therefore, the people obviously have moved out. The mission has compiled what it considers the best estimate of refugees somewhere in the range of 500,000; 210,000 of these being Vietnamese that have moved out of Cambodia into Vietnam, the rest being very largely around Phnom Penh; but also in the provincial cities such as Battambang and also in the areas under Communist control.

There clearly have been people who have moved into the population centers from the countryside. There does not appear to be cur-

rently a humanitarian problem. The people who are displaced have been taken care of except for this small group of people who are encamped in the outskirts of Phnom Penh itself.

Senator KENNEDY. Do we have any program to help assist them at the present time?

Mr. SULLIVAN. We have no specific refugee program. There have not been any demands as yet from Cambodians for assistance in this field. However, in our AID program we are including foods and certain other items such as public health equipment which we think would be of value to them.

Senator KENNEDY. So the official total number of refugees in Cambodia is 500,000; 200,000 returned to South Vietnam and approximately 300,000 others?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes.

Senator KENNEDY. And those 300,000, except for a very small percentage, have been resettled?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Resettled perhaps is not the word. Of course in the social system of a country like Cambodia with the extended family group, a great many of them have just been taken in by their relatives and by their family friends. They are not resettled to the extent of having reestablished villages. I think that they would still be people who would want to go back to the villages they came from once the security permits.

Senator KENNEDY. Do you have anything, while we are talking about it, on the Laotian refugee situation?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. When we testified last we had a total of 280,000. It is now about 316,000. These additional refugees came very largely in the south. As you will recall, in the late spring of this year the North Vietnamese moved over from the areas east of Bolovens Plateau and actually took control of the Bolovens Plateau and two or three population centers, Paksong particularly, which have been emptied out. These people have come into the area of the Mekong Valley down in Pakse. So there has been an increase from the time we testified of about 8,000. Eight thousand refugees.

Senator KENNEDY. Would you want to comment on the Vietnamese refugee situation? The situation, according to figures I have, is that there were nearly 100,000 during the first quarter of this year, during the first 5 months of this year. Are those your figures?

Mr. SULLIVAN. That is correct, sir.

Senator KENNEDY. This, as I understand it, is about comparable to recent years in terms of the numbers of new refugees that have been created.

I was wondering why this is so, given the apparent reduction in fighting.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, about 80,000 of those are accounted for by two distinct actions. One was the movement by the South Vietnamese armed forces into the U Minh Forest, which is down in the very tip of the Delta. That area has long been a Communist stronghold and this is the first time that the South Vietnamese armed forces have been able successfully to go in and penetrate the area and try to clean it up.

In doing this, they pulled out a great number of the people who resided in that area and put them in refugee camps while they continued their military action in the forest itself.

That is one of the main causes and I think that is the cause of somewhere around 30,000.

Senator KENNEDY. How much movement was there? This movement last spring, this enforced relocation of Montagnards; is it still continuing?

Mr. SULLIVAN. That is the point I was going to address myself to now. The larger group has been a movement in military region 2 of Montagnard tribesmen upward of 45,000 who were moved out forcefully and forcefully relocated by a new regional military commander.

This movement in the judgment of our people and also ultimately in the judgment of the Government in Vietnam was contrary to the policy of the government. It was stopped at the Saigon level. There have been no further enforced movements.

In other words, the policy is now bringing security to the people, rather than bringing the people out of the places considered insecure. These people were moved from the areas near Fire Bases 5 and 6 which, you may recall, came under heavy attack in the spring. This is in the area adjacent to the Cambodian border. There was a real security problem but we did not consider that this was the way to treat it and neither did the government in Saigon which eventually ordered the displacement to stop.

But nearly 47,000, I believe, were moved in that movement. So, those two movements from the U Minh Forest and from the Montagnards account for 80,000 of 100,000 which have been registered as new refugees in the first 6 months of this year.

Consequently, those who have been generated as the result of your correct analysis of diminishing military action were about 20,000 over that period if you set these two aside.

Senator KENNEDY. Could you tell us what you know of other planned relocations of people? Can we expect this will continue, or were these exceptions?

Mr. SULLIVAN. As I said, both of these—not the U Minh movement because that was something else, but movement in the second military region, are contrary to established governmental policy.

The policy of the Government is not to relocate people. Now, the absolute guarantee that this won't happen again, of course is very difficult to give but I can say with some confidence this is the way in which they will conduct themselves. As our forces diminish, particularly in the first military region, up until now we have had nearly three U.S. divisions. There may be deterioration of security since we note that the North Vietnamese are appearing to be making preparations in and through and south of the demilitarized zone to bring pressure on that area.

Now, whether this will result in population movements, it is too early to judge. Our hope would be instead of having any population movement there would be military security to screen the population from these attacks.

Senator KENNEDY. Is there a corresponding increase in civilian casualties? Would you say hospital admissions were 10,732 for January and February and March of this year?

I am wondering if—

Mr. SULLIVAN. This is another one of these statistical problems we have been having difficulty getting an actual firm fix on. We have

some serious effort going on to try to reconcile all of the statistics that are available to us.

Senator KENNEDY. That is right. They are comparable to 1968, which I believe, was the year of the highest civilian casualties. I mean we have always had problems about how we are going to figure them out, but just using the same figures we have been using all along—and these aren't subcommittee figures, they are yours—it is, as I understand it, the highest figure since June 1970.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Our hospital admissions figures counting civilian casualties in the first few months of this year have been at a rate that is, I think, less. I will have to get these for you accurately. I think it is less than they were certainly in 1970. The rate in 1968 was 6,391 on a monthly average. The rate is in 1970 about 3,853 on a monthly average.

I believe the current rate is somewhat below 3,300.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, in March it was 4,100. I was just wondering why they had gone up?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, Mr. Chairman, March was a period of extremely intensive heavy fighting up there as you recall in military region 1 particularly.

So there was an increase, a spurt in that month, that particular month was the one that raised the monthly average for the first quarter of this year.

We expect the average when we have a few more months of statistics to be considerably lower than it was in 1970 and I think you will find that it is less than half of what it was in 1968.

Senator KENNEDY. Just in terms of a report I saw this morning in the Times which tells of gains by the enemy in a survey by Saigon, telling of declining security in the Delta area.

Do you think if this was accurate and true, do you think this would mean there would probably be more fighting and more civilian casualties?

Mr. SULLIVAN. I think Tad Szulc seems to have gotten his copy of that cable before I got mine.

But in the previous month there has been some deterioration in the security situation in Binh Dinh and Phu Yen Province largely because these have been areas from which we have withdrawn U.S. forces. With less density of security forces in the area there is, of course, a reduction in the immediate security and some increase in the Vietcong terrorism and assassinations.

This sort of infliction of civilian casualties certainly is something that we feel is probably going to go up. That is to say, individuals are going to be killed by assassination, booby traps are going to be placed in areas where civilians innocently wander, and we do fear that there will be increases in civilian casualties in these areas where government security cannot be provided against this sort of indiscriminate attack.

Senator KENNEDY. There was a report of a meeting in May in which those familiar with the situation are predicting large scale urban violence before the end of the year, spearheaded by returning veterans. The report concludes that something new and different is called for to provide social order.

I was wondering whether something different is being done or whether this report from that meeting reflects increasing concern about social stability in Vietnam?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, that report which, again, appeared in the New York Times, was from a letter that had been sent to Ambassador Colby by one of the people concerned with the refugee problem particularly in the northern military regions. We think it was couched in rather dramatic language.

We do have a situation developing in a place such as Da Nang. Da Nang has been, of course, the center of the area where our U.S. Marines were centered. We have also supplied our 101st Division and part of the 23d Division through that port.

Therefore, there were a great many people who were employed working for the U.S. Government in that area. As we pull out, these people will at least temporarily be unemployed. A great many of them are people who came from the countryside or from areas where fighting had taken place and perhaps came to Da Nang originally in a refugee status.

We don't believe there is going to be anything quite as dramatic as that letter suggests in terms of urban violence but there will be some social problems resulting from unemployment and loss of jobs as we move out.

Senator KENNEDY. I think you have touched on something which is terribly important and that is as we move out, there will be the creation of this kind of a social climate which will lend itself to a great deal of unrest.

Are we doing anything? Is that part of our plan?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir; indeed it is and we had the Vietnamese Minister of the Economy over here recently and had some detailed talks with him about the prospects for being able to meet this problem.

Let me say that the problem is not numerically very large and it is not extensive throughout the country. It is pretty much confined, as we can foresee it, to the city of Da Nang. That is the one area that is going to have a problem. The rest of the country still has pretty much a labor market which is characterized by a tight employment situation rather than an unemployment situation.

But in that particular area there is going to have to be something done and we are working on the prospects of some industrialization projects. We are also working on the prospects of some investment from other countries. There isn't very much in the way of American investment going on. But in general, in trying to absorb these people very rapidly into the Vietnam economy the underemployment problem at this time is a minor one and the country is very heavily mobilized as you know.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much.

Senator MATHIAS. Mr. Chairman?

Senator KENNEDY. Senator Mathias.

Senator MATHIAS. I wonder if you could tell us what the status of the abandoned children of American servicemen is.

Does that come within the purview of your program?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. We have had some correspondence with our mission in Saigon about it and we have had some people looking into it.

Let me say first of all that I think in approaching this problem we should understand that the social attitudes towards illegitimacy in Asian countries, particularly in a country such as Vietnam, are quite different than they are here in this country. There is a certain amount of polygamy. There are cases of fathers of children by more than one wife and it is quite accepted socially and it is quite accepted legally as far as this is concerned.

In this instance, according to the Vietnamese Ministry of Social Welfare there are about 10,000 to 15,000 racially mixed children living in the care of their families. We are unable to determine exactly how many of these may have been fathered by American servicemen. The mothers have either kept the children themselves or they have been moved to the parents of the mother and there is little or no social stigma or other problem that is associated with them.

Only about 300 in the 120 orphanages recognized and subsidized by the Vietnamese Government, along with a great many other children who have either become orphans or have been abandoned or temporarily placed in orphanages by their parents during the course of the turbulence of the war.

Our general concern is one of attempting to provide assistance to those orphanages without any particular discrimination in favor of these people but being sure that these youngsters are encompassed in some program of assistance. As far as adoption is concerned, there has been a limited amount of adoption by Americans of either illegitimate children, half Vietnamese and half American, or of purely Vietnamese children. The Vietnamese children, largely because of this very strong family attachment, are not as keen about having people adopt their children and take them out of the country away from them.

So it doesn't appear to us that there is going to be any great prospect for American adoption agencies to meet this problem. We think it has to be through assistance to orphanages rather than otherwise.

Senator MATHIAS. What is the total population of these children in the orphanages now?

Mr. SULLIVAN. I would have to get that statistic for you. There are about 49,000 children in the 120 orphanages recognized and subsidized by the Vietnamese Government.

Senator MATHIAS. Would you? It's not primarily Vietnamese fathered by Americans?

Mr. SULLIVAN. No, the overwhelming bulk of the children in the orphanages are pure Vietnamese.

Senator MATHIAS. But you would say that the bulk of those in orphanages are there because of some war-related incident?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Most of the children, yes. Most of them are there because their parents have been killed, or have abandoned them or temporarily given them over to the care of the orphanages.

Senator MATHIAS. Thank you.

Senator KENNEDY. Do you have the numbers in terms of how many North Vietnamese men have been killed?

Mr. SULLIVAN. We think somewhere around 750,000.

Senator KENNEDY. How many South Vietnamese men have been killed?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Certainly not less than 150,000.

Senator KENNEDY. Just in terms of that whole country there is going to be a monumental problem with all these young people, let alone those that are in the orphanages.

The number in orphanages when I was over there actually is a very small percentage, but as I understand the Government of Vietnam figures by 1970 there will be some 258,000 orphans, is that correct?

Mr. SULLIVAN. I wouldn't be surprised at that statistic, since we have estimates that 320,000 children have lost one or both parents.

Senator MATHIAS. 258,000?

Senator KENNEDY. Yes. Which is an enormous figure. And I am sure there are lots on the street, too.

Senator MATHIAS. I wonder if the Ambassador could clarify one statement, he said that 700,000 North Vietnamese were killed—

Mr. SULLIVAN. Between 700,000 and 750,000 is our best calculation.

Senator MATHIAS. Are these North Vietnamese nationals, or are these people fighting on that side?

Mr. SULLIVAN. No, I am talking in terms of those who have gone outside of North Vietnam to fight whether it is in South Vietnam or Cambodia or Laos.

Senator MATHIAS. That's all I wanted to know.

Senator KENNEDY. As I understand, there was a meeting last week of a group that was very interested in this problem—I believe on Monday.

Mr. SULLIVAN. The International Social Services.

Senator KENNEDY. The subcommittee had some representatives there and I visited at the end of the day with some of those who had been involved. I understand it was difficult getting a consensus but there were some very important points made and very useful recommendations and I certainly hope that those observations made will be brought to your attention, as I am sure they will be. We are going to try to continue to follow this question; I hope you will give these recommendations some consideration.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir.

Senator KENNEDY. I have just a couple of final areas and then I would like to submit some questions.

I would be interested, Mr. Secretary, on the question of the Soviet Jewry. Do you have anyone with you on that? I commend you for coming here this morning, because we are covering about 25 or 30 potentially very troublesome questions involving a lot of difficult areas—but could you, or do you have some people, who might be able to bring us up-to-date on Soviet Jewry? Or if you want to submit a note to us we'll be glad to get that.

Mr. IRWIN. Perhaps I could speak briefly and we could try to furnish any further information you may wish, Mr. Chairman. As I know you are and the Congress is, the Executive is also deeply concerned about the inability of the Jewish community in the Soviet Union to have the right to leave if they wish.

They have many other problems within the country. They are discriminated against in many ways and only one of which is the inability to immigrate. We have spoken to this problem at various times and various ways.

President Nixon some time ago wrote a letter to the American Jewish leaders in which he gave his support to the concept of freedom of travel by the Soviet Jewish community.

Secretary Rogers has also had statements released by the Department on this. Secretary Rogers has spoken personally to Gromyko about it. Our press spokesman has spoken several times about it. Our representatives in the United Nations Human Rights Commission have urged the Government of the Soviet Union to give the right of freedom of emigration to Jews and other Soviet citizens and also freedom to practice the religion of their choice. And lastly Ambassador Beam has made various representations to the Soviet Government.

Since March there has been an increase in the number of Soviet Jewish citizens who have been permitted to leave the country, and in prior years I understand emigration has not exceeded about a thousand a year. The 6-month total for this year has been about 5,000. We are not certain exactly what has caused the increase this year. But in any case there has been a slight increase.

We have had such incidents as Mr. Rigerman being permitted to leave the Soviet Union. That became quite played up in the press. But as far as any basic change in the Soviet policy of denial of emigrations, I don't think we can speculate too much on that. Certainly there has been no evidence of any basic change of heart.

Senator KENNEDY. As you know, the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration has been a constructive force in the movement of people in Central Europe. They have been somewhat active in some of the Cuban refugee problems. In January I sent a letter to the Soviet Union on this question and I would be interested if either now or perhaps later you would let us know what your response would be.

Mr. IRWIN. If I may ask Mr. Kellogg to speak to that.

Mr. KELLOGG. Mr. Chairman, I was present at the international conference of ICEM last fall when your suggestion was made that their offices be used for this purpose. The U.S. Government and the Department has supported that effort. We know that ICEM did in fact make the approach. To date, I don't believe that there is any evidence or any hope of a response by the other side.

Senator KENNEDY. Finally, on the question of internationalizing relief efforts in Indochina, Mr. Secretary, could you tell us, or perhaps Mr. Sullivan would have some comment, about the efforts by the United States to utilize various specialized agencies of the U.N. in terms of meeting humanitarian needs in the Indochina Peninsula.

Mr. SULLIVAN. The efforts we have made in that direction, Mr. Chairman, have not been very fruitful so far. The International Committee of the Red Cross and some of the Red Cross societies of other countries have contributed assistance especially in Vietnam. In Cambodia there has been similar Red Cross assistance coming from the Japanese, Australians and others. The United Nations as such, we have not been able to engage in this but we will have submitted for the record a summary of what we have done and what the responses have been.

(Subsequently, the following information was provided:)

The main thrust of American economic and social assistance in Indochina has been to improve the capability of the governments of the region to handle their own problems including the problems of refugees and other dislocations resulting from the war. At the same time, we have welcomed and encouraged contributions from the United Nations and its specialized agencies, and from third countries. A summary of such assistance follows:

VIET-NAM

The United Nations and its specialized agencies are making a contribution to the social and economic development of Viet-Nam. Under the Technical Assistance Component (TA) of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Viet-Nam may plan for projects of a duration up to four years, although expenditures thereon are determined on the basis of annual targets. The target figure for 1971 is \$380,000. Over the past several years, the TA component has financed expert services and fellowships in such varied fields as maternal and child health, agriculture, labor administration, educational planning, telecommunications, meteorology and civil aviation. This assistance is carried out by various agencies in the UN system such as the ILO, FAO, UNESCO, WHO, ICAO, ITU, WMO and the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the UN.

The Special Fund component of the UNDP is financing two major projects. An Offshore Fishery Development Project with allocations of \$1,103,800 is executed by the FAO with the purpose of carrying out exploratory and experimental fishing in offshore waters and the South China Sea, as well as commercial feasibility and market studies. The United States has pledged \$2 million to enlarge the scope of this project through a funds-in-trust arrangement. The Netherlands Government is providing a fishing vessel for the project, also financed by a funds-in-trust arrangement.

The second UNDP Special Fund project in Viet-Nam is to improve and expand higher grade technical facilities and help the GVN to establish a National Technical Institute. UNESCO is executing this project for which the UNDP has earmarked \$1,484,900.

A number of other UN agencies are assisting Viet-Nam. UNICEF is conducting a health and child welfare program. WHO is providing assistance through its regular program for the establishment of a National Institute of Public Health in Saigon for the training of medical and para-medical personnel.

In addition to the United States and the United Nations specialized agencies, some thirty-eight countries have provided some non-military aid to the people of South Viet-Nam.

LAOS

UN specialized agencies in Laos have been involved in a number of programs, such as WHO's medical assistance program, which have obvious benefits for refugees. This program in 1970 reached a level of \$204,000 and occupied 13 UN staff members in Laos.

Japan leads among third countries providing assistance to refugees including \$300,000 in rice in 1968, \$500,000 in rice in 1969, \$200,000 worth of agricultural equipment and \$30,000 in drugs and other commodities in 1970. In 1971, Japan agreed to make available \$200,000 worth of agricultural equipment for the Lao relief program.

Among other countries, the French Committee for the World Campaign Against Hunger, a private organization, recently donated 30 tractors, four bulldozers, several trucks, and assorted agricultural equipment for use in the resettlement of refugees. The same organization in the past has donated rice, roofing, canned milk, and drugs for refugee relief. The United Kingdom, until last year, provided an advisor to the Laos Ministry of Social Welfare who worked closely with the refugee relief program.

CAMBODIA

Acting upon a request in June 1970 of the Government of Cambodia, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees made a survey of the refugee problems in that country with the view to lending his assistance if and to the extent that such problems involved refugees fell within the UNHCR terms of reference. The UNHCR, following receipt of the report of his representative who visited Cambodia, made available an amount of \$50,000 from his Emergency Fund for support of assistance measure already initiated toward meeting acute emergency relief needs. The High Commissioner's contribution was entrusted to the Cambodian Red Cross and earmarked particularly to improve living conditions of the most destitute refugee groups. The UNHCR is also undertook to keep UNICEF WHO and the World Food Program advised as to the situation in Cambodia.

The UNHCR finding that he was within his terms of reference to provide assistance in the refugee relief effort in Cambodia was predicated upon the fact

that, while the overwhelming majority of the refugees in Cambodia were of Cambodian nationality or origin, there were nevertheless some thousands of refugees of South Vietnamese nationality or origin. Many of these being persons in effect displaced from their homes in South Viet-Nam would qualify, by virtue of having crossed an international frontier and being in Cambodia, as being within the competence of the UNHCR.

The UNHCR somewhat earlier had established an office in South Viet-Nam and had sent a senior official to represent the interests of his office in that country. The terms of reference of this official were subsequently extended to cover Cambodia as well.

These actions by the UNHCR, although resulting directly from requests by the Cambodian and Vietnamese Governments, were given the strong support of the United States Government. As of the present time, the UNHCR does not have an active assistance program in either of these countries and no allocations of funds beyond the initial allocation of \$50,000 for each country have been made. The reason for this is that the refugee situations within these countries have become exclusively or almost exclusively internal refugee situations, i.e., Cambodians displaced within Cambodia and South Vietnamese displaced within South Viet-Nam. The UNHCR terms of reference do not extend to refugees displaced within the boundaries of their own nation.

Meanwhile, the War Victims Commission of the Cambodian Ministry of Social Action and Labor continues to look after refugee problems. By the spring of 1971, it had expended approximately \$3 million of its own money and was expected to continue expenditures at a rate of some \$55,000 per month for relief operations at present levels. The Commission has also received funds from 17 foreign relief organizations and Red Cross/Red Crescent societies. Donations so far have totalled approximately \$2.5 million. The Red Cross/Red Crescent aspect of this support is coordinated by a representative of International Committee of the Red Cross.

Senator KENNEDY. That would be very helpful. I raised this because first of all I can remember visiting with a number of agencies myself at the U.N. some time ago and feeling that most of them had at least a limited program in terms of the Indochina situation and were willing to consider some kind of expansion. I also note that in a recent interview Dean Rusk said in terms of the Pentagon Papers, that he expressed regret that the United States hadn't utilized the U.N. machinery more effectively and more significantly during his term of responsibility. Having listened to him make that comment, I am just wondering if there aren't some additional initiatives that might now be made in this area?

Mr. IRWIN. On the basic question of seeking U.N. support in this area, we would be very happy if we could obtain it.

As Mr. Sullivan said, our efforts have not been fruitful but it is not because we would not much prefer to have them. As in all of our relief areas and humanitarian areas, we feel that the efforts are really on such a large scale and so important to all countries of the world that we would welcome the participation of the U.N. and also of other individual countries.

Senator KENNEDY. I would like to submit some questions on a wide variety of other areas and perhaps you can elaborate on some of the answers you have given here.

I want to express my appreciation for your presence here.

Mr. Kellogg, we want to thank you very much for coming and the others that have been kind enough to join Secretary Irwin and we'll look forward to working with you in the future.

Thank you very much.

The subcommittee will stand recessed.

(Whereupon, the hearing was recessed at 12:30 p.m.).

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

AID RESPONSES TO 1970 GENERAL ACCOUNTS OFFICE REPORTS ON REFUGEE RELIEF AND CIVILIAN HEALTH AND WAR-RELATED CASUALTY PROGRAMS IN LAOS AND SOUTH VIETNAM

On February 11, 1971, the chairman submitted to Dr. John A. Hannah, AID Administrator, five General Accounting Office reports on refugee relief and civilian health and war-related casualty programs in Laos and South Vietnam. Printed below is the text of the chairman's transmittal letter and Dr. Hannah's responses of May 7 and 25, 1971. Sections of the response on Laos have been deleted at the request of AID on the grounds that such deletions are in the interests of national security.

FEBRUARY 11, 1971.

HON. JOHN A. HANNAH,
*Administrator, Agency for International Development, Department of State,
Washington, D.C.*

DEAR DR. HANNAH: On April 21, 1970, as Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees I requested the General Accounting Office (GAO) for a series of reports on war-related civilian problems in South Vietnam and Laos. The GAO has completed its inquiry, and in recent months has filed six reports with the Subcommittee. Summaries of two of these reports, both on war victims in Laos, were released this past Sunday. Enclosed are copies of these two reports, as well as the other reports of direct concern to the Agency for International Development, which were previously made available to members of your staff on an informal basis:

1. *Need for Improvement in the Control over Refugee Relief Commodities Shipped to Laos*, September 21, 1970—unclassified.

2. *Limited Review of the Refugee Relief Program in Laos*, November 5, 1970—classified "secret".

3. *Civilian Health and War-Related Casualty Programs in Vietnam*, November 9, 1970—unclassified.

4. *Continuing Difficulties in Assisting War Victims in Vietnam*, November 20, 1970—unclassified.

5. *The Civilian Health and War Casualty Program in Laos*, November 25, 1970—classified "secret".

These reports make findings in several general areas of immediate congressional and public concern: the deteriorating situation among war victims; the official understating of the extent war-related civilian problems exist in South Vietnam and Laos; the continuing lack of priority to these basically humanitarian concerns; the frequent inadequacy of official records relating to war victims and assistance programs; the frequent lack of general management procedures, contingency planning, et cetera; and, in the case of Laos, the apparently continuing diversion of foreign economic assistance funds and supplies into basically military concerns.

Members of the Subcommittee are deeply dismayed by the general findings of the GAO, and we would like to request your views and comments on these reports. In this connection, we would like to stress, especially, our concern over the findings on assistance to military, paramilitary forces and their dependents in Laos. We share your view that such assistance is incongruous with the purposes of the Agency for International Development, and we strongly feel that if such assistance is continuing in Laos, or elsewhere, remedial measures should be taken immediately, preferably through administrative procedures. We are extremely hopeful that you and your colleagues in the executive branch will be

able to supply us with definitive information on this important aspect of the GAO inquiry.

We appreciate very much your consideration, and look forward to hearing from you soon.

Sincerely,

EDWARD M. KENNEDY,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Refugees.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT,
Washington, D.C., May 7, 1971.

HON. EDWARD M. KENNEDY,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Refugees, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: With the help of our Mission in Laos, we have completed our review of the GAO reports you sent us on our refugee and health programs in that country. Our detailed comments, summarized below, are presented in appendices to this letter. Our comments on those GAO reports which dealt with Vietnam will be transmitted to you shortly.

Your letter of February 11 stressed particularly your concern regarding the GAO findings on A.I.D. "assistance to military, para-military forces and their dependents in Laos."

As the GAO notes, there had previously been shifts of assistance in this area. As a result, most such assistance had been transferred to non-A.I.D. financing prior to the GAO report. During this fiscal year, our Mission and we have examined the Laos program to identify any remaining costs that fall in this area and shift them to non-A.I.D. financing as soon as practicable. I can report to you now that with one shift made early this year and others that will be effective at the beginning of FY 1972, all of the A.I.D. financing with which you have been concerned will be terminated. Our appendices show the specifics.

Your letter expressed the view that our Laos and Vietnam programs reflected a "lack of priority to . . . basically humanitarian concerns."

I would like to stress that nothing in our A.I.D. program has a higher priority than helping refugees and civilian war casualties. It is, of course, generally impossible to have good and healthful living conditions immediately in an area into which large numbers of refugees have to be moved suddenly, or to avoid inadequacy of medical facilities in the face of a sudden influx of people needing emergency health care. Our missions, however, do all they can, in cooperation with the host government, to remedy unsatisfactory conditions as quickly as possible.

I might mention as an example the situation at Luang Prabang, the Lao Royal Capital, which experienced an enemy rocket attack on March 21 and around which there has since been vigorous military action by enemy forces. There had been almost 20,000 refugees in that general area. As a result of the enemy action Luang Prabang, whose normal population is about 20,000, experienced an influx of about 12,000 refugees—about 8,000 who were already in refugee status and about 4,000 newly created refugees. Our Mission immediately provided the refugees with food, clothing, and blankets, and began inoculation and sanitation programs. By April 8 all the refugees inoculation against cholera, a program to inoculate the regular population had been initiated, and additional sanitary facilities had been constructed at five schools where it had been necessary to house many of the refugees temporarily. By April 26 temporary relocation of refugees had enabled the schools to re-open. All refugees are receiving sufficient food and medical assistance (with outstanding help from a Swiss Red Cross medical team) and have been provided with adequate shelter and sanitary facilities. Plans have been made for more permanent settlement of the refugees or to move them back to their home villages if possible, but the plans are contingent on developments in the enemy-initiated military action.

We believe those who have seen refugee and health centers established with USAID/Laos assistance and unaffected by enemy action can attest to the accomplishments of our Mission in making such sites satisfactory in all respects within only minimal periods.

In this connection, we would cite this passage from the Digest of the GAO report on the Laos health program: "Given the wartime conditions in Laos and the general lack of economic and technical resources, GAO believes that the

contributions of the public health program represent a substantial achievement. Comments in this report are not intended to detract from these accomplishments. GAO's observations at field medical facilities were those seen through Western eyes and what might appear to be shortcomings may not be so considered by Laotian standards."

Your letter and the GAO reports show a third area of major concern as regards Laos—Mission management in the refugee and health fields.

Within this general area one of the concerns expressed is that USAID/Laos management is too often of a contingency nature, that there is insufficient long-range planning.

Unfortunately, the Lao situation has for a long time been fluid and unpredictable. One of the primary reasons for the existence of our refugee and health programs is precisely to react to contingencies, and I believe this has been done very well. But forward planning also takes place to the extent possible. As an example, in the latter part of 1970 the Mission embarked upon a program to increase substantially the hospital bed capacity in Military Region II and at a nearby point in MR III. This was done in anticipation of additional refugee requirements which did materialize as a result of communist actions.

The Mission constantly considers where new refugees who may be generated might be relocated. But it cannot actually prepare centers for new refugees until it is clear where new refugees may be created and to where it may be feasible to relocate them. Enemy military action can generally not be predicted far enough in advance to permit the pre-development of new refugee centers.

The second aspect of USAID/Laos management with which the GAO and you have been concerned is the control of refugee relief commodities.

The GAO team, while still in Laos, brought to the attention of the Mission certain weaknesses in the accounting and control procedures applied to refugee relief commodities. As shown in the GAO report, the Acting Mission Director ordered an immediate examination of the problem. One result was a USAID/Laos Action Memo, incorporated in the GAO report, providing for improvement in the Mission's organization and procedures in the fields covered by the GAO report. The Mission has since then made further improvements of this sort. Investigation by the Mission revealed that most of the losses cited by the GAO were not losses of the commodities themselves but reflected mis-filing or non-arrival of documents at the time the GAO report was made. Nevertheless, we attach high importance to the proper control over the receipt of refugee relief commodities, and are pleased that, as a result of the GAO visit, improvements in our Mission's organization and procedures for the control of refugee commodities have been effected.

I believe you will find the detailed comments which are attached comprehensive and responsive. I want to add that we are always glad to have constructive criticism. Our Laos and Vietnam programs are broad and complex, and an outside perspective frequently helps us achieve the objective you and we share—programs as helpful to those unfortunate countries and as efficient as we can possibly make them.

Sincerely yours,

(s) JOHN A. HANNAH.

AID COMMENTS ON GAO REPORT ENTITLED "LIMITED REVIEW OF THE
REFUGEE PROGRAM IN LAOS"

(The GAO findings and conclusions presented below with our comments are drawn from the GAO "Digest.")

1. GAO

"Only limited data on the evaluation of the program is submitted to Washington and A.I.D./Washington's management is limited to overall program direction."

Comments

Before September 1970, information on refugee matters was included in monthly reports of the Rural Development Division, which included a Refugee Relief Division; copies were regularly sent to A.I.D./W. Since September, when the Mission created a separate Office of Refugee Affairs, A.I.D./W has received not only monthly but also weekly reports prepared by that Office. In addition the Mission cables important developments to Washington immediately, and

able to supply us with definitive information on this important aspect of the GAO inquiry.

We appreciate very much your consideration, and look forward to hearing from you soon.

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when refugees are being displaced or created over an extended period, the Mission cables weekly or more frequent status reports and projections of future developments.

A.I.D./W, from 12,000 miles away, does not attempt to manage the Mission's program in any detail. It must, however, approve the overall lines of the Mission's program, make the funds available, select the personnel (except those hired locally) and approve personnel changes within the Mission. In these ways and by stepping in on specific program matters when that is considered necessary, A.I.D./W exercises as much program management as we consider appropriate.

2. GAO

"USAID/Laos does not have written operating procedures and its functional and Mission statement is outdated."

Comments

The Mission in September 1970 revised its refugee relief organization—elevating and expanding it—pursuant to a USAID/Laos Action Memo of September 1, 1970, which is attached. (Restaffing, see also 4, below.)

This Action Memo also enunciated Mission refugee assistance policy and procedures. In addition the Mission issues statements of policy and procedures that apply to all USAID activities including the refugee program.—e.g., in the fields of procurement management and transportation.

3. GAO

"USAID/Laos has stated that contingency plans have not been developed for movement of refugees in the event of dislocations caused by future military actions. U.S. officials have said that they have been reacting to the exigencies of the situation, rather than anticipating future needs and preparing alternative movement plans."

Comments

In planning refugee assistance the Mission regularly estimates probabilities, e.g., numbers of persons who might come out of certain areas and where they might be accommodated, in order to prepare to the extent possible to deal with them. One specific example of this planning is Ban Xon (Site 272), a former road camp whose facilities the Mission maintained while improving its airstrip and ramps in anticipation of their need if Sam Thong and/or Long Tieng should fall. These actions considerably eased the transformation of Ban Xon to its present status as a major refugee site.

Regardless of planning, the nature of the refugee problem makes it inevitable that the first phase of assistance takes place in emergency situations. The people generally prefer to stay on their land and in their homes as long as possible before fleeing. It is normally impossible to anticipate with precision how many will flee—successfully—and also what, if any, necessities they will be able to bring out with them.

Refugee warehouses outside Vientiane normally contain limited quantities of a broad range of commodities that can be distributed to new or displaced refugees as required. The central refugee warehouses in Vientiane normally contain greater quantities of commodities, awaiting distribution to outlying warehouses or directly to refugees as necessary. In an emergency, these can be delivered to any refugee site in Laos in a matter of hours. Experience has shown this to be a much more efficient system than attempting to preposition large amounts of commodities in outlying areas.

4. GAO

"USAID/Laos was not fully staffed to manage both the refugee program and its other programs. After repeated efforts, however, seven additional American positions for the refugee program were authorized on June 26, 1970. Quite a long time will elapse before these people are physically in Laos, because it takes time to select, process, train (including 6 months of Lao language instruction), and comply with other administrative requirements. In the meantime, personnel from other programs have been assigned temporarily to refugee operations."

Comments

As of April 1, 1971 the Mission's Office of Refugee Affairs had 24 U.S. personnel on board full time, an increase of 10 over last July. In addition, the Education Division has one full time Refugee Education Advisor, and other divisions (such as Health and Agriculture) assign personnel to full-time work on refugee

matters as needed. The Office of Refugee Affairs has about 40 local employees. Six of the Mission's seven Area Coordinators spend at least 50% of their time on refugee matters. Many other Mission personnel, both American and local, regularly devote a substantial amount of their time to helping refugees in one way or another, particularly in the community development and agriculture fields.

While the Mission's permanent Refugee Affairs staff has been expanded, it may still be necessary from time to time, as in the past, to "borrow" persons temporarily from other elements of the Mission for work in the refugee organization. This is much more efficient than attempting to staff the Office of Refugee Affairs with the maximum number of refugee officers that could ever be needed, and with every type of technician that might ever be needed temporarily to assist refugees. Calling upon Mission on-board personnel has the added advantage of utilizing persons familiar with the local language, customs, officials and terrain.

5. GAO

"With the exception of full assistance to refugees who recently have fled their homes, the amounts and types of support given other categories of refugees are not clearly defined. USAID/Laos has said that, because of the unstable and diverse conditions in Laos, standards have not been established as to the amounts and types of assistance. Instead, on the basis of their familiarity of the country and people, the needs of a particular group are assessed by Laotian Government and A.I.D. refugee officers on the spot."

Comments

Refugee assistance is categorized by the Mission as "full relief," "partial relief," and "relocation and resettlement assistance." As the GAO notes, the Mission has established quantitative standards for "full relief." However, the types and amounts of "partial relief" needed to assure refugees the basic necessities, and of "relocation and rehabilitation assistance" needed to make refugees self-sufficient, vary considerably, as shown on page 13-15 of the GAO report.

6. GAO

"During field visits to a limited number of refugee villages, GAO did not observe serious food shortages although it was understood that refugees do not have enough protein from animal sources. Refugees usually were poorly clothed. In some areas water supplies appeared inadequate, housing was small and crowded, farmland was limited, and medical dispensaries were lacking."

Comments

Insufficiency of animal protein from natural sources is a problem common to most Lao. It is a particular problem among refugees, many of whom in the course of one or more displacements have had to abandon livestock in favor of escaping with more precious possessions. Aware of the dietary implications of this problem, the Mission supplies protein supplement for as long as U.S. medical personnel determine it to be necessary. The Mission also supplies ducks, fingerlings and in some cases pigs, in areas where refugees will be able to raise and keep them as sources of protein.

The Mission does its best to ensure that all refugee sites have access to adequate water, housing, medical facilities, classrooms and cropland. Although not every site may have everything it needs at a given moment, the Mission is constantly working towards this goal and its achievements have been notable. Adequate cultivable land is a continuing problem on at least two counts: (1) Many of the refugees are hilltribe people who normally live and produce crops on plateaus and hillsides; much of this land is under enemy control and therefore not accessible; (2) Not all the land otherwise available for crop production by lowland refugees has been determined to be cultivable; the Mission and the Royal Lao Government presently have personnel working full time on soil surveys, land classification, and determination of ownership with respect to 95,000 acres of land in the Vientiane-Borikhane area—where presently 4,500 refugee families are situated in 27 villages—for possible refugee relocation on the basis of 5-7½ acres per family.

7. GAO

(Deleted.)

Comments

The two funding transfers mentioned above, one effective at the beginning of FY 1969 and the second effective at the beginning of FY 1971, amounted to about \$6 million and about \$3.5 million, respectively.

During FY 1971, USAID/Laos and A.I.D./W have examined the Laos program for the purpose of shifting to other agencies all remaining A.I.D. financed assistance to military/paramilitary personnel and dependents. The results in terms of medical support are shown under 2 of our comments on the GAO report on our health program. In addition, protein supplement and miscellaneous items (pots, pans, blankets, tools, etc.) for paramilitary dependents will also be shifted to non-A.I.D. financing effective at the beginning of FY 1972. With these transfers, no A.I.D. funds will any longer be used for assistance to military/paramilitary personnel and dependents.

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT TO LAOS

ACTION MEMO

September 1, 1970.

To: All Vientiane Offices and Field Stations.

From: Charles A. Mann, Director.

Subject: Mission Organization (Subject Index 220).

Effective September 1, 1970, the following organizational changes are effected in the USAID Mission to Laos:

A. The Rural Development Division is abolished.

B. The Office of Refugee Affairs (ORA) is established, in accordance with the following policy:

It is the policy of the USAID Mission to Laos to assist, materially and technically, the Royal Lao Government to provide timely and adequate assistance to refugees displaced, directly or indirectly to military actions and political instability in Laos.

This policy is based on a fundamental humanitarian concern—concern for the condition and distress of those people uprooted by war and unable, because of circumstances beyond their control, to provide their own basic requirements for survival.

Because of the non-deferrable, life or death nature of requirements, relief assistance to refugees will normally receive the highest priority within all USAID projects and supporting services in claims on material and human resources.

The goals of the refugee program are:

To demonstrate the humanitarian concern of the RLG and the USG for the victims of the war.

To insure that the RLG has necessary resources to assist refugees.

To promote and assist reestablishment of civilian government authority and services for refugee groups, strengthening their ties with and loyalty to the RLG.

To assist the RLG to bring the economic, social and political condition of the refugees to a level equal to that of Lao citizens (i.e., non-refugees) living in the general area of relocation, whose immediate physical condition and environment have not been directly affected by the war.

Appropriate USAID resources will be applied to the refugee program in the following order of priority:

1. Emergency movements created by or in anticipation of military action—evacuation assistance; emergency medical care and attention; provision of food by surface, air-drops or landed load location, provisioning and emergency staffing of temporary safe-haven and staging areas for displaced refugees; etc.

2. Relocation of refugees—allocation of land area; transportation to relocation areas; provision of food, blankets, clothing, utensils, shelter materials, medical care, assurance of potable water supply; movement of refugees into individual family housing constructed on self-help basis.

3. Assistance in provision of essential facilities (health, education, police, etc.), RLG services to necessary physical facilities such as schools, dispensaries, roads and wells and assist in establishing appropriate agricultural production to bring the refugee groups to a living condition equal to that of non-refugee in the general area where refugee groups are relocated. Any further assistance extended will be as part of normal rural assistance in health, education, agriculture, manpower development and the like as part of regular and national pro-

grams. While former refugees frequently are unusually susceptible to undertaking innovative practice and therefore constitute a special development resource, assistance basically designed to foster economic development should be extended as other than refugee assistance. As a minimum, the assistance designated as priority I will be given to any and all refugees where assistance has been requested by the RLG. As a maximum, assistance will be given under the aegis refugee affairs to bring refugee relocation villages to the approximate level of non-refugee neighbors. Once permanent schools, dispensaries or medical services, access roads, sources of potable water, self-sufficient agricultural production and civil authority have been assured at a level consonant with that of the larger community of which the refugee area is a part, no further assistance will be given as refugee relief, and the inhabitants of the relocation area will no longer be considered refugees.

C. The Office of Refugee Affairs is directed by an Assistant Director for Refugee Affairs (AD/RA) who is responsible for implementation of the above policy. It is composed of Refugee Relief, Refugee Affairs Administrative, Refugee Relocation, and Food for Peace Branches.

1. The Refugee Relief Branch (RRB) backstops all refugee Operations Officers in the field (who are responsible to the Area Coordinator of the area to which they are assigned). Included in the responsibilities of this branch are: Planning and monitoring of actions to provide initial emergency relief to refugees as they are initially displaced; implementation of requirements for refugee censuses; determination of overall initial commodity requirements, including medical supplies; coordination of logistics requirements, and preparation of requests for transportation of commodities; monitoring of refugee supplies (1) when received from Supply Management Branch and stored in RLG facilities, (2) when issued to Transportation Branch for surface or air transport to refugee sites, and (3) through reports from field operations officers, end-use and receipt of commodities by refugees.

2. The Refugee Affairs Administrative Branch (RAA) is responsible to AD/RA for programming preparation, record-keeping, organization, monitoring and serving as a central repository of *all* information relative to refugee affairs including information furnished by other elements of the Mission. It conducts a running evaluation of conditions of refugee groups assisted and keeps AD/RA informed as to problems, progress and potential for phase-out of assistance.

3. The Refugee Relocation Branch (RRL) plans, monitors, backstops, and provides necessary liaison with other Mission elements to assure implementation of steps designated as second and third priorities. It assists the Administrative Branch in assuring documentation, reporting and records relative to this phase of refugee relief operations.

4. The Food for Peace Branch (FFP) will program and monitor the implementation of PL-480 commodities. Responsibility for receipt and issue of PL-480 commodities, however, will remain with SMB until such time as issue is made to RLG or USAID offices, which then assume responsibility through end-use.

D. Personnel

1. Personnel of FO are unchanged.

2. Personnel of the Community Development Branch are unchanged.

3. Mr. John W. MacQueen is designated Assistant Director for Refugee Affairs.

a. Mr. Jack Williamson is designated Refugee Affairs Officer.

b. Mr. Robert Dakan is designated Refugee Relief Officer. He is assisted by two Assistant Refugee Relief Officers.

c. Mr. Fred Luning is designated Refugee Administrative Officer. He is assisted by Mr. Frederick Benson.

d. Mr. Roger S. Sprowls is Food for Peace Officer.

e. Mr. Hugh Brady is Refugee Relocation Officer. He is assisted by a Refugee Education Advisor, a Refugee Agriculture Advisor, a Refugee Public Works Advisor, and a Refugee Health Advisor, to be designated subsequently.

4. The Community Development Branch is transferred in its entirety to the Office of Field Operations and is redesignated Community Development Staff. Implementation of Rural Self-Help activities is the responsibility of the Assistant Director for Field Operations, in addition to his present duties, which are unchanged.

AID COMMENTS ON GAO REPORT ENTITLED "THE CIVILIAN HEALTH AND WAR CASUALTY
PROGRAM IN LAOS"

(The GAO findings and conclusions presented below with our comments are drawn from the GAO "Digest.")

1. GAO

"USAID has had to subordinate the development of long-range public health institutions and training of manpower under this project in view of the war in Laos."

Comments

The war has certainly inhibited public health development. Nevertheless, considerable development has been accomplished under the USAID Public Health Project, which includes the Village Health Program and the Operation Brotherhood (OB) activity. The Village Health Program has been responsible for the construction and operation of hospitals, dispensaries and training facilities throughout Laos, operation of a medical warehouse, in-country and third-country training of medics, practical nurses, and other technical public health personnel. The Operation Brotherhood Activity has developed and operated seven hospitals throughout Laos and has conducted training to facilitate replacement of OB personnel by Lao and integration of the OB program into the RLG national health system.

Since 1965, USAID has sponsored training for over 1,336 Lao personnel in public health fields. The trainees have become laboratory, medical, and sanitation technicians, hospital administrative personnel and in some cases doctors or doctors' assistants. Most of the training has been done in Laos, to utilize the environment in which the trainees must utilize their new skills and knowledge. When this has not been feasible, the training has most often been done in Thailand in order to take advantage of an environment similar to that in Laos.

In addition, USAID in 1969 established a Maternal and Child Health Project which aims to improve the well-being of the Lao people by better health care of mothers and infants and by introducing family planning techniques. A national maternal-child health center is being established in Vientiane, 5 provincial centers are being constructed, and 10 rural centers are being renovated, to provide medical care, training and dissemination of information and commodities in the fields of maternal and child health and family planning. The RLG is supplying staff for these facilities; UNICEF and WHO are providing teachers of nurses and midwives, and USAID is sponsoring technical training for Lao in both medical and administrative support fields.

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Comments

AID financing of some of the costs in question was terminated during FY 1971. Effective at the beginning of FY 1972, AID will no longer fund any of the costs in question.

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"AID's management seemed less than adequate in consideration of the relatively high priority assigned to these projects. The Public Health Division was generally reacting to the exigencies of the situation and there was little emphasis placed on development of long-range plans related to civilian war casualties."

Comments

One of the primary responsibilities of the Public Health Division is to react to the "exigencies of the situation." However, within the limitation imposed by the difficulty of predicting enemy actions and the refugee health needs that may result, long-range planning is done. In the latter part of 1970, for example, the Mission undertook a substantial increase in the bed capacity of two hospitals in MR II, at Ban Xon (Site 272) and Sam Thong and of the hospital at nearby Vang Vieng in MR V, on the likelihood of increased refugee requirements which did materialize. The increase in capacity has totaled 100 beds and another increase of 100 beds in being made, which will raise the total bed capacity in MR II and at Vang Vieng to 450.

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"During GAO's fieldwork in Laos, it was noted that the many crises arising from the war (such as the destruction of the Sam Thong hospital) kept top management fully occupied and precluded any substantive development of long range plans. Management officials felt that the recent authorization of another administrative position would alleviate the situation somewhat."

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Since February 1970 the Public Health Division has been increased by one Administrative Officer, one Public Health Physician position (nominee being processed), and two Maternal and Child Health staff members. The Public Health Division is now authorized 14 U.S. employees, of whom 13 are on board plus two MCH staff.

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"GAO representatives visited four of the seven Operation Brotherhood hospitals in Laos. Although these hospitals were above average, compared with other medical facilities visited in Laos, they generally had to care for more patients than the hospitals were designed to handle, and sanitary conditions seemed substandard. Patients were allowed to wear dirty street clothes, and bath rooms were generally lacking."

Comments

Like many hospitals in the U.S. today, hospitals in Laos generally have far more patients than they were designed to handle. This is the lesser of two evils; the greater would be to refuse treatment to the "excess" people. However, facilities are being expanded and improved all the time.

A continuing effort is made to maintain acceptable sanitary conditions in all USAID-supported medical facilities. This is a particularly challenging problem when faced with such things as overcrowding and local custom which permits families to remain constantly with patients. In Operation Brotherhood hospitals, bed patients are in many cases issued robes and pajamas. Ambulatory patients wear street clothes.

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Within the past year the Mission has considerably improved its monthly reporting of public health statistics, with an average of about 95 percent of USAID-supported dispensaries and hospitals now providing reasonably reliable information on the nature and number of patients, including civilian casualties,

treated. Although not separately identified, information on casualties dead on arrival or who die while undergoing treatment is included in the above statistics. The report is quite correct, however, in stating that no data are included on persons who are wounded but do not seek medical attention.

Our Mission reports that RLG hospitals and dispensaries not assisted by the U.S. maintain their statistics in accordance with the WHO international statistical classification format which does not differentiate between civilian and military patients and between war-connected and other injuries and deaths. The RLG does not require these installations to report war casualties as such on a regular basis. The RLG report system includes about 40 RLG dispensaries in areas with little or no military conflict or refugee problem.

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"GAO's inquiry into the extent of mortality among all refugees in Laos showed that reports on refugee mortality were incomplete. USAID had established maximum mortality levels for Lao refugees which, if exceeded, called for special remedial measures. GAO found, however, that corrective action was not initiated by USAID even when these levels were exceeded."

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The USAID management and public health staff take very seriously the need to assess and minimize refugee mortality rates. This is a continuing effort, but is easily complicated and temporarily frustrated by such things as communications breakdowns, insecurity, reporting snafus, etc.—all conditions common to underdeveloped countries and to wartime. USAID, of course, cannot take action in those cases where it is not aware of a need to act. In those cases where it is informed of a need, USAID takes all practicable corrective actions. Generally speaking, the mortality rate for refugees is well within acceptable norms.

What the GAO refers to as the USAID "maximum mortality level" is a rule of thumb death rate of one per day per 13,000 population derived from the normal life expectancy of 35 years (or about 13,000 days) throughout Laos.

The examples cited in the report, three villages with deaths far greater than the USAID rule of thumb "mortality rate" would seem to allow, are derived from single month figures and must be considered in that light. Figures taken for other villages in the same month or for these villages in other months would show entirely different results. For example, Na Nga, one of the three villages, in both April and December 1970 had no deaths, yielding a "mortality rate" of zero. In these three examples, the Mission had not been informed by the RLG of the excessive number of deaths until after the fact. Had it been informed in time, as is usually the case, it would have taken immediate and appropriate action to determine and eliminate the cause of the deaths.

A more meaningful reference to the USAID "mortality rate" could have been made by applying it to the 22,000 refugees on the Vientiane Plain who, from March through December 1970, suffered 329 deaths. Using the above rule of thumb death rate as a guideline, there should have been about 515 deaths among this group in this period. The lesser figure of 329 was therefore well within acceptable norms for Laos.

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Comments

This is a generalized statement of specific GAO points presented below with our comments on each.

2. GAO

"The Bangkok Operations Branch of USAID had approved for payment transportation billings submitted by the Express Transportation Organization, a

Thai Government entity, without documentation that refugee commodities had been received in Laos."

Comments

Payment to ETO by the Bangkok Operations Office is based on a signed Shipping and Receiving Report accompanying each invoice as evidence that the cargo was delivered to Thanaleng (Port of Entry for Laos). These payments are in accord with standard commercial practices relative to the payment of transportation invoices. At Thanaleng ETO delivers the cargo to Societe de Gestion et d'Outillage Public de la Province de Vientiane (SOGOV—a Lao Government controlled firm operating the in-transit customs warehouse) where it is, in turn, picked up by the Lao Transport Association for delivery to USAID. In every instance cited by the GAO, ETO produced receipts to prove it had performed the transportation service before payment was made.

The above procedure applies to approximately 90% of all ETO shipments. The other 10% consists of cargo which, for one reason or another, cannot be conveniently off-loaded and reloaded at Thanaleng and which the Royal Lao Government permits to be transported directly to receiving warehouses by the Thai trucks after clearing customs. These shipments are received, checked and signed for by USAID personnel and the Mission knows of no deficiencies in accounting for transportation services performed.

3. GAO

"Regarding shipments made by a second transportation company, Ear Peng Chiang, the GAO noted: 'Many of the commodities shipped with this carrier were signed for by employees of a USAID contractor and the Royal Laotian Government.' GAO observed some weaknesses in the receiving operation, including the use of inexperienced students and lack of signature authorization procedures."

Comments

The USAID Supply Management Branch (SMB) has taken over the receipt of all refugee relief commodities. Third Country National (TCN) personnel receiving commodities work in the SMB Supply Warehouse Section under American supervision.

Stock control records are maintained for all non-bulk items and all issues are via Supply Requisition/Issue and Return Document (Lao Form 203). The bulk commodities, rice, salt, etc., are handled differently after receipt by SMB since they are never actually stored for long periods but pass through KM-4 and Wattay Warehouses in transit to the refugee sites. The normal period for holding rice in Vientiane before transshipment is 24 to 48 hours. SMB monitors all shipments between KM-4 and Wattay Warehouses. A daily summary in and out record book is maintained and the balances on hand are verified by evening floor counts.

Signature cards are being obtained from all stations for those personnel authorized to receive refugee commodities. A set of these cards is maintained both at SMB/Vientiane and at the Bangkok Operations Office.

4. GAO

"On the basis of very limited tests, GAO found unexplained shortages amounting to about \$109,000 worth of commodities shipped with the two companies identified above. GAO was not able to determine whether any of these commodities were diverted to private use. After GAO's field review was completed, USAID informed GAO that receiving documents were found to account for most of the shortages."

Comments

The following are the specific shortages found by the GAO and the results of further USAID action thereon:

(1) The GAO states (p. 8) that: "Records at USAID/Laos showed that, of 39,250 bags of Public Law 480, Title II cornmeal, shipped from Bangkok during the period January through June 1970, only 37,515 were received, a shortage of 1,735 bags."

As footnoted in the GAO report (p. 8), USAID subsequently located documents accounting for all but 10 bags. It later found that another 10 bags could not be accounted for. It has submitted a claim on the missing 20 bags.

(2) The GAO states (p. 8) that: "Records at the medical warehouse showed that, of 74,985 pounds of milk products shipped to Vientiane in May 1970, only 56,760 were received, a shortage of 18,225 pounds."

The apparent shortage resulted from the misdirection of three conex containers. These were received subsequent to the shipment mentioned by the GAO and with their arrival receipt of the entire shipment was accounted for.

(3) The GAO states (p. 8) that: "Records at USAID/Laos showed that, of 8,993 cases of Singapore canned beef shipped from Bangkok to Laos during the period March through June 1970, only 6,085 cases were received, a shortage of 2,908 cases."

As footnoted in the GAO report (p. 8), all but 29 cases were subsequently accounted for. Later findings reduced the missing quantity to 25 cases plus 23 cans. A claim was filed on the missing quantity.

(4) The GAO states (p. 9) that it examined into "shipments of 2,174,400 cans of buffalo beef sent to Laos over a 6 month period in fiscal year 1970" and "found that USAID could not account for receipt of 312,960 cans, valued at about \$63,000."

As footnoted in the GAO report (p. 9), USAID subsequently located documents accounting for all but 176 cans of buffalo beef. It later accounted for the receipt of another 80 cans, reducing the number of unlocated cans to 96. A claim was filed on the missing quantity.

(5) The GAO states (p. 10): "We found that shipments of steel bars and axes could not be accounted for as having been received in Laos, although Ear Peng Chiang had been paid for shipping them."

This matter was explained to GAO representatives by the Bangkok Operations Office. The steel bars and axes were shipped in mixed loads, part of which were signed for on the manifest at the SMB Thong Thoun Warehouse, Vientiane, with the axes and bars deleted. The balance of the shipment was signed for at the Refugee Relief That Khao Warehouse on a separate receiving report. Both documents were shown to the GAO representatives.

5. GAO

"A USAID internal audit report dated August 1969 stated that USAID controls over receipts of bulk commodities were weak and that rice inspection services did not conform to requirements of the contracts. The report showed that rice quantity and quality certifications were made at the shipping sources in Thailand rather than at the delivery points in Laos. The report showed also that no count of rice was made at the receiving warehouse in Laos."

Comments

The USAID Supply Management Branch is verifying the quantities of all Thai rice received as an integral part of its receiving function. Quality is guaranteed by the Royal Thai Government under the terms of USAID contracts. In addition, International Inspection and Testing Corporation (INTECO) is now inspecting refugee commodities at the Lao point of receipt.

Regarding control over receipt of bulk commodities, see 3, above, and 6, below.

6. GAO

"GAO does not know what improvements, if any, were made after issuance of the USAID report. GAO can only conclude, on the basis of its own review, that weaknesses in the controls over receipts of refugee supplies still exist and that there is a need for USAID to restudy its operation and make improvements."

Comments

Effective August 13, 1970, as outlined in USAID/Laos Action Memo 71-02 of that date (incorporated in the GAO Report as Appendix II), the Supply Management Branch (SMB) took over the receipt of all refugee commodities at the principal warehouses (KM-4, Wattay Airport and Thong Thoun), and accounting and control procedures were tightened up. In October 1970, SMB was assigned the responsibility for the receipt of all refugee relief commodities, and also for their inspection, storage and issuance. A special warehouse unit was established in the SMB Supply Warehouse Section to deal with refugee relief commodities. Further, since the GAO report three additional Third Country Nationals (TCN's) have been recruited to deal with the receipt, storage, inspection and issuance of bulk refugee relief food commodities at Wattay Airport and KM-4 warehouses and at a large warehouse newly rented in November 1970. As stated under 3, above, the TCN's work under American supervision. In addition, another American employee is being hired for SMB work in this field under a personal services contract.

7. GAO

"GAO's review showed that USAID was not processing most claims against carriers for shortages or damages incurred in transit. GAO observed weaknesses in internal control, both in evaluating losses or damages and in not processing potential claims against carriers, among the responsible organizational elements of USAID."

Comments

In instances where shortages or damages are noted but claims are not filed, this is due to the minor amounts involved. The "rule of thumb" in deciding which shortages and/or damages are significant is \$15 or over. Appropriate claims are then filed accordingly.

The Supply Management Branch in conjunction with the Office of Refugee Affairs (ORA) and the Bangkok Operations Office (BOO) investigated the shortages mentioned by the GAO and filed claims against the transportation companies on the quantities found to be missing. Five additional claims, for a total value of about \$270, have been filed on missing commodities since the Supply Management Branch took over the receipt, storage, and issuance of refugee relief commodities in October 1970.

The GAO notes (p. 12) that as of July 31, 1970 the Mission had not collected on a claim for \$239 against the transportation of certain medical equipment that had been lost. This was correct, but after an additional Mission effort (November 1970) to collect this amount was unsuccessful, the amount was deducted from the transporter's subsequent billing.

8. GAO

"USAID pays about \$56 more per 10-ton truckload for cargo moved from Bangkok to Vientiane by the Express Transportation Organization than for cargo transported by Ear Peng Chiang."

Comments

As the GAO report recognizes elsewhere, the Express Transportation Organization is a Thai Government corporation having the sole authority to transport international cargo off-loaded in Thailand to the Lao border. It is correct that the Mission obtains lower rates from Ear Peng Chiang, with whom it contracts for transporting to Laos commodities bought in Thailand. The ETO rates, however, have been reduced four times over the past eleven years; they are now about 20 percent less than they were prior to June 1, 1960. We are hopeful that further reductions can be achieved. The Joint Lao-Thai Committee for Economic Cooperation, which held its first meetings in 1970 and in concerning itself with transportation matters among others, may be helpful in this regard.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT,
Washington, D.C., May 25, 1971.

HON. EDWARD M. KENNEDY,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Refugees, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: We have now completed our review of the GAO Reports you sent us on our Refugee and Health Programs in Vietnam. Our detailed comments are presented in the attachments to this letter.

In your letter dated February 11, 1971 to me, you noted that the GAO Reports spoke of a deteriorating situation in which the victims of the war have found themselves. I would like to take this opportunity to supplement the comments in the attachments on this particular issue.

No one can or will deny that the conflict in Vietnam has brought great human suffering to the people of Vietnam. Since 1964, over five million people, or nearly one-third of the total population, have become refugees or suffered damage to life, limb, and property. This occurred at a time when the human and material resources of the country, already strained by twenty years of war, were taxed to the limit by the rapid escalation of internal conflict and external aggression. With the national economy disrupted by the demands of the war, with a disproportionate amount of the national budget required for purposes of defense, with the buildup to more than one million men under arms—not counting the People's Self Defense Force and the National Police—and with no tradition of institutionalized relief and social welfare services to build upon, the GVN Min-

istry of Social Welfare had to start from scratch creating the machinery to scope with the massive influx of refugees and other war victims. Its weak and largely inexperienced organization was overwhelmed and disrupted time and time again, first by almost a million new refugees in 1967 and 1968, next by over a million victims of the VC/NVA Tet offensive in 1968, then by over 200,000 repatriates from Cambodia in the summer of 1970, and again by over 300,000 flood victims in the Northern provinces in the fall of 1970.

Under these circumstances, it is remarkable that the Ministry managed since 1967 to distribute benefits of one kind or another to 5.9 million persons, made some progress toward upgrading more than 800 refugee sites, improving the infrastructure of the hamlets to which the refugees have returned, and largely re-establish the repatriates from Cambodia into normal living conditions.

To all this, A.I.D. technical assistance and financial support have made substantial contributions. Counting only direct dollar inputs by A.I.D.'s Vietnam Bureau, the value of PL-480—Title II commodities and the dollar equivalents of counterpart funds generated by the Commodity Import Program and made available to the GVN Ministry of Social Welfare, A.I.D. has spent between 1967 and now more than a quarter of a billion dollars in support of refugee and social welfare programs in Vietnam.

I don't intend to attempt to convey the notion that everything that could be done for refugees has been done. I do, however, hope that the performance of both A.I.D. and the GVN can be measured in terms of what is possible within the constraints imposed by an unconventional wartime situation. I fully understand and appreciate the fact that the GAO auditors were working under a time limitation which afforded them no opportunity to attempt to evaluate the positive achievements which have been registered.

I trust you will find the attachments responsive. Please be assured that we do appreciate the very helpful advice and suggestions that have come from your Subcommittee and the GAO. Evaluations of our assistance programs by external sources are always welcome, particularly in this case in which we share the common humanitarian objective of seeking ways to prevent avoidable war-induced suffering and insecurity.

Sincerely yours,

MAURICE WILLIAMS,
(For John A. Hannah.)

AID COMMENTS ON GAO REPORT ENTITLED "CONTINUING DIFFICULTIES
IN ASSISTING WAR VICTIMS IN VIETNAM"

(The GAO findings and conclusions quoted below are drawn from the GAO Digest.)

1. Program Management—GAO

"Although some changes have taken place in the roles of the Government of Vietnam and the United States, overall program management remains in the hands of the Government of Vietnam; advice is provided by American personnel."

Comments

Unlike other GAO Reports, this one is essentially an examination into the operations of a foreign government, the Government of Vietnam. The refugee and other welfare programs in Vietnam are administered by the GVN Ministry of Social Welfare under the direction of the Prime Minister. In program management the role of the U.S. Government is limited to that of advisors to the Ministry and its provincial services. The Ministry establishes the level of benefits, determines the location of, and manages camps and institutions, allocates with USG concurrence the counterpart funds made available from the American Aid Chapter and the Special Fund, and disburses these funds. The only leverage the U.S. Government has is through the financial support it gives to these programs and the technical advice given by American officials to the officials of the GVN—the power of the pursestring and the power of persuasion. Most of the difficulties discussed in this report can, therefore, be resolved only by the GVN.

It is notable, however, that contrary to earlier reports this GAO Report does not contain any charges of misuse or diversion of funds or commodities by the GVN or of any failure on the part of the American advisors to perform their functions properly.

The principal criticisms contained in the report—the recognition of new refugees, the inadequacies of the statistics, the failure to develop social welfare programs in general and programs for the urban areas in particular, the inadequacies of some of the camp sites and of the hamlets to which the refugees have returned, and the delay in the delivery of the benefits to which the refugees are entitled, are directed at the Government of Vietnam, not against the Agency for International Development.

The questions raised about the generation of new refugees by American and allied military actions, are rooted in problems of military strategy and tactics, over which AID has no control.

Since 1968, the relationship between the Ministry of Social Welfare and the CORDS/Refugee Directorate (now the War Victims Directorate), has undergone far reaching changes. As the experience of the Ministry increased and its staff grew in both numbers and competence, it has become more and more independent and self-reliant. This is as it should be. Any reassertion of greater American control would be contrary to the President's policy of Vietnamization.

Meanwhile, critics of shortcomings need to bear in mind that as long as the war continues, the GVN efforts to improve the welfare of the war victims will remain severely limited by security conditions in the countryside and shortages of manpower, material and funds.

2. *Priority Accorded to Refugee Relief—GAO*

"Neither the United States nor the Government of Vietnam has established priorities for U.S. assistance programs. The primary emphasis during 1965-69 was on providing emergency relief in the form of resettlement allowances and temporary homes to the estimated 3.5 million refugees while the needs of other war victims such as widows, orphans, and the handicapped received less attention. Likewise, development of the sites in which refugees and former refugees are located has not received much attention."

Comments

The GAO is correct in pointing out that from 1965 to 1969 the GVN placed primary emphasis on providing emergency relief to the refugees. Considering the limitations of their capability mentioned above, this is again as it should have been. During 1968, normal refugee relief operations had come to a virtual standstill because of the Tet and May offensives and their aftermath. Throughout 1969 and deep in 1970 the Ministry concentrated on delivering the benefits it had promised the refugees and which it had not been able to deliver, in many instances, for as much as a year or even two. It succeeded in accomplishing this task to a large extent. In 1969 and 1970 it distributed refugee and war victims benefits to more than 2½ million persons even though normal operations were once again disrupted by the emergency created by the flight of more than 200,000 ethnic Vietnamese from Cambodia to Vietnam in the Summer of 1970, and by the floods in the Northern provinces which made over 300,000 persons homeless.

It is not correct to say that neither the U.S. Government nor the GVN has established priorities for U.S. assistance programs. Both the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan and the 1971 Community Defense and Development Plan clearly establish the upgrading of campsites which must continue to be used and the improvement of the hamlets to which the refugees have returned as the two highest priorities in the overall war victims program.

3. (a) *Reporting System—GAO*

"Since February 1968 the refugee reporting system has undergone three major revisions, but the information being reported is still conflicting, confusing and inconsistent, in part because it is compiled by untrained personnel. Reliability of the reported data should be improved."

Comments

The GAO Report states correctly that CORDS and MSW are now using the fourth reporting system since 1968, and a fifth one is now in process of preparation.

Designed originally as a statistical system to count monthly the number of refugees by province, Corps and nationwide to obtain a running record of the magnitude of the refugee problem, the reporting systems have been gradually converted into a management tool to guide the decisions of American and Vietnamese officials concerning the deployment of personnel and material resources and to measure and monitor program performances. In the process, the systems have become steadily more complex and voluminous. As the classification of

refugees and other war victims, the variety and flexibility of benefit claims, the classification of refugee sites and the classification of claimants who had received all benefits to which they were entitled were steadily refined, the difficulties of reporting data accurately increased also, aggravated by the constant high mobility of the refugee population and the continuing hazards of security which from time to time impede access to places where refugees are located.

Despite all this, the quality and quantity of data has improved steadily, but it is unreasonable to assume that counting and classifying a volatile population of several million in over 850 different locations in the midst of wartime conditions can ever achieve the degree of accuracy to which auditors are accustomed.

CORDS and the Ministry are continuing their efforts to produce data which is essential for managing and monitoring all aspects of the refugee and social welfare programs. However, since these reports must be produced by the same people who carry the full burden of responsibility for operations, both the Ministry and CORDS must guard against the danger of imposing accuracy requirements which demand a disproportionate amount of the time of the operating officials.

3. (b) *Number of War Victims*

"During 1969 the number of refugees declined from a high of over 1.4 million in February to a low of 268,000 in December. This decrease is misleading because of:

A reluctance by the Government of Vietnam to report new refugees,

A policy of claiming refugees as resettled on the basis of payment of allowances even though many of these people need more help,

An apparent misinterpretation by Vietnamese officials which resulted in refugees being classified as returned to their original village or resettled when the Government of Vietnam only promised to pay allowances,

A policy of classifying refugees as returned to their original village and presumably self-sufficient when, in fact, many of them still cannot earn a living, and

A policy of removing from the rolls refugees living outside of camps who have received their temporary allowances, which terminate benefits until such time as they are able to return to their original villages.

"Other persons have suffered because of the war and are in need of assistance—war widows, orphans, and the physically disabled. The actual number in these categories is not known. There are, however, an estimated 258,000 orphans, 131,000 war widows, and 183,000 disabled persons. Some assistance had been provided these people by the Government of Vietnam."

Comments

While we agree that the statistical reports have been a source of confusion, we find it unfortunate that this GAO Report, like earlier ones, has again given undue emphasis to the importance of numbers. No less than 18 of the 39 substantive pages of the text are given over to a critique of the refugee statistics. Preoccupation with questions of statistical definitions and measurements of progress should not be allowed to obscure the basic fact, important in human and political terms, that very substantial progress has been made, through the dedicated efforts of Vietnamese and U.S. personnel, in meeting the needs of vast numbers of people.

Much of the controversy over the number of refugees stems from a misinterpretation of the figures on which it is based. It has its origin in the fact that the *cumulative total* of refugees and the *current total* of refugees are frequently confused.

The "*cumulative total*" is the number of persons who since the beginning of an organized, identifiable refugee program have been officially recognized by the MSW and its predecessor agency, the Commissariat for Refugees, as refugees, or who, to express it differently, have been on the government's refugee rolls at one time or another.

Estimates of the *cumulative total* vary depending on what categories of war victims are included. However, there is now general agreement that since 1964 approximately 3½ million persons have been, at one time or another on the refugee rolls. By adding to the officially recognized refugees other categories of "war victims" like the one million persons displaced temporarily by the 1968 Tet and May offensives, the repatriates from Cambodia, and the persons entitled to various forms of compensation because of war related damages to life, limbs, and property, the cumulative total of refugees and war victims reaches 5.3 million persons.

The current total of refugees consists of those persons who are, at any given time, on the refugee rolls (in the "Active Caseload"). They are the persons who have not yet received all the benefits (temporary benefits, resettlement benefits, return-to-village benefits, and war victim benefits) to which they are entitled. This total fluctuates from month to month, depending on how many new refugees and war victims are added to the rolls, and how many are removed after they have received all benefits. On 31 December 1970, this figure stood at 428,000 refugees and 70,000 war victims.

As to the much criticized drastic reduction in the current total from 1.4 million in February to 270,000 in December 1969, the explanation lies in part in the fact that during this period those who had received previously or received at that time all the benefits to which they were entitled were dropped from the active rolls. Unfortunately, both CORDS and AID/Washington failed at the time to explain properly these statistical adjustments. The Government of Vietnam did not claim, as the report charges, "that refugees had been resettled on the basis of payment of allowances even though many of these people need more help." Unfortunately, the statistical summaries prepared by CORDS reported those who had received resettlement benefits under the abbreviated column heading "resettled." This has since been corrected. The removal from the rolls of large numbers of refugees living outside of camps, which accounted for another part of the reduction in the active caseload, was justified because most of these persons are in fact self-resettled and are as well, and sometimes even better off than their neighbors, and are economically self-sufficient. They remain eligible for full return-to-village benefits if and when they return to their original hamlets.

4. Refugees from Cambodia—GAO

"About 159,000 persons had left Cambodia as of July 1970 to seek refugee in South Vietnam—10,000 Cambodian refugees and 149,000 Vietnamese repatriates. They are not recognized as Vietnam refugees but are reported separately as refugees from Cambodia."

Comments

According to the latest available information, a total of approximately 210,000 ethnic Vietnamese have fled from Cambodia to Vietnam since March 1970. By March 1971, 155,000 had been paid self-resettlement allowances and have melted into the population. Another 55,000 are currently participating in GVN group resettlement projects, most of which are succeeding very well.

There are no reports of any ethnic Vietnamese returning to Cambodia. However, approximately 3,000 ethnic Cambodians and Cambodian Montagnards have returned to that country from Vietnam.

As of February 1971 the GVN had allocated VN\$587 million and expended VN\$350 million for Temporary Relief and Resettlement of the Cambodian Repatriates. The amount of VN\$600 million was transferred from the CORDS Special Fund to the Ministry's American Aid Chapter to replace the funds used for relief for the Cambodian repatriates.

The integration of the repatriates has been greatly facilitated by the fact that many of them are from urban areas and have skills which can be readily utilized in the Vietnamese economy. Nevertheless, the quick response of the GVN in meeting the needs of such a large number of new arrivals, while maintaining relief assistance to the active case load of in-country refugees is a striking accomplishment in the field of social welfare which is not likely to be matched by other developing countries in peacetime—much less in time of war.

5. War Victims in Urban Areas—GAO

"The number of persons seeking refuge in urban areas (primarily Saigon) is unknown but is estimated at one million. Because of high employment most people find jobs; however, these jobs are usually dependent on the presence of U.S. troops. The unemployed in the urban areas receive no assistance from the Government of Vietnam or the Agency for International Development and are dependent on relatives and voluntary agencies. An estimated 600,000 people are dependent upon the presence of U.S. troops but no plans have been formulated to deal with these people when the troops withdraw. The United States and the Government of Vietnam anticipate that most of these people will want to return to their original homes."

Comments

It is estimated that approximately one million persons have moved from rural

to urban areas since 1965 either to seek refuge or more advantageous employment opportunities. It is difficult to distinguish between the influx associated with the characteristic "urban drift" which is a world-wide phenomenon and that attributable to insecurity in the countryside.

At the very beginning of the refugee program the GVN adopted a policy designed to discourage further overcrowding in congested cities and to facilitate return of refugees to their own villages as soon as possible by not registering as refugees persons who moved into urban areas on their own initiative.

In 1968, as security improved, the GVN initiated return-to-village benefits payable to registered refugees and other displaced persons who were forced to flee from their villages but were never registered as refugees. Among the hundreds of thousands who have returned to their villages and received RTV benefits since 1968, a substantial number were persons not previously registered as refugees who returned from urban areas.

Although unemployment has not surfaced as an urban problem to date, it is recognize that reduction in the American presence both military and civilian, will entail a period of economic readjustment. This will in part be offset by the inducements or improved economic opportunities in rural areas particularly for unskilled workers once post-war development gets underway. In addition to entitlement to return-to-village benefits, land reform, improved agricultural systems, the village self-development program and other plans still on the drawing board for new land development will assist significant numbers to return to farming under more promising circumstances than before.

It is not possible to estimate the proportion of the persons now in urban areas who will remain regardless of economic or other hardship. To date, detailed plans have not been formulated to deal with accompanying urban problems. However, the GVN has taken steps to improve the environmental situation of all city dwellers such as housing, sanitation, creation of urban cadres to assist in local community efforts. These steps are as yet insufficient and a new office has been established within the U.S. Mission to assist the GVN and municipal authorities in more adequate planning for urban development. The MSW through grants to Vietnamese voluntary organizations is encouraging their efforts to assist with the problems of war victims in urban areas.

6. *Status of Site Facilities—GAO*

"There is still a considerable shortage of facilities—needed by war victims—such as housing, classrooms, wells, medical and sanitation facilities, and many of those that exist are inadequate."

Comments

The GAO states correctly that many of the refugee sites which are still in use and which will continue to be used for some time to come are seriously defective in one respect or another. Many such sites will continue in use either because the occupants cannot yet return to their original villages for lack of security, or because the occupants do not wish to leave at the present time due to the fact that their present, albeit inadequate, location offers them opportunities to support themselves which they think are better than what they can find elsewhere.

Upgrading of existing sites has not received the attention which was contemplated earlier, because the MSW, understandably and properly, gave first priority to the massive distribution of the basic benefits to which the refugees are entitled and whose distribution had fallen behind every time the Ministry's regular program was interrupted by some sudden emergency.

Nevertheless, much work was done in this area in 1970. The attached tabulation of "Statistics on Development Projects carried out from January 1, 1970 to December 31, 1970" shows that the Ministry allocated VN\$171.3 million and expended VN\$121.4 million for 350 classrooms, 30 Maternity Dispensaries, 183 self-help projects and the conduct of 170 vocational training classes.

The GVN's 1971 "Self Defense and Community Development Plan" has assigned a high priority to the upgrading of existing sites. At the end of 1970, 354 out of the 804 refugee sites were reported as being defective in one respect or another. CORDS and MSW have now singled out for priority attention those sites which are most in need of improvement, are likely to remain in use for some time to come and which are economically sufficiently viable to justify the investment of improvement funds.

7. *Correlation between Refugees Resettled and Amount of Resettlement Funds Expended—GAO*

"GAO was not able to correlate spending with the number of refugees reported as resettled or returned home because (1) the number of refugees reported to

be resettled was not accurate and (2) refugees living in temporary camps, and scheduled for transfer into resettlement sites, did not receive monetary housing allowance if housing was provided."

Comments

The report correctly states that it is not possible to correlate the increases or decreases in the number of refugees resettled and the increase or decrease in allowances paid. This is due to the nature of the variable involved. In the first place, the number of refugees to be counted in such correlations poses some difficulty considering that (1) refugees living outside of camps who have received temporary allowances and are in fact resettled receive no resettlement benefits and are taken off the active rolls until such time as they may return to their original village when they become entitled to full return-to-village benefits; and (2) there may be duplications in reporting of resettled refugees who subsequently return to their villages.

The main factor, however, making precise correlation impossible stems from the fact that some payments are made not in money but in kind, and additionally most are made in installments which overlap the beginnings and ends of fiscal years. Thus a simple division of number of people into a sum of money expended in a certain time would not reliably indicate the expenditure per refugee.

8. Piaster Fund Releases by Ministry of Social Welfare—GAO

"Slow spending continues to be a problem in the refugee and social welfare program. As a result many refugees vacated controlled areas and returned to Viet Cong areas.

During the first 5 months of 1970, only 12 percent of the resettlement fund and 1 percent of the special welfare fund had been spent. During 1969—the first-year funds were provided for comprehensive social welfare—only 6 percent was used. Of the remaining funds, 28 percent were never spent and 66 percent were authorized for 1970 spending or transferred to other projects."

Comments

The GAO correctly reports slow expenditures of refugee resettlement funds in the first half of 1969 and in the first five months of 1970. They also correctly report that by the end of 1969, 94 percent of the funds budgeted for this purpose had been expended. By the end of 1970, 73 percent of funds budgeted for temporary relief and war victims, and 91 percent of funds budgeted for resettlement and return-to-village benefits had been expended. The disastrous floods in Region I during the autumn of 1970 causing displacement of 300,000 persons and necessitating concentration of efforts upon providing disaster relief were a major factor delaying both expenditures for refugee resettlement and return-to-village benefits and implementation of development projects to upgrade resettlement sites.

Nevertheless, the rate of spending for these programs is a problem and continues to receive attention by the U.S. Mission and MSW. The GVN procedures for release and expenditure of funds is complicated and not well adapted to emergency conditions. Changes in these procedures to increase flexibility are taking place. Resettlement, as other expenditures, however, always increase in the last half of the year. The slow start in the first months is basically caused by fiscal complexities at national and provincial levels largely beyond controls of a single Ministry.

After an intensive investigation, the Mission finds no evidence to substantiate the GAO statement that as a result of slow disbursement of resettlement benefits in Region IV "many refugees vacated controlled areas and returned to Viet Cong areas".

As regards assistance to the GVN social welfare program, the GAO correctly reports that counterpart funds for social welfare activities were first provided in 1969 and that slow spending of these funds continues to be a problem. However, of the VN \$96,440,000 budgeted for the social welfare program in 1970, 99 percent was obligated by the end of the year.

The factors contributing to the slow development of a basic social welfare program by the MSW simultaneously with meeting the overwhelming demands of massive refugee needs are correctly reported by the GAO. With the dramatic changes in the refugee situation, more attention is now being focused upon social welfare training to strengthen the capability of GVN personnel at ministerial and province levels to upgrade and further develop social welfare programs particularly for widows, orphans and disabled war victims. The MSW

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Nevertheless, much work was done in this area in 1970. The attached tabulation of "Statistics on Development Projects carried out from January 1, 1970 to December 31, 1970" shows that the Ministry allocated VN\$171.3 million and expended VN\$121.4 million for 350 classrooms, 30 Maternity Dispensaries, 183 self-help projects and the conduct of 170 vocational training classes.

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The factors contributing to the slow development of a basic social welfare program by the MSW simultaneously with meeting the overwhelming demands of massive refugee needs are correctly reported by the GAO. With the dramatic changes in the refugee situation, more attention is now being focused upon social welfare training to strengthen the capability of GVN personnel at ministerial and province levels to upgrade and further develop social welfare programs particularly for widows, orphans and disabled war victims. The MSW

recognizes the importance of initiating plans and establishing the framework for a comprehensive social reconstruction and rehabilitation program. The GAO Report fails to make any reference to the fact that the Western concept of government responsibility for social welfare was virtually unknown in Vietnam until a few years ago. It will probably take several years before a system of public social welfare services and institutions can be developed in Vietnam.

9. U.S. Commodity Support—GAO

"The United States contributed food during fiscal years 1968, 1969, and 1970 worth \$10 million, \$14 million, and \$20 million, respectively. About half of the commodities are distributed by the Government of Vietnam and the other half by voluntary agencies. The commodities are not distributed on the basis of need and therefore some inequities have resulted."

Comments

Since the GAO auditors reviewed the program, the distribution of PL 480 Title II surplus food commodities has been completely reorganized. Further shipment of certain commodities not acceptable to Vietnamese for human consumption, and consequently diverted by the recipients to use as animal feed, i.e. bulgur wheat, cornmeal, CSM and rolled oats, have been suspended. The level of shipments programmed for FY's 1971 and 1972 have been substantially reduced to bring them in line with actual need of eligible recipients. Overall control over both direct government distribution and distribution by participating voluntary agencies has been concentrated in the Ministry of Social Welfare and accounting controls over distributions in the field have been tightened. A joint committee composed of representatives of MSW, CORDS, USAID, and the voluntary agencies has been established to serve as advisory committee to the Ministry to oversee the program.

Because of the magnitude of this program (2.9 million recipients in FY 1971) it is impossible to conduct any kind of a means test to make certain that only "needy" people receive surplus food commodities. However, the tighter controls now instituted should substantially reduce the likelihood of less needy employed persons receiving such commodities.

As far as U.S. provided project commodities are concerned, their number and quantities have been greatly reduced in recent years. Except for tents and tarpaulins, none of the commodities mentioned by the GAO have been procured since 1969. Only 1,000 tents and 250 tarpaulins were programmed for FY 1971 and only 500 tents and no tarpaulins are programmed for FY 1972. Tents and tarpaulins are prime requirements for the emergency reception of new refugees and must be available in country at all times.

STATISTICS ON DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
CARRIED OUT FROM 1 JANUARY TO 31 DECEMBER 1970

MILITARY RECTIONS	PROJECTS	FUNDS ALLOCATED	FUNDS EXPENDED	FUNDS REIMBURSED TO MSW	OPERATIONS PERFORMED	NUMBER OF RECIPIENTS	REMARKS
MR 1	Education Health Self Help Voc. Training Total	29,997.325\$ 4,139.254 3,122.000 13,155.800 50,414.379\$	25,976.171\$ 2,484.000 2,455.685 6,739.162 37,655.018		149 Classrooms 6 Maternity Disp. 50 Projects 29 Courses	6,530 2,390 11,040 Persons 870	(a) Funds Allocated Funds Reimbursed to MSW 171,352.466\$ 3,080.233\$ 168,272.233\$
MR 2	Education Health Self Help Voc. Training Total	20,332.517\$ 6,100.000 10,030.000 9,278.500 45,741.017\$	14,897.342\$ 1,906.183 5,765.708 6,841.436 29,390.669\$	300.000\$	74 Classrooms 4 Maternity Disp. 115 Projects 37 Courses	4,664 Students 1,275 Persons 27,506 Persons 955	(b) Self Help Project Agriculture & Fishery Equipment Construction Animal Husbandry Farming Building of Road, Play Yard 27 Projects 9 " 92 " 51 " 4 "
MR 3	Education Health Self Help Voc. Training Total	13,138.000\$ 3,200.000 926.000 2,624.070 19,888.070\$	7,078.824\$ 1,780.000 917.500 1,416.120 11,692.444\$	600.000\$	28 Classrooms 12 Maternity Disp. 16 Projects 10 Courses	600 Persons Not Yet Reported 1,611 212	(c) Vocational Training Mechanics Automobile Sewing Home Electricity Iron Industry Wood Industry Construction Engineering Electronics Wireless Set Machinery Accounting Mechanical Drafting Lathes Industrial Electricity Typing Book Binding Embroidering Barber Bamboo Weaving Sleeping Mat Making Weaving Mat Making Fishing Net Making 4 Courses 6 " 87 " 9 " 10 " 16 " 12 " 4 " 1 " 2 " 1 " 1 " 1 " 5 " 1 " 1 " 1 " 2 " 2 " 1 "
MR 4	Education Health Self Health Voc. Training Total	23,189.000\$ 10,500.000 350.000 5,270.000 39,309.000\$	15,414.172\$ 9,096.113 Not Yet Reported 4,180.623 28,698.933\$	1,147.233\$ 250.000 258.000 1,655.233\$	99 Classrooms 17 Maternity Disp. Not Yet Reported 26 Courses	1,340 Students Not Yet Reported Not Yet Reported 663	
Technical Education Schools Ministry of Education	Voc. Training	16,000.000\$	13,963.156\$		70 Courses	1,130 Students	
GRAND TOTAL		171,352.466\$	121,400.220\$	3,080.233\$	RECAPITULATION		
	Education Health Self Help Voc. Training Total	86,656.842\$ 23,939.254 14,428.000 46,328.370 171,352.466\$	63,366.514\$ 15,264.316 9,118.893 33,650.497 121,400.220\$	2,047.233\$ 250.000 783.000 3,080.233\$	350 Classrooms 10 Maternity Disp. (b) 183 Projects (c) 170 Classes	13,134 Students 3,665 Persons 40,187 Persons 3,810 Teachers	

Saigon, December 31, 1970
Chief of Vocational Training and
Development Service

VU-HUY-THAN



Republic of Vietnam
Ministry of Social Welfare
Directorate of Refugees
Vocational Training and Development Service

LIST OF 60 REFUGEE SITES HAVING DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN 1970

Page 1 of 4 Pages

Order Number (1)	Name of Resettlement Camp or Refugee Hamlet (2)	EDUCATION AND HEALTH		SELF HELP		VOCATIONAL TRAINING		TOTAL FUNDS (\$)
		Number of Projects Authorized (3)	Funds Allocated (4)	Number of Projects Authorized (5)	Funds Allocated (6)	Number of Classrooms Authorized (7)	Funds Allocated (8)	
MR 1								
Tinh Quang-Trai Province								
1	Ha-Thanh	0	0	0	0	2 Sewing 2 Carpentry	815.500\$	815.500\$
Tinh Thanh-Thien								
2	Thuan-An	1 Maternity Clinic	400.000\$	3 Pig Raising	150.000\$	1 Hat Making	225.000	775.000
3	Ton That Xa	2 Classrooms	290.000	0	0	3 Sewing	624.000	914.000
4	Loc Thuy	2 Classrooms	290.000	3 Pig Raising	150.000	0	0	440.000
5	Thuy-Luong	4 Classrooms	580.000	2 Pig Raising	100.000	0	0	680.000
6	Da-Nang Dong Phuoc (My Kha)	12 Classrooms 4 Kindergarten 1 Maternity Clinic	4.295.000	0	0	4 Classroom Const.	380.000	4.675.000
Tinh Quang-Nam								
7	Xuyen-Chau	2 Kindergarten	310.000	0	0	1 Sewing	248.100	558.100
8	Trung-Phuoc	2 Kindergarten	310.000	0	0	1 Sewing	248.100	558.100
9	Thuan-Tinh	2 Kindergarten	310.000	0	0	1 Sewing	248.100	558.100
Tinh Quang-Ngai								
10	Ha-Tay	2 Classrooms	290.000	3 Agriculture & Fishery Equipment	155.000	3 Barber	249.000	694.000
11	Rung-Lang	3 Classrooms 2 Kindergarten	745.000	10 Market, Hall & Road Construction	500.000	1 Sewing	228.000	1.473.000
12	La-Ha	4 Classrooms 2 Kindergarten	890.000	8 Market & Hall Cons- truction, Land Rental	426.000	0	0	1.316.000
13	Cao-Dai	2 Classrooms	310.000	3 Brick Kiln Const.	150.000	1 Sewing 1 Woodworking	456.000	916.000
14	Battangan	0	0	25 Fishery Equipment	1.251.000	0	0	1.251.000

LIST OF 60 REFUGEE SITES HAVING DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN 1970

Page 2 of 4 Pages

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
15	Thanh-That	2 Kindergarten	310,000\$	0	0	1 Sewing Class	228,000\$	538,000\$
16	Tinh Quang-Tin Ba-Lam	3 Classrooms	435,000	0	0	0	0	435,000
17	MR 2 Tinh Binh-Dinh Go Mit	3 Classrooms	435,000	0	0	1 Sewing	228,000	663,000
18	Tinh Binh-Thuan Song Trao	2 Classrooms	500,000	3 Goat Raising	150,000	1 Sewing	199,030	849,030
19	Canh-Dien	2 Classrooms	500,000	3 Goat Raising	150,000	1 Sewing	199,030	849,030
20	Tinh Cam-Banh My-Ca	1 Maternity Clinic	1,500,000	0	0	1 Carpentry	288,000	1,728,000
21	Tinh Ba-Lie Buen Ho	1 Maternity Clinic	1,600,000	0	0	0	0	1,600,000
22	Buen Cu Kik	6 Classrooms	990,000	0	0	0	0	990,000
23	Buen M'Duk	4 Classrooms	720,000	0	0	0	0	720,000
24	Tinh Lam-Dong Ten Bai-Thuong	0	0	6 Oxen Raising	300,000	0	0	300,000
25	Klong Trao	2 Classrooms	300,000	0	0	0	0	300,000
26	Tinh Binh-Thuan Binh Son	4 Classrooms	640,000	0	0	1 Sewing	218,000	858,000
27	Tinh Piskay Phu Nhon III	4 Classrooms 1 Maternity Clinic	1,550,000	3 Agriculture(Seeds)	150,000	0	0	1,700,000
28	Kochrak	2 Classrooms	420,000	3 Agriculture(Seeds)	150,000	0	0	570,000
29	Piet-de-Lin	2 Classrooms	420,000	3 Agriculture(Seeds)	150,000	0	0	570,000
30	Thanh-Aa	0	0	3 Agriculture(Seeds)	150,000	1 Sewing	114,000	264,000
31	Tinh Tuyen-Duc M'Lon	2 Classrooms	420,000	4 Pig Raising	200,000	1 Sewing	285,000	905,000
32	Dagun	1 Classroom 1 Maternity Clinic	910,000	4 Pig Raising	200,000	0	0	1,110,000
33	Tinh Khanh-Hoa Cu Thanh	0	0	1 Chicken Raising	50,000	1 Sewing	242,000	292,000

LIST OF 60 SITES HAVING DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN 1970

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
34	Tỉnh Quang-D'uc Khien Gan	0	0	3 Pig Raising	140,000	1 Sewing	239,150	379,150
35	Tỉnh Phu-Bon Ca Lui 1	0	0	9 Pig Raising	480,000	0	0	480,000
36	Tỉnh Kontum Plektrong	0	0	9 Goat Raising	450,000	0	0	450,000
	ME 3							
37	Tỉnh Long-An Pha Tu Ky-Son	3 Classrooms	435,000	2 Play-yard/Ditch Const	100,000	0	0	535,000
38	Nhan Khuong	1 Classroom	165,000	2 Road Building	100,000	0	0	265,000
39	Vam Thu	4 Classrooms	580,000	0	0	0	0	580,000
40	Thu-Thua	4 Classrooms	580,000	0	0	0	0	580,000
	Tỉnh Phuoc-Long Dong-Xoi	2 Classrooms 1 Kindergarten 1 Maternity Clinic 1 Medicine Station	1,186,000	0	0	0	0	1,186,000
42	Buward	2 Classrooms 1 Kindergarten	686,000	0	0	0	0	686,000
	Tỉnh Hau-Nghia Loc-Khe	7 Classrooms	1,015,000	0	0	0	0	1,015,000
44	Tỉnh Tay-Ninh Ban-Vung(Quan Khien-Hanh)	3 Classrooms 1 Kindergarten 1 Medicine Station	890,000	0	0	1 Sewing	228,000	1,118,000
	Tỉnh Gia-Dinh Tam-Roa	2 Classrooms 1 Maternity Clinic	790,000	0	0	0	0	790,000
46	An-Nghia	2 Classrooms 1 Maternity Clinic	790,000	0	0	0	0	790,000
	ME 4							
47	Tỉnh An-Giang (Hui-Choc)	3 Classrooms	396,000	0	0	2 Sewing	382,000	778,000
48	Qui-Long	3 Classrooms	435,000	0	0	0	0	435,000
49	Tỉnh An-Xuyen Ham-Rong	3 Classrooms 1 Medicine Station	1,010,000	0	0	0	0	1,010,000

LIST OF 60 SITES HAVING DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN 1970

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
50	Binh-Hung	4 Classrooms	680,000\$	?	0	0	0	680,000\$
51	Cat-Dot-Vam	6 Classrooms	1,020,000	0	0	0	0	1,020,000
52	Tinh Kien-Giang Yam-Xang	3 Classrooms 1 Kindergarten 1 Maternity/Med Clinic	1,090,000	1 Pig Raising	50,000\$	0	0	1,140,000
53	Dong-Thanh	3 Classrooms	590,000	1 Bridge Building	50,000	0	0	640,000
54	Tinh Vinh-Long Cat-Quan	3 Classrooms 1 Maternity/Med Clinic	935,000	0	0	0	0	935,000
55	Tuong-Ngai	4 Classrooms 1 Maternity/Med Clinic	1,080,000	0	0	0	0	1,080,000
56	Ngai-Lo	3 Classrooms 1 Maternity Clinic	935,000	0	0	0	0	935,000
57	An Hoa	4 Classrooms 1 Maternity Clinic	1,080,000	0	0	0	0	1,080,000
58	Tinh Mac-Lieu Cat-Day	1 Maternity Clinic	2,000,000	0	0	0	0	2,000,000
59	Tinh Vinh-Binh Phu-Tho	2 Classrooms 1 Kindergarten	603,000	0	0	0	0	603,000
60	Tinh Kien-Thuong Hoa-Cu	2 Classrooms 1 Maternity Clinic	790,000	0	0	0	0	790,000

Saigon, January 12, 1971
Acting Chief of Vocational Training
and Development
Development of Health Education and
Development Bureau

PHAM-THI-KIM-LIEN

AID COMMENTS ON GAO REPORT ENTITLED "CIVILIAN HEALTH AND
WAR-RELATED CASUALTY PROGRAMS IN VIETNAM"

1. GAO

No specific AID project exists to care for civilian war-related casualties. Assistance to these people is provided under a medical care project as part of the AID health program.

Comment

The GAO Report notes "A.I.D. considers the treatment of civilian war casualties (CWCs) as a high priority item within the total Vietnam program. A primary goal of the United States in Vietnam for FY '71 is to ease the suffering of civilians displaced or injured by the war . . .".

The United States and Free World assistance has been provided to the Ministry of Health (MOH) provincial and prefectural health services since 1963. This assistance, which focused during most of the time on CWC care, is provided by U.S. Military and Provincial Health Assistance Program (MILPHAP) teams; USAID contract teams (8 Korean and 1 Chinese teams); the American Medical Association Volunteer Physicians for Vietnam program (AMA/VPVN); the U.S. Catholic Conference and the International Rescue Committee. Free World voluntary medical teams, which receive USAID logistics support in varying degrees, also provide assistance.

While skilled medical manpower available for civilian care in Vietnam is limited, significant improvement has been shown over the past two years. This improvement in the GVN capability to provide improved medical care to CWCs, refugees, and the general population, is partially attributable to more effective utilization of GVN medical manpower and facilities. Implementation of the GVN decree which called for a joint utilization of military and civilian health manpower and facilities, resulted in additional ARVN personnel provided to 26 province hospitals and 185 districts. Thus far, 1600 military personnel have been assigned to MOH staff.

As a result of the increased responsibility taken by the Vietnamese in this program—as joint utilization has become operational—it has been possible to reduce the MILPHAP personnel and USAID-funded operational personnel (e.g., general duty nurses).

MOH and USAID policy focuses on upgrading medical practices and facilities for better medical care, including CWC. Both MOH and USAID require top priority by given CWC. There is no change in this policy, although CWC are currently 8% of hospital admissions.

2. GAO

No reliable data are available on the total number of civilian war-related casualties in Vietnam.

Comment

In October 1967 at the hearing held before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees of the Committee on the Judiciary, the then Administrator of the Agency for International Development, Mr. Gaud, testified: "... We have records we consider adequate of the number of people that have been treated, I think it is fair to say that the only figures that we have with reference to civilian casualties are the number of admissions to the hospitals.

"... The estimates beyond that are only estimates. * * *

"... We can tell you how many civilian casualties are treated in hospitals and we have that figure and we think it is an accurate figure, but we can't tell you and I don't think anybody can tell you how many civilian casualties are wounded in the boondocks, who don't get local treatment, and don't report their injuries and the like. These are figures that don't exist."

Dr. Hannah, Administrator for A.I.D., at the hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees of the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, held in June 1969, in his statements to the Subcommittee reported: "While it is impossible to be precise as to the numbers of civilians killed or injured in the fighting in Vietnam, we do have quite reliable information as to the numbers of civilian war-related cases admitted to and treated in hospitals."

To our knowledge the GVN or U.S. Government sources do not cite CWC hospital admissions as a total figure. It is recognized that additional numbers of CWCs are treated at either facilities or not treated at all. There is no accurate method of determining the exact number of such cases and estimates of total CWCs are speculative.

3. GAO

Although some improvements have occurred with respect to Vietnamese medical personnel shortages, there is a continuing need for most medical specialties—primarily because of low Government salaries and the military draft.

Comment

The GVN has recognized the importance of the civilian medical program and has placed greater emphasis on improving and increasing medical service available to the civilian population. Two important indicators of the increased GVN concern for the level of medical care available to the civilian populace—manpower and funds—show a definite positive change in recent years. The following chart illustrates the significant increases in staff and funding for the MOH hospitals from 1966 to 1971:

	MOH staffing				Funding (VN dollars in thousands)			
	1966	1969	1970	1971	1966	1969	1970	1971
National and regular hospitalization.....	3,533	4,597	6,400	6,257	438,220	936,280	1,243,500	1,456,500
Providing health services and hospitalization.....	3,613	11,026	14,100	15,829	341,580	1,426,786	1,802,060	2,184,900
Total	7,146	15,623	20,500	22,086	779,800	2,363,066	3,045,500	3,641,400

Further, regarding the improvement in Vietnamese medical personnel, the increased emphasis on training should be noted.

The University of Saigon Faculty of Medicine is by international standards a very large medical school. Its graduating class (191 in 1970) is one of the largest in the world and the graduation of more than 200 physicians yearly from the Saigon and Hue Medical Schools is resulting in a 12.5 percent increase in physician strength annually, probably one of the largest annual increases in the world. The enlargement of the dental clinic space to be completed by June 1971 will make it possible to increase graduates to a maximum of 60 per annum. In the meantime, in dental as in medical education, particular emphasis is being placed on upgrading the quality of teaching, and on improving patient care, through the development and implementation of a modern curriculum and use of post-graduate training courses.

The number of nursing schools and, consequently, the number of graduate nurses has increased considerably. Since 1966 seven additional assistant nurse schools have been opened and the number of nurse graduates for 1970 has increased to 785 from 400 in 1966. The expected improvement in patient care has been slow to develop, however, in part because of other priorities and in part because of a traditional understanding of the role of the nurse which limited her actions and authority within the hospital and, consequently, within the Ministry of Health. An administrative step designed to correct this situation was taken on November 11, 1969, when the Bureau of Nursing was raised to a higher organization level in order to effect a higher status, increased allowances for Bureau personnel, and more authority to deal with nursing problems in provincial hospitals.

It is impossible to say that patient care provided by nurses has improved to the degree desired by American advisors. Nonetheless, the basis for improvement is firmly laid. The steps described above are leading in a direction which will permit an increasing recognition and acceptance of the nurse's function along the lines of modern Western nursing care. The present Minister of Health has firmly proposed that the nursing care program be further developed along such lines.

Progress in the Laboratory Technology project in 1969-70 is considered to be among the most rapid in the public health sector. A classification of all laboratories located in MOH facilities has been completed and standardized procedural manuals and supply kits have been provided, resulting in the increased use of diagnostic laboratory analysis by VN medical personnel.

The Laboratory Advisory Program has indeed established requirement goals for laboratory technicians and has made estimates of additional technicians required. Approximately 560 additional graduates of the one year assistant laboratory technician course will be required to staff hospital laboratories, malaria control activities, and dispensaries. This goal should be reached in the latter

part of 1973, if current training rates are maintained. Approximately 250 technicians, with 3 years of training, will be needed for hospital laboratories, dispensaries, and as teachers for the laboratory schools. If training of three year technicians begins in autumn 1971 as planned, this goal should be reached in autumn 1980.

4. GAO

While the Ministry of Health has increased spending for hospital maintenance over the past few years, AID considers the amount inadequate, since facilities are reported to be deteriorating and lacking essential utilities. Also, equipment is poorly maintained.

Comment

Difficulties have been encountered in the operation and maintenance of utilities systems at Vietnam civilian medical facilities. The problem is not one of design but rather a lack of understanding on the part of hospital personnel and patients with regard to the proper use of these facilities. The resolution requires a more extensive effort in health education rather than a provision of additional commodities or the redesign and construction of additional systems. The long range master plans developed by AID contractors are being utilized by the Ministry of Health as they make improvements in various hospitals. Increased impementation of these plans must await the realignment of priorities following hostilities.

5. GAO

The Government of Vietnam long-range medical plans apparently do not consider the possibility of transferring excess Vietnamese military facilities to the Ministry of Health following an end to hostilities and the resulting reduction in military patient loads.

Comment

The Mission and GVN are conducting joint reviews for the utilization of excess U.S. and GVN military facilities by the Ministry of Health. The selection of these sites is the result of careful planning to insure that the Ministry of Health possesses the capability to staff and operate these facilities.

APPENDIX II

A SURVEY OF CIVILIAN WAR CASUALTIES AMONG REFUGEES FROM THE PLAIN OF JARS, LAOS, BY WALTER M. HANEY, AND TEXT OF CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE CHAIRMAN AND DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE WILLIAM H. SULLIVAN

JULY 26, 1971.

HON. WILLIAM H. SULLIVAN,
*Deputy Assistant Secretary,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.*

DEAR AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN: Just a note to say how much I appreciated your helpful participation in the Subcommittee hearing last week.

As we discussed at the hearing, I am formally submitting a copy of Mr. Walter Haney's "Survey of Civilian Casualties Among Refugees from the Plain of Jars". I would appreciate the Department's evaluation of the survey as well as a comment on its conclusions and what action, if any, has been taken in light of its findings.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, *Chairman,
Subcommittee on Refugees.*

AUGUST 10, 1971.

HON. EDWARD M. KENNEDY,
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Refugees,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your letter of July 26, 1971 forwarding a copy of Mr. Walter Haney's report entitled "Survey of Civilian Casualties Among Refugees from the Plain of Jars". I have read his report with close attention and with interest, and have found it to be a serious and carefully prepared piece of work.

I know Mr. Haney and have talked with him in recent weeks. He is an objective and conscientious young man who is personally attached to the Lao people with whom he has been associated as an IVS volunteer and a teacher during the past few years. His paper seems to be a conscientious one-man effort to survey civilian casualties on the Plain of Jars. As he says, it is not intended to be a complete survey but rather a study "comprised of all those case histories of civilian war victims which I could gather in the time available to me".

The persons he interviewed were drawn from the same or similar groups of refugees who figured in the Plain of Jars Survey conducted by the U.S. Embassy in Vientiane in July, 1970. In fact, seven of the ten villages surveyed in both cases are either clearly identical or are villages whose inhabitants were once colocated in the same tasseng on the Plain of Jars.

The refugee villages visited by Mr. Haney contained a total of 8,500 people. Mr. Haney has gathered case histories from this population to demonstrate that 189 people died as a result of military action. A little over half of these deaths were a result of air action. Of this latter group, somewhat less than half were victims prior to 1968-69.

As I have previously testified, the fighting raged back and forth over the Plain of Jars and meticulous efforts were employed to minimize casualties resulting from that fighting. Even given the intensive fighting in 1969 when the Plain changed hands two or three times, the statistics in Mr. Haney's report indicate that this policy has been essentially successful. While 189 deaths out of an 8,500 population certainly constitute too many to have been caught in the war, they do nevertheless represent a small percentage of the total population, given the intensity of the fighting that took place.

As I testified before your Subcommittee on April 22 and July 22, the primary cause for the generation of refugees in Laos has been North Vietnamese military pressure. This statement, I believe, is still justified. At the same time, I also testified that fear of bombing was another factor and that this was doubtless a much more significant element in the minds of some 17,000 people from the Plain of Jars who were caught up in the fighting before they were removed to the Vientiane Plain.

We can not dispute Mr. Haney's conclusion that aerial bombardment was the primary cause of civilian casualties among the people he interviewed, although we have no reliable statistical basis for extending that conclusion to all those who previously lived in the Plain of Jars. On the other hand, we do not, on the basis of his evidence, accept his conclusion that the bombing of the civilian population was extensive. We believe that the policies which govern air operations were conscientiously construed by the United States Mission in Vientiane and we have no reason to believe that they were flagrantly disregarded by the pilots of the aircraft operating in that area.

Nevertheless, we have drawn the conclusions of the Haney report to the attention of our Mission and the appropriate United States military authorities concerned with air operations in Laos. We have instructed them to redouble their efforts to avoid incurring civilian casualties.

I would like to add a few comments on the subject of poison which is mentioned a number of times in the Haney survey. United States forces, of course, do not employ any poisons or poisonous weapons in Southeast Asia or elsewhere. While the description of the substances encountered by the refugees is far from being specific, we have, with the help of the Defense Department, come up with some possible explanations. For example, the long strips of silver paper correspond to an accurate description of radar chaff which is commonly used to interrupt or confuse enemy radar. It is nontoxic, being similar in substance to aluminum foil. The granular yellow powder remains unidentified, but the Defense Department notes that a wide variety of United States or communist equipment such as batteries, smoke cannisters, parachute flares, and the like could produce a residue resembling a powder, some of which could be toxic to plants, animals, and possibly to humans.

Finally, I wish to thank you again for the courtesy and serious purpose which have characterized the hearings of your Subcommittee when I have been a witness before it. It will be our continuing common purpose to ease the plight of those hapless civilians who have become victims of the fighting in Indochina.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM H. SULLIVAN,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

A SURVEY OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AMONG REFUGEES FROM THE PLAIN OF JARS, LAOS

(By Walter M. Haney)

IVS VOLUNTEER, LAOS, 1970-71

A. Background to the Survey

During the summer of 1970, I helped organize a program for Lao students to work during their school vacation. The program was funded by USAID Laos and organized by International Voluntary Services, Inc., Laos (IVS) together with the Lao Ministry of Youth and Sports. During the program, I became involved with students who were teaching refugee children in four camps near Vientiane. The refugees in these villages were part of the reported 15,000 who were evacuated from the Plain of Jars in February 1970. From their involvement with these refugees, the students in the summer program learned a great deal about the refugees' lives prior to their evacuation from the Plain of Jars. As the students told me of their experiences with the refugees, I became increasingly disturbed about what they had learned about bombing on the Plain of Jars. As a result of what I had learned from the students, I was moved to write a letter to the U.S. Ambassador to Laos, Mr. McMurtrie Godley, protesting what had evidently been the bombing of innocent civilians, (see Appendix B.) I also sent copies of this letter to my Senators in Washington, Senators Hart and Griffin from Michigan.

In November, Ambassador Godley invited me to discuss the matter with him personally. In our discussion on Nov. 23, Ambassador Godley received me most cordially and expressed his deep concern over the question of bombing of innocent villagers. He told me that American aircraft in Laos adhere to strict rules of engagement which proscribe the bombing of inhabited villages except under highly unusual circumstances. He acknowledged, however, that mistakes do occur and that innocent civilians have on occasion been subject to aerial bombardment. He maintained, however, that considering the number of aerial sorties over Laos, the number of errors resulting in the bombing of innocent villagers had been remarkably few. He suggested that while refugees may talk of the bombing in general terms, very few can actually give first hand accounts of the deaths of civilians by bombing.

As a result of my letters to Senators Hart and Griffin, I received copies of a letter from a Mr. David Abshire of the United States Department of State. In his letter, dated November 23, 1970, Mr. Abshire stated (see Appendix C for full text of letter) :

"American air support of the Royal Lao Government . . . is furnished under rules of operation designed specifically to protect civilians and to limit attacks to military targets. There is no question but that there have been civilian victims of bombing errors which were due to both mechanical and human causes, but a continuing effort goes on, even in the heat of battle, to keep such errors to a strict minimum. The rules do not permit attacks on non-military targets and places out-of-bounds all inhabited villages."

One of the students in the summer program had written (see Appendix A) : "During the bombing, if the planes couldn't select a place to bomb, but they saw some animals or people they would simply drop the bombs on them. This was the primary reason why the refugees fled from the homes of their birth and came here. . . . The most important reason why the refugees had to come here from their villages must be the bombing."

Obviously, there was a conflict between what American officials, on one hand and students in the summer program on the other, had told me about the bombing.

In November, I visited a refugee camp north of Vientiane at Ban Ilay. There, I talked with the sub-district chief, Than Thit Thong, of the Ban Ilay refugee camp. He told me that the planes had bombed only when North Vietnamese soldiers shot at the planes. However, more than a dozen villagers in the same camp told me of how their homes had been destroyed by bombing when there were no soldiers in their village.

Again, there was a conflict between official and non-official accounts of the bombing. What had actually happened on the Plain of Jars? What was the nature of the bombing? Were there only a few mistaken bombings of innocent civilians or, was bombing of civilians heavy enough to have been a "primary cause" for their flight to this side?

B. Method of the Survey

The information which I had gleaned from the students working with the refugees had been subject to a number of possible sources of error. First, the students had not set out specifically to get information about the refugees' experiences on the Plain of Jars. Thusly, between their off-hand reception of the information from the refugees and their later retelling to me, there may have been omissions and distortions. Further, the information from the students was of a general nature with very little specific information. Ambassador Godley had suggested that refugees talk of the bombing largely in general terms, but that few have first-hand specific information about civilian deaths from bombing. Perhaps this had been the case with the refugees with whom the students worked.

So, I set out to make a survey to gain specific information about what had happened on the Plain of Jars. During my vacation from school, December 23, 1970 to January 4, 1971, I visited ten refugee camps on the Vientiane Plain. In order to give my survey greater objectivity, I asked not only about bombing victims, but more generally about any civilian casualties of war. When I went into a village, following the Lao custom, I did not initiate my inquiry immediately. Rather, I conversed very generally with the villagers for thirty minutes or an hour. Only then would I express interest in the question of civilian war victims. My questioning followed this pattern. First, I would inquire if any of the refugees had had any civilian relatives killed while they still lived on the Plain of Jars. Were any relatives shot and killed, or bombed and killed by either Pathet Lao (PL) forces or by Royal Lao government (RLG) forces?

I asked only about incidents in which immediate relatives of my interlocutors had been killed or wounded, on the theory that information about such specific incidents would be more reliable than non-specific descriptions of the situation in general.

If an individual had had a civilian relative killed, I asked the following questions:

What was the name of the narrator?

From what village and district was he?

What was the name of the victim and his relationship to the narrator?

When did he die?

Why did he die?

What was he doing when he died?

Often I would ask additional questions in order to clarify the details of the incident.

During an interview I took notes on what was said. After the interview I asked the interviewee if I might be able to take his picture. Invariably people were happy to have their pictures taken. Further, I also taped most interviews.*

In the interviews in Section II, the abbreviations listed below have been used.

T. Tasseng or subdistrict of the interviewee.

B. Ban or village of the interviewee.

N. Name of the interviewee or narrator.

(Names listed in parentheses in this category are those of whoever may have given most of the information during the interview, if it was someone other than the relative of the victim.)

V. Relationship and name of the civilian victim.

D. Date of the incident.

O. Direct cause of death.

C. Circumstances of the incident.

T. Tape on which the interview was recorded.

Interviews usually involved extensive discussions and interplay between myself, the interviewee and other refugees. These interviews as transcribed in Section II are greatly abbreviated from the actual conversations. They were written from my notes and the tapes of the interviews. In some cases, I do not have tapes of the interviews. In these instances I have transcribed the interviews from my notes alone.

Please see Section III for my evaluation of the veracity of the information found in the interviews.

C. Text of Interviews

I. Ban Veun Kham—Tasseng Phan (Thao Ounkham Phimmavong) 241 families 1269 people.

VILLAGES

1. Ban Phan.
2. Ban Nasay.
3. Ban Pung.
4. Ban Phonsay.
5. Ban Vene.
6. Ban Khong Tai.
7. Ban Khong Neua.
8. Ban Nong.
9. Ban Tang.
10. Ban Ko.

1. T. Phan.
- B. Pung.
- N. Pho Xieng Onh
- V. Father Pho Titkhanta Mother Me Sao Douang another woman.
- D. 66/7 (2 young cousins)
- O. Large bomb, "fire bomb" from T-28.
- C. They were at home. This was before everyone had fled their homes.

big, big bomb set everything on fire. "Mother was burned up, Father..."

*I made these tapes surreptitiously. I feared that if refugees knew that they were being taped they would have felt less free to express themselves. I may have been wrong because in all cases refugees knew that I was taking complete notes on what was said, yet they expressed themselves with apparent forthrightness. Nevertheless, refugees did not know that I was taping our conversations.

was burned up. The children were burned up. Everything was burned up." There were no soldiers in the village. T-1A.

2. T. Phan.
B. Pung.
N. Sao Noi.
V. Pho Louang Ti—father.
D. 66/1.
O. T-28 bombi.
C. There were no soldiers around.
- T. 1A.
3. T. Phan.
B. Khong Neua.
N. Pho Kang Poua.
V. Son who was 8 years old.
D. 69/6.
O. T-28 bombi.
C. Boy ran for a hole but the planes dropped the bombi before he reached the shelter. No soldiers in the village. There were some PL soldiers in the area but they were far away. "The planes just shot and bombed the village." T. 1A. Later told me about his older brother Ba Pa who was also killed by bombi from a T-28. He was old and deaf and didn't hear the planes coming. Untaped.)
4. T. Phan.
B. Pung.
N. Me Sao Chanta.
V. Husband 38 y., three children, Sao Bouavan 12 y.; Sao Bouathong 9 y.; Sao Tui 8 y.
D. '69 or '68, 9th month.
O. Jet, big bomb (one of Sao Chanta's surviving children suggested it was F 105, but mother said she only knew it was a jet.)
C. Father and children had gone to work in rice field north of village. They hid in hole when the planes came, but planes dropped bombs near the hole. They were killed by bomb fragments. No relatives of Sao Chan Ta have been killed by PL or NVN. "There were no soldiers in our village when the planes bombed."
- T. 1A.
5. a.:
T. Phan.
B. Vene.
N. Pho Xieng Ta.
V. Daughter who was 6 y. old.
D. 69/6.
O. T-28 bombi.
C. The girl and her brother were running for hole but they didn't make it in time. The boy was wounded in his right thigh. He almost died also. There were no soldiers in the village when the bombing occurred. Xieng To says that he has had no relatives killed by PL or VN.
- T. 1A.
5. b.:
V. Wife's younger brother Ba Chun 40y.
D. 1965.
O. Gunshot.
C. He had gone to upland rice field he was returning through the forest when some Meo soldiers shot him. They also shot three other villagers that day.
- T. 1A.
6. a.:
T. Phan.
B. Tang.
N. Xieng Boua Pha.
V. Younger brother Thao La.
D. '63/9.
O. Mine.
C. He had gone to fetch buffalo about 6 p.m. He stepped on a mine at the edge of village. The Meo soldiers had put the mine there.
- T. 1A.
6. b.:
V. Son of his younger brother.

- D. '67/1.
O. Mine.
C. The boy was a novice monk. He stepped on the mine at the edge of the wat at about 12 noon. The Meos put in all the mines. No relatives killed by PL or VN.
- T. 1A.
6. c.:
V. Daughter of older sister.
D. '68/8 about 6 p.m.
O. 155 mm shell.
C. She was in Ban Ko near Muong Soui. There were RLG soldiers in the village. A 155 mm shell landed in the village and a shell fragment killed her in her home.
- T. 1A.
7. T. Phan.
B. Khong Neua.
N. Sao Deuang.
V. Younger brother Thao Ba La.
D. '64.
O. Gunshot.
C. He had gone to forest to look for food and things which he could sell. Region 2 Meo soldiers shot him. They shoot anyone they see in the forest.
- T. 1B.
8. T. Phan.
B. Vene.
N. Tit Khamsing.
V. Son Thao Sisouphan 8y.
D. '69/5.
O. Jet, big big bomb.
C. All of the family was in a hole together. The jet—maybe it was F105—dropped big bombs. Sisouphan was hurt inside. He ran around like he was drunk. He died 15 days later. There had been PL soldiers in the village. Didn't count how many but thought it was a company. They were staying—living and eating with the villagers. They left the hour before the jets came.
- T. 1B.
9. T. Phan.
B. Khong Neua.
N. Sao Saphan.
V. Younger brother Xham Si 12y.
D. '64(?) "The year when the PL came to Xieng Khouang for the first time.
O. Gunshot.
C. He was walking in the forest going to upland ricefield. He was going there to raise food for us. The Meo soldiers shot killed him. Shot him right through his cheek bones (When I asked if any other relatives had been killed by shooting or bombing they said,) No, but in Ban Khong Tai in 1970 just before we came here the bombing was very very heavy. All kinds of jets. We had to stay in the holes all the time. Even at night the planes shot and bombed. And they would drop flares. There were no soldiers in our village. In the month before we came to this side the bombing was heaviest.
- II. Ban Phao—Tasseng Fat, 134 families, 768 people.

VILLAGES

1. Ban Fat Soi.
2. Ban Muong.
3. Ban Vieng.
4. Ban Nhat Si.
5. Ban Napheung.
6. Ban Khouane.

BAN PHAO INTERVIEWS

1. T. Fat.
- B. Napheung.
- N. Me Tum.
- V. Daughter Me Pao.
- D. '69/4.

O. Jet bombi "F-4-hat".

C. She was walking along path when jets dropped bombi. Tasseng said that there were PL and VN soldiers in the village when planes bombed.

T. II A.

2. T. Fat.

B. Ban Nhat.

N. Sao Leh.

V. Son Xieng Thong Chan.

D. 68/12.

O. F105 bombi.

C. We were already living in holes then because the planes always shot up the village. Thong Chanh had gone to the forest to find things to eat and there was no place for him to hide when the planes came. We lived in the holes for five years, but the bombing was only really heavy for two years '68-'69. We had to run to go cook or work in the ricefield. The planes came everyday T-28s, and F105s. But it was mostly F105s. The bombi came from a big bomb which exploded when it was still high in the air. The bombi were round and fell over a wide area. There were at least three hundred in each big cylinder. They exploded pom, pom, pom. It was impossible to flee. When the little pieces hit a person they twisted and turned inside the body.

T. 2A.

3. T. Fat.

B. Nhat.

N. Sao Home.

V. Son Xieng Boun Song 16 yrs.

D. '68/12.

O. Bombi from jet "F105".

C. Had gone out to the forest to get things to eat. The planes came very fast and he couldn't find—place to hide in time. No relatives were shot or killed by the PL or VN.

T. 2A.

4. a.:

T. Fat.

B. Napheung.

N. Bondi.

V. Sisters Sao Nong 35y and cousin Xieng Boua Phan 26y.

D. 68/12/17.

O. Bombi from T-28.

C. We were just starting to flee to this side, when the planes dropped the bombs on us. We had just come out of our holes. There were no PL NVN soldiers around. There were many people together but only these two were killed. There were no soldiers with us.

T. 2A.

4. b.:

V. Father Xieng Boua Phan 62y cousin Thao Kham.

D. 69/10.

O. Gunshot.

C. We were fleeing to this side when the Vietnamese soldiers saw us. A group of 12 soldiers caught them and shot them. There were seven of us together but they only caught these two. It was very dangerous when we were coming to this side. If the planes saw us they would shoot us. If the Vietnamese saw us they would capture us.

T. 2A.

5. T. Fat.

B. Fat Sol.

N. Sao Phim.

V. Mother Sao Sa about 50y.

D. '67/6.

O. Big bomb from T-28.

C. She was in the ricefield but didn't flee because there were no soldiers and she didn't think the planes would shoot. No relatives killed by PL or Meo soldiers.

T. 2A.

6. a.:

T. Fat.

B. Fat Sol.

N. Chang Khamdi.

- V. Older brother Kang Chouk.
 D. 66/1.
 O. T-28 firebomb.
 C. He was at home and the plane dropped a big firebomb, the house burned up. Everything burned up. There were no soldiers in the village.
- T. 2A.
 7. T. Fat.
 B. Sang.
 N. Me Sanout.
 V. Son Titsomphan 23 y.
 D. 67/3.
 O. bullets from a T-28.
 C. He was coming back from the market when the planes came. He didn't flee in time. Three or four PL soldiers were also killed at the same time.
- T. 2A.
 8. a.:
 T. Fat.
 B. Nhat.
 N. Sao Som.
 V. Younger brother Bathon 28 y.
 D. 66/6.
 O. Bullets from a T-28.
 C. He had gone to visit relatives. He was sitting in the house just like we are now. The planes shot the house and he died immediately. There were no soldiers in the village.
- T. 2A.
 8. b.:
 B. Leng.
 N. Sao Som.
 V. Son Douangsi 22 y.
 D. '66/7/13.
 O. Gunshot.
 C. He was sleeping in wat when the Vietnamese came and shot up the wat. They wanted to get the monks belongings.
- T. 2A.
 8. c.:
 T. Kheung.
 B. Ban Ang.
 N. Sao Som.
 V. Relative, in-law Xieng Nohn 47 y.
 D. 67/11.
 O. Gunshot.
 C. He was at home in RLG controlled area. The Vietnamese shot up the house at night. They wanted money. His wife and child died also.
- III. Ban Veun Khene—Tasseng Sene Noi, 416 families, 2310 people.

VILLAGES

1. Ban Theuang.
2. Ban Khan Nhao.
3. Ban Sao.
4. Ban Na-Oh.
5. Ban Manh.
6. Ban Ton Neua.
7. Ban Ton Tai.
8. Ban Naha.
9. Ban Nason.
10. Ban Nakhu.
11. Ban Ngoua Neua.
12. Ban Ngoua Tai.
13. Ban Phone.
14. Ban Nong Tai.
15. Ban No Ngan.

BAN VEUN KHENE INTERVIEWS

1. T. Sene Noy.
- B. Ton.

- N. Mother of Titkhamphan and Backhamta.
 V. Sons Titkhamphen 24y Backhamta 12y.
 D. Unsure of year but it was 9th month.
 O. Jet.
 C. Boys had gone to work in the ricefield. Just after they finished eating, the jets came. Tit Khampheng and Backhamta ran into the hole but a bomb dropped near their hole. There were no soldiers in the area.
- T. No tape.
2. T. Sene Noy.
 B. Ton.
 N. Sao Toum Ni.
 V. Husband TitPhan 43y.
 D. Unsure of year 9th month.
 O. Jet with big bombs.
 C. He didn't get into the hole in time. Three others died also. There were no soldiers around. No relatives killed by PL.
- T. No tape.
3. T. Sene Noy.
 B. Ton.
 N. Sao Tum.
 V. Husband Xieng Phila 60 y.
 D. '69/9.
 D. Jet.
 C. There were no soldiers around. The jets just dropped bombs on the villagers. No relatives killed by PL or VN.
- T. No tape.
4. T. Sene Noy.
 B. Lat Sene.
 N. Sao La.
 V. Older brother Xieng Bout Si 48 y.
 D. '68/11 doesn't remember day but about 10 AM.
 O. Jets and T-28's with big big bombs.
 C. He had gone to work in the forest but he didn't flee fast enough. There were no soldiers around only villagers. Xieng Bout Si died that evening.
- T. No tape.
5. Sene Noy.
 B. Lat Sene.
 N. Sao Phomma.
 V. 69/9.
 O. Jet bombi.
 C. He was walking along a path after the jet had dropped the bombi. One went off and killed him. There were only villagers in the area. No soldiers. No relatives killed by PL.
- T. No tape.
6. T. Sene Noy.
 B. Lat Sene.
 N. Sao Moun Ta.
 V. Husband Xieng Oum 53-54 y.
 D. 69/6.
 O. Shot. (unsure of origin of bullets)
 C. He was shot at night. Maybe by a plane but not sure. He was taking things from our house. There were planes all around dropping flares and shooting.
- T. No tape.
- IV. Ban Mak Hiao—Tasseng Sene Noi, 178 families 998 people.

VILLAGES

1. Ban Kao.
2. Ban Mi.
3. Ban Phoum.
4. Ban Nadil.
5. Ban Naheung.
6. Ban Nason.
7. Ban Si.

BAN MAK HIAO INTERVIEWS

1. T. Sene Noi.
- B. Phoum.

- N. Sao Noy.
 V. Son Thao Van 14 y.
 D. 3-4 yrs. ago 3rd month.
 O. Small bomb (doesn't know what kind of plane)
 C. He had been taking care of buffalo alone. He was hit by bomb fragments in the neck and chest. He died 30 min later. There were no soldiers around. There was only our village. No relatives killed by PL or Meo soldiers.
- T. 2B.
 2. T. Sen Noi.
 B. Si.
 N-V. Xieng Boua Phan.
 D. '69/8/16, 7 a.m.
 O. Bomb from jet.
 C. Had been going to buy some things to eat near his home. Saw the plane and ran for a hole but didn't make it. He was hit in the lower part of his left leg and in his left shoulder. There were no soldiers around when the jet bombed. Has had no relatives killed by PL or VN. Can only walk a little and he has four children whom he can't support because he can't work in the field. The government hasn't yet changed his PL money.
- T. 2B.
 3. a.:
 T. Sene Noi.
 B. Si.
 N. Onh Chanh.
 V. Mother Sao Sonh 50.
 D. '69/10.
 O. Shot.
 C. When fleeing to this side to Thong Hai Hin (Plain of Jars) Vietnamese shot her.
3. b.:
 V. Younger brother Side 19 y.
 D. 68/6/10.
 O. Big, big bomb from T-28.
 C. He was in Ban Si. There were no soldiers around neither Plan VN.
- T. 2B.
 4. T. Sene Noi.
 B. Na Sou.
 N. Xieng Som Di.
 V. Wife Sao Oum, father Titkhamta, mother Me Douangta, three children.
 D. '67/7/15.
 O. Big, big bombs from T-28.
 C. He had gone to work in the rice field and his family was all at home. There were no soldiers in the village but the planes bombed anyway. Lost wife, mother, father, three children and all his belongings all he had were the clothes on his back. No relatives shot or killed by the PL or VN. (Note: probably same family as Veunkham No. 1).
- T. 2B.
 5. T. Sene Noi.
 B. Phou Houm.
 N. Chan Panya.
 V. Son Thao Van 13 y.
 D. '68/4/11.
 O. Bomb fragment.
 C. The planes shot up the houses but son did not reach the holes in time. There were no soldiers in the village.
- T. 2B.
 6. a.:
 T. Sene Noi.
 B. Phou Houm.
 N. Sao La.
 V. Son Khamsing 8 y.
 D. '69/9/27.
 O. Bomb from Jet.
 C. He was playing at edge of ricefield. He was too small to know enough to run. There were no soldiers around.

T. 2B.

6. b.:

V. Son Khamseum 4 y.

D. '69/3/7.

O. Bombi from jet.

C. He was playing near ricefield. Was too little to know enough to flee when the planes came. Parents were working in their upland rice-field and garden. There were no soldiers around. No relatives killed by PL or VN. Has 3 children left.

T. 2B.

7. T. Sene Noi.

B. Nasou.

N. Sao Bona Pa.

N. Older brother, his wife, three children and a cousin.

D. '66/7/25 (?) Doesn't remember date exactly "was so afraid that I can't remember exactly."

O. T-6, T-28 (not sure) big bomb.

C. They were at home. There were no soldiers around. Only villagers the the planes bombed and the house burned up completely. The whole family died. No relatives killed by PL or VN. (Note: Probably same incident as Veunkham #1 and Mak Hiao #4.)

T. 2B.

8. T. Sene Noi.

B. Nasou.

N. Sao Pheng.

V. Mother Sao Kanna 120 y.

D. 69/7 (doesn't remember day because she was so afraid.)

O. Jet, F105 big, big bomb.

C. Mother was 120 y but still very healthy "Stronger than me". Could work in ricefield all day. But she was deaf and didn't hear the planes coming. Younger brother was also hurt. He was unconscious and very sick but he recovered. There were no soldiers in the village on the day the bombs were dropped. No relatives shot or killed by PL or VN.

T. 2B.

9. T. Sene Noi.

B. Nasom.

N. Sao Oum.

V. Son Xieng Keo.

D. '68/9.

O. T-28 fire bomb.

C. Had gone to visit relatives. He was killed outside village when he returned. There were no holes nearby which he could get into. There were no soldiers around.

T. 2B.

V. Ban Done Tai—Tasseng Seng (Thao Pheung Vongsa) (Khamphoui) 122 families 713 people.

VILLAGES

1. Ban Kom.

2. Nong Kuang.

BAN DONA TAI INTERVIEWS

1. a.:

T. Seng.

B. Kohm.

N. Xieng Phomma.

V. Son Leng 20 y.

D. ?

O. Nine.

C. Had been ordered to go porter for PL, when he stepped on mine.

T. 4A.

b. V. Son Titminh 30 y.

D. '64/9.

O. Bombs from plane.

C. Had gone to porter for the PL and was killed by bombs from plane.

T. 4A.

2. T. Seng.

B. Kohm.

N. Thao More (village secretary).

V. Son Ba Moui 17 y.

- D. '69/.
- O. Bombi from "B-52" plane.
- C. Had gone to school and when returning home was killed by bombi, when he stepped on it. Jet B-52 had dropped the bombs 3-4 days earlier. There were PL and NVN soldiers in the area.
- T. 4A.
3. T. Seng.
- B. Kohm.
- N. Xieng Phomma (Thao Mone Village secretary).
- V. Daughter Nang Tut 35 y, Son-in-law Thao On 35 y.
- D. '66/7 about 12 Noon.
- O. 75mm shell.
- C. They had gone to catch fish near Ban Kom when shell from Meo soldiers fell and killed them. Unsure where exactly the shot came from. There were no soldiers in the area.
- T. 4A.
4. T. Seng.
- B. Kohm.
- N. Thao Sing.
- V. Older sister Nang Ma.
- D. '66/7.
- O. 75mm shell.
- C. Had gone fishing with Nang Tut and Thao On and was killed at the same time.
- T. 4A.
5. a.:
- T. Seng.
- B. Kohm.
- N. Tittkhamta.
- V. Older brother Khanta 44 y older brother of Thao Su named Thao Sou 45 y. also killed.
- D. '66/6 about 8 am.
- O. 106 mm shell.
- C. Meo soldiers were shooting at the PL but they made a mistake and shell fell near Ban Kohm. Both Thao Khanta and Thao Sou were killed by the shell. There were no soldiers around.
- T. 4A.
5. b.:
- T. Seng.
- B. Kohm.
- N. Tit Khamta.
- V. Tit Bouang Di.
- D. '67/9.
- O. Mine.
- C. Had gone to porter for the PL when he stepped on a mine of the Meo soldiers.
- T. 4A.
6. T. Seng.
- B. Kohm.
- N. Thao Vong, village chief.
- V. Younger brother Tit Bout Di 25 yr and Xieng Khong younger brother of Thao Mon.
- D. '68/12.
- O. 75 mm shell.
- C. Bout Di and Xieng Khong were sawing wood outside their homes when a shell from the government side (RLG) fell in the yard killing both of the men. There were no soldiers in the village.
- T. 4A.
7. T. Seng.
- B. Kohm.
- N. Sao Nol.
- V. Husband Xieng Ohn 45 and 12 yr. old son.
- D. '67/9.
- O. "Can" mine.
- C. They had gone to the upland ricefield when Xieng Ohn stepped on a big can (kapong) mine. Both of them were killed. The PL soldiers never used the path to the ricefield. PL soldiers sometimes came to the vil-

lage, but only once in a long while. They always came and went through the forest on different ways but not along the path.

T. 4A.

8. T. Seng.

B. Kohm.

N. Xieng Thanh (village secretary Thao Mone).

V. Son Thao Mi 12 yr.

D. 66/6 in the evening about 4 pm.

O. M-14 mine.

C. He had gone to the upland ricefield with his parents. When they returned, he ran ahead of his parents and stepped on the mine put in by the Meo soldiers. He lost all of his lower leg and died very soon. There were no soldiers around.

T. 4A.

9. T. Seng.

B. Kohn.

N. Thao Phan (village secretary Thao Mone).

V. Older brother Xieng Phila 33 y.

D. '64/6 about 3 p.m.

O. Mine.

C. He had gone to get grass to put on the roof of his house when he stepped on a mine of the Meo soldiers. There were no soldiers around.

T. 4A.

10. T. Seng.

B. Kohm.

N. Thao Pheng (village secretary Thao Mone).

V. Younger brother Thao Pha 35 y.

D. '68/6.

O. Gunshot.

C. Had gone to get rice seedlings to transplant. The Meo soldiers shot him from far away. Maybe they thought he was a PL soldier, but there were no soldiers in the area. His wife was wounded at the same time but she didn't die.

T. 4A.

11. T. Seng.

B. Kohm.

N. Thao Khing (village secretary Thao Mone).

V. Son Tit Nan Thi 33 y.

D. '68/8.

C. Had gone to get buffalo and when he came back he was killed by a mortar from the Meo soldiers. There were no soldiers around. The PL soldiers came to visit only once in a long long while. In a month once or twice but sometimes they didn't come at all for two or three months.

T. 4A.

12. T. Seng.

B. Kohm.

N. Thao Myouang.

V. Nang Phai 5 yr.

O. '69/9 (later told me it was '66/6 about 8:30 a.m. tape 6B).

O. Big bomb from T-28.

C. She had gone to the garden with her mother. As they returned the planes came over, but Nan Phai was too small to know enough to get in to the ditch. She didn't because it was full of water. There were no soldiers around. (and 6B later as noted above)

T. 4A.

13. T. Seng.

B. Kohm.

N. Nang Mai (village secretary Thao Mone).

V. Younger sister Nang Bac 6 y.

D. '68/9.

O. Big bomb from T-28.

C. She had gone to the garden with Nang Phai and her mother. But the children were too small to know enough to get into the hole with Nang Phai's mother.

T. 4A.

14. T. Seng.

N. Nang Phiou (village secretary Thao Mone).

- V. Older brother Thao So 33 y.
 D. '69/9.
 O. Bombi from T-28.
 C. He had gone to chase pigs out of the rice field. He stepped on a bombi which a T-28 plane had dropped earlier. It exploded killing him. There were no soldiers around.
- T. 4A.
 15. T. Seng.
 B. Kohm.
 N-V. Thao Vohng 38 y.
 D. '67/8 about 8 o'clock in the morning.
 O. Bombi from T-28.
 C. Had been working in the ricefield, transplanting rice. When the airplanes came I ran for the holes but didn't make it. No soldiers in the village that day. I was hit in the head and hand. (Note: Thao Vohng was permanently blinded by the bombi).
 T. No tape.
16. T. Seng.
 B. Kohm.
 N-V. Tit Phong (village secretary Tao Mone).
 D. '67/4.
 O. Mine.
 C. Was working with buffalo in ricefield when buffalo stepped on M-14 mine of the Neo soldiers. He lost his leg only. There were no soldiers in the area.
- T. 4A.
 17. T. Seng.
 B. Kohm.
 N-V. Thao Sing.
 D. '64/1.
 O. Mine.
 C. Stepped on a M-14 mine. There were no soldiers in the area. He was later taken to Hanoi and given an artificial leg. However he still cannot work very easily.
- T. 4A.
 18. T. Seng.
 B. Nong Kuang.
 N. Tit Pheng.
 V. Father Xieng Phim 60 y and wife Sao Boun 27 yr.
 D. '66/6 about 5 p.m.
 O. Mine of cannister type.
 C. They had gone to take buffalo to the ricefield. When they went back to get the buffalo they set off the mine, killing them both.
- T. 4A.
 19. T. Seng.
 B. Muang.
 N-V. Thao Phom 43 y now.
 D. '69/8/12 about noon.
 O. Bombi from jet.
 C. Was coming back from the upland ricefield to his house. A bombi exploded as he passed hit him in the foot, hand, arm and back. The bombi had been dropped by the jet two or three hours earlier. He had hidden in a hole when the jet dropped the bombs. He thought that they had all exploded, but they hadn't. He was treated in a PL hospital but still can't work in the field. Can only hold a spade with one hand. And even when he goes walking he can't keep up with his friends because he has to walk very slowly. Still has some pellets from the bombi inside his leg and arm. There were no soldiers in the area when the jet dropped the bombi. Only villagers (General Narration with Thao Phoum and other refugee's from Done Tai). The jets and T-28's came for many years—when we were with the PL, they bombed every year every, every, every day. Jets, T-28's, Jets, T-28's They bombed everything, buffalos, houses, people, everything. If they saw any people—they didn't know if they were villagers or soldiers—they would bomb them. If we even heard the sound of—plane we would run for our holes, so they wouldn't see us. If they saw you they would bomb. Every day they would bomb three, four or even five times. But it depended whether they saw people or not. We

couldn't work during the day. Because if we heard the sound of a plane we had to flee for the holes, we had to work at night or early in the morning. Then in the daytime we slept (laughter). The worst were the little bombs, this size (indicating a sphere 8-12 cm. in diameter) which we called bombi. They would drop all over the village. And explode, pum, pum, pum, pum, pum. After five or ten minutes most explode then after two or three hours you think that they are all exploded and you come out. And just as you walk by one it explodes, just like someone set it off. But they really just explode by themselves. Most of the bombi came from jets and from T-26s-like. T-28 except bigger. The T-28's usually dropped big bombs sometimes bombi but not usually. The bombi came from a big cannister that exploded in the air scattering the little bombs. The bombi were mostly from the jets and the T-26 planes.

There were different kinds of planes. The kind that went very strong and loud, we called jet and the kind that went softer, r-r-r-r-r, we called T-28. And the kind Dakota rrrrrr shot at night. If they saw a fire they would shoot. Right after cooking at 6 o'clock we had to put out the fires even if it was very cold. We couldn't let them see the fire. If it was so cold that we had to make a fire then we had to keep branches handy so if we heard the sound of a plane we could put out the fire. Because if they saw the fire they would drop bombs. At night it was the kind we called Dakota or the kind that looks like a soldiers clothes. It was very difficult. If anyone wasn't very careful they would die. Now its better but I still can't work very well. When they operated they took out a bone in my foot so it is difficult for me to walk.

T. 4B.

20. T. Seng.

B. Kohm.

N. Thao Soun.

V. Son Thao Mo 4 y.

D. '66/1 about 7 m.

O. Artillery.

C. He had been eating evening meal with his family. A 75 mm shell about three meters from the house. He was hit by a fragment and died the next morning. There were no soldiers in the village when the shell hit.

T. 6B.

21. a.:

T. Seng.

B. Kohm.

N. Thao Thone.

V. Daughter Nang Kham 5 y.

D. '65/8.

O. Bomb from T-28.

C. She had run for a hole but a big bomb dropped near her hole. She died one day later. There were no soldiers near. At that time in '65 it was mostly the T-28s which came but there were some jets too.

T. 6B.

21. b.

V. Mother Tao Inh about 70 yrs.

D. '65/3 about 4 pm.

O. "oil bomb from six planes T-28s and T-6s.

C. She had gone to the field with the buffalo and was napping there. She was deaf so didn't hear the planes. The planes dropped the oil bombs and her blouse and skirt caught on fire. She died three days later. Don't know whether it was the T-28 or the T-6 which dropped the "oil" bombs. The T-6 was bigger than the T-28 but we just called them all T-28. In '65 it was mostly the T-28's which bombed. The jets didn't come much until 1966 and after.

T. 6B

22. T. Seng.

B. Kohm.

N-V. Xieng Thong.

D. '65/3.

O. T-28.

- C. Had taken children to the holes. The planes bombed the houses. Xieng Thong came out of the holes to try to put out the fire. The planes came back and strafed again, and Xieng Thong was hit in the stomach. The PL soldiers came and took him about 40 km to the hospital at Lat Bouak. There had been no soldiers in the village when the planes bombed.

T. 6B.

VI. Ban NaKung—Tasseng Seng, 30 families 158 people.

VILLAGE

Ban Mene.
Ban Nong Kuang.
Ban Muang.

BAN NKUNG INTERVIEWS

1. T. Sen.
B. Mene.
N. Nang Ming.
V. Daughter Nang Thong 13 y.
D. '68/10 about 11 p.m.
O. Bombi from T-28 (?).
C. She had gone to take gifts to the Wat. On the way a bombi which had dropped earlier exploded killing her.
- T. 4A (incomplete tape).
2. T. Seng.
B. Mene.
N. Sao Dum.
V. Husband Thao Tha.
D. '66/10 about 8 A.M.
O. Mine.
C. The PL had taken him to porter for them. He had been gone on the portorage for three days. As he returned, he stepped on a mine. There were some PL in the area. None were killed by the mine.
- T. 4B.
3. T. Seng.
B. Mene.
N. Sao Nan.
V. Husband Tiltwan 35 y.
D. '67/3.
O. Gunshot and grenade.
C. He had gone to the forest and was returning with buffalo. Government soldiers ambushed him. They probably suspected he was a PL. But he was just a villager. There weren't any PL soldiers in the area. Has no other relatives killed by PL, VN or bombing.
- T. 4B.
4. T. Seng.
B. Mene.
N. Sao An (Thao Phu village chief, Sao Nyouang).
V. Son Thao Phone 4 y.
D. '64/11 about 12 noon.
O. Fire bomb from T-28.
C. The child was at home. This was before we fled our homes. There were no soldiers in the village. Thao Phu's (village chief) younger brother Thao Phai 4 y and Sao Nyouang's son 4 y were also killed at the same time. The children's parents had all gone to work in the upland rice-field. When the planes came over the children were afraid and ran inside. But the planes dropped the bombs right on the houses. There were no soldiers in the village.
- T. 4B.
5. T. Seng.
B. Mene.
N. Thao Da.
V. Younger brother Thao Bata.
D. '69/8.
O. Small arms.
C. He was returning from portering for the PL for 2 days. There were no soldiers with him. He was alone. The Meo soldiers saw him and shot him immediately. They probably thought he was a soldier. There were no soldiers with him. They had released him to come back alone.

T. 4B.

6. T. Seng.

B. Mene.

N. Nang Ouan (Thao Phu).

V. Father Pho Nan 48 y.

D. '65/6.

O. Mine.

C. Some PL soldiers had died nearby. Other PL soldiers organized villagers to carry the dead soldiers back to their villages. Pho Nan, drafted into this task stepped on a mine. A PL soldier, a company officer, died at the same time.

T. 4B.

7. T. Seng.

B. Mene.

N. Thao Peng.

V. Younger brother Thao La 17 y.

D. '67/7/3 about 5 PM.

O. Cannister mine.

C. He was portering for the PL one day out of Ban Mene, somewhere in Xieng Khouang province. The mine was from the Meo soldiers. There were soldiers with Thao La when he died but don't know if any soldiers died. When villagers have to go portering they usually go for around three days. The village chief has to select who will go. How many people go portering from each village depends on how much equipment the PL have to transport. If it's not very much few go, if it is a lot many go. This time it was one person from each village.

T. 3A.

8. T. Seng.

B. Mene.

N. Sao Naa (village chief Thao Phu).

V. Older sister Sao Maa about 40 y.

D. '69/3.

O. "Canon."

C. Sao Maa had gone to look for fish outside Ban Mene. Some PL were passing by and stopped to watch and talk with the villagers catching fish. Meo soldiers up on the mountain saw the PL and shot at them. Sao Maa and one PL soldier were killed.

T. 3A.

9. a.:

T. Seng.

B. Mene.

N. Sao Di (village chief Thao Pha).

V. Daughter Sao Ba 5 y.

D. '68/7 around noon.

O. "poison" from planes.

C. The planes had dropped poison. Sao Ba was curious and picked some up. Uncertain whether she ate it or just smelled it. She became very drunk and died the next day. The poison came from T-6 planes, like the T-28 only bigger. There were no soldiers around when they dropped the poison.

T. 3A.

9. b.

V. Younger sister Sao Si 8 years old.

D. '67/10 in the morning.

O. Silver and gold paper from the airplanes.

C. The planes had dropped the gold and silver paper. Sao Si had gone out to the ricefield with her mother. She picked some of it up and smelled it. She became very drunk and threw up and died the next day. Usually we were very careful because the PL had told us that it was poison. But Sao Si picked it up and smelled it before her mother could keep her from picking it up. The planes dropped the poison three times. (Later the village chief told me that the poison was dropped many times.)

T. 3A.

10. T. Seng.

B. Mene.

N. Sao Som.

- V. Younger brother Thao Si 24-25 y.
 D. '66/11 in the evening.
 C. A group of villagers had gone to their upland ricefield to get rice. When they were returning some Meo soldiers saw them and shot at them. There were five villagers in the group no soldiers but the Meo probably thought they were soldiers. Two villagers died.
- T. 3A.
 11. T. Seng.
 B. Mene.
 N. Sao Phohng.
 V. Father Ai Tao 80 y.
 D. '69/5 in the evening.
 O. Burning oil.
 C. When the planes dropped the burning oil Ai Tao was hit. He couldn't get his clothes off fast enough. He was badly burned. Bumps came out all over his body and then they burst and his eyes burst also. Four days after he was hit he died. The T-28 planes dropped the burning oil this time.
- T. 3A.
 12. (I returned to Nakung after I realized that I had not comprehended the explanation of the "poison". Sao Di who had originally told me of her sister and daughter being killed by the poison was not in the camp, so I talked with the village chief Thao Phu and a group of 4 or 5 others. I asked, "I do not yet understand about this poison. Can you explain it to me?")
- N. Thao Phu (primarily). The "poison" was sent down by the airplanes. We called it *ya phit* or *ya beua*. The planes dropped a bomb which broke open and sent out the paper, silver and gold paper. The Pathet Lao told us that it was poison. It was long but very narrow like the noodles in Chinese soup. (At this point one man picked up a rice straw to show me what the paper was like.)
 Very narrow. Not really white but this color like your watch (silver.) It was very pretty so the children like to pick it up. The girl who died had picked it up and put it around her neck and smelled it. They dropped it many times in '67, '68, '69. They dropped it all over. In Ban Mone, Ban Kohm, Ban Leh. The poison was dropped by T-28's and T-6 planes. If animals ate the grass on which the poison had dropped they would die. Pigs, chickens, ducks, buffalo, cows even dogs died from the poison. We couldn't touch it so we had to take sticks and push it into holes and bury it. No, Sao Ba and Sao Si didn't eat the poison they just picked it up and smelled it and in two days they died.
- T. 6B.
 VII. Ban Thoun Loua—Tasseng Seng, 57 families 223 people.

VILLAGES

Ban Bouak.
 Ban Leh.

BAN THOUN LOUA INTERVIEWS

1. T. Seng.
 B. Bouak.
 N. Thao Khan.
 V. Daughter Nang Khong 15 y.
 D. 67/12 about 10 A.M.
 O. Big bomb 500kg from jet.
 C. Three children had gone to look for fish when the plane came. But the plane, an F-4—jet dropped big bombs in the area of their hole. They were afraid and ran out and Nang Khong was killed and the other two were wounded.
- T. No tape.
 2. T. Seng.
 B. Bouak.
 N. Thao Phone.
 V. Son Xieng Nyo 21 y.
 D. '67/11.
 O. Can mine.
 C. He had gone to look for a place to make an upland ricefield. Around noon he stepped on the mine and died. There were no soldiers with

him. The path was only used by villagers. The PL soldiers never used the path.

T. No tape.

3. T. Seng.

B. Bouak.

N. Xieng Pheng (village Secretary).

V. Son Pa Pheung 3 y and younger sister Sao Euan 12 y.

D. '68/6 early morning.

O. Big bomb 500 kg from a T-28. When the planes came, the children didn't run because they were afraid that the planes would see them. They tried to stay still. But they had started a small fire to keep warm. The plane probably saw the fire before they could put it out. They were both buried when the bomb exploded. There were no soldiers in the village that day.

T. No tape.

4. T. Seng.

B. Bouak.

N. Nai Phouang (village chief).

V. Daughter Sao Ba 12 yr and young nephew Bai Enly.

D. '65/12 about 2 P.M.

O. Big big bomb from T-28.

C. The children had been playing in the sun. Sao Ba was wearing a white blouse. The plane saw them playing in the open space. We had told the children not to run back to the big holes when the planes came because they would see where the big shelters were and then everyone would die. Both Sao Ba and Bai Eh were killed. There were no soldiers around. Life was very difficult then because the planes came all the time. We had to live with the pigs and eat with the dogs.

T. No tape.

5. T. Seng.

B. Bouak.

N. Sao Nya.

V. Husband Thao Khanta 43 y.

D. '66/5.

O. Mine.

C. He had heard a mine go off and he was afraid that it had killed his buffalo so he went out to see. He stepped on a mine and was killed. It was on a path which villagers always used going back and forth. Soldiers never used it. Doesn't know who set the mine but we were living in region controlled by PL.

T. No tape.

6. a.

T. Seng.

B. Leh.

N. Bouasone (village chief).

V. Older brother Xieng Ouan 39 y. cousin Thao Van 28 y Thao Phan 38 y.

D. '67/9/11 about 8 A.M.

O. Big bombs from T-28.

C. The three men had taken their buffalo out to the fields when four T-28s came over. They ran for the forest but they did not get there in time. All three were killed. There were no soldiers in the area.

T. No tape.

6. b.

V. Wife's younger brother Xieng Moun 37 y.

D. '66/2/9 about 11 A.M.

O. Big bomb 500kg from a T-28.

C. He was going to the upland ricefield. He was hit and killed along the way. There were no soldiers in the area. No soldiers ever used the path.

T. No tape.

7. a.:

T. Seng.

B. Leh.

N. Thao Kong (village chief Bouasone).

V. Older brother Thao Kong.

D. '68/5 about 11 A.M.

O. 500kg bombs from T-28's.

- C. He was coming back from his bath at the river. Two T-28 planes came over. He tried to hide along the path but there wasn't any good place to hide. He was only 30-40m away from the village. Everyone else in the village had heard the planes coming and had fled. There were no soldiers around.
7. b.:
- V. Older brother Thao Ot 22 y, Nang Deng.
 - D. '68/12/13 about 2 P.M.
 - O. Bombi from T-28's.
 - C. Many people had been working together in the field binding bundles of rice and taking them for storage. When the planes came—six of them—all the people lay down in the field. But the planes must have seen them because they dropped the bombs. Two villagers died. Thao Ot and Sao Me's daughter Nang Deng who was 19 y. There were no soldiers around.
- T. No tape.
8. T. Seng.
- B. Leh.
 - N. Sao Me
 - V. Son Thao Onh.
 - D. '68/11/9 about 11 A.M.
 - O. Bombi from T-28.
 - C. He was bringing the buffalo back home. Two T-28 planes came over. He hid, but the planes saw the buffalo and dropped the bombs. There were no soldiers near. There were some far away but there were none near.
- T. No tape.
9. T. Seng.
- B. Leh.
 - N. Sao Douang.
 - V. Son Thao Phom 23 y.
 - D. 67/9/8 about noon.
 - O. Bombi from T-28.
 - C. He was coming back from the upland ricefield. He was killed by the bombi. The kind with wire. The bombi had been dropped by T-28 two days earlier. He was just walking along when he was hit. There were no soldiers around when the bombs were dropped.
- T. 4B.
10. T. Seng.
- B. Leh.
 - N. Thao Pheng.
 - V. Two nephews Thao Phom 16 y and Thao Bu 24 y.
 - D. '66/11/22 about 11 A.M.
 - O. Big bombs from T-28's.
 - C. Villagers were all living in holes but Thao Phom returned to the village to get rice for the children to eat. The planes had already passed once but while Thao Phom was in the village six T-28's came back. They probably saw him because they bombed the village. Thao Bu was in his hole near the village. The planes bombed the forest around the village also and that's when Thao Bu died. There were no soldiers around that day neither in the village or in the forest.
- T. 4B.
11. a.:
- T. Seng.
 - B. Leh.
 - N. Xieng Boua (narrated originally by village Chief Bouasone. Later verified by Xieng Boua).
 - V. Son of older sister Xieng Douang 19 y.
 - D. 66/8/11 about 9 A.M.
 - O. 500 kg. bombs from T-28.
 - C. Xieng Douang was working in the ricefield when four T-28 planes of the very black kind came over. He was alone in the rice field. The planes were bombing village next to the ricefield. Xieng Douang couldn't get out of the ricefield in time and was killed. No one else was killed. There was no one in the village. There were no soldiers around.
- T. 4B.
11. b.:

V. Nephew of Xieng Boua named Xieng Phoumi 19 y.

D. '67/6/13.

O. Big bombs from jet.

C. Villagers were still living in the village. Everyone ran for the holes but a bomb hit Xieng Phoumi's hole and killed him. No soldiers in area.

T. 4B.

12. T. Seng.

B. Leh (near Ban Leh).

N. Sao Toum (village chief Bouasone).

Husband's younger sister Sao Deng 22 y.

D. '68/2/9 about 12 Noon.

O. Bombi from jets and T-28's.

C. Sao Deng had gone out to watch the buffalo. Three days earlier 2 T-28s and 2 F-4-hat jets had destroyed a bridge and had dropped bombi all around the area of the bridge. Sao Deng was killed by one of the bombi which exploded when she was near. There were no soldiers.

T. 4B.

13. Seng.

B. Bouak.

N. Pho Phouang (village chief).

No, I can't tell you anything about the poison they never dropped any poison in Ban Bouak. But a jet did drop butterfly bombs on Ban Bouak once in 1968. Very small like a leaf. If you stepped on one it would explode and blow off your leg. These bombs came in two different colors, green and brown like the color of a dried up leaf. No, they weren't the same as bombi. They were much smaller. (At this point he took two leaves, one green and one dry and brown in order to show me what the butterfly bombs were like. Triangular in shape and quite flat.) They only dropped these bombs once. And only one plane. But there were many. A thousand. More than a thousand. Ten buffalo were killed from stepping on the butterfly bombs. When the jet dropped the butterfly bombs there were no soldiers in the whole area. We were in the upland ricefield when these bombs were dropped. They were dropped all around. In an area as big as like Thoun Loua to Ban Nakung (4-5 km.). They were very dangerous and we had to be very careful. We had to collect them and bury them. Yes, they were dangerous. We learned that it was safe to pick them up by one of the three corners. If we touched either of the wrong corners the bombs would explode and we would be killed. But by one corner it was safe to pick them up.

T. 6B.

14. T. Seng.

B. Bouak.

N. Thao Sing.

V. Son Thao Thone.

D. '66/1 about 10 A.M.

O. Big bombs from T-28 planes.

C. The boy was sleeping at home. His parents had gone to work in the ricefield. Four planes came and bombed the village. We hadn't yet gone to live in the holes. The bombs dropped too close to the house and the child was killed immediately. There were no soldiers in the village when the planes bombed.

T. 6B.

15. T. Seng.

B. Bouak.

N. Nang Ban.

V. Son Thao Phom 10 y.

D. '67/10 about 8 A.M.

O. Big bombs from T-28 planes.

C. Child had been playing in area near the village. The planes dropped big, big bombs, and a tree fell over on the child killing him. His parents were working in the upland ricefield. There were no soldiers in the village. At that time, the planes came four or five times a day. Mostly T-28's bombed then. The jets started coming heavily in 1968. The jets and the T-28's would come together.

T. 6B.

16. T. Seng.

B. Boua.

- N. Xieng Thong.
 V. Sons Thao Boun Tham 4 y and Thao Boun Thian 2 y.
 D. '69/11 about 10 A.M.
 O. Artillery shell.
 C. The boys didn't make it to the hole in time. A 106 shell from Bouamlong fell near them killing them both. There were no soldiers in the area. The soldiers (PL) usually stayed in the forest and in the mountains. The guns in Bouamlong would sometimes shoot constantly from 7 A.M. until noon. No relatives have been killed by the PL or the Vietnamese.
- T. 6B. (Partial interview only.)
17. T. Seng.
 B. Bouak.
 N. Xieng Pa.
 V. Daughters Nong Khamphanh 3 y and Nang Phon 2 y.
 D. '67/5 about noon.
 O. Big bombs from a jet.
 C. Most of the adults in the village had gone to work in the upland ricefield. Khamphanh and Phon were in the village. They hid in a hole when the planes came. But the jets dropped big, big bombs—500 kg. bombs and both girls were killed. There were no soldiers around. They never came to stay in the village.
- T. No tape.
18. T. Seng.
 B. Bouak.
 N. Thao Khan.
 V. Grand-daughter Sao Leh 4 y.
 D. '66/11 about 8 A.M.
 O. 106 mm. shell from Bouamlong.
 C. Sao Leh was eating in a hole. A shell fell nearby and a fragment flew into the hole and killed her immediately. There were no soldiers in the area that day.
- T. No tape.
19. T. Seng.
 B. Bouak.
 N. Thao Duan.
 V. Daughter Sao Phim 8 y.
 D. '67/10.
 O. Artillery shell from Bouamlong.
 C. She was playing in the village when the shell hit. A shell fragment struck her. She died immediately. There were no soldiers in the area.
- T. No tape.
20. T. Seng.
 B. Leh.
 N. Thao Bouasone village chief.
 V. Daughter.
 D. '69/7.
 O. Smoke bomb (?).
 C. Adults had gone to work in the village. The children had been told to stay in the holes and hide from the planes. A smoke bomb fell near the hole. The kind which they shoot. Nang Boudi ate some vegetables near where the bomb had fallen. She got sick and died three days later. We think that the bomb had poisoned the vegetables. Both T-28s and jets were around that day. Don't know whether it was T-28 or jet which dropped the smoke bomb.
- T. 7A.
24. T. Seng.
 B. Leh.
 N. Sao Khampa (village chief Boua Sone).
 V. Son Thao Phiou 8 y. Sao Thoumi's daughter Nang Vang Pheng 3 yr. Thao Oun's son Thao Phi 10 y. Thao Chand's son Thao Phi 6 yr.
 D. '69/9.
 O. "Poison."
 C. The children had gone to care for the buffalo. They stopped to eat some sour leaves, the kind which they regularly ate. But this time after eating the leaves, they started to throw up. Threw up many times. Three days later they all died. The planes had dropped poison two

days before. The poison had probably contaminated the leaves. The planes had dropped the poison on the village and the area around the village. There were no soldiers around when they dropped the poison. The poison was like sheets of paper.

T. 7A.

(Earlier Xiang Boua and Bouasone had described the poison in general terms.) The planes dropped the poison many times. Many animals died from the poison, pigs, cows, buffalos and chickens. The poison was like sheets of paper. But in many different sizes sometimes as big as 1 m. x 25 cm. It was both green and white in color. It would burn your feet if you stepped on it.

T. No tape.

VIII. Dong Kaleum—Tasseng Xiang, 60 families 340 people.

VILLAGES

1. Ban Siphom.
2. Ban Nasay.
3. Ban Naliang.
4. Ban Sang.

BAN DONG KALEUM

1. T. Xiang.
- B. Nasay.
- N. Thao SoPl.
- V. Older brother Thao La.
- D. '69/4 about 9 A.M.
- O. Bombi from a jet.
- C. Thao La was working in the ricefield when the jet came over. The fragments from the bombi killed him. There were no soldiers in the village but the planes probably thought that there were some in the forest near the village.
- T. No tape.
2. T. Xiang.
- B. Sang.
- N. Nai Mul.
- V. Younger brother Thao Bouala now 10 years old.
- D. '69/3/14 or 15 about 2 P.M.
- O. Bomb from F105 jet.
- C. Thao Bouala fled for the hole when the jets came but he didn't make it. He was hit by fragments from a bomb. He survived but lost the use of his left arm. The bomb was about the size of a bucket. There were no soldiers in the village. At that time the planes were always around. From 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. there were always planes around. Mostly F105 and F-4-hat jets. The T-28's didn't bomb very much then. (Pic. of F105 like the one which dropped bomb which injured Thao Bouala.)
- T. No tape.
3. T. Xiang.
- B. Phia Vat.
- N. Nang Khamphounta.
- V. Husband Tit Boun Thong 27 y.
- D. '69/8/23 in the afternoon 3 or 4 P.M.
- O. Big bombs from T-28.
- C. Tit Boun Thong had been working in the ricefield and did not reach the hole in time when the planes came over. There were no soldiers around when the planes bombed. Nang Khamphounta couldn't remember how many times the planes came over in a day because when they came she was very frightened and just ran for shelter. "Every time I heard a plane I fled for the holes." (Picture is of Nang Khamphounta's children Phomachan and Chanthadon. Khamphounta was shy and preferred that I take a picture of her children.)
- T. No tape.
4. T. Xiang.
- B. Kang Pa.
- N. Sao Thongdi.
- V. Relative Thao Keo 26 y.
- D. '69/1/12.
- O. Big, big bombs from T-28 or jet (not sure).
- C. He had been working in the ricefield near the village. He ran for a hole when the planes came but did not make it. He was hit in the neck and

stomach by bomb fragments and died that day there were many, many planes. There were no soldiers in the village when the bombs were dropped.

T. 5A.

5. T. Xieng.

B. Ban Nasay.

N. Sao Ka Meung.

V. Younger brother Thao Tha 15 y.

D. '64/11 about 5 P.M.

O. Bombs from T-28.

C. Thao Tha was the only one at home when the planes came. They bombed the village and Ka Meung's house burned up completely. There were no soldiers in the village when the planes bombed, only villagers. The bombing was the worst in '68 and '69. We had to stay in the holes all the time, can't remember what kind of planes. "Always fled. When we heard the sound of a plane. Didn't stop to look."

T. 5A.

6. a.:

T. Xieng.

B. Si Phom.

N. Pho Ngeun Nan Ta.

V. Son Xieng Ouan 26 y.

D. '69/12.

O. Shot.

C. Pho Ngeun NanTa didn't really know the cause of his son's death. He only knew that he was shot while he was in the village. There were no soldiers around at the time.

6. b.:

V. Pho Ngeun Nan Ta's son Xieng Dam Douan 18 y.

D. 67/5.

O. Big bombs.

C. Xieng Dam Douan had been at home when the planes came over. There were four of them but unsure of which kind. There had been 10 PL in the village but they left just before the planes came.

T. 5A.

7. T. Xieng.

B. Nasay.

N. Me Daa.

V. Mother Sao Deng 64 y.

D. 62 (?) /3.

O. 106 shell from the RLG side.

C. Sao Deng was old but she was very strong and always went to work in the ricefield. She had been boiling rice at home. She was the only one in the house. All the rest were in the holes. A 106 shell landed under the house. There were no soldiers around when the shell fell. But that evening the PL came and operated on Sao Deng. They took out two shell fragments but it didn't do any good. She died the next morning.

T. 5A.

8. T. Xieng.

B. Si Phom.

N. Sao Oun.

V. Husband Thao Khen 27 y.

D. '67/9/10 about 2 P.M.

O. Big bombs from T-28.

C. He had been going to the ricefield when the planes came over. He was hit by fragments and died. There were no soldiers in the village at the time. In '67 the planes didn't come very often, only two times a day. It was mostly jets then, F-4-hat jets.

T. 5A.

9. T. Xieng.

B. Tiavat.

N. Nan Ta.

V. Younger brother Thao Mi 53 y.

D. '68/3 morning.

O. Mine.

C. He had gone to catch fish in small stream near ricefield. He stepped on a mine and died. There were no soldiers with him but sometimes the PL soldiers used that path.

T. 5A.

10. a.:

T. Xieng.

B. Sang.

N. Than Tit Bounml.

V. Son Xieng Onhta 18 yr.

D. '65/6 about 9 A.M.

O. Mine.

C. He had gone to porter for the PL. One day out of Ban Sang when he stepped on a mine and was killed. He was the only one who was killed.

T. 5A.

b.:

(On tape after #14).

V. Xieng Som Si 15 yr.

D. '67/7 about 4 P.M.

O. Big bombs from T-28's.

C. He had gone to visit relatives when he was coming back with a group of twelve people, the planes came over. The people ran for the holes but Xieng Som Si did not make it in time. There were not any soldiers with the group or even in the area. The bombing started in 1965, but it was not very heavy. There were only T-28s. The F105 jets first came in 1965. The F-4 hat jets came after that. After 1965 all three kinds were in together T-28, F105 and F-4 hat. Often the T-28's came first and then the jets came after. (I then asked whether the planes just shoot at the soldiers.) Maybe the planes wanted to shoot the soldiers. But the soldiers went away into the forest. So all they could see was villagers. So they bombed villagers. If they saw anyone they would shoot. They just shot everything.

T. 5A.

11. T. Xieng.

B. Nasay.

N. Sao. Mi.

V. Father Vou Chin Chong 60 y.

D. 70/4.

O. Jets.

C. He was trying to come to this side. Came out after the other refugees. Father tried to bring out two of his small children before the rest of the family. He was trying to go up Phou Khe mountain. But the soldiers must have seen him and thought that he was a PL because the jets came and strafed them. Only father was killed. The two children were taken to Savannakhet by the soldiers.

T. 5A.

12. T. Xieng.

B. Nasay.

N-V. Xieng Boua Pa.

D. '69/7 about 11 A.M. or noon.

O. Big bomb, jet or T-28 (not sure).

C. He had come back from working in the field and had stopped to talk with friends. Three planes (thinks they were jets but not sure) came over. Xieng Boua Pa fled for the holes but it wasn't quite in time. They had just been sitting talking together. There were no soldiers in the village. At that time the F-4 hat jets came very often, many times each day. Only the men came out of the holes all of the time.

T. 5A.

13. T. Xieng.

B. Masay.

N. Xieng Phai.

V. Older Brother Xieng Nuan 45 y.

D. '68/7/5.

O. Big bombs from T-28 planes.

C. He was in the PL jail called Tham Chan. It was in the jungle outside of Ban Kong Pho. There were more than one hundred prisoners in the jail. Sixty-three died when the planes bombed. There were no soldiers but there were some police guards.

T. 5A.

14. a.:

T. Xieng.

- B. Phleng.
 N. Me Bounta.
 V. Older brother Xieng Tan 33 yr.
 D. '65/4.
 O. Small arms.
 C. Two PL soldiers were in the village RLG soldiers encircled the village. In the battle which followed Xieng Tan was killed. Two other villagers were also killed. And the two PL soldiers were killed too.
 b. (at this point a neighbor started to help in the narration because Me Bounta's child was crying) :
 V. Younger brother Thao Thong 19 y.
 D. '68/9/18.
 O. Mine.
 C. He had gone to porter for the PL. He wasn't out of Ban Thieng more than one day. He was killed by a mine. PL sometimes had villagers porter for one day only, sometimes for many days.
- T. 5A.
 15. T. Xieng.
 B. Nasay.
 N. Nang Sida.
 V. Husband Tit Van Di 25 y.
 D. '68/11 about the 11th, about noon.
 O. Big big bombs from jets.
 C. All of the villagers were living in holes then. But Tit Van Di went back to the village to get some things to take to the holes. While he was in the village the jets bombed before he could flee. There were no soldiers in the village. At that time the planes came many times every day 4 or 5 times even at night. The jets and the T-28s together. Sometimes the T-28's would drop the big bombs first and then the jets would drop the bomb.
- T. 5A.
 16. T. Xieng.
 B. Sang.
 N. Xieng Souha.
 V. Older brother Tit Thani 60 yr.
 D. '68/7/5 about 10AM.
 O. Big bombs from T-28s and jets together.
 C. The PL had put Tit Thani in the jail called Tham Chanh. Jets and T-28s came together. The planes probably bombed on account of the PL guards. But the guards just locked the prison and fled into their holes as soon as the planes came. Sixty-two or sixty-three prisoners died. (T.5A) In 1968 the planes came to Ban Sang many times each day maybe even 10 or 20 times a day. There were no soldiers in the village but maybe the planes saw villagers and thought that they were soldiers. Usually all the villagers made it to the holes in time.
- T. 5B.
 17. T. Xieng.
 B. Sang.
 N-V. Xieng So Pha 62 yrs.
 D. '67/12/7 about 4 PM.
 O. Big bombs from T-28 planes.
 C. Had been putting away rice when two T-28 planes came. They dropped big bombs which destroyed everything. Xieng So Pha was hit in the back and head. The PL gave him medical treatment and took him to a hospital in Xieng Khouang for an operation. However, he is still deaf in his right ear and it hurts inside. He cannot do heavy work.
- T. 5A.
 18. T. Xieng.
 B. Sang.
 N-V. Tit Phang.
 D. '69/9/10 about noon.
 O. Bomb from T-28s and jets.
 C. Had been transplanting rice. Some prisoners from the jail called Tham Chan were working in the field nearby. Some PL guards were with them. Everyone ran for the holes when the planes came but I did not reach a hole in time. There were about 20 prisoners working in the field but none of them were injured. They and the guards all reached the holes safely.

Was wounded in the back. (I) recovered although it still hurts sometimes. In '69 it was mostly jets which bombed though on the occasion when I was wounded, it may have been T-28s rather than jets which dropped the bomb. The planes, mostly jets, came two or three times a day. If they saw *anyone* they would just shoot them.

T. -5B.

19. T. Ngan.

B. Muang Ngan.

N. Nang Inh.

V. Older brother Thao Tun 48 y.

D. '68/9 in the morning.

O. 106 shell.

C. He had been gone portering with the PL one and a half or two days.

There were many villagers together portering and some guards. A 106 cannon shell fell and killed Thao Tun.

T. 5B (bad tape).

20. T. Xieng.

B. Siphom.

N. Thanh Nui.

V. Son Thao Somnuck 13 yrs.

D. '67/2 or 3 morning.

O. 106 cannon shell.

C. Thao Somnuck had gone to work in the rice field when a 106 cannon shell fell nearby injuring him. He did not die but he lost his right hand. There were some PL soldiers in the area when the shell fell. About 500 meters away from Thao Somnuck.

T. No tape.

21. T. Xieng.

B. Na Liang.

N. Nai Eh.

V. Older sister Sao Phomma and her child Thao Chanh 3 y.

D. 67/1.

O. 106 shell.

C. Sao Phomma was carrying the child on her back when the shell fell. Both Sao Phomma and the child were killed. This was when they on the PL side. The shell was from the RLG side. There were no soldiers nearby when the shell fell. There were some about 1km away on top of a mountain.

T. No tape.

IX. Nong Van Pheung—Tasseng Xieng, 93 families 486 people.

VILLAGES

1. Ban Pho Si.

2. Ban Naou.

3. Ban Konhsavan.

4. Ban Nakham.

5. Ban Muong Khong.

6. Ban Thoum.

7. Ban Seh Fa.

8. Ban Kang Pa.

NONG VAN PHEUNG INTERVIEWS

1. T. Xieng.

B. Kong Pa.

N. Sao Siphon 47 y.

V. Children. Thao Von 16y, Thao Li 13y, Nang Thong Tan 12y, Thao Chantadom 10y, Thao Khamla 7y, Thao Khamsook 5y, Nang Say-sompheng 1y.

D. '69/7 and 8.

O. Disease.

C. It was when we were at Nalouang. (RLG.) They would have a fever for two or three days and then die. It wasn't a normal disease. They would just have a fever for a few days and then they would die. It was the place Nalouang. It had bad spirits. It was a bad place. Doctors went to see but they didn't know what was wrong. Even an American doctor came but it didn't help. The children still died. All of my children, all seven died.

- T. 6A.
 2. T. Xieng.
 B. Kang Pa.
 N. Sao Van Si.
 V. Husband Xieng Dong Di 35 y.
 D. '69/10.
 O. -7.
 C. We had come to this side already on the plain of Jars. They captured him and made him a soldier. He did not want to be a soldier. But they made him a soldier anyway. He died less than a month later. It was the Meo soldiers from region two who made him a soldier. I haven't received any money from the government and I have six children to raise. It is very difficult. (Note: When I learned that Xieng Dong Di had been a soldier when he died, I explained that I was primarily interested in civilians. Sao Van Di said that her husband really wasn't a soldier. He didn't want to be a soldier. They made him be a soldier. But really he was a civilian "just like us.")
- T. 6A.
 3. T. Xieng.
 B. Na Kham.
 N. Sao Nali.
 V. Daughter Sao Dam Douan.
 D. '69/8.
 O. Fever.
 C. It was in Nalouang, after we had come to this side. She got the fever and a Meo doctor gave her a shot but it didn't do any good. She still died.
- T. 6A.
 4. T. Xieng.
 B. Nakham.
 N. Sao Anta.
 V. Children Thao Ko 5 y, Thao Eh 1 y.
 D. (Same) '69/8.
 O. Fever.
 C. They died in Nalouang. They had the fever. The doctors gave them mauu shots but in 4 or 5 days they died.
- T. 6A.
 5. T. Xieng.
 B. Nakham.
 N. Sao Vandl.
 V. Children Sao Boun Ma 3 y and Thao Eh 2 y.
 D. (Same.)
 O. Fever.
 C. They died in Nalouang also. The doctors gave them shots but they died in 4 or 5 days. They died after we had been in Nalouang only about one month. We were there in Nalouang altogether about 11 months.
- T. 6A.
 6. T. Xieng.
 B. Nakham.
 N. Sao Nouan.
 V. Daughter Nang Boua Wai 1 y.
 D. '69/12.
 O. Fever.
 C. She died when we were in Nalouang. She had a fever and a cough and was given shots but after 4 or 5 days she died.
- T. 6A.
 7. T. Xieng.
 B. Thoum.
 N. Sao Khamphenl.
 V. Children Sao Khamtan 5 y Thao Thongton 3 y.
 D. '69/8.
 O. Fever.
 C. When we were in Nalouang, they died from the fever.
- T. 6A.
 8. T. Xieng.
 B. Seh Fa.
 N. Sao Boun Ma.

- V. Children Sao Keo 10 y, Thao Le 7 y, Thao Bounchan 5 y, Nang Damdouan 4 y.
 D. '69/7, 8.
 O. Fever.
 C. They all died in Nalouang, all four of my children. I have no children left.
- T. 6A.
 9. T. Xieng.
 B. Muong Khong.
 N. Sao Phai.
 V. Daughter Sao Phai 5 y.
 D. (Same.)
 O. Fever.
 C. She had the fever also.
- T. 6A.
 10. T. Xieng.
 B. Seh Fa.
 N. Xieng Sing.
 V. Nephew Thao Soundara 5 y.
 D. 67/2/5 5:30 A.M.
 O. Douchett (small rocket) from T-28.
 C. The child was in a hole but the hole was hit by a douchett from a T-28. There were no soldiers in the village. At that time the planes came alot. At least every day.
- T. 6A.
 11. T. Xieng.
 B. Ban Nakham.
 N. Thao Tha (Tasseng Xieng Secretary) Boun Song.
 V. Child Thao Tha 6 y.
 D. '70/3.
 O. Sickness.
 C. He had a headache and fever for two or three days. It was when we came on the plane to Vientiane. Three or four hundred children died altogether. Three or four hundred children from Tasseng Xieng and Tasseng Nueun died while we were in Nalouang. The two Tassengs had maybe 2600 people altogether. Out of this number 300 children died when we were in Nalouang. Mostly all children. Just a couple old people.
- T. 6A.
 12. T. Xieng.
 B.
 N. Thanh Boun Song (Tasseng Xieng Secretary) and group of 5-6 other villagers (I asked if the airplanes had ever dropped poison on their villages) Yes, they dropped it on us. It was the F105 jets which dropped it. It was long. It looked like the little noodles from Chinese soup. The Vietnamese said that it was poison. The Pathet Lao taught us to get long sticks and use the sticks to move it into holes and bury it. Also there was another kind of poison which looked like salt. After buffalo ate grass on which it was dropped they died. The paper kind sometimes was in very long pieces two or three meters. It looked like thin strips of paper. Like if you cut a piece of white paper into small strips. We were afraid to touch it.
- T. (No tape.)
 13. (I returned to Van Pheung on Jan 2 because I had not recorded the villagers description of the poison on Jan 1. See #12).
- T. Xieng.
 N. Thanh Boun Song (Tasseng Xieng Secretary).
 Yes, there were many kinds of things which the villagers called poison, but its not important. We don't really know where it came from. Whether it came from the planes or whether someone brought it, we're not sure. No, I never saw any poison. In Xieng Khouang all I saw was the bombs that exploded sending out many small white particles. If the chickens ate it they would die. It was small and white like salt.
 (At this point other villagers, including village chief of Ban Kang Pa. Xieng Pheng joined in the conversation). No, it wasn't like paper. You see there were two kinds, one like salt and the other like paper.

- T. 6A.
 2. T. Xieng.
 B. Kang Pa.
 N. Sao Van Si.
 V. Husband Xieng Dong Di 35 y.
 D. '69/10.
 O. -7.
 C. We had come to this side already on the plain of Jars. They captured him and made him a soldier. He did not want to be a soldier. But they made him a soldier anyway. He died less than a month later. It was the Meo soldiers from region two who made him a soldier. I haven't received any money from the government and I have six children to raise. It is very difficult. (Note: When I learned that Xieng Dong Di had been a soldier when he died, I explained that I was primarily interested in civilians. Sao Van Di said that her husband really wasn't a soldier. He didn't want to be a soldier. They made him be a soldier. But really he was a civilian "just like us.")
- T. 6A.
 3. T. Xieng.
 B. Na Kham.
 N. Sao Nali.
 V. Daughter Sao Dam Douan.
 D. '69/8.
 O. Fever.
 C. It was in Nalouang, after we had come to this side. She got the fever and a Meo doctor gave her a shot but it didn't do any good. She still died.
- T. 6A.
 4. T. Xieng.
 B. Nakham.
 N. Sao Anta.
 V. Children Thao Ko 5 y, Thao Eh 1 y.
 D. (Same) '69/8.
 O. Fever.
 C. They died in Nalouang. They had the fever. The doctors gave them mauu shots but in 4 or 5 days they died.
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 5. T. Xieng.
 B. Nakham.
 N. Sao Vandl.
 V. Children Sao Boun Ma 3 y and Thao Eh 2 y.
 D. (Same.)
 O. Fever.
 C. They died in Nalouang also. The doctors gave them shots but they died in 4 or 5 days. They died after we had been in Nalouang only about one month. We were there in Nalouang altogether about 11 months.
- T. 6A.
 6. T. Xieng.
 B. Nakham.
 N. Sao Nouan.
 V. Daughter Nang Boua Wai 1 y.
 D. '69/12.
 O. Fever.
 C. She died when we were in Nalouang. She had a fever and a cough and was given shots but after 4 or 5 days she died.
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 7. T. Xieng.
 B. Thoum.
 N. Sao Khamphenl.
 V. Children Sao Khamtan 5 y Thao Thongton 3 y.
 D. '69/8.
 O. Fever.
 C. When we were in Nalouang, they died from the fever.
- T. 6A.
 8. T. Xieng.
 B. Seh Fa.
 N. Sao Boun Ma.

- V. Children Sao Keo 10 y, Thao Le 7 y, Thao Bounchan 5 y, Nang Damdouan 4 y.
 D. '69/7, 8.
 O. Fever.
 C. They all died in Nalouang, all four of my children. I have no children left.
- T. 6A.
 9. T. Xieng.
 B. Muong Khong.
 N. Sao Phai.
 V. Daughter Sao Phai 5 y.
 D. (Same.)
 O. Fever.
 C. She had the fever also.
- T. 6A.
 10. T. Xieng.
 B. Seh Fa.
 N. Xieng Sing.
 V. Nephew Thao Soundara 5 y.
 D. 67/2/5 5:30 A.M.
 O. Douchett (small rocket) from T-28.
 C. The child was in a hole but the hole was hit by a douchett from a T-28. There were no soldiers in the village. At that time the planes came alot. At least every day.
- T. 6A.
 11. T. Xieng.
 B. Ban Nakham.
 N. Thao Tha (Tasseng Xieng Secretary) Boun Song.
 V. Child Thao Tha 6 y.
 D. '70/3.
 O. Sickness.
 C. He had a headache and fever for two or three days. It was when we came on the plane to Vientiane. Three or four hundred children died altogether. Three or four hundred children from Tasseng Xieng and Tasseng Nueun died while we were in Nalouang. The two Tassengs had maybe 2600 people altogether. Out of this number 300 children died when we were in Nalouang. Mostly all children. Just a couple old people.
- T. 6A.
 12. T. Xieng.
 B.
 N. Thanh Boun Song (Tasseng Xieng Secretary) and group of 5-6 other villagers (I asked if the airplanes had ever dropped poison on their villages) Yes, they dropped it on us. It was the F105 jets which dropped it. It was long. It looked like the little noodles from Chinese soup. The Vietnamese said that it was poison. The Pathet Lao taught us to get long sticks and use the sticks to move it into holes and bury it. Also there was another kind of poison which looked like salt. After buffalo ate grass on which it was dropped they died. The paper kind sometimes was in very long pieces two or three meters. It looked like thin strips of paper. Like if you cut a piece of white paper into small strips. We were afraid to touch it.
- T. (No tape.)
 13. (I returned to Van Pheung on Jan 2 because I had not recorded the villagers description of the poison on Jan 1. See #12).
- T. Xieng.
 N. Thanh Boun Song (Tasseng Xieng Secretary).
 Yes, there were many kinds of things which the villagers called poison, but its not important. We don't really know where it came from. Whether it came from the planes or whether someone brought it, we're not sure. No, I never saw any poison. In Xieng Khouang all I saw was the bombs that exploded sending out many small white particles. If the chickens ate it they would die. It was small and white like salt.
 (At this point other villagers, including village chief of Ban Kang Pa. Xieng Pheng joined in the conversation). No, it wasn't like paper. You see there were two kinds, one like salt and the other like paper.

During the May and June of 1969 before the government (RLG) came, the bombing was the heaviest, they dropped many bombs. Both T-28's and jets dropped the bombs. Four villagers from Kang Pa died from the bombing in 1969. The bombing was the heaviest in May and June before the government (RLG) came in July. Yes, there were soldiers in the village when the planes dropped the bombs. Four or five Vietnamese always stayed with us. They were afraid that we would come to this side. If we moved from one place to another they would always move with us. There were more than 100 villagers in Kang Pa. can't count how many times the planes dropped the bombs. No, we never saw any poison. Whether they dropped any poison in Kang Pa or not, I don't know. There were some people who got sick and drunk though. No, we never saw any poison. Never. (At this point one man in the background said that the planes sometimes dropped paper). It was paper like this. In very small strips. (One man took the foil from a cigarette package and sent a small girl to get some scissors. When she brought them he started cutting the foil into small strips perhaps 2-4 mm wide.) The paper was like this. Both T-28's and jets dropped it. The Vietnamese told us that it was poison and that we shouldn't touch it or pick it up. Or sometimes they called it *ya mao* (literally "drunk medicine") Or they said like in Vietnam K-nee poison. Animals never ate this kind of poison. They only ate the white kind which was like salt. The paper kind came in long long pieces. Sometimes three or four meters. They told us "this is poison. Don't touch it or you will get drunk and die." Even if you only touch it. We had to take sticks and bury it, we couldn't touch it. If we touched it, it would burn. It was like this (gesturing to the cut strands from the cigarette package foil.) except much longer. The other kind was white, like salt. If buffalo ate it they would die. If it fell on grass all the grass would die. It came from the planes like the other kind. (There followed a general discussion of villagers killed by bombing, artillery and one woman killed by the "enemy" when she tried to come to this side. I didn't have time to get all of the details or even names.)

X. Mak Nao—Tasseng Thai (Thao Chan Phet), 44 families 203 people.

VILLAGES

Ban Puk.
Ban Chuay.

BAN MAK NAO INTERVIEWS

1. T. Thai.
B. Chuay.
N. Sao Chan.
V. Younger brother Siphon 22 y.
D. '68 (?) /1.
O. Mine.
C. He had gone portering for the PL. He stepped on a mine and was killed as he was returning to Ban Chuay.
2. T. Thai.
B. Puk.
N. Sao Phan.
V. Husband Thao Toumma 23 y.
D. '69/11 or 12/.
- O. Bombs from T-28's and jets.
C. He had gone to get rice in the upland ricefield. When they were coming back to the holes the planes came. They couldn't flee in time. Nine villagers were killed. There were no soldiers around just villagers. The planes dropped big big bombs. The planes came very often. They came like the birds. All the time there were a few. Even at night we couldn't sleep safely. Even though there were no soldiers the planes shot up everything.
3. T. Thai.
B. Puk.
N. Brothers Xleng Si Da and Thit Phim Pha.
V. Sister-in-law Sao Mone 27 y.

- D. '69/11 about 12 noon.
O. 2 T-28 planes and jets.
C. She had gone to get rice in the ricefield. On her way back the planes came and dropped big bombs. There were no soldiers in the village. At that time the planes came very often. There were more planes than birds.

- T. 6A.
4. T. Thai.
B. Chuay.
N. Bouavan.
V. Mother Sao Da 54 y and younger brother Boua Thong 14 y.
D. '69/11.
O. Big bombs from jets and T-28's.
C. They had gone to get rice in the upland ricefield. When they were returning the planes came over. They ran for the holes but couldn't reach safety in time. Nine villagers died at the same time. In those days the planes came very often 8 or 10 times each day.
- T. 6A.
5. T. Thai.
B. Puk.
N. Sao Siphon.
V. Father Tit Tuam 56 yr. and brother-in-law Thao Then 23 y.
O. Bombs from T-28's and jets.
C. They had gone to the upland ricefield to get rice to bring back to the holes. They couldn't hide when the planes came over. Nine villagers died. There were no soldiers with the group.
- T. 6A.
6. T. Thai.
B. Chuay.
N. Sao Oun.
V. 64/11 (?)
O. Mine.
C. He had gone to get rice in the upland rice field. When he was returning, he stepped on a mine. We took him to a hospital but he died before we could get there. We were in the region controlled by the PL. So the mine was probably put in by the soldiers from this side.
- T. 5A.
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N. Tasseng Chanphet and old man.

All of the villagers had to live in the holes for two years '68-'69. The planes shot everything, the houses and the buffalo, just everything, it it all burned. In '66 only the T-28's came to bomb. But by '68 there were more jets than T-28's. There were two kinds of jets, F105 and F-4-hat. The F-4-hat could go very low close to the trees but the F105 usually flew much higher. In those two last years we had to stay in our holes all the time. We dug a hole 10 meters into the side of the mountain. In 1968 there were more F105 than F-4-hat, but in 1969 there were more F-4-hat than F105. First the Eller 19 plans would come and shoot a smoke bomb. Then T-28's would shoot, then two F-105's then two F-4-hats, etc. etc. They came in pairs two at a time. The planes shot up our village 12 times, T-28's and jets. On the day that nine villagers died there were twenty-two planes. First there was an Eller-19 which shot—smoke bombs. Then there were two T-28's then all the rest were jets. They came at 9 A.M. that morning and shot all through the day. There were no soldiers around only villagers. A large group of maybe 30 villagers had gone to get rice in the ricefield near Ban Chuay. (See map) when they were returning to the holes an Eller 19 saw three or four of the villagers and must have ordered the jets. They probably thought that there were many people in the hills on both sides of the valley. That day they mostly dropped the 150 kg bombs, it was about 4km from the rice field to the holes. Twelve of the villagers were caught in the valley half-way between the ricefield and the holes. They had no place to hide. Nine were killed.

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X. Mak Nao—Tasseng Thai (Thao Chan Phet), 44 families 203 people.

VILLAGES

Ban Puk.
Ban Chuay.

BAN MAK NAO INTERVIEWS

1. T. Thai.
B. Chuay.
N. Sao Chan.
V. Younger brother Siphon 22 y.
D. '68 (?) /1.
O. Mine.
C. He had gone portering for the PL. He stepped on a mine and was killed as he was returning to Ban Chuay.
2. T. Thai.
B. Puk.
N. Sao Phan.
V. Husband Thao Toumma 23 y.
D. '69/11 or 12/.
- O. Bombs from T-28's and jets.
C. He had gone to get rice in the upland ricefield. When they were coming back to the holes the planes came. They couldn't flee in time. Nine villagers were killed. There were no soldiers around just villagers. The planes dropped big big bombs. The planes came very often. They came like the birds. All the time there were a few. Even at night we couldn't sleep safely. Even though there were no soldiers the planes shot up everything.
3. T. Thai.
B. Puk.
N. Brothers Xleng Si Da and Thit Phim Pha.
V. Sister-in-law Sao Mone 27 y.

- D. '69/11 about 12 noon.
O. 2 T-28 planes and jets.
C. She had gone to get rice in the ricefield. On her way back the planes came and dropped big bombs. There were no soldiers in the village. At that time the planes came very often. There were more planes than birds.

- T. 6A.
4. T. Thai.
B. Chuay.
N. Bouavan.
V. Mother Sao Da 54 y and younger brother Boua Thong 14 y.
D. '69/11.
O. Big bombs from jets and T-28's.
C. They had gone to get rice in the upland ricefield. When they were returning the planes came over. They ran for the holes but couldn't reach safety in time. Nine villagers died at the same time. In those days the planes came very often 8 or 10 times each day.
- T. 6A.
5. T. Thai.
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N. Sao Siphon.
V. Father Tit Tuam 56 yr. and brother-in-law Thao Then 23 y.
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We had dug our holes between the two mountains so that it would be hard for the planes to shoot us. No, the planes never dropped any silver paper in our village. They just dropped bombs. All of our houses were

destroyed. They only dropped the poison in Tasseng Seng. And they dropped belts and pens. Very pretty pens. If you opened them they would explode. This was in 1969. I never saw them. I only heard about them. Villagers told me about them. Many pens and watches. But you could not pick them up. If you wound the watches they would explode. But I never saw them I only heard the news.

On our village they only dropped bombs. Big bombs and the bombi. Once in 1969, the 10th month, they bombed our buffalo. There were over 20 animals tied together. There were no soldiers around or even any people. There were never any soldiers in our village. The planes buzzed the buffalo and then dropped the bombi. Nine buffalo were killed.

The planes never saw any people because if we even heard the sound of a plane we fled and hid. We were too afraid. From 1964 on, we lost villagers only on that one occasion. Because we always hid. Even that time no one would have died except that they returned from getting rice after the rest of us. If they hadn't been slow the planes probably wouldn't have seen them. But the planes didn't know if they were villagers or soldiers or what. So they just shot, shot *everything*. Our life was very difficult. We didn't have any money or gold or houses. Just our own bodies and our lives. We were very lucky not to lose our lives.

Sometimes we had to go porter.

Sometimes one or two days. The groups of villagers portering sometimes number 10 or 20 or sometimes 30. If the portering was a large one of say 30 people, three or four soldiers would go with us, no more than that. The soldiers were always Lao soldiers. Vietnamese soldiers never went portering. Yes, I saw some Vietnamese soldiers. Maybe 9 or 10 altogether. They would be with the PL soldiers. In a group of 10 PL soldiers there might be one Vietnamese never more than one. If there were 20 PL soldiers there might be five Vietnamese. But usually there were no Vietnamese. If I saw PL soldiers ten times there would be Vietnamese with then only once. Or maybe more but never more than 5 out of 10 times.

When we went portering the sub-district chief and the village chief would consult about who should go.

T. 7B.

D. Evaluation of the Survey

I. Accuracy of the Interviews.

When I first went into a village, I found that people sometimes were hesitant to talk to me about civilian war casualties. Particularly, I found that officials were hesitant to talk about such casualties. This hesitation seemed to vary directly with the level of the official. In November, I had found that many individual refugees in Ban Ilay had contradicted the account of the sub-district chief of that refugee camp who had told me that planes only bombed when Vietnamese soldiers shot at the planes first. On many occasions during my ten-day survey, I again noticed contradictions in the accounts of minor officials and those of refugees holding no official positions. In the Veun Khene refugee camp the subdistrict chief showed me a list of civilian fatalities. I asked him why the people had died. He replied, "On account of the Pathet Lao." I asked him why the

I inquired further, "What do you mean? Were these people Pathet Lao?"

"I do not understand. What do you mean? Why did you say that these people were caused by the Pathet Lao?"

He answered, "The people were killed by many things. But if the deaths had not been there, the people would not have been killed. And it was the of the Pathet Lao because they would not let the people come. And it was those people could have come to this side they would." And it was the

The logic of this subdistrict chief is undeniable but Veun Kheng would not have been killed in the refugee camp, (see Interviews Section).

Also, in the refugee camp in Dongkaloum Section III.) a story quite different than that of most non-ag

"There were very few civilian deaths. It's hard to say why. I'm very confused, you know. On account of the war. I don't have any information here, why don't you go look at the war. I don't know."

information here, why don't you go look at the lists which we sent to the war. You can't really say why they died, to say why they were killed in the inquiry. He said that the village was destroyed.

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The responses of individual refugees (See Dongkaleum Interviews Section VIII) again were much more explicit about causes of death.

I think, however, that most non-official refugees told me their stories with as much truth as their memories would serve them. Certain characteristics of our conversations indicated truthfulness. Conversations were not dominated by a single individual. Answers about details often came only after discussions among family or neighbors. Also, I found that after I had been in a village for a length of time, people volunteered information about which I would never have thought to ask; for instance, "poison." Nor was I particularly interested in people who had died from disease, except that in Nong Vang Pheung, women kept coming up to me wanting to relate how their children had died. Thus, I think that the interviews in section two are truthful insofar as the knowledge and the memories of the refugee interviewees would nerve them.

This is not, however, to say that either the refugees' memories of, or even, original knowledge of particular incidents were completely faultless. More particularly I would judge the accuracy of the responses as follows. I feel that refugees knew their own sub-district, their village, their name, and that of their deceased relative, with complete accuracy. Also, I feel that people knew with accuracy the general cause of their relation's deaths such as bombing, mines, or small arms. When it came to identifying the specific cause, I would be less certain of reliability. For instances, people seemed to be able to tell the difference between what types of planes had been present, whether jets or propeller driven planes, but I would question identification of specific types of jets or propeller driven planes. One man told me quite simply that, "All the planes which went r-r-r-r-r-r-r-r and had propellers we called T-28's and all the kind which went rrrrrrrrr and didn't have any propellers we called *ai phone* (jet) or *ef loi ha* (F 105)." However, it seems clear that more than just these two types of aircraft took part in the bombing. Many people told me about a second type of jet which they called *ef si hat* (F 4-H.) Also, types of propeller driven craft other than T-28's were identified. A further difficulty in the identification of the aircraft responsible for an individual's death was that, sometimes, different types of aircraft were reported to have been present together. People simply didn't know with much accuracy, in such cases, which planes had dropped which bombs or caused which deaths.

Almost invariably refugees reported that RLG forces were the source of mines and artillery fire which killed villagers. Such opinions seem to be based entirely on the fact that the people were living in PL controlled areas. The people have therefore assumed that any shelling or mining of the area must have been done by RLG forces. They seem to have no basis for such conclusions other than this assumption.

Another section of the interviews which ought to be judged with some reservation is that of the date of the incidents. Most of the refugees in the survey simply could not recall the day of the month or which a relative died. But, the particular month of the incidents, they seemed to know reliably.* The year of the incident was often a source of much discussion. In a number of cases people told me that relatives died on the Plain of Jars in the summer of 1970. This was completely impossible since the refugees had come to Vientiane in February of 1970. When I asked if they were sure it was 1970 or "But when did you come to Vientiane," they would simply reply, "Oh, then it must have been 1969." So I would suggest that the years given for the incidents are not always completely accurate.

Beyond these reservations, I believe that the information in these interviews is quite accurate.

I. Summary.

1. General Pattern of the Bombing.

From 1964 to 1969, villagers on the Plain of Jars were subjected to dangers from many sources. It is clear, however, that the major source of hazard for these people was aerial bombardment (see Tables 1 and 2.) The bombing was particularly heavy in 1968 and 1969. This bombing was done by a variety of jet and propeller driven aircraft, using a wide variety of ordnance. Among the ordnance dropped by the planes, the following were described to me by refugees from the Plain of Jars:

*Refugees could recall the months of particular incidents reliably because they could relate incidents to seasonal activities such as planting rice in the sixth or seventh month or harvesting rice in the eleventh or twelfth month. The Lao calendar is one month ahead of the western calendar (i.e. the seventh month Western calendar is the eighth month Lao calendar.) so that if a narrator did not specify by which calendar he was reckoning, I would ask, "Do you mean Lao calendar or Western (*sao kone*)?"

- a. "big, big bombs" or "500kg" bombs.
 b. smaller or "regular" bombs which apparently were in the 150-250kg class.
 c. Anti-personnel bombs or what the refugees called "bombi." These were evidently of two different types. The most commonly described type was round, roughly 8-10cm in diameter. The other, less frequently described variety, was larger and rested on a set of "legs." See pictures number 1 and 2 which contain drawings by refugees of these two types to anti-personnel weapons. Picture number 3 shows pellets which reportedly came from one of the "bombi." Refugees had gathered these pellets to use in their home-made muskets.
 d. Napalm referred to by refugees as *bom napan* or *bom fai* (fire bomb.)
 The 74 incidents of aerial bombardment involving 108 casualties were described to me as follows:

	Number of incidents	Number of casualties
I. No PL or NVN soldiers present at time of incident.....	58	91
II. PL soldiers present at time of incident.....	5	6
III. Presence or absence of soldiers not noted in the interview.....	11	11

In two of the incidents in the first category it was reported that Pathet Lao soldiers had been present in the village but had left just before the bombing. One of the incidents in the second category, involving two deaths, was that of the prison bombing described in the next section.

2. Bombing of Pathet Lao Prison.

While I was interviewing refugees in the Dongkaleum refugee camp, three individuals independently described to me the bombing of a Pathet Lao prison in 1968. The first time I heard of the incident, the description was very vague. The man told me only that sixty prisoners of the "Lao Issara" (Pathet Lao) had been killed when the planes bombed a prison in the forest near Ban Sang. The other two descriptions were much more explicit. (See Dongkaleum Interviews No. VIII 13 and VIII 16.) Both of these refugees told me that the bombing of the jungle prison occurred on July 5, 1968. Of the more than 100 prisoners in the jail, sixty-three died. The prison was reportedly bombed by T-28s and jets. Ironically, these prisoners were evidently political, (i.e. anti-Pathet Lao.) These stories were corroborated in an informal conversation which I had with a refugee from the Ban Ilay refugee camp. However, this individual said that of the sixty-three fatalities from the prison bombing, sixty were prisoners and three were Pathet Lao guards.

3. "Poison" dropped by aircraft.

As I mentioned earlier, I stumbled on to an account of civilian deaths due to "poison" quite by accident. When I first heard the account of the children's deaths due to "poison" I did not quite believe it. I thought that the refugees were simply using the word "poison" to describe napalm which had not ignited. Only after I had returned to get details of the "poison" did I really comprehend that they were describing something quite distinct from napalm. (see Nakung Interviews VI 9 and 12) After this first story about the poison, I began to make gentle inquiries about it in other refugee camps. Altogether, I heard first hand accounts of the poison in three camps, of the last four camps which I visited; Nong Vang Pheung, Nakung and Thoun Loua. Refugees in the Ban Mak Nao camp had never seen any of the "poison". I had visited all of the other refugee camps prior to first hearing about the "poison" and so had made no inquiries about it in the majority of the villages which I visited.

Two types of "poison" were described to me.
 a. The most commonly described type of "poison" (Mong Vang Pheung, Nakung, and Thoun Loua) looked like paper. In two cases (Nakung and Nong Vang Pheung) refugees described it as being long strips of silver colored paper. Some refugees compared it to the small thin noodles in Chinese soup. One man compared it to rice straw. One man said that it was the color of my silver watch and others said that it was the color of the foil paper from a cigarette package. Evidently this paper was dropped in long tangled masses. According to the refugees it killed both plants and animals. A paper sort of "poison" was also described to me in the Thoun Loua camp but here the refugees described it as sheets rather than strips. Further, I have received reports that the refugees in

the Veun Kham camp and the Ban Ilay camp both talk about this paper "poison." In both cases the refugees reportedly describe it as looking like long strips of silver colored paper.

This type of "poison" sounds suspiciously like radar chaff which might have been dropped by the airplanes in order to jam radar controlled antiaircraft installations in the area. For obvious political reasons the Pathet Lao might have identified such radar chaff as poison. I suggested this explanation to one refugee. He replied that, yes, the planes sometimes did drop the "radar paper". He said that the poison paper looked almost exactly like the radar paper but could be distinguished from it in four ways;

- If the paper poison was touched it would feel hot or at least warm.
- If the paper poison was immersed in water it would bubble. (Reportedly making the water toxic.)
- If the paper poison was hit or moved roughly it would give off a fine dust.
- The poison paper was toxic to both plants and animals. These distinctions between the "poison paper" and radar chaff are rather tenuous and at any rate were probably unknown to the majority of the refugees. Therefore, I think it safe to assume that at least some of the reports of the poison silver paper were merely reports of radar chaff.

b. The second type of "poison" described to me was of a granular or powdery character. I have personally received accounts of it only from refugees in the Nong Vang Pheung camp. There, refugees compared it to salt. They said that any fruit trees or grass on which it was dropped would die. Also they said that it was toxic to many kinds of animals which would forage in an area where it was dropped.

Also in an interview taped by a Lao friend of mine, refugees in Ban Veun Kham told of this type of poison. They described it as looking like yellow flour. They compared the color to the yellow of a khaki uniform. They reported that on one occasion it was dropped on a field and after grazing there thirty cows died. They said that if pigs or chickens foraged in an area where it had been dropped they would die with their flesh turning yellow and intestines green. They said further that it would kill plants as well.

4. Other Devices.

A wide variety of other explosive and poisonous devices have been described to me. However, such reports are usually second or third hand. Or, if first-hand, have been reported by only a single individual. I therefore will omit any discussion of these devices. I can only hope that these reports are the products of Pathet Lao propaganda and have no basis in fact.

5. Portage.


Of the incidents described in this survey, eleven involve the deaths of civilians while either portering for the Pathet Lao (eight) or while returning from portage duties (three.) Of these eleven individuals, eight were reported killed by mines and one each by artillery, aerial bombardment and small arms. Four were reported killed prior to 1966, three in 1966-67, three in 1968-69 and in one case the year was not noted.

It is interesting to note how the refugees referred to portage. Six said simply that the victims had gone portering (*pai lam liang*.) Others reported that the victims had been ordered (*bang khap*.) forced (*inum*.) caught (*chap*.) or organized (*chat*.) into portering.

While I did not delve into the question of portage extensively these descriptions indicate that coercion was often involved in the organization of portage.

6. Presence of North Vietnamese Soldiers.

Again, this is a question into which I did not delve directly. However, the mention of Vietnamese soldiers (*thahaan keo*, or *thahaan Vietnam*; and I think it safe to assume that refugees were referring to North rather than South Vietnamese) in six separate interviews indicates that North Vietnamese soldiers certainly were present on the Plain of Jars. Two refugees simply mentioned the presence of Vietnamese soldiers (Interviews III and X 6.) Two related that Vietnamese soldiers shot villagers as they were trying to flee to this side. (Interviews II 4b and IV 3a.) One narration by a group of refugees in Ban Wong Vang Pheung (Interview IX 13.) told of how Vietnamese had lived with the villagers in order to prevent them from coming to RLG controlled territory. And one refugee (Interview II 8) related that Vietnamese soldiers had killed villagers in order to get their belongings.



- a. "big, big bombs" or "500kg" bombs.
 b. smaller or "regular" bombs which apparently were in the 150-250kg class.
 c. Anti-personnel bombs or what the refugees called "bombi." These were evidently of two different types. The most commonly described type was round, roughly 8-10cm in diameter. The other, less frequently described variety, was larger and rested on a set of "legs." See pictures number 1 and 2 which contain drawings by refugees of these two types to anti-personnel weapons. Picture number 3 shows pellets which reportedly came from one of the "bombi." Refugees had gathered these pellets to use in their home-made muskets.
 d. Napalm referred to by refugees as *bom napan* or *bom fai* (fire bomb.)
 The 74 incidents of aerial bombardment involving 108 casualties were described to me as follows:

	Number of incidents	Number of casualties
I. No PL or NVN soldiers present at time of incident.....	58	91
II. PL soldiers present at time of incident.....	5	6
III. Presence or absence of soldiers not noted in the interview.....	11	11

In two of the incidents in the first category it was reported that Pathet Lao soldiers had been present in the village but had left just before the bombing. One of the incidents in the second category, involving two deaths, was that of the prison bombing described in the next section.

2. Bombing of Pathet Lao Prison.

While I was interviewing refugees in the Dongkaleum refugee camp, three individuals independently described to me the bombing of a Pathet Lao prison in 1968. The first time I heard of the incident, the description was very vague. The man told me only that sixty prisoners of the "Lao Issara" (Pathet Lao) had been killed when the planes bombed a prison in the forest near Ban Sang. The other two descriptions were much more explicit. (See Dongkaleum Interviews No. VIII 13 and VIII 16.) Both of these refugees told me that the bombing of the jungle prison occurred on July 5, 1968. Of the more than 100 prisoners in the jail, sixty-three died. The prison was reportedly bombed by T-28s and jets. Ironically, these prisoners were evidently political, (i.e. anti-Pathet Lao.) These stories were corroborated in an informal conversation which I had with a refugee from the Ban Ilay refugee camp. However, this individual said that of the sixty-three fatalities from the prison bombing, sixty were prisoners and three were Pathet Lao guards.

3. "Poison" dropped by aircraft.

As I mentioned earlier, I stumbled on to an account of civilian deaths due to "poison" quite by accident. When I first heard the account of the childrens' deaths due to "poison" I did not quite believe it. I thought that the refugees were simply using the word "poison" to describe napalm which had not ignited. Only after I had returned to get details of the "poison" did I really comprehend that they were describing something quite distinct from napalm. (see Nakung Interviews VI 9 and 12) After this first story about the poison, I began to make gentle inquiries about it in other refugee camps. Altogether, I heard first hand accounts of the poison in three camps, of the last four camps which I visited; Nong Vang Pheung, Nakung and Thoun Loua. Refugees in the Ban Mak Nao camp had never seen any of the "poison". I had visited all of the other refugee camps prior to first hearing about the "poison" and so had made no inquiries about it in the majority of the villages which I visited.

Two types of "poison" were described to me.
 a. The most commonly described type of "poison" (Mong Vang Pheung, Nakung, and Thoun Loua) looked like paper. In two cases (Nakung and Nong Vang Pheung) refugees described it as being long strips of silver colored paper. Some refugees compared it to the small thin noodles in Chinese soup. One man compared it to rice straw. One man said that it was the color of my silver watch and others said that it was the color of the foil paper from a cigarette package. Evidently this paper was dropped in long tangled masses. According to the refugees it killed both plants and animals. A paper sort of "poison" was also described to me in the Thoun Loua camp but here the refugees described it as sheets rather than strips. Further, I have received reports that the refugees in

the Veun Kham camp and the Ban Ilay camp both talk about this paper "poison." In both cases the refugees reportedly describe it as looking like long strips of silver colored paper.

This type of "poison" sounds suspiciously like radar chaff which might have been dropped by the airplanes in order to jam radar controlled antiaircraft installations in the area. For obvious political reasons the Pathet Lao might have identified such radar chaff as poison. I suggested this explanation to one refugee. He replied that, yes, the planes sometimes did drop the "radar paper". He said that the poison paper looked almost exactly like the radar paper but could be distinguished from it in four ways;

- If the paper poison was touched it would feel hot or at least warm.
- If the paper poison was immersed in water it would bubble. (Reportedly making the water toxic.)
- If the paper poison was hit or moved roughly it would give off a fine dust.
- The poison paper was toxic to both plants and animals. These distinctions between the "poison paper" and radar chaff are rather tenuous and at any rate were probably unknown to the majority of the refugees. Therefore, I think it safe to assume that at least some of the reports of the poison silver paper were merely reports of radar chaff.

b. The second type of "poison" described to me was of a granular or powdery character. I have personally received accounts of it only from refugees in the Nong Vang Pheung camp. There, refugees compared it to salt. They said that any fruit trees or grass on which it was dropped would die. Also they said that it was toxic to many kinds of animals which would forage in an area where it was dropped.

Also in an interview taped by a Lao friend of mine, refugees in Ban Veun Kham told of this type of poison. They described it as looking like yellow flour. They compared the color to the yellow of a khaki uniform. They reported that on one occasion it was dropped on a field and after grazing there thirty cows died. They said that if pigs or chickens foraged in an area where it had been dropped they would die with their flesh turning yellow and intestines green. They said further that it would kill plants as well.

4. Other Devices.

A wide variety of other explosive and poisonous devices have been described to me. However, such reports are usually second or third hand. Or, if first-hand, have been reported by only a single individual. I therefore will omit any discussion of these devices. I can only hope that these reports are the products of Pathet Lao propaganda and have no basis in fact.

5. Portage.

Of the incidents described in this survey, eleven involve the deaths of civilians while either portering for the Pathet Lao (eight) or while returning from portage duties (three.) Of these eleven individuals, eight were reported killed by mines and one each by artillery, aerial bombardment and small arms. Four were reported killed prior to 1966, three in 1966-67, three in 1968-69 and in one case the year was not noted.

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


TABLE I.—CIVILIAN CASUALTIES: REFUGEE CAMP VERSUS CAUSE¹

Refugee camp	Aerial bombardment	Mines	Artillery	Small Arms		Cause unknown ²
				RLG-meo forces	PL-NVN forces	
Veunkham	15	2	1	3	0	0
Ban Phao	0	0	0	0	0	0
Veun Khone	6	0	0	0	0	0
Mak Miao	8	0	0	0	1	1
Done Tai	10	10	9	2	0	0
Nakung	7	3	1	3	0	0
Thoun Loua	28	2	4	0	0	0
Dongkaleum	15	3	5	0	0	2
Nong Vang Pheng	1	0	0	0	0	21
Mak Nao	9	2	0	0	0	0
Total	108	22	20	8	7	24

¹Sum total 189.—In tabulating these figures for civilian casualties, I have attempted to avoid listing multiple descriptions of single incidents (e.g., interviews I 1, IV 4, and IV 7 and the much described bombing incident in Ban Mak Nao section X) more than once. Also, in order to insure against any duplications in the tabulation I have not listed any casualties which were described only in vague term without any specification of name or relationship to the narrator (e.g., the "other villagers killed" in interview I 5b, III 2, VI 10, VII 1, and VII 14).

²The unusually high number of deaths caused by artillery and by mines reported in the Done Tai refugee camp may be partially explained by the origin of these refugees. They came from Tasseng Song, north of the Plain of Jars just south of a line of mountains occupied by RLG forces. The RLG forces evidently used these positions to shell Pathet Lao positions to the south. Thus, the hapless villagers in Tasseng Seng received more than their share of stray artillery shells. (See map of the Plain of Jars.)

³Disease.

⁴The total of 108 casualties due to bombing includes the 6 deaths attributed by villagers to poison dropped by airplanes (interviews VI 9a, 9b; VI 12; and VIII 24) and 1 death reportedly caused by a smoke bomb (interview VII 20).

⁵Of the 22 casualties by mines, 8 civilians were killed in connection with portage; 6 while porting and the 2 while returning from porting.

TABLE II.—CIVILIAN CASUALTIES: CAUSE VERSUS YEAR¹

	Pre-1966	1966-67	1968-69	Year not give ²
Aerial bombardment by—				
Jets	0	4	19	4
T-28's	0	0	17	2
Both or aircraft unidentified	16	27	22	0
Mines	0	3	2	1
Artillery	7	12	8	0
Small arms	1	11	8	0
Cause unidentified	4	6	2	0
Total	22	63	97	7

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²This figure substantiates allegations by refugees that bombing by jet aircraft was relatively light prior to 1968 but became heavy in 1968 and 1969.

³The "T-28" rubric includes aircraft identified by refugees as "A-6" as well as other propeller driven planes.

⁴This figure of 22 includes 9 civilian deaths reported from Ban Hak Hao. It was reported that these 9 individuals died during a bombing raid by 2 T-28's and 19 jets.

⁵21 disease.

D. Conclusion

This survey was by no means a complete survey of all of the civilian war casualties among refugees from the Plain of Jars. Nor was it a complete survey of all of the civilian war casualties from any of the refugee villages which I visited. Rather it was a random sampling comprised of all those case histories of civilian war victims which I could gather in the time available to me. The villages which I visited contain approximately 8500 of the 25,000 refugees from the Plain of Jars now residing on the Vientiane Plain.

If the sampling in this survey is representative of the experience of the refugees from the Plain of Jars as a whole, then the following conclusions may be drawn:

1. Aerial bombardment was the primary cause of civilian war casualties among refugees from the Plain of Jars while under Pathet Lao control 1964-1969.

2. Contrary to the policy statements of American officials, bombardment of the civilian population of the Plain of Jars by aircraft, including large numbers of American jets, was extensive and caused large numbers of civilian casualties.

APPENDIX A

The following account of the "Former Life of the Refugees in Ban Veun Kham" was written for me by a student participant in the 1970 IVS Student Summer Work Experience Program. I have omitted the name of the student since he was fearful of personal repercussions.

However, let me give the following biographical information. The boy is a student at one of the highest educational institutions in Laos. I have known him for more than a year. He came to the summer program recommended by both Lao and foreign staff at his school.

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In this village there live 223 families containing 2219 people. These refugees came from the province of Kieng Khoueng which is presently controlled by the Neo Lao Hak Sat.

Before 1964 (according to the refugees) in the region of Tasseng Phan and Tasseng Phiang there was only prosperity in the ricefield and fish in the plentiful waters. There were no floods and no droughts because the water which fed the rice plants came from the mountains and not simply from rainfall as in our part of the country. Many animals were raised very comfortably. Each family had not less than 20 cows and numerous pigs, dogs, ducks, and chickens.

After 1964 the conditions of the area changed greatly in many different ways. Sometimes the administration of the area belonged to the Royal Lao Government and sometimes the area was under Pathet Lao administration. But more often the Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS) controlled the area. At that time began the bombing increasing the misery of the people until finally it became impossible to live in the region.

LIFE UNDER THE PATHET LAO CADRES

When the bombing became heavy with T-28 airplanes and many kinds of jets bombing the forests in the vicinity of the villages, it was necessary to go live in the forest and to dig holes in which many families lived together. For food it was necessary to work together in teams when the planes were not bombing. When the airplanes came over a lot it meant that there wouldn't be enough rice for everyone.

The holes had to be dug very deeply and on top it was necessary to put broken tree branches.

If the branches were already dry it was necessary to remove them and put on fresh branches. And on the paths in the area it was necessary to place grass after traveling back and forth. If that wasn't done they would be bombed.

During the bombing, if the planes couldn't select a place to bomb, but they saw some animals or people, they would simply drop the bombs on them. This was the primary reason why the refugees fled from the homes of their birth and came here.

Life with the Pathet Lao was difficult because they always accused people of holding allegiance to the Royal Lao Government (RLG). People were always being taken for interrogation. Young men and women were drafted into working for the army, into being soldiers or carrying supplies and weapons for the army. Girls 13 years old and older had to work for the army. What made it especially oppressive for the refugees was when they were ordered to move. Sometimes they heard news that the position of their tunnel homes had been revealed. Then a company of Meo Lao soldiers would come and order the people to move. Always they moved at night. Sometimes they were not able to sleep all night. Whenever they stopped they had to dig holes in which to hide. Sometimes they tunneled into the tops of mountains. They had to carry all their food and belongings with them. When the food was all gone they had to return to their old homes and dig up rice which they buried in barrels. The constant moving created many problems for the refugees. They grew sick and tired of working that way, until finally they decided not to move anymore and they fled to the region controlled by our government to gain their freedom.

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living in holes eating in the holes and sleeping in the holes this way. We could say that the emigration was necessitated equally in these two ways.

Planting rice had to be done at night. Sometimes the planes would bomb all night until daylight so there was no opportunity to plant rice. The most important reason why the refugees had to come here from their villages must be the bombing.

Also the upland rice fields where the bombs had already fallen had become entirely covered with ponds and small craters. It was impossible to grow rice. Also there were "bombl" of the very round kind, so many that they were almost everywhere. These "bombl" were another important reason why the search for food was dangerous.

The refugees were sick and tired of the actions of the Meo soldiers because as they said they were always seeking wealth. Many people said that the Meo soldiers waged war not to win independence but to win cattle, buffalo and property of the population. Many parents of refugee children had been killed by the Meo soldiers. When the refugees arrived in the area controlled by the Meo soldiers, many of them saw buffalo and cattle which the Meo soldiers had stolen. Yet it was impossible to claim their livestock because the soldiers maintained that the buffalo and cattle had been captured from the Vietnamese.

When living with the Pathet Lao cadres, the people were drafted into working without pay. Rice, fish and other food was also conscripted. When the refugees came to the government's side, the Meo soldiers stole their cattle and buffalo and killed them for eating right in front of their, the refugee's eyes.

To summarize: wickedness was always with the people. The wealthy people were those who had the power. Lawlessness was present on both sides.

EDUCATION OF THE CHILDREN

With the Pathet Lao the children were not able to study with full effectiveness because they did not have schools, nor teachers with much knowledge, nor teaching equipment.

Each student had to pay an instruction fee of 50k/month. The teachers were selected by their own village when the village saw that the candidate had sufficient knowledge. He could then compose his own lessons and teach.

Traveling to school had to be done when the airplanes were not bombing, like very, very early. After nine A.M., the school let out. When traveling to and from school the children had to add tree branches to their clothing and wear very drab colors. They absolutely could not wear red or white.

For the adults specifically: Old people also had to go to school under the trees. But they had "workers" to teach them separately. The workers really belonged to the NLHS. With the Pathet Lao, the children practiced the dance "Cooperation", the "Naly" dance, and many, many others. In singing the only popular songs were those which cursed all the American imperialists. The habits of the children were to like singing songs to like dancing, and to like working together. It shows how the children have been trained by the Pathet Lao and the training has all been absorbed by the children.

TACTICS OF THE NEO LAO (HAK SAT)

For recruiting young men into serving they had many kinds of psychology. For instance when the young men hold their guns, they have power for freedom and all have thoughts like "Fight against the interfering imperialists." If they are allowed to fight anywhere against those from the government's (RLG) side, they will fight until the others give in, if the others don't give in they won't allow them to escape, if they try to escape they will kill them.

There is a certain kind of grass which they call freedom grass or grass against

¹ After translating this paper I asked the author to explain what was meant by the term "bombl". He said he had never heard of it before talking with the refugees. They had explained that the "bombl" were round metal balls dropped by the airplanes. They were roughly 10cm in diameter. The refugees said that they were "everywhere in Xieng Khouang" in the villages, in the forests and in the ricefields. When the "bombl" were touched or disturbed they would explode, sending out many small bullets. The refugees said that the adults and the older children learned to avoid them but that they were very dangerous for the little children who didn't know enough not to touch them. W.H.

² This is a kind of dance for girls only. W.H.

things which have a split leaf like the *dok dao heuang* leaf¹ except bigger. It is this leaf which all of the PL soldiers must eat before they wage war. If this leaf is lost and not eaten then their hearts will not be courageous. Their (the PL) object of worship during the time of battle is the rain. If the rain falls they will have good opportunity to win easily because their weapons are most effective when the rain falls.

All of the above is from the real lives of the refugees as related by them. Up until 1-9-69 the refugees said that they were fleeing from hell. Then they came out of their holes to the region of freedom.

The poverty of living, eating and sleeping in the holes, the fear of all the different kinds of bombs dropped by the airplanes, the fatigue of constantly being ordered to move, the conscription into working, the conscription of food by the Neo Lao, all added to the sorrow of these fellow Laotians, who had done no evil but still reaped such misfortune.

Catching fish seems very difficult because the refugees are not used to such large bodies of water. They cannot swim or sail boats. Also, they cannot raise animals with much success because their houses were built too close together. There are many diseases which easily kill the animals. Equipment for living and cooking is sufficient, but there is a great lack of kerosene. The things which interest the refugees are far beneath the dignity and concerns of the local villagers. In response to my questions the refugees said that they now regard themselves as having a very low status.

The houses where they had always lived and always slept, and the land on which they had always planted their crops, the land where they had spent all of their days, all of the animals which they used to sell to earn profit for their homes were completely bombed. From this damage there remained only many ponds, two or three times a man's height in depth. Of trees there remained only a few mango trees and coconut trees. There was left only the remains of the earth which had lost its fertility for growing crops. This, like the ruins of the mistreatment of the refugees when the war ended.

PROBLEMS OF THE REFUGEES IN THEIR PRESENT LIVES

As normal, living in a new place, different from that where one had always worked and made a living and spent his life, caused problems. Now the refugees have no jobs or if they do, it is as at only very low wages, like 200K per day.

These are the problems of the refugees at the present time.

APPENDIX B

Hon. McMURTIE GODLEY,
U.S. Ambassador to Laos,
Embassy,
Vientiane, Laos

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: During the summer of 1970, I helped organize a program for Lao students to work during their school vacation. The program was funded by USAID and organized by International Voluntary Services, Inc., Laos, working together with the Lao Ministry of Youth and Sports.

During the program I became especially involved with students who were teaching children in four refugee villages near Vientiane. These refugees were part of the reported 15,000 who were evacuated from the Plain of Jars in February 1970. The students in the program taught in the refugee villages for lengths of time varying from four weeks to ten weeks. The variations in program length were necessitated by our limited budget. The program was moderately successful, but that is not what concerns me here. Rather, I would like to relate some of the profoundly disturbing stories of the refugees' lives prior to their evacuation from the Plain of Jars as told to students in the summer program. I shall omit students' names since they were fearful of personal repercussions.

Ban Ilay

Refugees in Ban Ilay told students of how their houses were burned in 1963 by gunfire from the Pathet Lao. The people were then relocated by the Pathet Lao. Jets started bombing their village in 1964, and bombed most heavily in 1966. The refugees had to live in holes in the ground. At first they tried cultivat-

¹ I checked with the author of this paper on the significance of the "split leaf" and the "dok dao heuang" leaf. He was uncertain of their meaning. They were simply terms used by the refugees in explaining the "freedom grass." W.H.

living in holes eating in the holes and sleeping in the holes this way. We could say that the emigration was necessitated equally in these two ways.

Planting rice had to be done at night. Sometimes the planes would bomb all night until daylight so there was no opportunity to plant rice. The most important reason why the refugees had to come here from their villages must be the bombing.

Also the upland rice fields where the bombs had already fallen had become entirely covered with ponds and small craters. It was impossible to grow rice. Also there were "bombl" of the very round kind, so many that they were almost everywhere. These "bombl" were another important reason why the search for food was dangerous.

The refugees were sick and tired of the actions of the Meo soldiers because as they said they were always seeking wealth. Many people said that the Meo soldiers waged war not to win independence but to win cattle, buffalo and property of the population. Many parents of refugee children had been killed by the Meo soldiers. When the refugees arrived in the area controlled by the Meo soldiers, many of them saw buffalo and cattle which the Meo soldiers had stolen. Yet it was impossible to claim their livestock because the soldiers maintained that the buffalo and cattle had been captured from the Vietnamese.

When living with the Pathet Lao cadres, the people were drafted into working without pay. Rice, fish and other food was also conscripted. When the refugees came to the government's side, the Meo soldiers stole their cattle and buffalo and killed them for eating right in front of their, the refugee's eyes.

To summarize: wickedness was always with the people. The wealthy people were those who had the power. Lawlessness was present on both sides.

EDUCATION OF THE CHILDREN

With the Pathet Lao the children were not able to study with full effectiveness because they did not have schools, nor teachers with much knowledge, nor teaching equipment.

Each student had to pay an instruction fee of 50k/month. The teachers were selected by their own village when the village saw that the candidate had sufficient knowledge. He could then compose his own lessons and teach.

Traveling to school had to be done when the airplanes were not bombing, like very, very early. After nine A.M., the school let out. When traveling to and from school the children had to add tree branches to their clothing and wear very drab colors. They absolutely could not wear red or white.

For the adults specifically: Old people also had to go to school under the trees. But they had "workers" to teach them separately. The workers really belonged to the NLHS. With the Pathet Lao, the children practiced the dance "Cooperation", the "Naly" dance, and many, many others. In singing the only popular songs were those which cursed all the American imperialists. The habits of the children were to like singing songs to like dancing, and to like working together. It shows how the children have been trained by the Pathet Lao and the training has all been absorbed by the children.

TACTICS OF THE NEO LAO (HAK SAT)

For recruiting young men into serving they had many kinds of psychology. For instance when the young men hold their guns, they have power for freedom and all have thoughts like "Fight against the interfering imperialists." If they are allowed to fight anywhere against those from the government's (RLG) side, they will fight until the others give in, if the others don't give in they won't allow them to escape, if they try to escape they will kill them.

There is a certain kind of grass which they call freedom grass or grass against

¹ After translating this paper I asked the author to explain what was meant by the term "bombl". He said he had never heard of it before talking with the refugees. They had explained that the "bombl" were round metal balls dropped by the airplanes. They were roughly 10cm in diameter. The refugees said that they were "everywhere in Xieng Khouang" in the villages, in the forests and in the ricefields. When the "bombl" were touched or disturbed they would explode, sending out many small bullets. The refugees said that the adults and the older children learned to avoid them but that they were very dangerous for the little children who didn't know enough not to touch them. W.H.

² This is a kind of dance for girls only. W.H.

things which have a split leaf like the *dok dao heuang* leaf¹ except bigger. It is this leaf which all of the PL soldiers must eat before they wage war. If this leaf is lost and not eaten then their hearts will not be courageous. Their (the PL) object of worship during the time of battle is the rain. If the rain falls they will have good opportunity to win easily because their weapons are most effective when the rain falls.

All of the above is from the real lives of the refugees as related by them. Up until 1-9-69 the refugees said that they were fleeing from hell. Then they came out of their holes to the region of freedom.

The poverty of living, eating and sleeping in the holes, the fear of all the different kinds of bombs dropped by the airplanes, the fatigue of constantly being ordered to move, the conscription into working, the conscription of food by the Neo Lao, all added to the sorrow of these fellow Laotians, who had done no evil but still reaped such misfortune.

Catching fish seems very difficult because the refugees are not used to such large bodies of water. They cannot swim or sail boats. Also, they cannot raise animals with much success because their houses were built too close together. There are many diseases which easily kill the animals. Equipment for living and cooking is sufficient, but there is a great lack of kerosene. The things which interest the refugees are far beneath the dignity and concerns of the local villagers. In response to my questions the refugees said that they now regard themselves as having a very low status.

The houses where they had always lived and always slept, and the land on which they had always planted their crops, the land where they had spent all of their days, all of the animals which they used to sell to earn profit for their homes were completely bombed. From this damage there remained only many ponds, two or three times a man's height in depth. Of trees there remained only a few mango trees and coconut trees. There was left only the remains of the earth which had lost its fertility for growing crops. This, like the ruins of the mistreatment of the refugees when the war ended.

PROBLEMS OF THE REFUGEES IN THEIR PRESENT LIVES

As normal, living in a new place, different from that where one had always worked and made a living and spent his life, caused problems. Now the refugees have no jobs or if they do, it is as at only very low wages, like 200K per day.

These are the problems of the refugees at the present time.

APPENDIX B

Hon. McMURTIE GODLEY,
U.S. Ambassador to Laos,
Embassy,
Vientiane, Laos

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ing rice at night. But then the planes started bombing at night. If the villagers started even a small fire, they would be bombed and strafed by the planes. Villagers said that they had to live in holes in the ground for three years.

Dan Na Nga

The approximately 2000 refugees in this village came from Ban Lat Sene in Xieng Khouang province. They said that the bombing started there in 1967. The bombing was so heavy in the daytime that villagers could work in their rice fields only at night. All of the people's homes were destroyed so they had to live in the forest or in caves in the mountains. In 1969 the planes started dropping flares at night and bombing by the light of the flares.

At first the villagers simply fled when they heard the sound of a plane. But then the PL taught them how to use rifles to shoot at the planes. Some of the children (again according to the refugees as told to the students in the summer work program) became very adept at shooting down the planes. When the refugees came down from the Plain in February 1970, one or two of the young men and women from each family stayed with the Pathet Lao. I asked one of the students why these young people had stayed with the P.L. He replied, "Because the P.L. lied to them and persuaded them to stay. The young people chose to stay with the P.L., but it was because the outlaws (P.L.) lied to them."

I then asked this same student why he thought these villagers had been bombed by the airplanes. He answered, "Because there were Pathet Lao soldiers in the village."

I enquired further, "Do you mean that Pathet Lao had a camp in the village?" "No, but some of the boys in the village had joined the Pathet Lao, and they were living and working with their families."

Many of the refugees told students that they do not like life in Ban Na Nga. They went there on account of the bombing; and when the bombing stops, they want to go back to their homes.

Ban Nongsa

Villagers in Ban Nongsa related to students working there that they had not liked living with the Pathet Lao because the Pathet Lao had not allowed them to practice their Buddhist beliefs. If the people gave offerings to the monks, they would be ridiculed by the Pathet Lao. The P.L. would ask them where they got the offerings to waste on the monks.

They would suggest that perhaps the offerings came from the government (RLG) side where many people still follow such wasteful traditions.

Refugees told how they had had to farm at night because if they worked in the ricefields during the daytime the planes would shoot at them. Also it was impossible to show any kind of a light at night because the planes would see it and shoot at it. Villagers told how they had to live in holes in the ground or in the forest for two or three years.

Ban Veun Kham

Refugees in this village told students how they had to live in holes in the ground for three years. The planes would shoot or bomb any people whom they saw. Sometimes the planes would even bomb cattle or buffalo. Villagers even told how once some monks in their orange robes had been strafed by a jet as they came out of their cave. One man told how his wife had gone out to fetch their water buffalo and had been strafed by a jet.

The above information comes from the refugees as told to students in the summer work program. The appended article comes from the same source. None of this is information which has been dug out by a reporter or by anyone else with a particular viewpoint to push. It is information which students in the summer program discovered through their work in the refugee villages. Some of the students were quite agitated about what they learned from the refugees. Previous to their summer work experience, they had thought that such stories were merely Pathet Lao propaganda. Some of them now think quite differently.

Undoubtedly, some of the stories were related to me with imperfect accuracy. And after working in Laos for more than two years, I would readily admit that some of the stories may have been embellished by the villagers in their original telling. But out of these stories from four separate villages, one fact seems to emerge incontrovertibly. The United States has been waging an extensive bombing campaign against the civilian populations of portions of Pathet Lao occupied territory.

Exactly what portion of the bombing has been conducted by US aircraft and what portion by Royal Lao aircraft is unclear. But this distinction is a spurious one.

Whether the bombs were dropped by US planes or by RLG planes is immaterial. Even if all of the bombs were dropped by RLG aircraft the United States is culpable, simply because we train and supply the Royal Lao Air Force.

Surely, evils have been perpetrated by the Pathet Lao. Refugees stories testify to this. As the student author of the appended article has written, "Wickedness was always with the people . . . Lawlessness was present on both sides."

But a large part of the "lawlessness" perpetrated on these "Laotians who had done no evil but still reaped such misfortune," seems directly attributable to policies of the United States government.

As an American I feel compelled to protest these policies. The bombing of innocent civilian population is, to me, completely inexcusable.

Sincerely yours,

WALTER M. HANEY.

APPENDIX C

Hon. ROBERT P. GRIFFIN,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRIFFIN: I have received your communication transmitting the letter of Mr. Walter Haney of Vientiane concerning the grave effects of the war in Laos on the civilian population of the country.

The President on March 6 made public the fact that we provide air support for the neutral government of Laos, which is defending itself against invasion by more than 60,000 troops of North Viet-Nam. North Viet-Nam, like us, signed the Geneva Agreements of 1962, which specifically forbid the introduction of foreign troops into Laos. Despite this, the North Vietnamese continue to use Lao territory in the southern part of the country for a large road network serving their war aims in South Viet-Nam, and in North Laos have expelled the neutral Royal Lao Government of Souvanna Phouma from a large part of the national territory, particularly those areas of Laos near North Viet-Nam.

American air support of the Royal Lao Government, which is directed against North Vietnamese troop concentrations, lines of communication and logistic stores, is furnished under rules of operation designed specifically to protect civilians and to limit attacks to military targets. There is no question but that there have been civilian victims of bombing errors which were due to both mechanical and human causes, but a continuing effort goes on, even in the heat of battle, to keep such errors to a strict minimum. The rules do not permit attacks on non-military targets and place out-of-bounds all inhabited villages. In cases where it is believed there may be a question about the nature of the target, a Lao national is required to participate in the control bombing operations. The rules of operation are the subject of continual review.

In contrast to the North Vietnamese/Pathet Lao, we also give major support to the Lao Government to relocate members of the civilian population who freely choose to move away from the areas of fighting, and to provide them with food and medical care.

The reports of the refugees which Mr. Haney has received through the Lao students who worked with him last summer attest vividly to the suffering which the war has imposed on the Lao, perhaps most harshly of all in the northeastern part of the country from which these refugees come. It is clear that danger comes to the civilian population from both of the combatant sides, and also that the line between civilian and soldier is blurred, as the passage on villagers' efforts to shoot down aircraft illustrates.

Mr. Haney attributes a large part of the misfortune inflicted on the villages to the policies of the United States government. These policies, however, are undertaken not independently but at the request of the Royal Lao Government, acting in response to the unprovoked invasion of that neutral country by North Viet-Nam.

Like the Royal Lao Government, our Government has repeatedly protested North Viet-Nam's imposition of war on Laos, which seeks no more than neutrality and to be left alone. We deeply regret the fate of all the victims of

ing rice at night. But then the planes started bombing at night. If the villagers started even a small fire, they would be bombed and strafed by the planes. Villagers said that they had to live in holes in the ground for three years.

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the war, both those killed by North Vietnamese action, and those whose lives have been lost or disrupted as a consequence of the defense of their country. If we can be of further assistance on this or any other matter, please do not hesitate to let us know.

Sincerely yours,

DAVID M. ABSHIRE,
Assistant Secretary
for Congressional Relations.

APPENDIX III

CHAIRMAN'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT RICHARD M. NIXON, APRIL 23, 1971, AND
RESPONSE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS
DAVID M. ABSHIRE, MAY 26, 1971

APRIL 23, 1971.

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Yesterday, the Honorable William H. Sullivan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, appeared before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees to testify on war-related civilian problems in Laos and Cambodia.

In discussing the situation in Laos, Ambassador Sullivan referred to two wars in which the United States participates. The first war he described relates to military operations along the Ho Chi Minh trail in southern Laos, which he associated with the policy objectives of the continuing United States military presence in South Vietnam. The second war he described relates to military operations in northern Laos, which, according to Ambassador Sullivan's statement, have "nothing to do with military operations in South Vietnam or Cambodia." Based on the public record, Ambassador Sullivan's testimony appears to be the first time an official from the Executive branch has identified two separate wars in Laos.

The Congress and the American people have previously been informed that United States military activities in Laos relate solely to the protection of remaining United States forces in South Vietnam and the stability of the South Vietnamese government, and that the authority for military activities in Laos is found in the powers of the Commander in Chief to accomplish these objectives. Ambassador Sullivan's testimony, however, strongly suggests that United States military activities in northern Laos, notably the air war, are totally unrelated to these objectives.

This raises most serious questions as to the precise authority for continuing United States military activities in northern Laos. I would appreciate very much, your early clarification of this matter.

Sincerely,

EDWARD M. KENNEDY.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., May 26, 1971.

Hon. EDWARD M. KENNEDY,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR KENNEDY: The President has asked me to reply to your letter of April 23, 1971 concerning the authority for continuing the United States military operations in northern Laos.

As you pointed out, Ambassador Sullivan, in his testimony before your Subcommittee on April 22 stated that North Vietnamese military operations in northern Laos were conducted separately from their operations in southern Laos along the Ho Chi Minh Trail which supplies their forces in South Viet-Nam and Cambodia.

However, as the President said in his address to the nation on October 7, 1970, the war in Indochina "cannot be cured by treating only one of its areas of outbreak". If the North Vietnamese were to conquer all of Laos they could divert thousands of their forces now engaged in North Laos to the war against South Viet-Nam, and greatly enhance their position in those areas of Laos bordering on

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South Viet-Nam from which they launch attacks on United States and allied forces.

Before the ink was dry on the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos, the North Vietnamese began violating them. They left over 6,000 troops in that country, and their number has steadily grown ever since. In mid-May 1964, the Pathet Lao, supported by the North Vietnamese, attacked Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma's neutralist military forces on the Plain of Jars. In May 1964, as North Vietnamese presence increased, the United States, at the request of the Royal Lao Government, began flying certain interdiction missions. These air operations continued over the next four years.

This was the situation which President Nixon inherited upon taking office in January 1969. The policy of this Administration has been to support the independence and neutrality of Laos under the 1962 Geneva Agreements and to assist the neutral government of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma against North Vietnamese invasion. Our course in Laos, as in the rest of Southeast Asia, is to bring the hostilities to an end.

President Nixon has been carrying out a continuing program of withdrawal of United States forces from Southeast Asia. The President's constitutional powers as Commander-in-Chief and in the field of foreign relations provide authority for him to take reasonable measures to carry out these withdrawals, to protect our troops, and to bring the hostilities which were underway when he took office to an end in a way that will contribute to a durable peace.

Sincerely yours,

DAVID M. ABSHIRE,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

APPENDIX IV

TEXT OF CHAIRMAN'S PROPOSAL FOR A MILITARY PRACTICES REVIEW BOARD AND EXCERPTS FROM A RELATED BRIEF SUBMITTED TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE BY PROFESSOR GIDON GOTTLIEB OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, APRIL 29, 1971

THURSDAY, APRIL 29, 1971.

Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees, today recommended that the President create a Military Practices Review Board to curb the effects on the civilian population of United States military policy in Indochina.

Senator Kennedy said the Review Board "would advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff on standards and procedures designed to keep American military policies and practices within the bounds of simple humanitarian and international legal obligations, and would monitor the implementing of the rules of engagement governing American armed forces in active combat."

"The Review Board should be appointed by the President at an early date in consultation with the appropriate committees of the Congress. The Review Board should be attached to the National Security Council, and should be composed of high level officials in government as well as recognized non-governmental experts on humanitarian problems and international law."

Senator Kennedy said: "In light of the bitter experience in Indochina, the time is long overdue for this Nation, at the highest level of government, to take stock of policies and attitudes which have contributed so heavily to the massive flow of refugees, the occurrence of civilian casualties, and the inexcusably low priority attached to the care and protection of civilians in combat zones."

"The latest hearings by the Subcommittee confirm again that the forced evacuation of civilians, aerial bombardment, free fire zones, and similar practices are continuing to have a devastating impact on the civilian population of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. There continues to be a vast gap between the official policy of our government and the performance in the field. We must finally come to grips with this issue. We must finally come to recognize and understand the flagrant abuses of American power. And we must resolve that what has been done in Indochina, in America's name, must never happen again."

Senator Kennedy made his recommendation and comment in releasing excerpts from a brief submitted to the Subcommittee by Professor Gidon Gottlieb of the New York University School of Law. The brief is one of several under review by the Subcommittee. Excerpts of the brief follow.

EXCERPTS FROM BRIEF SUBMITTED BY GIDON GOTTLIEB, PROFESSOR OF LAW, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, TO THE SENATE JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE ON REFUGEES

President Nixon has told the nation that he is prepared to wage unlimited air warfare in Indochina for years to come. This announcement imposes a most urgent task, the adoption of standards and procedures to limit the killing and maiming of civilians and the generation of thousands of new refugees. President Nixon's announcement requires the adoption of measures designed to keep American war policies within the bounds of humanitarian and legal obligations. It requires standards to reduce the incredible toll of lives in a country which we are committed to assist.

The broad principles and standards so far set out in the Geneva Convention of 1949 and other instruments of international law are but weak barriers within which to contain imperious arguments of military necessity, of expediency and facility. More than general principles are required. It is urgent that:

A precise recommended code of practices for the protection of non-combatants translating broad juridical principles into express prohibitions and specific directives be worked out in cooperation with the Armed Forces;

South Viet-Nam from which they launch attacks on United States and allied forces.

Before the ink was dry on the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos, the North Vietnamese began violating them. They left over 6,000 troops in that country, and their number has steadily grown ever since. In mid-May 1964, the Pathet Lao, supported by the North Vietnamese, attacked Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma's neutralist military forces on the Plain of Jars. In May 1964, as North Vietnamese presence increased, the United States, at the request of the Royal Lao Government, began flying certain interdiction missions. These air operations continued over the next four years.

This was the situation which President Nixon inherited upon taking office in January 1969. The policy of this Administration has been to support the independence and neutrality of Laos under the 1962 Geneva Agreements and to assist the neutral government of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma against North Vietnamese invasion. Our course in Laos, as in the rest of Southeast Asia, is to bring the hostilities to an end.

President Nixon has been carrying out a continuing program of withdrawal of United States forces from Southeast Asia. The President's constitutional powers as Commander-in-Chief and in the field of foreign relations provide authority for him to take reasonable measures to carry out these withdrawals, to protect our troops, and to bring the hostilities which were underway when he took office to an end in a way that will contribute to a durable peace.

Sincerely yours,

DAVID M. ABSHIRE,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

APPENDIX IV

TEXT OF CHAIRMAN'S PROPOSAL FOR A MILITARY PRACTICES REVIEW BOARD AND EXCERPTS FROM A RELATED BRIEF SUBMITTED TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE BY PROFESSOR GIDON GOTTLIEB OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, APRIL 29, 1971

THURSDAY, APRIL 29, 1971.

Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees, today recommended that the President create a Military Practices Review Board to curb the effects on the civilian population of United States military policy in Indochina.

Senator Kennedy said the Review Board "would advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff on standards and procedures designed to keep American military policies and practices within the bounds of simple humanitarian and international legal obligations, and would monitor the implementing of the rules of engagement governing American armed forces in active combat."

"The Review Board should be appointed by the President at an early date in consultation with the appropriate committees of the Congress. The Review Board should be attached to the National Security Council, and should be composed of high level officials in government as well as recognized non-governmental experts on humanitarian problems and international law."

Senator Kennedy said: "In light of the bitter experience in Indochina, the time is long overdue for this Nation, at the highest level of government, to take stock of policies and attitudes which have contributed so heavily to the massive flow of refugees, the occurrence of civilian casualties, and the inexcusably low priority attached to the care and protection of civilians in combat zones."

"The latest hearings by the Subcommittee confirm again that the forced evacuation of civilians, aerial bombardment, free fire zones, and similar practices are continuing to have a devastating impact on the civilian population of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. There continues to be a vast gap between the official policy of our government and the performance in the field. We must finally come to grips with this issue. We must finally come to recognize and understand the flagrant abuses of American power. And we must resolve that what has been done in Indochina, in America's name, must never happen again."

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The broad principles and standards so far set out in the Geneva Convention of 1949 and other instruments of international law are but weak barriers within which to contain imperious arguments of military necessity, of expediency and facility. More than general principles are required. It is urgent that:

A precise recommended code of practices for the protection of non-combatants translating broad juridical principles into express prohibitions and specific directives be worked out in cooperation with the Armed Forces;

An effective advisory board to monitor and review military practices on the basis of these principles be established in cooperation with the Armed Forces. These procedures and standards must at a minimum govern:

- The selection of military targets;
- The ordinance used in prosecution of the war;
- The relocation and resettlement of refugees;
- The care and treatment of the injured and the sick;
- The adoption of military policies such as free fire zones.

They must be capable of providing guidance for responsible officers, officials and ambassadors involved in these matters as well as for our allies. They must set the standards to which they will be held and for violations of which they will be asked to account. They should be accepted and adopted by the Department of Defense and issued in the form of directives to all Armed Forces of the United States. Pending the adoption of such a recommended code Congress should scrutinize military policies adopted in the war in Indochina on the basis of the Draft Rules of the Red Cross for the Limitation of the Dangers to Civilian Population and suggest such changes in the policies as it may deem necessary.

Congress should moreover draw the attention of senior officials of the U.S. government and of senior officers of the Armed Forces to the standards established in the Red Cross Rules and to the principles of international law restated by the Institute of International Law on the nature of military targets.

In developing appropriate procedures and standards five points should be made:

The standards need not necessarily be legislated and made into law; it is enough that they be developed in cooperation with the Department of Defense and the Department of State and accepted or issued by them in the form of directives;

The standards should be based upon rules developed by the International Committee of the Red Cross and other instruments declaratory of international law binding on the United States;

The Congress need not await adoption of standards by the International community in the form of international conventions before deciding to recommend to the Armed Forces a code of practices for the protection of civilians;

The application of standards should be monitored and military policies should be reviewed by an appropriate agency;

The standards should also be explicitly accepted by all foreign recipients of U.S. military aid and machinery should be agreed upon to monitor and review their application as well as to provide emergency assistance to civilian populations in armed conflicts.

The protracted efforts to terminate U.S. involvement in the Indochina war have not borne fruit as yet. In the meantime hundreds of thousands have died in the conflict. I appeal to the opponents of the war to take time off to support measures for the protection of the civilian population of Indochina. It is both a moral and a legal duty. To tinker with the protection of civilians, to ameliorate their destiny is not to make war more acceptable. Self-righteous pacifism cannot be waged at home at the expense of the women and children of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

I would also appeal to those who support the President's policy in Indochina to lend their support to measures for the protection of civilian populations. Surely, these policies do not preclude attempts dictated by the American tradition, by law and by morality, to protect the innocent non-combatants, the honor of the American Army and the memory of its dead.

On the issue of the protection of the civilians no fair man can remain neutral. Only the callous or the guilty can remain quiet.

APPENDIX V

CHAIRMAN'S LETTER TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
MELVIN R. LAIRD, MAY 10, 1971

The letter below requests Secretary Laird's comment on a number of items raised at subcommittee hearings on April 21 and 22, 1971. As of mid-September, no response has been received, despite repeated inquiries. The subcommittee can only conclude that there is official reluctance within the Department of Defense to comment on the issues raised in the Chairman's letter.

MAY 10, 1971.

HON. MELVIN R. LAIRD,
Secretary of Defense,
Department of Defense,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: As you probably know, since 1965 war-related civilian problems in Indochina have been a matter of primary interest to me personally and to the Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees. Over the years, members of the Subcommittee and others have been deeply concerned about the devastating impact of United States military activities on the civilian population. And, for both strategic and humanitarian reasons, we have long believed that steps were needed to minimize America's contribution to the rising number of refugees and civilian casualties, and to better care for the civilian war victims that did result from the conflict.

In this connection, as a result of the Subcommittee's latest hearings on April 21 and 22, a number of items have again been raised, and I feel it would be helpful to have the Department's comments on them. The items are listed below:

1. The Subcommittee confirms a request during the hearings to Mr. Dennis Dooin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, for a glossary of terms which have been used to describe various American or American supported military activities in Indochina. The glossary should include such official and unofficial terms as "specified strike zone", "area bombing", "free strike zone", "free fire zone", "H & I fire", "recon by fire", "search and destroy", "clear and sweep", "cordon and search", "protective encirclement", "maximum suppressive fire", "artillery umbrella", "county fair operation", "restricted zone", "protective reaction", "forced evacuation", and so forth. The glossary should contain a precise definition of each term, the projected impact on civilians of the military activities associated with each term, the rules of engagement governing these activities, and the Department's appraisal of performance in the field. In this connection, I would also like to request for use by the Subcommittee, a copy of the full text of the "Report of the Department of Army Review of the Preliminary Investigations into the My Lai Incident"—the Peers report.

2. The intensity and the impact on the civilian population of the American sponsored air war in Laos has evoked much controversy and concern. The hearing records and other documents of the Subcommittee contain significant information, but continue to raise a number of questions. What is the history of the air war over Laos, which some sources suggest has evolved in at least four escalating phases beginning in 1964? In separate calculations for northern and southern Laos, what is the monthly rate of sorties, identified by the kinds of aircraft employed, since January 1968? What is the monthly tonnage of ordnance for each area, and over the same period of time? How would the Department characterize the kinds of ordnance used? What are the rules of engagement and operations authorities governing air activities in Laos? What revisions, if any, have been made in these procedures since January 1968?

3. At a hearing on May 7, 1970, the exchange below took place. In the absence of a satisfactory response at that time, it would be helpful to receive the Depart-

An effective advisory board to monitor and review military practices on the basis of these principles be established in cooperation with the Armed Forces. These procedures and standards must at a minimum govern:

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They must be capable of providing guidance for responsible officers, officials and ambassadors involved in these matters as well as for our allies. They must set the standards to which they will be held and for violations of which they will be asked to account. They should be accepted and adopted by the Department of Defense and issued in the form of directives to all Armed Forces of the United States. Pending the adoption of such a recommended code Congress should scrutinize military policies adopted in the war in Indochina on the basis of the Draft Rules of the Red Cross for the Limitation of the Dangers to Civilian Population and suggest such changes in the policies as it may deem necessary.

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3. At a hearing on May 7, 1970, the exchange below took place. In the absence of a satisfactory response at that time, it would be helpful to receive the Depart-

ment's full comment now, in the context of the hearing last year and subsequent developments.

Mr. DOOLIN. In terms of our air attacks, Senator, I believe my statement is as far as I can go in open session; it accurately reflects the operating authorities. As I indicated, all air strikes, except some are validated by the Ambassador to Laos and to my knowledge maximum care is taken to avoid the causing of civilian casualties

Senator KENNEDY. Well, are these limitations really any different from Vietnam

Mr. DOOLIN. I can only say on the basis of the information available, the maximum care is taken to avoid civilian casualties wherever possible.

Senator KENNEDY. I'm sure maximum care is taken. I want to know what the results are.

Now, you must know from aerial photography how many villages have actually been destroyed—what the size was of villages where you take pictures one day and then again the next day; you can tell where the buildings were, whether they are up or down; and you can make some estimation as to whether there had been people in the village or not. Have you done any kind of work like this?

Mr. DOOLIN. Mr. Chairman, there is some information available and I will be pleased to prepare a report on the subject and submit it to you and correlate it with the rules of engagement which I will go into in much more detail either in executive session or private correspondence.

Senator KENNEDY. I don't think any of us are looking for confidential materials here. I think what we are trying to find out is whether there are procedures used in bombings, and whether you follow those procedures to the best of your ability. We are interested in what the results of these procedures are in terms of civilian casualties and the creation of refugees.

Now, I'm sure that there are refugees that have been created by North Vietnamese terrorism and other kinds of factors. But I'm equally sure that tens of thousands of refugees have also been created by bombing, and what we are trying to do here is to find out how they are created as well as what happens to them—and if you're going to have an intensification of military activity what plans you've made to prepare for these refugees

Mr. DOOLIN. Well, as I indicated in my statement, Mr. Chairman, the air action, English-speaking; they avoid towns and these strikes are validated by the U.S. Embassy in Vientiane.

Senator KENNEDY. That, of course—

Mr. DOOLIN. They might put them as close to the scene as possible.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, now I'm interested in the performance chart as well as what the procedure chart shows. I'm sure we have outlined carefully prescribed procedures to avoid the creation of civilian casualties and refugees. But I'd be interested in what the results of those procedures have been as seen from aerial photography and from other kinds of intelligence activities you have access to and whether you are sufficiently concerned about these problems that you are taking these precautions.

Mr. DOOLIN. I'll see if I can provide that to you, Senator.

4. At the hearing on April 22, Mr. Doolin submitted a series of aerial photographs of selected towns and villages in Laos in order to illustrate the care taken by American personnel in protecting the civilian population in areas subject to air strikes. These photographs, and relevant identifying data, will be made a part of the public record. It would be useful, however, to have as well a number of additional photographs for the Subcommittee's review. I would like to suggest that this request include the most recent photographs, and relevant identifying data, of the towns and villages listed below:

1. Phong Saly.
2. Sam Neua.
3. Ban Ban.
4. Ban Souy.
5. Ban Tham.
6. Ban Koua (Taseng Nhoune).
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8. Ban Hop Oh (Taseng He Mouane).
9. Ban Sy Louang (Taseng Ang).
10. Ban Thateng (Saravane Province).
11. Ban Na Kay (Khammouane Province).

5. There are currently in existence manuals on rules of land warfare and on rules of naval warfare. What is the status of proposals on a similar manual relating to the rules of air warfare? Also, what program of instruction pertaining to the protection of civilians in air warfare is currently in use at the Air Force Academy? Does the Department accept the statement of the Institute of International Law on the nature of military targets (resolutions at Edinburgh, 1969) as an accurate restatement of international law? Does the Department accept the "Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War"—prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)—as acceptable standards for the protection of such populations, and, if not, are there specific changes the Department would suggest? Are the classified rules of engagement governing American military activities in Indochina fully compatible with the general rules established by the ICRC and the general standards set by the Institute of International Law?

6. Finally, as a result of the Subcommittee's latest hearings and additional inquiry, on April 29 I recommended that the President create a permanent Military Practices Review Board to advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff on standards and procedures designed to keep American military policies and practices within the bounds of simple humanitarian and international legal obligations, and to monitor the implementing of the rules of engagement governing American armed forces in active combat. I further recommended that the Review Board be appointed by the President at an early date in consultation with the appropriate committees of the Congress; that it be composed of high level officials in government as well as recognized non-governmental experts on humanitarian problems and international law; and that it be attached to the National Security Council. The recommendation has generated much positive response among persons in government and elsewhere, and I would appreciate very much learning the Department's views in this matter. Enclosed is a press release containing the recommendation.

In conclusion, let me say that I fully appreciate the lengthy nature of these inquiries. But, in view of the widespread congressional and public interest in the issues raised by these inquiries, I strongly feel that meaningful responses will contribute to greater understanding and will be beneficial to all concerned. I am extremely hopeful that it will be possible to include a good deal of the responses in the public record. I would also like to suggest that, as responses are prepared to individual items, they be forwarded to my office.

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Many thanks for your consideration.

Sincerely,

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APPENDIX VI

INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE FOR EUROPEAN MIGRATION: REVIEW OF ACHIEVEMENTS, 1970

INTRODUCTION

In the history of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration 1970 will be marked as a year during which policy decisions were taken, that will have an important bearing on future operations and their financing.

During recent sessions the ICEM Council has given considerable attention to the question of establishing a more realistic system for operational financing in order to diminish or eliminate the continuing deficits caused by insufficient contributions from governments. In this context a working group composed of representatives of ten governments was set up in 1970 to consider the problem in detail.

Taking into consideration each government's general interest in ICEM and its more specific interest in certain programmes, "model schedules" were proposed for the financing of the refugee and the Latin American programmes—the two sections of the budget where the perennial deficits occur. These model schedules are significant in that they are based on the principle of cost-sharing—an equitable participation of all Member Governments in the financing of both of the programmes mentioned.

At its Session in November 1970 the Council approved the model schedules but, bearing in mind the principle that contributions to the operational programmes are voluntary, stated that the schedules were to be considered as guidelines to governments to determine their annual contributions. This effort to establish a more predictable level of operational financing constitutes a most important step forward, and it is gratifying that the Council has been responsive to this need.

Another decision was made by the Council related to the planning of ICEM's future activities. The suggestion was put forward that an evaluation be made of the European migration phenomenon by analysing national migration policies and their underlying principles and purposes in all countries interested in migration from Europe. Because of the

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INTRODUCTION

In the history of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration 1970 will be marked as a year during which policy decisions were taken, that will have an important bearing on future operations and their financing.

During recent sessions the ICEM Council has given considerable attention to the question of establishing a more realistic system for operational financing in order to diminish or eliminate the continuing deficits caused by insufficient contributions from governments. In this context a working group composed of representatives of ten governments was set up in 1970 to consider the problem in detail.

Taking into consideration each government's general interest in ICEM and its more specific interest in certain programmes, "model schedules" were proposed for the financing of the refugee and the Latin American programmes—the two sections of the budget where the perennial deficits occur. These model schedules are significant in that they are based on the principle of cost-sharing—an equitable participation of all Member Governments in the financing of both of the programmes mentioned.

At its Session in November 1970 the Council approved the model schedules but, bearing in mind the principle that contributions to the operational programmes are voluntary, stated that the schedules were to be considered as guidelines to governments to determine their annual contributions. This effort to establish a more predictable level of operational financing constitutes a most important step forward, and it is gratifying that the Council has been responsive to this need.

Another decision was made by the Council related to the planning of ICEM's future activities. The suggestion was put forward that an evaluation be made of the European migration phenomenon by analysing national migration policies and their underlying principles and purposes in all countries interested in migration from Europe. Because of the

interrelationship between the European labour situation and the manpower needs of overseas countries, it was suggested that ICEM might serve as a catalyst and central information point on international migration policies and could be instrumental in advising those governments seeking to develop such policies.

In the light of the Council discussions a pilot project has been undertaken to gather and study appropriate information from several governments. It is hoped that the final outcome of the study which will be continued during 1971 may determine the basis for future ICEM activities, related directly to the need of its Member Governments and the persons who are interested in and will benefit from internationally planned migration.

New initiatives related to the Latin American Programme were also taken during 1970. As a result of the success achieved by ICEM in helping to plan and set up the National Training Centre for Artisans in Popayán, Colombia, several other Member Governments requested ICEM's help in working out similar projects for their countries. During 1970 surveys were made in seven countries, and it was agreed that there was a great need to revive, expand or modernize local artisan activities. If this were to be carried out, large numbers of local workers could earn a steady income and the receipts from tourists and export sources could be augmented.

Accordingly ICEM, in co-operation with interested governments, worked out detailed plans and, for several countries, recruited European instructors who had the appropriate background and experience to undertake the training of the local artisan workers and the supervision of the centres. Those projects which were initiated in 1970 are expected to further develop and expand during the next few years.

During the year under review relations were strengthened with those International Organizations and Agencies particularly engaged in the further development of the Latin American countries.

To comply with the needs for specialists within the framework of several development projects ICEM made available its expertise and

operational know-how in order to recruit and select highly skilled and professional manpower for various sectors of the economy where progress is hampered by lack of skills in the local economy.

Another matter which came under discussion in the Council was the fact that ICEM was approaching its twentieth anniversary. The Council took note that, since its inception in December 1951, ICEM had assisted nearly 1.8 million migrants and refugees to rebuild their lives in new home countries.

The Council agreed that the twentieth anniversary would be a good occasion to make the purposes and humanitarian aims of the Committee better known to the general public and to all directly interested in migration affairs. In this respect it decided to undertake the production of a documentary film showing various aspects of ICEM's contribution in the fields of manpower movements, refugee aid and economic development through migration.

The Council also agreed to other initiatives such as the issue of a special publication, depicting twenty years of internationally planned migration and the role ICEM has played in this field, as well as the holding of a poster contest to visualize the aims and objectives of the Committee.

Within the framework of the 1971 November Session of the Council a special commemorative meeting will be held, with the participation of leading personalities from the Member Governments.

On the following pages will be found a detailed review of ICEM's activities during the year 1970. They demonstrate the achievements of the Committee in a world burdened with political tensions, economic and social problems and human distress. Within the family of international organizations ICEM strives to achieve improvement and progress by serving its Member Governments and people in need of help.

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PEOPLE BEHIND THE STATISTICS

Close on 80,000 persons seeking resettlement abroad called upon ICEM's assistance in 1970. More than 50,000 of them were refugees or "involuntary" migrants as they might be called, while the remaining part were national migrants who for "voluntary" reasons have decided to leave their home country to find new employment possibilities abroad.

The transportation and supporting services are to a great extent identical for both groups. However, their background and motivation are so different that it is justified to deal with them separately. For whereas the so-called voluntary national migrant category travel on their original national passport holding all the normal rights it entails, the refugee involves numerous legal and political problems which ICEM must resolve before resettlement can be effected.

EMIGRATION OF NATIONALS

The desire of nationals to emigrate from Europe to overseas countries followed much the same pattern as in recent years in numbers as well as in the choice of immigration country. Despite the prosperity in Europe, which made it possible for many nationals to finance and arrange their own emigration, the number of assisted migrants remained relatively high. Nearly 27,000 Europeans appealed for and received assistance from ICEM which put at their disposal a network of services in order to arrange for an orderly and smooth transfer to new home countries. The fact that every single migrant will be fully assisted is of fundamental importance for all member countries believing in the basic right of the individual to freedom of movement and freedom to settle where he prefers.

The interest of Europeans to emigrate underwent no substantial fluctuation. Migration from Austria and Malta remained steady although there was a slight decline in the movements from the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the Netherlands.

In 1970 the main reception country was again Australia with an intake of 17,500 national migrants, while over 6,000 persons resettled in the other traditional immigration countries such as Canada, New Zealand, South Africa and the United States. Another 3,000 nationals moved to Latin and Central America, many of whom were Europeans who went to Latin America to join their families and relatives already there. This relatively modest number should be considered in the light that Latin America can develop its lands through natural population growth. On the other hand, Australia needs quantitative migration to populate its immense territory.

Latin American countries need specific types of qualified workers and for that reason in 1964 ICEM developed its present Selective Migration Programme. Through this programme skilled people in Europe are recruited for and transferred to Latin America to those sectors of the economy where skills and experience can be put to the best use. Obviously, it is not easy to recruit highly skilled migrants at a time when this category is in short supply in Europe. Nevertheless, of the 3,000 migrants moved to Latin America in 1970, over 1,600 were specifically recruited to meet high level labour shortages which could not be met locally.

SELECTIVE MIGRATION PROGRAMME

Through its Selective Migration Programme, which provides skills lacking in industry, agriculture, education and other sectors, ICEM contributes to the economic and social development of the countries of Latin America.

As regards the recruitment and selection of the necessary human resources, ICEM serves as an agent for its Latin American members, which usually do not have at their disposal the machinery available to other immigration countries. ICEM's task is also to acquaint the Latin American member governments with the requisites and complexities of

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present-day selection, recruitment and placement of selected migrants. This is done in the form of seminars which take place in Latin America or Europe. The Australian Government traditionally supports these seminars, thus making available to the Latin American governments its rich experience in migration activities.

The most recent seminar, lasting four weeks, was held in 1970 in Europe for senior government officials from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Panama, Peru and Venezuela. It opened in Geneva and continued with visits to the Australian immigration missions and ICEM missions in Austria, Germany, Greece, Italy and Spain to familiarize the participants with the operational activities, procedures and general tasks carried out by those missions.

In a joint final report the participants recommended that Latin American countries should establish inter-ministerial committees to frame a national migration policy and to establish the relationships needed for closer co-operation with ICEM. In this connexion the governments of Latin America should consider the implementation of measures to attract immigrants, for example by introducing more liberal customs regulations and offering continuity with the social security schemes maintained by the migrant's country of origin. They should also attempt to disseminate within Europe a more positive image of actual conditions in Latin America and to this end should seek the practical support of European governments. Furthermore, the necessity of ICEM continuing its efforts to recruit highly specialized manpower for Latin America was stressed, particular mention being made of the need to attract agricultural settlers to introduce new methods of production and to disseminate their skill and experience. Emphasis was also placed on the desirability of all international organizations concerned with development assistance collaborating closely with ICEM in carrying out their own programmes on behalf of Latin America.

During the year 1970 several European governments expressed their interest in the further implementation of the Selective Migration Programme. Accordingly, an agreement was reached with *Belgium* for set-

ting up an independent ICEM office in Brussels, and arrangements were made with the "Centre d'Etudes des Problèmes des Pays en Développement, CEDEV" for priority attention to be given to the recruitment of professors for universities in Latin America. The *German* Government sent an official to Latin America to examine how they could help to increase the effectiveness of the programme. In *Italy*, under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a working group comprising the Italo-Latin American Institute, the National Research Council and the Institute for Economic Co-operation with Developing Countries, is co-ordinating efforts to select university professors and research staff for Latin America. In *Spain* the Institute of Emigration and other governmental authorities continued their traditional co-operation with ICEM in the implementation of the Selective Migration Programme. Training courses for qualified technicians were organized at the "Casa de América" Centre in Vigo. The *Swiss* Government intensified its collaboration with ICEM in connexion with the programme and for the first time contributed financially to it.

As in previous years, in 1970, Brazil received the largest number of migrants under the programme. Increased numbers were placed in the North-East area, the development of which is a priority target for the Government. The upgrading of the skill level needed and ICEM's ability to meet this requirement are best illustrated by Brazil's request for very highly specialized technicians for the aeronautical industry. Increased movements to Colombia reflected the continued economic expansion in that country, particularly in the industrial sector. As a result of measures taken during the previous year, there was also an upward trend in movements to the Central American area.

The fact that refugees also possess required skills has not gone unnoticed among Latin American governments, and several of them have agreed to accept suitably qualified candidates.

In the educational field, large numbers of secondary school teachers, training instructors and academic staff are needed from European sources. During 1970 over 600 in these categories were moved to Latin America.

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Some idea of the kind of university posts open to immigrants may be gained from the following examples :

A graduate of the University of Louvain, in Belgium, took up a post with the Catholic University of Córdoba, Argentina. He occupies the Chair of Histology and Embryology and has responsibility for the Electronic Microscope Centre. He is conducting research on certain subjects in his field of specialization and publishing the results. Another Belgian was recruited to take up a post in the same university as a professor in the Faculty of Engineering. In addition to lecturing, he is developing special studies on photoelasticity in the School of Civil Engineering.

A Spanish professor was engaged first as Director of the High School for Tourism in the University of Neuquén, Argentina, and later as Director of the Tourism Development Plan in the Province of Córdoba.

Experience has shown that special forms of assistance are sometimes needed to facilitate the recruitment and integration of selected migrants for Latin America. One form is the Adjustment Fund, from which salary equalization grants, dependants' allowances and installation grants are made to highly skilled and professional migrants to compensate for the difference between the initial salaries offered in Latin America and those received in Europe. In 1970, 255 persons received such assistance. A further type of assistance, consisting of medical and insurance protection during the period in which the migrant is not yet entitled to benefits under the national social security schemes, was granted to some 500 selected migrants during 1970.

REFUGEES

The American Immigration and Citizenship Council at a ceremony in New York presented its annual award for 1970 to ICEM "for outstanding services to migrants and refugees". This took place in a year when ICEM's assistance in the resettlement of refugees was extended to some 52,000 persons.

Who were these refugees, the human beings behind the "cold figures" of those assisted by ICEM ? The sight of squalid and depressing refugee camps in Europe is part of the past, a no longer existing heritage of the Nazi regime's forced labour and concentration camp programmes or of the human upheavals that marked the aftermath of World War II.

Today growing trade and a certain political détente have eased communications between East and West. There is a constant stream of tourists across borders. In this atmosphere it is difficult to believe there is an undercurrent of people who cross these same borders with what they consider to be compelling reasons for migration to new homelands. Some people have felt they were forced to leave ; others have finally cleared tortuous administrative road blocks so that they are at last able to rejoin relatives in overseas countries from whom they have been separated for years.

Europe is fortunate that there exists an international mechanism, a closely coordinated effort, which does not leave these persons stranded en route in their search for new homelands. Within this mechanism are the regular annual quotas established by countries of immigration for the admission of refugees and rapid procedures for their processing. Another important part is the work of private voluntary agencies, which are in contact with relatives and sponsors. Because of this chain, countries of asylum can receive refugees, frequently without the need of establishing their right to political asylum since after a short period of transit residence they can be accepted by countries of immigration. In this whole process ICEM is an integral part because its services ensure that persons receive their visas and depart for the new home countries without delay.

It is fortunate too that this mechanism functions quietly and efficiently so that the question of refugees is not one that troubles political relations in Europe. In 1970 ICEM was calmly handling the resettlement of the residue of more than 80,000 Czechoslovaks who had remained outside or left their country after the tragic events in Prague during the summer of 1968. This had been a dramatic flood until November 1969 when the Czechoslovak frontiers were closed. Consequently, though there were

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only a small number of new arrivals in 1970 ICEM resettled in that year nearly 3,300 persons, the majority of whom fled in 1969.

The spotlight of public attention is frequently not helpful to sustaining the possibilities for exit of certain groups of persons, because of the political implications involved under the label "refugees". An example of this is one particular problem which has now become almost common knowledge.

Shortly after the six day war of 1967 in the Middle East, a statement was made by the then Premier Gomulka questioning the loyalty of the Jews remaining in Poland. Various pressures were brought to bear on these people leading to their obtaining a document permitting their legal exit after they had signed a statement renouncing all rights to Polish nationality or of return. These persons began to arrive in European countries of asylum, where they quietly remained outside official refugee centres or statistics and emerged statistically only as part of ICEM's overall figures for movements to various countries of resettlement. At first, as some knowledge of these movements became available, they were regarded as representing a legal migration motivated by economic reasons—a description which was not entirely accurate but which caused no halt in the flow. ICEM had arranged the resettlement from temporary countries of asylum of 2,564 of these persons in 1968 and 3,907 in 1969.

Newspapers then began to print interviews with some of these persons and identified them clearly as refugees. Late in 1969, Polish authorities announced a deadline for the processing of applications for exit permits and by 1970 the flow became a trickle. So in 1970 ICEM's work consisted of completing the resettlement of 1,900 persons who had been able to leave Poland before the dateline. Denmark and Sweden received in total some 4,000 persons directly from Poland and because of intensive and extensive government programmes to assist their integration it has only been necessary for ICEM to become involved with the resettlement to other countries of a few family reunion cases.

In general, the picture of the refugee situation in Europe during 1970 was characterized by a lower rate of new arrivals in countries of asylum

than in 1969. Though tensions remained high in the Middle East and North Africa, the number of persons from various minority groups in the area who sought asylum in Western Europe was low. There was, however, one disturbing exception to the general trend. A very significant increase was shown in the number of persons arriving in Spain from Cuba—a monthly average in the latter half of 1970 of 1,300. This developed at the same time as a sharp drop in outward movements from Spain to the United States, as the result of the application of a labour certificate requirement in view of employment conditions in that country. ICEM, together with the Voluntary Agencies, began intensive efforts therefore to awaken an interest among the Cuban refugees in Spain for resettlement in other countries such as Australia or those in Latin America. Only small results were registered from these efforts—11 departed for Australia and 62 for Latin America in 1970—but it is hoped others may become interested during 1971 when reports are received from these refugees after their arrival in their new homelands. Unless these hopes are realized the accumulation of refugees in Spain will continue to mount dangerously. Movements of Cubans out of Spain during the entire year 1970 amounted to 3,394 persons compared with 11,159 new arrivals during the same period.

During 1970 only 12 persons of European origin were able to reach Hong Kong from mainland China, though there are known to be somewhat more than 1,000 persons who have been making persistent and sometimes desperate efforts to pursue applications for exit permits. Consequently one of the major activities of the Joint ICEM/UNHCR Office in Hong Kong was directed towards the resettlement of the elderly and handicapped refugees who had been able to reach there.

ICEM's transportation services during 1970 were valuable in facilitating the resettlement of close on 1,000 non-Europeans refugees, though special funds or full reimbursement of costs are required by the ICEM Council for this purpose. The major part of these movements were effected from Hong Kong to the United States and comprised mainly Chinese refugees from that area, Macao or other countries in South-East Asia. Among

other non-European refugees benefiting from ICEM services were 10 Haitian refugees from the Bahamas to Belgium, 114 Tibetans to Switzerland and 14 African refugees from various countries accepted mainly in Europe. For all these movements ICEM relied upon its working partnership with Voluntary Agencies, and in some instances the UNHCR was instrumental in processing or placement. A special contribution of the Norwegian Refugee Council to ICEM permitted the carrying out of certain of these movements where the necessary financing was otherwise absent. ICEM sent one of its officials to Lagos to provide technical advice to an UNHCR team in the preparation of an air lift for the repatriation of 4,500 children to Nigeria.

Among the various refugee groups assisted by ICEM are always to be found "handicapped cases". As in any population segment, there are individuals with health or social problems, and naturally their admission to countries of immigration requires exceptional measures because they are generally regarded as potential public charges on the state. In fact, many of these "handicapped cases" with their families can become self-supporting if special attention is given to their individual placement. Over the years countries of immigration have come to appreciate this factor, and more and more handicapped cases are being resettled under normal immigration schemes due to relaxation of criteria or the compassionate interpretation of regulations in exceptional individual cases. In this connexion, many handicapped cases are accepted by countries such as Australia, Canada and the United States. Nevertheless, special handicapped schemes or quotas are still necessary for the most difficult cases and the generous admission policies of countries like Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Switzerland and Sweden were the basis for the solution of a number of such cases in 1970.

During the year 894 handicapped cases, comprising 1,609 persons were resettled by ICEM from European countries of first asylum, North Africa, the Middle East and Far East. These figures have little meaning in themselves, but each case has its story of long, disillusioning periods

of waiting, suddenly brightened by acceptance into a new society with opportunities for the future.

The most difficult category among the refugees for placement are mental cases because institutional space is limited in most countries and such cases are a welfare burden. Letters from mental cases are rare and for this reason the following extracts of a letter from a White Russian refugee ex Harbin is most interesting after his arrival during 1970 in a mental home under the sponsorship of the Danish Refugee Council:

"... This is my first letter to inform that we reached our destination and everything is all right. In this hospital there is a department where the patients are given work such as wrapping up candles, packing them or to frame and pack children's pictures, etc. This hospital is very good and is especially for the mentally ill. The job is paid ... I am very happy that I have been placed here.

... I am also studying Danish ... When I arrived here I found everything very strange with some employers and doctors speaking English. I then began to write down the names of certain things in Danish and the meaning in Russian. The staff were interested and decided to help me.

You may be sure that I will not betray your trust for everything you have done for me. It is necessary that I work hard, learn Danish for as you used to tell me one has to have an aim or purpose in life. So, I now have an aim to reach which is not easy to do in this life. However, as we know there is nothing in life that is easy..."

Another letter from a 60-year old man, who had lingered 14 years in a refugee camp in Italy suffering from an old pulmonary tubercular, described his reunion during 1970 with his mother and two sisters in the United Kingdom in the following terms: "At long last I have met my mother again. It was very touching but also sad. She became blind two years ago and my brothers and sisters have never wanted to tell me this news. She was staring at me with her blind eyes, touching my face with her hands, saying over and over again 'My poor boy, my poor, poor boy'. I could not avoid crying like a small child. But at last we are together again".

other non-European refugees benefiting from ICEM services were 10 Haitian refugees from the Bahamas to Belgium, 114 Tibetans to Switzerland and 14 African refugees from various countries accepted mainly in Europe. For all these movements ICEM relied upon its working partnership with Voluntary Agencies, and in some instances the UNHCR was instrumental in processing or placement. A special contribution of the Norwegian Refugee Council to ICEM permitted the carrying out of certain of these movements where the necessary financing was otherwise absent. ICEM sent one of its officials to Lagos to provide technical advice to an UNHCR team in the preparation of an air lift for the repatriation of 4,500 children to Nigeria.

Among the various refugee groups assisted by ICEM are always to be found "handicapped cases". As in any population segment, there are individuals with health or social problems, and naturally their admission to countries of immigration requires exceptional measures because they are generally regarded as potential public charges on the state. In fact, many of these "handicapped cases" with their families can become self-supporting if special attention is given to their individual placement. Over the years countries of immigration have come to appreciate this factor, and more and more handicapped cases are being resettled under normal immigration schemes due to relaxation of criteria or the compassionate interpretation of regulations in exceptional individual cases. In this connexion, many handicapped cases are accepted by countries such as Australia, Canada and the United States. Nevertheless, special handicapped schemes or quotas are still necessary for the most difficult cases and the generous admission policies of countries like Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Switzerland and Sweden were the basis for the solution of a number of such cases in 1970.

During the year 894 handicapped cases, comprising 1,609 persons were resettled by ICEM from European countries of first asylum, North Africa, the Middle East and Far East. These figures have little meaning in themselves, but each case has its story of long, disillusioning periods

of waiting, suddenly brightened by acceptance into a new society with opportunities for the future.

The most difficult category among the refugees for placement are mental cases because institutional space is limited in most countries and such cases are a welfare burden. Letters from mental cases are rare and for this reason the following extracts of a letter from a White Russian refugee ex Harbin is most interesting after his arrival during 1970 in a mental home under the sponsorship of the Danish Refugee Council:

"... This is my first letter to inform that we reached our destination and everything is all right. In this hospital there is a department where the patients are given work such as wrapping up candles, packing them or to frame and pack children's pictures, etc. This hospital is very good and is especially for the mentally ill. The job is paid ... I am very happy that I have been placed here.

... I am also studying Danish ... When I arrived here I found everything very strange with some employers and doctors speaking English. I then began to write down the names of certain things in Danish and the meaning in Russian. The staff were interested and decided to help me.

You may be sure that I will not betray your trust for everything you have done for me. It is necessary that I work hard, learn Danish for as you used to tell me one has to have an aim or purpose in life. So, I now have an aim to reach which is not easy to do in this life. However, as we know there is nothing in life that is easy..."

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There was also tragedy, patience, and final reunion in the case of a family of 6, belonging to the religious sect of the "Old Believers". They had arrived in Hong Kong during 1964, but because of the history of a medical condition for one of the sons exceptional measures were required to permit their final reunion during 1970 with other direct relatives in Argentina—a reunion described simply as being "very, very happy". Space will not permit here a summary of the personal tragedies in the lives of all the other handicapped cases leaving from Hong Kong, but mention can be made of a 70 year old woman with TB accepted by Switzerland and a mentally retarded woman with her child admitted by New Zealand to the Nansen home in Wellington.

The resources of ICEM, UNHCR, and the Voluntary Agencies are closely geared to bring about the acceptance of these tragic cases of handicapped refugees. Unfortunately these special efforts must be continued because there are inevitably a small number of handicapped cases among the newly arriving refugees whose problems multiply if they cannot benefit from an early opportunity for resettlement. As the ICEM Senior Medical Officer said in a speech appealing to Governments for their support, "the misery of a few does not diminish because so many have been helped, and it is easy to forget about the few if one is not occasionally reminded of their problem".

The above statement could in fact be applied to all of ICEM's work in the field of refugees. It is good that there is a machinery for the orderly and rapid processing of refugees. But there is also a danger that public support may weaken for an activity which gives none of the outward aspects of being a critical problem.

TO BENEFIT PEOPLE AND NATIONS

As stated earlier, in 1970 almost 80,000 national migrants and refugees benefited from the network of services and accumulated knowledge and experience which ICEM has built up over the years. The services may differ from country to country according to the wishes of the sending and receiving countries and the needs of the migrants.

SERVICES IN EUROPE

The range of assistance available to the migrants and refugees prior to departure include:

- information on emigration possibilities;
 - counselling on the opportunities existing in the different immigration countries, relating to the applicant's personal capacity, or professional attainment;
 - preparing and making available booklets and pamphlets in several languages giving information on such matters as climate, cost of living, salary levels, housing, education facilities, etc., for those countries which do not provide appropriate information material;
 - language training and accelerated professional training, wherever necessary and needed, to make a better start and/or to become immediately productive for the country of reception;
 - assistance in obtaining and filling in application forms, medical certificates, tax clearances, educational diplomas and any other papers needed for travel documentation and the migrants' visas.
- The above services include, especially for refugees, a great amount of translation of documents and interpretation during interviews with the officials of the immigration countries.

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After acceptance by the immigration authorities, the migrants are informed of the travel possibilities, and are given baggage instructions and information on customs regulations. Bookings are then made by sea or air, depending on the migrants' preference.

During the year 1970 ICEM maintained its traditional *language training* activities and even introduced them into new areas. This ICEM service is instrumental in helping to ensure easier adaptation as the language barrier is one of the major obstacles a migrant has to overcome. He will, however, surmount the first barriers if he knows and can understand the most common words. Since 1953, when ICEM started language training, over 140,000 national migrants and refugees have received this language "first aid", which was developed in Australia according to a situational method.

ICEM, with the assistance of over 100 teachers, conducts language training for more than 13,000 migrants and refugees annually, in eleven countries, including the Middle East and Latin America. English remains the basis of instruction for migrants wishing to settle in Australia, Canada or the United States. Classes are also organized in Spanish and Portuguese for settlers in Latin American countries.

ICEM's language training record for 1970 makes impressive reading: in Germany, Greece and Italy alone, where ICEM conducts special language courses on behalf of the Australian Government, over 6,000 prospective migrants for Australia received basic language training in 181 classes or by correspondence. Of these countries Greece and Italy have the most ambitious language training programmes exclusively for migration to Australia. In addition to the teaching centres in Athens, Salonica, Patras, Karditsa and Larissa for Greek male and female workers and family groups, courses in English are given in the Residential Centres of Kifissia and Ioannina. Ninety-eight language classes were organized in 1970.

Language training in Italy for nationals destined for Australia extends from Milan in the north to Pachino in the southern tip of Sicily. Sixty-six classes were started in 1970, involving nearly 2,000 students.

ICEM also conducts or co-operates in training programmes in Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and Malta for nationals interested in migration to Australia.

Australia contributes generously to the costs of these programmes and pays the salaries of the three regional language training supervisors in Germany, Greece and Italy.

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The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the U. S. Refugee Program and ICEM share in the cost of the refugee language programmes. Several Voluntary Agencies assist in the local administration of the classes.

Another facet of ICEM's adaptation activity is to help young Greek women in their resettlement in Australia. ICEM conducts special *home economics courses* at the Residential Training Centre at Kifissia on the outskirts of Athens. There, during a period of three months, Greek girls are learning all modern household techniques, which would help them to make the first start as smooth as possible. Under the supervision of qualified teachers they learn the modern way of housekeeping and the general activities associated with the working girl in Australia. They learn to serve meals and the routine is that on alternate days they serve other students or are served by them. Electric sewing machines used during the training are donated by Australian manufacturers.

Over 400 girls benefited from this accelerated home economics training during the year under review and went better equipped to their new home country.

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As part of the Spanish effort of co-operation in the development of Latin America, the Spanish Emigration Institute established in 1966 an

Advanced Technical Training Centre called "Casa de América", which is located at one of the traditional points of Spanish migration: Vigo. This Advanced Training Centre has a dual purpose: to advance the technical qualifications of selected migrants to higher level of skills commensurate with job offer requirements and to prepare them for a smooth adaptation and integration in their new environment.

The "Casa de América" operates on a live-in basis and its courses last from four to six months for a maximum of 190 students.

In 1970 a total of 118 migrants received this accelerated technical training, while 35 trainees from Latin America received scholarships to familiarize them with up-to-date techniques.

SERVICES OVERSEAS

During the years the traditional immigration countries, such as Australia, Canada, South Africa, where migrants arrive in great numbers, have built up a very effective reception and placement system which provides for the rapid integration of the migrants in the various sectors of economy. The countries of emigration have an interest as to where their citizens are going, what security of tenure or employment they are being offered, what kind of housing, educational, medical and other social facilities are available. The receiving countries provide information on these and many other matters to the interested governments and individuals. Upon arrival, competent officials help the migrant through the immigration procedures, find him accommodation, arrange transport to his place of work and take care of many other details which need attention to smooth the resettlement process.

For migrants going to countries which have not yet established machinery for the many services needed, in particular the Latin American countries, ICEM is instrumental in the reception, adaptation, placement and integration of migrants arriving under the Selective Migration Programme.

Additionally, in several Latin American countries ICEM is participating in joint surveys to determine the nature and extent of manpower requirements not available locally but essential for further development. These result in detailed job offers being sent to the ICEM missions in Europe to locate and recruit migrants qualified for specific vacancies. Once contact has been established with appropriate candidates, through advertising or personal approaches to professional associations or institutions, curricula vitae are collected and analyzed. Arrangements are made for medical examinations and aptitude tests, and finally other details are elicited on which a decision can be made as to the suitability of a candidate for the vacancy. When finally the employer and the migrant are in accord regarding all relevant details, ICEM arranges the transport and takes part in the reception and placement procedures, including landing facilities, inland transport, introduction to the employer, etc.

Although reception and placement procedures may differ from country to country, the network of services given by ICEM after arrival might best be illustrated with the procedure followed in Brazil for migrants for whom employment has not been arranged in advance.

On arrival they are met by ICEM representatives at the port or airport. They are assisted with custom formalities and collection of luggage, which is onforwarded by ICEM in co-operation with the *Brazilian authorities*. After these initial formalities, arrangements are made to obtain the documents necessary for the migrant's placement at no cost to him. The ICEM placement service maintains regular contacts with firms requiring technicians or skilled workers in order that the applicant may be introduced to employers for the necessary interviews and tests. In the meantime migrants in São Paulo may stay in a hostel belonging to the State of São Paulo with free room and board up to one month. In addition, this hostel maintains a language laboratory with modern electronic equipment, for use by immigrants during and after working hours. In 1970, 223 migrants from nine different European nationalities were accommodated by the hostel in São Paulo prior to final resettlement. In the Vocation and Adaptation Centre which is adjacent to the hostel, technical training courses both for migrants and Brazilians were given to train toolmakers.

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In 1970, the Argentine Government and ICEM approved final plans for the construction of a reception, integration and placement centre at Bahía Blanca. The Government has made the necessary budgetary appropriations for initiation of the work.

SERVICES TO GOVERNMENTS

Planned and organized migration as carried out by ICEM fulfils two main functions:

- to place migrants in the best position to integrate and to become part of the infrastructure of their new country, and
- to give to receiving countries the possibility of developing and progressing through the contribution received from the migrants.

It is becoming universally clear that material aid, i.e. money and machinery, is relatively ineffectual without an additional ingredient: skilled workers and technicians who in this context may be referred to as "human capital". ICEM is supplying some of the essential human capital to those nations who require it for their further development and for stimulating certain activities hampered by lack of skills.

One of the direct answers to the need to create employment and to develop co-operative production in marginal sectors of the economy, has been the establishment in 1968 of the National Artisan Training Centre in Popayán, Colombia. This centre, under the auspices of the National Apprenticeship Service (SENA), is aiming to restore the prestige of national handicrafts under the guidance of European specialists, selected and recruited by ICEM. Additional instructors were again recruited in 1970 and the artisan centre is now successfully training 1,600 artisans and local instructors annually.

Based on this example similar initiatives were undertaken in 1970 in Costa Rica, Panama, El Salvador and Honduras. In Costa Rica ICEM provided the first instructor for an artisan project sponsored by the U.S.

Peace Corps. Another expert was recruited for a school/workshop to develop the handicrafts industry through the Institute for Special Rehabilitation in Panama. Other European instructors were recruited for a training and production centre in Honduras, the national artisan centre "Valle de Angeles" and a mother of pearl handicraft centre in the Bahía Islands. Financing for these projects was provided partly by the Governments and partly by the U.S. Agency for International Development and the OAS (Organization of American States).

Apart from assisting in the organization of projects for the development of handicrafts, ICEM also provides aid in the *agricultural* field by the introduction of new methods of production and management. Under the guidance of experienced immigrant farmers, Brazilian and other Latin American prospective rural leaders are taking part in the regular courses in the Holambra Training Centre in the State of São Paulo and at the Castrolanda Centre in Paraná. At the request of the Brazilian Secretariat of Agriculture, during 1970 special short courses were given at the Holambra Centre to young Brazilian agriculturists to cope with social problems in rural areas. Training in modern farming techniques continued at Castrolanda and the 1970 courses again proved successful. In addition to forty Brazilian trainees, eight from Uruguay and four from Paraguay also attended.

In Argentina a special project for the agricultural development of Lower Rio Negro Valley has been established in co-operation with ICEM. This project was established for the settlement of European farmers with capital. In 1970 ICEM recruited the first two European farm families for this purpose. The development of this fertile valley is intended to give more opportunities to national farmers and is being carried out with the assistance of the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the Inter-American Development Bank.

The Government of Paraguay requested ICEM's assistance to give impetus to the National Wheat Project, for which experienced European farmers, together with national farmers, are required to develop this source of considerable income for the country.

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The Colombian Government sought ICEM's advice on a problem of *internal migration* related to the seasonal harvesting of cotton and the orderly yearly movement of some 26,000 workers for this purpose.

Another problem of migratory movements was raised at the autumn session of the Council in 1969 by the Argentine Government and supported by other Latin American countries. This resulted in a request to ICEM to study certain *intra-American migration movements* about which there is special concern. Accordingly, ICEM prepared a questionnaire to elicit basic information as to the nature and extent of migratory movements into Argentina from Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay, and submitted it to the Governments concerned. The replies received are being analysed to determine the possibility of carrying out a more extensive study of these movements.

INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION

ICEM is co-operating with a number of governmental and non-governmental agencies and international organizations within the framework of its various programmes.

For the movements of specific categories of European refugees a close relationship exists between ICEM and the *U. N. High Commissioner for Refugees*. Both organizations are receiving contributions from governments for this purpose but in view of the different aspects of their work no duplication of efforts is involved in the resettlement process.

Substantial financial assistance is received from the *United States Refugee Program* for refugees eligible under the criteria of this office to be transported by ICEM.

Annual agreements are maintained with a number of *Voluntary Agencies* which assist national migrants and refugees. In the last two years there have been less requests by national migrants for assistance from Voluntary Agencies. To a large extent this is due to the more liberal criteria for acceptance under government-assisted emigration schemes by Australia. Nevertheless, there still remains a need for individual assistance such as finding sponsors and provision of loans for individuals not covered by the criteria of the governmental schemes. During the year under review 1,288 nationals and 18,962 refugees transported by ICEM fell within that category.

In connexion with the Selective Migration Programme for Latin America, close contact was maintained with the *Organization of American States*, the *Inter-American Development Bank*, the *Food and Agriculture Organization* of the United Nations, the *International Labour Office*, the *Council of Europe*, the *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization*, the *World Health Organization*, the *Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development* and the *United States Agency for International Development*. ICEM was represented at the most important conferences and operational contact was maintained at area levels.

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Substantial financial assistance is received from the *United States Refugee Program* for refugees eligible under the criteria of this office to be transported by ICEM.

Annual agreements are maintained with a number of *Voluntary Agencies* which assist national migrants and refugees. In the last two years there have been less requests by national migrants for assistance from Voluntary Agencies. To a large extent this is due to the more liberal criteria for acceptance under government-assisted emigration schemes by Australia. Nevertheless, there still remains a need for individual assistance such as finding sponsors and provision of loans for individuals not covered by the criteria of the governmental schemes. During the year under review 1,288 nationals and 18,962 refugees transported by ICEM fell within that category.

In connexion with the Selective Migration Programme for Latin America, close contact was maintained with the *Organization of American States*, the *Inter-American Development Bank*, the *Food and Agriculture Organization* of the United Nations, the *International Labour Office*, the *Council of Europe*, the *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization*, the *World Health Organization*, the *Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development* and the *United States Agency for International Development*. ICEM was represented at the most important conferences and operational contact was maintained at area levels.

Because of a growing awareness of the importance of migration in relation to human resources development in Latin America, ICEM was invited to participate in several specialized meetings. These included the Ninth Conference of Latin American Members of the ILO in Caracas, at which progress made under the "Ottawa Plan for Human Resources Development" was reviewed; the First National Labour Convention organized by the Venezuelan Government in Caracas, and the Regional Seminar on the "Establishment of Migration Services in Labour Ministries for Migrant Workers" held by the OAS in Kingston, Jamaica.

Among special papers prepared by ICEM for international meetings may be mentioned one on "ICEM's Role and Experience in the Field of Migration", presented at the Jamaica seminar. Another entitled "ICEM's Selective Migration Programme - Its Role and Contribution to Human Resources Development" was submitted to the Round Table Conference organized by the Council of Europe in Rome in preparation for the annual debate of its Inter-Parliamentary Committee on Development.

HOW THEY MOVE

During 1970 70 per cent of the migrants travelled by air. Approximately 33,000 persons were moved by 197 charter flights leaving from airports in Europe, with 107 flights destined for Australia and 90 for the United States of America and Canada.

In addition to chartered aircraft, regular air services are used extensively. More than 25 per cent of all movements were effected in this way mainly to South Africa and Latin America.

However, ships continue to play an important role in the transportation pattern of ICEM. About 23,000 persons, or 30 per cent of the total number of migrants moved during the year under review, went by boat, mainly to Australia.

On all charter flights ICEM arranged for crew members speaking the language of the migrants, and on the sea movements of larger groups to Australia trained ICEM escort officers were employed to accompany and assist the migrants during the journey.

Because of its geographical location Austria was the main country of departure, followed by Italy, Greece and the Federal Republic of Germany. Overseas, Australia received the greatest number of migrants from Europe: 36,000 national migrants and refugees were moved to this new homeland. The United States were second with more than 15,000 arrivals.

The expertise of ICEM in the field of transport is a useful instrument for its Member Governments. By its forward planning ICEM is able to group migrants and refugees for the same destination, thereby facilitating the use of block bookings on ships or the chartering of aircraft, thus reducing the transports costs. As national airlines and shipping companies of many different countries are being used, ICEM is in a position to achieve an equitable distribution of the volume of traffic, and in this way harmonize the interests of its Member Governments.

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STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION OF ICEM

All Member Governments are represented in the *Council*, the governing body of ICEM. It meets once or twice a year to discuss and decide upon policy, programmes and plans for future activities. In 1970 there was only one regular meeting in November at which an important debate took place on methods of achieving a more stable financial system to avoid annual shortfalls in the operational budget. The details of the decisions taken on this matter appear in the section on Financing ICEM's Operations (page 33). The other major proposal accepted by the Council related to the changing migration situation in Europe and other parts of the world, and ICEM's role in the future.

Following the retirement of Mr. Walter M. Besterman (USA) from the post of Deputy Director, Mr. G. Maselli (Italy) was elected to that office. He took up his new duties on 1 October 1970.

Nine Member Governments form the *Executive Committee*, elected annually by the Council. Its regular task is to discuss and make recommendations on matters coming before the Council. It met twice during 1970.

The *Sub-Committee on Budget and Finance*, consisting of five Member Governments, and the *Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport* enter into detailed discussion of the subjects indicated by their titles, thus clearing the way for the Council to concentrate on policy matters.

* * *

The following is a list of Member Governments, observer governments and observer organizations attending ICEM Council meetings :

Member Governments :

Argentina	Ecuador	Panama
Australia	El Salvador	Paraguay
Austria	Germany (Federal Republic of)	Peru
Belgium	Greece	South Africa
Bolivia	Honduras	Spain
Brazil	Israel	Switzerland
Chile	Italy	United States of America
Colombia	Luxembourg	Uruguay
Costa Rica	Malta	
Denmark	Netherlands	
Dominican Republic	Nicaragua	
	Norway	

Observer Governments :

Cyprus	San Marino
Guatemala	Turkey
Holy See	Venezuela
Japan	Sovereign Order of Malta
Portugal	

Observer Organizations :

United Nations
International Labour Organization
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
World Health Organization
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
Council of Europe
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

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Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

Commission of the European Communities
 Organization of American States
 Inter-American Development Bank
 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
 Special Representative of the Council of Europe for National Refugees
 and Overpopulation
 International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
 International Organization of Employers
 World Confederation of Labour
 International Council of Voluntary Agencies
 Commission of the Churches on International Affairs
 Aide suisse à l'étranger
 CARE Inc.
 Catholic Relief Services
 International Catholic Migration Commission
 International Labour Assistance
 International Rescue Committee
 International Social Service
 League of Red Cross Societies
 Lutheran World Federation
 Tolstoy Foundation Inc.
 United HIAS Service
 United Ukrainian American Relief Committee
 World Council of Churches
 International Committee of the Red Cross

The *Administration* consists of the Director and Deputy Director, and the staff recruited mainly from Member Countries. At present, 30 nationalities are represented on the ICEM staff. The Headquarters is in Geneva, Switzerland, with field offices in many other countries.

The structure of Headquarters was modified in 1970 by reducing the staff in the Director's Office and reorganizing the Department of National

Migration and Refugee Assistance. The Latin American Programme is handled by a department. Transport, Finance and Administration also operate as separate departments, while units dealing with conference, publications, press, medical and audit services report directly to the Director's Office.

In order to strengthen the Selective Migration Programme the organization's structure in Latin America was reorganized during 1970. South and Central America was divided into four basic areas:

1. Brazil, Bolivia;
2. Colombia, Ecuador, Peru;
3. Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay;
4. Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama,

each supervised by an Area Co-ordinator.

In addition, an information officer was attached to the ICEM Mission in Colombia for the purpose of giving greater publicity on ICEM in Latin America and providing more information concerning the possibilities for European migrants.

Commission of the European Communities
 Organization of American States
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FINANCING ICEM'S OPERATIONS

ICEM's financial resources are basically divided into two parts:

(a) The Administrative Budget, which is financed by mandatory contributions from all Member Governments according to an agreed scale of percentages. In 1969 the Member Governments accepted a new scale of contributions to the Administrative Budget, as recommended by the Council. The new scale was applied in 1970, and that Budget is now financially stable.

(b) The Operational Budget receives most of the funds it requires from governmental sources, which contributions are entirely voluntary. Because of their diverse interests, it has always been a principle of ICEM's operational financing that Member Governments were free to make whatever contributions they wished to the programmes in which they had special interest and desired to support. Such contributions have been made in two ways: per capita contributions according to the number of movements carried out, or lump sum contributions not necessarily related to the number of movements. Another factor which affects the level of contributions is the extent and nature of the services ICEM renders to individual governments, which, in supplying funds, sometimes request that they be used for certain specific purposes.

In 1970 the Council devoted special attention to the unsatisfactory situation regarding operational financing, because of recurring shortfalls in the level of total contributions. A special Working Group on the Financing of Operations was set up to develop cost-sharing formulae for voluntary governmental contributions to finance two operational programmes—Refugee Migration and the Latin American Programme—which habitually started each year with a significant deficit.

The Working Group noted that the three basic operational programmes of ICEM, i.e. National Migration, Selective Migration and Refugee Migration, were to a certain degree interdependent. While some Members

might have a specific interest in particular operational activities, they also possessed a general interest as Members of ICEM. The Working Group considered that the moral and psychological effect of full participation by all Member Governments was of great importance, and there was general agreement that the principle of universal participation should be applied to the financing of both programmes mentioned above. It proposed model schedules which, while not completely eliminating the shortfalls, would go a long way towards achieving more stable financing.

The Council recommended that the model schedules embodying the principles and criteria of universal participation in the financing of the Committee's programmes should be used as guidelines for contributions to the Operational Budget for 1971 and subsequent years.

Several Member Governments stated that they were not yet in a position to make a firm commitment on this new criterion. Despite this, the general picture regarding financing ICEM operations on a long-term basis was more encouraging at the end of 1970 than it had been for several years.

The total cost of operating ICEM in 1970 was U.S.\$ 24,147,000. Of this amount, U.S.\$ 2,470,000 were used for administrative purposes, while the remaining U.S.\$ 21,677,000 went for the cost of operations. It is evident that by far the greater part of the latter sum was spent on actual transport by sea and air, but international migration involves much more than just making transport arrangements for a given number of people. All kinds of services related to recruitment, selection, arranging for documentation and making migrants "travel-ready", language or vocational training either before departure or after arrival, and many other details—all these factors cost money but are a necessary part of the migration process.

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INFORMATION

Press and Public Information. The Director and Deputy Director met with journalists at press conferences, radio broadcasts and interviews, in particular on the occasion of the Director's official visits to Italy, Malta and Latin America. As a result, more than 250 articles were published in 22 countries. ICEM was also the subject of several radio programmes in Europe and overseas. In addition, special assistance was given to the Australian Information Officers in Europe on the occasion of Minister of Immigration Lynch's visit to Geneva, for distributing success stories in Switzerland and for projecting the Swiss TV/ICEM film "To become an Australian" in Belgium and France. Contacts were also re-established with the editors of publications sponsored by immigrant societies in Anglo-Saxon immigration countries.

Particular attention was given to promoting the Selective Migration Programme for Latin America. The occasion of the Director's visit to Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru was used to attract public opinion in those countries to ICEM activities. Visits to Latin America of European and American journalists were sponsored, and a 16 mm film on ICEM's operations in Colombia was prepared, to which the organization made a small financial contribution. The seminar for Latin American immigration officials organized in the autumn of 1970 received very good coverage from the public information media in Europe and Latin America.

In order to keep persons officially engaged in international migration affairs currently abreast of ICEM's activities, as well as the general public, four issues of the information bulletin "News of ICEM" were distributed in 1970 in four languages (English, French, Spanish and German) to some 2,500 addressees all over the world. Illustrated feature articles describing the stories of refugees and migrants who benefit from ICEM's activities are now regularly included in each issue. Three reports and articles of particular interest were reprinted and distributed together with "News of ICEM" by courtesy of the Congress of the United States, the Bremen Chamber of Commerce and the American magazine "New Republic".

The publication "Review of Achievements 1969" was distributed in English, French and Spanish in order to provide general information on various aspects of ICEM's work and achievements. A revised and up-to-date edition of "Facts and Figures" was also issued giving an outline of ICEM's structure, financing, activities, and co-operation with other organizations. Illustrated feature stories on the practical results of ICEM's operations appeared in "People for Progress", of which two issues were published in English/French and in English/Spanish and distributed to 8,000 addressees. In the quarterly "International Migration" various problems of a more scientific nature in connection with international migratory movements were analysed by various authors in the demographic and sociological fields.

On the occasion of the second anniversary of the exodus from Czechoslovakia "The Significance of August 1968" was published, illustrating ICEM's watchfulness for new refugee situations and readiness to put into effect emergency plans to ensure speedy emigration.

For the first time a special endeavour was made in 1970 to promote the interest of youth in international migration affairs through the publication of articles in magazines of youth organizations and university students' associations in Switzerland. This action will be pursued in other countries.

Information for Migrants. As regards information on Latin America, special emphasis has been given to producing material particularly useful to highly skilled candidates considering resettlement in that continent. Revised editions of booklets on Argentina, Chile and Colombia were published, while new editions were prepared for Brazil and Ecuador. The Governments of Argentina and Brazil participate financially in the production of information material for their countries and distribute the ICEM booklets through their representatives in Europe. Additional material dealing with social and labour legislation, education, revalidation of titles, taxes, etc. is constantly under revision. It is vitally important that candidates receive up-to-date information of this nature before making their final decision.

ADDRESSES

Headquarters : ICEM, 9, rue du Valais, 1211 Geneva 14, Switzerland. ☎ 32 36 00

Argentina

CIME, Avenida de Mayo 715, 2º piso, Buenos Aires. ☎ 34 25 42.

Australia

ICEM, City Mutual Building, 7th Floor, 8-14 Hobart Place, Canberra City. ☎ 49-1277.

Austria

ICEM, Rudolfsplatz 6, Vienna. ☎ 63 37 55.

Belgium

CIME, 9, rue Bréderode, 1000 Brussels. ☎ 13 94 16.

Bolivia

CIME, Edificio «Avenida», 7º piso, Avenida 16 de Julio, La Paz. ☎ 2-4589.

Brazil

CIME, Rua Barao do Flamengo 22, 3rd floor, Flamengo, Rio de Janeiro. ☎ 245-8040.

Chile

CIME, Edificio España, Calle Estado 337, 6º piso, Oficinas 618-619, Santiago de Chile. ☎ 35-481.

Colombia

CIME, Edificio Seguros Bolívar, Carrera 13 - No. 63-39, Oficinas 905-906, Bogotá. ☎ 35 12 82.

Costa Rica

CIME, Edificio Claraliz, 3er piso, Avenida 5 entre calles 1 y 3, San José. ☎ 21 35 49.

Dominican Republic

CIME, Avenida Ciudad de Sarasota 4, Apartado 850, Santo Domingo. ☎ 3-2457.

Ecuador

CIME, Avenida Colón 327 y Tamayo, Quito. ☎ 23 43 07.

El Salvador

CIME, 11 Ave. Nte. No. 240, San Salvador. ☎ 21 92 45.

Federal Republic of Germany

ICEM, Friedrichstrasse 10, Bonn - Bad Godesberg. ☎ 65 888.

Greece

ICEM, Dodekanissou Street, Agios Panteleimon, Alimos, Athens. ☎ 999-040.

Guatemala

CIME, 17 Calle «A», 3-53 Zona 10, Guatemala City. ☎ 68 20 50.

Honduras

CIME, Avenida La Paz, Casa 407, Tegucigalpa. ☎ 2-7102.

Hong Kong

Joint Migration Committee/UNHCR, Far East Office, United Chinese Bank Building (7th floor), 31/37, Des Vœux Road C., Hong Kong. Ø 231-549.

Italy

CIME, Via Po 32, Rome. Ø 850 151.

Luxembourg

ICEM, 43, rue Adolphe, Luxembourg.

Nicaragua

CIME, Edificio Cámara de Industrias de Managua, Managua. Ø 24-475.

Norway

ICEM, Prof. Dahls gate 1, Oslo 3.
Ø 60 3942.

Panama

CIME, Avenida Cuba 33A-34, Primer Alto, Oficina 15, Panamá, R.P.
Ø 25-1285.

Paraguay

CIME, 171, 25 de Mayo, 2º piso, Asunción. Ø 46 914.

Perú

CIME, Camino Real 1214, 6to piso, Lima 27. Ø 22 96 8.

Republic of South Africa

ICEM, Thibault House, Room 747, 225 Pretorius Street, Pretoria. Ø 28025.

Spain

CIME, Montalbán 5, 1º derecha, Madrid 14. Ø 232 61 20.

United States of America

ICEM, 1346 Connecticut Avenue, Suite 711, Washington D.C., 20036. Ø ADAMS 2-8000.

Uruguay

CIME, Juncal 1305, 9º piso, Oficina 902, Montevideo. Ø 9 72 85.

Venezuela

CIME, Avenida Principal No. 18, La Castellana, Caracas. Ø 33 18 94.

STATISTICS

1 FEBRUARY 1952 - 31 DECEMBER 1970

Total Migration	1,775,974
National Migration	907,289
Refugee Migration	868,676
GRAND TOTAL	

1 FEBRUARY 1952 - 3	
Immigration Countries (excluding Latin America)	
Total	1,435,123
Australia	584,791
Canada	199,279
Israel	214,678
New Zealand	17,791
South Africa	53,755
USA	297,741
Other	7,771
Overseas	33,227
Europe	62,217

Immigration Countries (Latin America)		Peru		Uruguay		Venezuela		Latin America and the Caribbean	
Argentina	372	17,292	2,781	5,397	604	805	80	426	170
Bolivia	498	93,808	6,014	6,302	740	895	1,562	13,553	69,236
Brazil	870	111,100	8,785	6,302	740	895	1,562	13,553	69,236
Chile	372	17,292	2,781	5,397	604	805	80	426	170
Colombia	372	17,292	2,781	5,397	604	805	80	426	170
Ecuador	372	17,292	2,781	5,397	604	805	80	426	170
Paraguay	372	17,292	2,781	5,397	604	805	80	426	170
Peru	372	17,292	2,781	5,397	604	805	80	426	170
Uruguay	372	17,292	2,781	5,397	604	805	80	426	170
Venezuela	372	17,292	2,781	5,397	604	805	80	426	170
Total	337,851	119,271	870	111,100	8,785	6,302	740	895	1,562
	308,281	115,343	498	93,808	6,014	6,302	740	895	1,562
	29,570	3,868	372	17,292	2,781	5,397	604	805	170

NATIONAL MIGRATION

Countries of Origin	GRAND TOTAL
Austria	34,001
Belgium	7,742
Germany	119,226
Greece	139,045
Italy	310,500
Malta	49,658
Netherlands	134,257
Spain	97,682
Others	24,187
Total national Migration	907,298

Immigration Countries (excluding Latin America)										
Total	Australia	Canada	Israel	New Zealand	South Africa	USA	Other Overseas			
32,734	21,357	5,630	204	361	3,700	1,082	200			
6,278	3,070	71	14	36	2,907	138	42			
116,178	65,785	35,197	148	216	8,033	6,683	116			
121,910	104,750	5,751	155	621	7,432	2,538	693			
104,964	55,320	31,463	462	15	10,748	3,062	3,894			
49,643	47,105	1,594	—	71	—	873	—			
131,318	85,753	737	115	13,792	11,388	17,909	1,624			
13,096	11,521	1,109	11	6	2	313	134			
22,896	6,211	15,620	354	9	14	629	259			
599,017	400,872	87,172	1,463	15,127	44,224	33,227	6,932			

Immigration Countries (Latin America)											
Total	Argentina	Bolivia	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Ecuador	Paraguay	Peru	Uruguay	Venezuela	Central America, Panama and the Caribbean
1,267	52	52	983	34	54	1	5	1	—	63	22
1,464	96	36	803	151	174	36	38	19	9	37	67
3,048	130	36	1,578	612	154	48	13	77	55	286	59
8,135	823	—	6,995	50	33	—	—	—	62	161	11
205,536	85,433	29	55,901	2,712	1,522	124	108	394	7,029	41,787	497
15	—	—	13	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2,939	104	—	2,673	66	40	1	2	12	9	13	16
84,586	18,527	331	24,459	2,252	3,218	368	268	877	6,377	26,844	945
1,291	218	11	403	135	202	82	17	102	12	45	64
308,281	115,383	498	93,808	6,014	5,397	660	469	1,582	13,553	63,238	1,681

REFUGEE MIGRATION

Countries of Departure and Status of Refugees therein		Immigration Countries (Latin America)												Immigration Countries (Other Regions)												TOTAL	
		Argentina				Bolivia		Brazil		Chile		Colombia		Ecuador		Paraguay		Peru		Uruguay		Venezuela		Central America and Caribbean			
		Total	Asylum	Transit	Other	Total	Asylum	Transit	Other	Total	Asylum	Transit	Other	Total	Asylum	Transit	Other	Total	Asylum	Transit	Other	Total	Asylum	Transit	Other		
Austria	224,900	59,877	39,309	32,411	1,260	3,924	59,901	123	32,918	5,077	1,187	443	239	1	15	9	77	861	44	44	1	1	1	1	1		
Belgium	203,499	59,658	39,070	2,085	1,258	3,919	59,467	123	32,864	5,055	1,166	443	239	1	15	9	77	861	44	44	1	1	1	1	1		
France	12,607	11,379	259	30,326	2	5	434	18	54	22	147	15	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		
Germany	11,499	664	2,711	847	16	131	8,064	18	248	148	16	9	9	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		
Greece	79,468	77,676	2,799	689	18	131	7,950	13	8	17,332	233	179	14	15	15	3	121	208	49	49	1	1	1	1	1		
Italy	31,555	29,952	3,354	5,292	3,369	17,832	15	25	1,603	221	34	774	4	15	15	3	110	208	49	49	1	1	1	1	1		
Netherlands	189,124	152,168	34,130	25,475	348	297	88,966	87	1,731	3,956	279	108	69	22	146	59	103	482	34	34	1	1	1	1	1		
Spain	151,331	131,786	25,190	328	297	3,133	85,628	87	1,684	3,936	277	108	69	22	146	59	103	482	34	34	1	1	1	1	1		
Other European Countries	857	837	344	285	16	18,946	2	46	241	1,291	178	1	3	17	17	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		
Asylum	34,327	33,031	3,688	910	19,023	239	738	6,690	13	1,734	1,362	102	509	26	61	31	121	208	49	49	1	1	1	1	1		
Transit	14,881	13,590	3,504	834	16	18,946	2	46	241	1,291	178	1	3	17	17	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		
Other	23,043	22,313	62,742	13,353	97,604	343	267	37,981	61	10,982	9,730	457	68	3,253	897	374	26	59	103	482	34	34	1	1	1		
Asylum	91,037	84,975	23,429	12,063	2,335	204	245	36,732	58	9,881	6,122	457	68	3,253	897	374	26	59	103	482	34	34	1	1	1		
Transit	1,899	1,338	39,313	1,264	95,269	139	22	1,249	3	1,079	3,609	905	18	2,168	144	135	2	8	45	170	15	15	1	1	1		
Other	1,032	1,825	426	945	64	36	31	301	323	1,079	74	18	10	28	2	2	10	10	10	10	6	6	1	1	1		
Asylum	25,079	24,871	35	69	12	2	24,726	8	12	208	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	6	6	1	1	1		
Transit	25,017	24,609	35	24	2	2	24,726	8	12	208	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	6	6	1	1	1			
Other	62	62	45	10	10	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7			
Asylum	38,829	34,422	7,238	11,070	101	89	9,860	28	5,501	536	270	32	2	4	10	2	13	96	19	19	1	1	1	1			
Transit	28,525	28,060	3,383	3,673	101	89	9,175	28	5,584	535	270	32	2	4	10	2	13	96	19	19	1	1	1	1			
Other	9,769	9,769	745	8,297	1	1	805	1	5,983	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1			
Moved from Poland	27,503	27,093	5,644	3,643	72	1,179	7,512	56	5,501	410	31	181	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		
Inside Europe	21,186	14,920	6,993	532	221	6	583	429	3,159	6,266	270	102	5,077	432	15	16	178	37	7	112	11	5	2	2			
East Progr.	3,771	3,634	5	16	—	52	—	3,207	—	137	25	—	78	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—			
European Refugees	868,676	839,106	183,919	102,207	213,215	2,664	8,531	264,514	839	62,217	20,570	3,888	372	17,292	2,781	905	80	426	170	459	2,062	236	—	—	—		
European Refugees moved with the special authorization of the Executive Committee under consultation procedure.																											

STATISTICS

OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS WITHIN THE SELECTIVE MIGRATION PROGRAMME TO LATIN AMERICA 1964-1970

Occupational Classification	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	Total 1964- 1970
Professional Occupations								
University Teachers	128	211	317	376	648	614	687	2,981
Other Teachers	24	28	26	42	63	26	40	249
Engineers and other Professional Occupations	90	161	275	307	494	504	564	2,395
	14	22	16	27	91	84	83	337
Sub-Professional Occupations								
Technical Engineers	70	120	191	348	637	784	533	2,683
Draftsmen and Technicians	16	25	97	165	249	257	158	967
Other Sub-Professional Occupations	10	28	23	71	185	232	119	668
	44	67	71	112	203	295	256	1,048
Highly Skilled and Skilled Workers								
Farmers, Fishermen	269	196	193	294	478	347	2,287	
Textile, Leather Workers	128	69	52	65	51	31	432	
Metal, Electrical Product Workers	9	13	13	33	25	28	170	
Woodworkers	95	84	85	132	49	125	990	
Other Workers	13	8	13	54	18	19	103	
	24	22	30	10	22	144	592	
	467	527	701	1,018	1,795	1,567	7,951	

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APPENDIX VII

PREPARED REMARKS OF SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY TO THE 1971
CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF VOLUNTARY AGENCIES
NEW YORK CITY, JUNE 30, 1971

It is a great pleasure for me to be here this morning.
As one who shares the deep admiration of so many Americans for the impor-
tant work of voluntary agencies throughout the world, let me add another wel-
come to New York.

I recall very well your last conference in London just three years ago, a
regret that I was unable to participate in those sessions. So I especially ap-
preciate the opportunity to join today's meeting, sponsored by Church World
Service.

Like all the member agencies of the International Council, Church World
Service has an outstanding record of accomplishment on behalf of disadvantaged
people throughout the world.
Over the years, all of you have meant a great deal to me. Because of your
expertise—and your compassion toward your fellowman—I have looked to you
for guidance and counsel and support. It has been a privilege to work with Jim
MacCracken and John Schauer of Church World Service—and the representa-
tives of the other agencies in this country and overseas.

With the first flow of refugees in Indochina—you were there.
With the outbreak of civil war in East Pakistan—you were there.
You were organized for relief in Biafra—you were there.
You were organized for relief in these areas, and elsewhere—and your very
concern for people caught in conflict, or natural disaster, helped to
size public opinion, and governments, to move on humanitarian relief.
You are here today to renew a commitment to build on this record—and to
then our joint efforts to better serve mankind, at a time when the growing
sector to meet the requirements of adequate relief.
It illustrates this more, perhaps, than the tide of human misery and
duced by the civil war in East Pakistan. The tragedy is unequalled in
ness. In a matter of weeks, well over 6,000,000 persons—a number
in the population of Switzerland or my own state of Massachusetts—
it necessary to flee to India to escape conditions in their homeland—
tens of thousands of others have been slaughtered or wounded in the civil
millions more face disease and starvation, unless something more is
them. Regrettably, whatever progress is being made in bringing
of to the area, is being out-paced by mounting tragedy—as condi-
tions deteriorate even more, and the massive flow of refugees
ues.

It is of people also exists in Indochina. Over many years of war,
persons—nearly one third of the population of Laos, Cambodia,
—have been displaced within their country or forced to flee
boundaries. Civilian casualties, including deaths, number well
countless others have suffered in North Vietnam as well.
war continues, and Indochina's crisis of people escalates

in South Asia and Indochina were not enough
ms" continue throughout the world. Especially
mg problem in southern Sudan. And
East, in Europe, in Latin A
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and

...in the world we have created to accept suffering and in-
specially in our time when violent conflict and oppression are active in
many areas. But the newer world we seek will not evolve if we ignore these
challenges to leadership, and take comfortable refuge in the mundane patterns
and attitudes of the past.

Several items are on the agenda for action—you know them better than I. A
good share of these items deal with immediate problems. But there are two items
of longer term, which I strongly feel need top priority by all concerned. I recom-
mend these items for active consideration in your meetings this week, and ask
for your help and support in seeing them through.

The first relates to rehabilitative needs in Indochina, and the second to more
innovative international machinery for responding to human suffering in times
of crisis.

In the case of Indochina the needs of the war victims are great. The efforts be-
ing made to meet these needs are fragmented—and without a sense of urgency
the situation demands.

I have long believed that the U.S. bears the major responsibility to salvage and
rehabilitate the people of Indochina—but as I suggested in comments to a Geneva
meeting of the International Council more than 5 years ago, voluntary agencies
from many countries and individual governments should also participate.

Over the years a measure of participation by the international community has
occurred. And it is gratifying to note that in recent months, especially, interest
and concern and offers to help, have grown considerably—on the part of volun-
tary agencies, international organizations and various governments.

In this connection, I recommend today that the highest priority be given by
all concerned, to involving the United Nations in the relief and rehabilitation
effort so urgently needed in Indochina.

The Secretary General of the United Nations should be requested to convene
as soon as possible an international conference on Indochina relief. The current
and long term needs of the people throughout this area can never be met through
existing relief mechanisms.

Such a conference would lend fresh perspective in the possibilities of expand-
ing emergency relief operations, and in the approaches to the bigger task of
social rehabilitation and reconstruction.

Through the good offices of the Secretary General, the conference should make
an effort to establish an international relief mechanism for Indochina. It should
be the function of this body to receive and channel relief contributions, to appeal
for the safe conduct of mercy missions into difficult areas, to supervise and
coordinate general relief operations, and to involve additional humanitarian
and development agencies—including those represented here today.

In the case of better international machinery for responding to human suf-
fering as it occurs—there is today no broadly based and continuing mechanism
to render massive emergency assistance to populations ravaged by conflict and
oppression or natural disaster. Although a large number of international public
and private organizations—including those within the United Nations—exist for
this purpose, the fact remains that these organizations are too often limited in
what they can do, by their individual mandate, tradition, political or regional
association, and small resources.

In light of distressing developments involving humanitarian aid to victims of
the conflicts in Vietnam, Nigeria, and today in East Pakistan and India—new
initiatives must be taken within the United Nations to establish a United Nations
Emergency Service (UNES), supported, perhaps, by a declaration on humani-
tarian assistance to civilian population in armed conflicts and other disasters.
Such a service would exist purely for humanitarian purposes. It would function
as a separate office within the United Nations—responding to a call from the
Secretary General to mobilize and coordinate the vast resources of the United
Nations and its specialized agencies. In this connection, the pattern of pro-
cedures and activities developed by the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, offers some guidelines for the operations of the emergency service.
The Service would be headed by an impartial diplomatic leadership for nego-
tiating mercy agreements and consent for the deployment of relief corps. The
relief corps would consist, in part, of nationally financed technical units, orga-
nized on a standby basis and equipped for use in combat zones, famine-stricken
areas, flooded provinces, refugee camps, and devastated cities. The national
units would be placed under international direction in the event of an emergency.
Along with personnel resources from other offices and agencies of the United
Nations, regional organizations, individual governments, and voluntary

agencies—the national units would be deployed with maximum speed to areas. The emergency service would have the authority to call for and contributions in funds and kind from public and private sources within international community. It would supervise and coordinate emergency efforts under its umbrella.

To establish a United Nations Emergency Service is a logical extension of United Nations activities in humanitarian questions—and, hopefully, it will also be a means to blunt and overcome some norms of international conduct, bureaucratic inertia, and diplomatic complexities reflected in the erratic and timid international response to massive human suffering in so many troubled areas. The experiences in East Pakistan and India today should compel men of good will, to do all they can to enlist the support of their governments in bringing this matter before the next session of the United Nations General Assembly.

As I said a few minutes ago, we meet at a time when the growing toll of human suffering seems to outpace our ability to meet the requirements of adequate relief. This gap can and must be closed. And I strongly believe the items I have recommended will put us far down the road in accomplishing this objective. We know the needs. We also know how to meet these needs. There is nothing but inertia to prevent meaningful progress.

APPENDIX VIII

REPORT ON REFUGEES OF THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF VOLUNTARY AGENCIES,
1971 GENERAL CONFERENCE, NEW YORK CITY, JULY 1971

INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF VOLUNTARY AGENCIES CONSEIL INTERNATIONAL
DES AGENCES BENEVOLES

1971 GENERAL CONFERENCE—REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON REFUGEES
AND MIGRATION

1. Preamble

The Working Group on Refugees and Migration was pleased to note the progress made during the last years by intergovernmental organisations, such as UNHCR and ICEM, as well as by national governments or national organisations such as USRP and also by Voluntary Agencies, in the field of migration movements and refugee work, including resettlement of handicapped refugees. This common effort helped to solve many difficult problems and contributed to alleviation of the fate of old refugees.

However, the Working Group had to recognize the fact that every year new refugee movements occur in almost every part of the world: in Europe as well as in Asia, in Africa and in the Western hemisphere.

Such new trends have to be studied, new appropriate solutions have to be found, particularly for those problems that have an urgent character. This is a common task and a challenge for all the peoples of the world, represented by intergovernmental as well as voluntary organisations in order to do their best to respond to human needs.

In 1971, two intergovernmental organisations working in the field of refugees and migration, UNHCR and ICEM, will celebrate their 20th anniversaries. On this occasion the Conference conveys its congratulations to these two organisations and expresses its gratitude for the excellent co-operation with ICVA member organisations in the past.

2. Refugees from East Pakistan in India

The deepest concern felt by the Working Group for the five to six million refugees who had fled from East Pakistan to India. It noted with utmost gratification the extraordinary efforts of the United Nations and, particularly, its Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees to mobilize the entire world to assist the government of India to alleviate the terrible suffering of this unprecedented multitude of helpless human-beings.

The Working Group commended the Indian Government for the vast relief programme organised on behalf of these refugees. It was self-evident that the material resources required were far beyond the possibilities of that government and its people. The general contributions so far provided by governments and voluntary agencies must be increased and speedily if an unconscionable number of deaths among these refugees are to be avoided. It was reported that the cholera epidemic appeared to be under control for the time being but more supplies of food, clothing and especially housing were most urgently required.

The Working Group called on ICVA to promote in every way possible the earliest contributions of these life-saving supplies from all possible public and private sources.

3. Refugees and displaced persons in Indochina

The Working Group, recognising the utmost importance of this problem, which the continuation of the war makes more and more dramatic, noted the proposal to organise an international effort to alleviate the human and social consequences of this war, when conditions of peace will be re-established on the whole of Indochina. The Working Group hoped that the United Nations and all interested countries will be brought together as soon as possible in a conference for im-

mediate planning and joint execution of rehabilitation, and wished to see the willingness of Voluntary Agencies to participate fully in such an integrated effort.

4. Tibetan refugees (in India)

The Working Group expressed its appreciation to those government voluntary agencies, and especially the host country, India, for the considerable amount of aid of all kinds made available to Tibetan refugees in India. It was with satisfaction the progress reported by the European Common Fund in settlement on the land of a large number of these refugees. The training of young Tibetans in the managerial skills will provide an important ingredient in the further success of this essential self-help programme. The Working Group looked to the UNHCR Office in India, the Common Fund, the Government of India and the voluntary agencies for continuing guidance on all these projects aimed at Tibetans in India.

5. Chinese refugees

The Working Group was concerned about the plight of Chinese refugees in South East Asia, particularly those having sought refuge in Hong Kong and Macao. It welcomed the recent opportunities for resettlement for part of this group and appreciated the assistance of ICEM, UNHCR, and voluntary agencies active on behalf of these refugees. Nevertheless the group pointed out that, in resettlement, this group of refugees was not receiving financial assistance equal to that given to refugees originating in other geographical areas, and recommended that consideration be given to equal treatment for all refugees being resettled.

It was noted that new Chinese refugees include a large number of youth aged 16 to 25 who require assistance appropriate for their years. Therefore, in addition to resettlement activities, the Working Group requested new efforts on the part of government and voluntary agencies to aid these young people.

6. African refugees

6.1. In noting the gravity of the African refugee problem, its causes and the complexity of the situation, the Working Group wished to emphasize that in the context of the African situation there were large groups of refugees and in addition, refugees "sur place" and migrants.

In noting that more than 90% of the African refugees were rural refugees and further that in most situations voluntary repatriation will not—(in the foreseeable future)—present a realistic solution to the problem, the Working Group recommended that the problem be attacked within the framework of integrated rural development, leading to an integration between the refugees and the local population and a development towards self-sufficiency of both groups. In doing so the Working Group wished to stress that assistance to refugees should not be divorced from development aid as such, and further that the policy of restricted camps, where it exists, should be reviewed in favour of an integrated development approach based on careful and detailed studies of the proposed settlement areas. The Working Group recommended a continuation of the efforts of an actual and effective co-ordination of voluntary agency and inter-governmental efforts in this field.

6.2. Further, the Working Group noted the serious situation of the urban refugees in Africa, and recommended continued efforts to provide educational and vocational guidance for these refugees as well as co-ordinated efforts, already being implemented in some countries, in order to provide the most effective and relevant assistance to this group of refugees. The Group congratulated the Organisation of African Unity's Bureau for Education and Placement of Refugees (OAU/BPEAR) for its efforts and achievements to date in the provision of employment and educational and training facilities for the refugees. It called upon the member agencies of ICVA to continue and increase their co-operation with the OAU/BPEAR both on the central and the local levels, and commended the ICVA Working Group on African refugees for its efforts in this regard.

The Working Group finally appealed to the refugee assistance agencies to facilitate the task of returning refugees to the liberated areas in order to assist in the reconstruction of these areas.

7. Refugees in the Near East—UNRWA

The voluntary agencies maintain the belief that in the absence of a political settlement in the area, the international community cannot abandon this large number of refugees. The Working Group noted with satisfaction the relatively successful efforts of the UN Temporary Working Group to secure additional funds and material resources for UNRWA, thereby substantially reducing its large foreseen deficit for this year. It expressed its deep concern with respect to the even greater deficit looming ahead for 1972. It appealed urgently to all governments members of the UN to make available the resources which will enable UNRWA to carry on its essential services.

It recommended further that the UN Temporary Working Group be made permanent in order that it may explore all avenues to finance UNRWA's future activities adequately.

The Group noted with interest the search for additional funds for economic development of the area in accordance with the report of the ICVA 1968 London Conference which stressed the need to raise the standard of living of all people in the area.

8. Refugees in Europe

There is an on-going problem of refugees in Europe. The Working Group wished to caution governments, the UNHCR and ICEM, as well as voluntary agencies to maintain their structures and services to meet the needs of the present refugees in Europe and those refugees who continue to arrive. Particular note was given to the emergence of new groups of refugees in Europe from Greece, Portugal, Brazil, Near East, Africa, Cambodia, and others, for whom assistance was requested. Cuban refugees in Spain are a particularly disadvantaged group and the Working Group called upon all countries to give consideration to their need for resettlement.

9. Definition of refugees

The Working Group noted the practical problems encountered by organisations aiding refugees owing to the various definition of "refugee" and even how long a "refugee" is a "refugee".

Recognizing that various definitions of "refugee" have arisen for historical reasons and that it may be impractical to achieve uniformity the Working Group emphasized the spirit that generates concern by the voluntary agencies and the international community for the uprooted.

In a world that throbs with social unrest, the turmoil of a revolutionary age—we are faced with the inevitable refugee, exile, escapee, temporary resident, sojourner, stranger. People who are now refugees—and those who will inevitably follow—cannot and will not be ignored.

The Working Group urged ICVA to promote, by all means possible, the collection of information from every part of the world on this question. It urged further the co-operation of all concerned to make studies and analyses in order to assure compassionate interpretation of all definitions.

It was expected that this process will greatly enhance understanding of the needs and help shape effective and expanded activities by all on behalf of the displaced and homeless people where ever they may be.

10. The Intergovernmental Committee for European migration

The Working Group wished to congratulate ICEM for twenty years of remarkably successful work, often carried out under very trying conditions, on behalf of the residual caseload of displaced persons from World War II, the massive Hungarian exodus of 1956, national migrants throughout the entire period, the refugee movements from Czechoslovakia and Poland, and the Children's Airlift in Nigeria, among others. ICEM and the voluntary agencies, working in partnership with it, had reached their mutual goal of limiting new refugee camps, especially in Europe, by speedy processing and movement of refugees.

The Group was pleased to note that while not neglecting its task in Europe, ICEM was finding ways to come to the assistance of non-European refugees, especially from Hong Kong. Another area of deep concern to ICVA membership was Latin America, which is daily producing new refugees and migrants who are moving from one Latin American country to another. It was hoped that ICEM will find the way to apply its time-tested techniques to the solving of this group of problems.

During this celebration of ICEM's Twentieth Anniversary, its Executive Committee is urged to consider if the time has not come to change its original

statutes. The Working Group expressed the belief that ICEM should modify its mandate in order to facilitate the provision of its important assistance to refugees and migrants in need of its help everywhere in the world. The members of the Working Group were fully aware of ICEM's need for funds to carry out its manifold tasks and pledged themselves to continue interpreting to governments the need for adequate financial support.

11. Admission of refugees to countries of resettlement

The Working Group recognized increasing problems threatening the orderly and speedy resettlement of refugees in overseas countries, stemming partly from unstable economic conditions as well as restrictive laws and policies. It asked all voluntary agencies to make the maximum possible effort vis-a-vis the governments concerned in order to achieve the following objectives:

(a) That governments of immigration countries liberalize their legislation, policies and criteria concerning the admission of refugees, including extension of preferential treatment to the maximum degree and, wherever appropriate, to as wide a range of countries as possible.

(b) That governments of immigration countries and all other countries concerned, eliminate or apply flexibly any restrictions in processing and admission of members of separated families in order to achieve full adherence to the principle of family reunion.

12. Aged and handicapped refugees, children

The Working Group, while recognising the progress made in recent years, was still deeply concerned for the fate of aged and handicapped refugees whose problems grow more serious and costly to voluntary agencies assisting them, generally in countries of first asylum. Special consideration is required for aged and handicapped refugees who are the least well equipped to help themselves, as well as children who require special measures on their behalf because of their vulnerability.

Assistance to aged and handicapped refugees over long periods of time was extremely costly and grew more expensive each year. Therefore, in any future refugee situation all efforts should be undertaken to identify quickly these special cases and to mobilize all resources to prevent such special cases from becoming new residual hard-core groups.

13. UNHCR—Legal protection

The Working Group on Refugees and Migration congratulated the Office of the UNHCR, under the successful leadership of previous High Commissioners and especially of the present incumbent, Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, on the continuous strengthening of measures for the international protection of refugees and the positive steps taken to seek interim arrangements and permanent solutions for various categories of refugees throughout the world in close collaboration with governments and voluntary organisations.

The Working Group recorded with satisfaction in this 20th anniversary year the effective and continuous collaboration between the Office of the UNHCR and the voluntary agencies.

The Working Group noted that up to the present time some 60 states are parties to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, that some 45 States among them are parties to the 1967 Protocol, and that two further States are parties to the 1967 Protocol only. It called once again upon all member agencies of ICVA to make a concerted effort through all appropriate means available to them to prevail upon other States which have not already done so, to accede to the 1959 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, thereby providing as wide a framework as possible for effective action by the Office of the UNHCR under its Statute.

In this connection the Working Group noted with satisfaction recent steps taken by the UNHCR for the issuance of a standard questionnaire addressed to governments, concerning implementation of the terms of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol. It was anticipated that the governments parties to these two instruments will provide the necessary information on the steps taken to put into effect the measures which they are called upon to take under the relevant provisions of these instruments, thereby providing evidence that the requisite legislation and administrative practice have been adopted for the actual protection of refugees in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the Convention and the Protocol.

The Working Group further noted that the 1961 U.N. Convention on Statelessness had been ratified by only three signatory States, namely Sweden, the U.K.

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There is an on-going problem of refugees in Europe. The Working Group wished to caution governments, the UNHCR and ICEM, as well as voluntary agencies to maintain their structures and services to meet the needs of the present refugees in Europe and those refugees who continue to arrive. Particular note was given to the emergence of new groups of refugees in Europe from Greece, Portugal, Brazil, Near East, Africa, Cambodia, and others, for whom assistance was requested. Cuban refugees in Spain are a particularly disadvantaged group and the Working Group called upon all countries to give consideration to their need for resettlement.

9. Definition of refugees

The Working Group noted the practical problems encountered by organisations aiding refugees owing to the various definition of "refugee" and even how long a "refugee" is a "refugee".

Recognizing that various definitions of "refugee" have arisen for historical reasons and that it may be impractical to achieve uniformity the Working Group emphasized the spirit that generates concern by the voluntary agencies and the international community for the uprooted.

In a world that throbs with social unrest, the turmoil of a revolutionary age—we are faced with the inevitable refugee, exile, escapee, temporary resident, sojourner, stranger. People who are now refugees—and those who will inevitably follow—cannot and will not be ignored.

The Working Group urged ICVA to promote, by all means possible, the collection of information from every part of the world on this question. It urged further the co-operation of all concerned to make studies and analyses in order to assure compassionate interpretation of all definitions.

It was expected that this process will greatly enhance understanding of the needs and help shape effective and expanded activities by all on behalf of the displaced and homeless people where ever they may be.

10. The Intergovernmental Committee for European migration

The Working Group wished to congratulate ICEM for twenty years of remarkably successful work, often carried out under very trying conditions, on behalf of the residual caseload of displaced persons from World War II, the massive Hungarian exodus of 1956, national migrants throughout the entire period, the refugee movements from Czechoslovakia and Poland, and the Children's Airlift in Nigeria, among others. ICEM and the voluntary agencies, working in partnership with it, had reached their mutual goal of limiting new refugee camps, especially in Europe, by speedy processing and movement of refugees.

The Group was pleased to note that while not neglecting its task in Europe, ICEM was finding ways to come to the assistance of non-European refugees, especially from Hong Kong. Another area of deep concern to ICVA membership was Latin America, which is daily producing new refugees and migrants who are moving from one Latin American country to another. It was hoped that ICEM will find the way to apply its time-tested techniques to the solving of this group of problems.

During this celebration of ICEM's Twentieth Anniversary, its Executive Committee is urged to consider if the time has not come to change its original

statutes. The Working Group expressed the belief that ICEM should modify its mandate in order to facilitate the provision of its important assistance to refugees and migrants in need of its help everywhere in the world. The members of the Working Group were fully aware of ICEM's need for funds to carry out its manifold tasks and pledged themselves to continue interpreting to governments the need for adequate financial support.

11. Admission of refugees to countries of resettlement

The Working Group recognized increasing problems threatening the orderly and speedy resettlement of refugees in overseas countries, stemming partly from unstable economic conditions as well as restrictive laws and policies. It asked all voluntary agencies to make the maximum possible effort vis-a-vis the governments concerned in order to achieve the following objectives:

(a) That governments of immigration countries liberalize their legislation, policies and criteria concerning the admission of refugees, including extension of preferential treatment to the maximum degree and, wherever appropriate, to as wide a range of countries as possible.

(b) That governments of immigration countries and all other countries concerned, eliminate or apply flexibly any restrictions in processing and admission of members of separated families in order to achieve full adherence to the principle of family reunion.

12. Aged and handicapped refugees, children

The Working Group, while recognising the progress made in recent years, was still deeply concerned for the fate of aged and handicapped refugees whose problems grow more serious and costly to voluntary agencies assisting them, generally in countries of first asylum. Special consideration is required for aged and handicapped refugees who are the least well equipped to help themselves, as well as children who require special measures on their behalf because of their vulnerability.

Assistance to aged and handicapped refugees over long periods of time was extremely costly and grew more expensive each year. Therefore, in any future refugee situation all efforts should be undertaken to identify quickly these special cases and to mobilize all resources to prevent such special cases from becoming new residual hard-core groups.

13. UNHCR—Legal protection

The Working Group on Refugees and Migration congratulated the Office of the UNHCR, under the successful leadership of previous High Commissioners and especially of the present incumbent, Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, on the continuous strengthening of measures for the international protection of refugees and the positive steps taken to seek interim arrangements and permanent solutions for various categories of refugees throughout the world in close collaboration with governments and voluntary organisations.

The Working Group recorded with satisfaction in this 20th anniversary year the effective and continuous collaboration between the Office of the UNHCR and the voluntary agencies.

The Working Group noted that up to the present time some 60 states are parties to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, that some 45 States among them are parties to the 1967 Protocol, and that two further States are parties to the 1967 Protocol only. It called once again upon all member agencies of ICVA to make a concerted effort through all appropriate means available to them to prevail upon other States which have not already done so, to accede to the 1959 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, thereby providing as wide a framework as possible for effective action by the Office of the UNHCR under its Statute.

In this connection the Working Group noted with satisfaction recent steps taken by the UNHCR for the issuance of a standard questionnaire addressed to governments, concerning implementation of the terms of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol. It was anticipated that the governments parties to these two instruments will provide the necessary information on the steps taken to put into effect the measures which they are called upon to take under the relevant provisions of these instruments, thereby providing evidence that the requisite legislation and administrative practice have been adopted for the actual protection of refugees in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the Convention and the Protocol.

The Working Group further noted that the 1961 U.N. Convention on Statelessness had been ratified by only three signatory States, namely Sweden, the U.K.

and Norway and that it will not enter into force until two years after the last of three further States has ratified or acceded to it.

Accordingly the Working Group called upon ICVA members to use the 20th anniversary of the establishment of the Office of the UNHCR as a suitable occasion to urge governments to which they have access to ratify or accede to this Convention at a very early date, thereby enabling its provisions to enter into effect, in particular so as to reduce the number of children who are stateless by the acquisition of the nationality of their country of birth.

14. Asylum

The Working Group, conscious of the fundamental importance of the development of the principles of asylum as a basis of effective international protection of refugees in the spirit of Article 14(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, was encouraged to note that since the date of the last ICVA General Conference two instruments have been adopted, namely the 1969 Convention of the Organisation of African Unity, relating to the specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa, and the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights of the same year, which both contain important provisions relating to asylum.

The Working Group, while being aware that the Office of the UNHCR, and other bodies, have been responsible in intervening effectively where the principles relating to asylum have not been recognised in recent months, firmly believed that only a more liberal practice on the part of States with respect to the observance of these principles can appreciably alleviate this situation.

It reaffirmed the principle contained in the U.N. Declaration on Territorial Asylum of 1967, that the granting of asylum is a peaceful and humanitarian act which should not be regarded as being an unfriendly or hostile measure by any State.

The Working Group, recalling Section IV B of the Final Act of the U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons of July 1951, reaffirmed its belief that one of the fundamentals of the international protection of refugees is the preservation of the unity of the family. This essential right is denied to many refugees whose close family members are refused exit permits by their countries of origin.

The Working Group called upon member agencies of ICVA, and all other concerned organisations, to do everything within their power to persuade governments to adopt the most liberal practices to give expression to this basic human right, so that countries of origin will consider favourably requests of close relatives of refugees to depart and rejoin other family members.

15. Naturalisation

The Working Group commended the Office of the UNHCR for its efforts in promoting naturalisation in countries where refugees have been resident for protracted periods, in circumstances in which voluntary repatriation is not an applicable solution. It noted with satisfaction the UNHCR's active collaboration with the Council of Europe, whose Consultative Assembly, applying the principle contained in Article 34 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, obliging State Parties to facilitate as far as possible the assimilation and naturalisation of refugees, adopted, in September 1969, Recommendation 564 and Resolutions 416 and 419. These latter call upon member governments to introduce certain measures to facilitate the acquisition by refugees of the nationality of their country of residence.

It further noted that this Recommendation was accepted by the Committee of Ministers in January 1970.

It recalled that the ICVA 1968 General Conference in London, as well as the ICVA Refugee Commission meeting in Geneva in May 1970, had been responsive to a request by the UNHCR to familiarize their member agencies with more liberal practices and proposed legislative changes, enabling greater numbers of refugees residing in various European countries to become naturalised. Member agencies of ICVA were accordingly requested to continue their efforts to bring to the attention of the refugees with whom they are in contact, the advantages afforded by the naturalisation and the increased facilities available for this purpose in European countries as well as their efforts to promote, where appropriate, liberalisation of legislation.

16. Indemnification

The Working Group noted that following the closure of both the original UNHCR Indemnification Fund and the Supplementary Indemnification Fund, the UNHCR continues to expend certain residual funds available as a result of

the indemnification agreement between the Federal German Republic and the UNHCR of October 1960 to particular categories of refugees persecuted on grounds of nationality, who for reasons of noncompliance with time limits, or for other technical reasons, could not benefit from the Federal German Indemnification Law nor from payments out of the two above-mentioned funds. Noting also that the UNHCR continues to be concerned with the implementation of Article I of this agreement in connection with the procedures adopted by the competent Federal German authority, the Working Group recorded the encouraging developments in the form of a pronounced trend towards a more liberal application of the criteria in arriving at favourable decisions on the claims of persons having suffered permanent injury to body or health as a result of National Socialist persecution on grounds of nationality.

The Working Group was however concerned that as of 30th April, 1971, some 7,567 cases were still pending for decision, and it urged the UNHCR to make the necessary representations for as rapid a determination of these remaining cases as possible.

It further called upon the UNHCR to continue to use his good offices in representations with the Federal German Government to ensure adequate compensation to victims of National Socialist persecution, both on grounds of nationality as well as for racial reasons, who have not been eligible for consideration hitherto by virtue of their noncompliance with the deadline of the 31st December 1965, provided for in Articles V and VI of the final Federal German indemnification laws of the 14th September 1965.

17. Migration movements between Latin American countries

The Working Group, having examined the problem arising from large migration movements of population between Latin American countries and stressing the fact that a large proportion of those migrants move from one country to another without any visas or working permits, recommended:

- (a) That further studies should be made on this field by international governmental and non-governmental organisations in order to acquire a better knowledge of the causes and the consequences of these movements of population;
- (b) That sending and receiving countries sign bilateral agreements to protect the well-being of the migrants and, when necessary, request the help of international and intergovernmental organisations in order to solve the numerous problems resulting from such movements of population such as vocational training counselling, creation of reception centres, etc.;
- (c) That the Voluntary Agencies foster interest in these movements of population and each in its own field try to improve the conditions of living and of work of these migrants.

18. The equivalence of diplomas and practice of professions by migrants and refugees

Having examined the problem of the access of foreign-trained migrants and refugees in professional categories to the free or salaried practice of medicine, dentistry, nursing, architecture, engineering and accountancy, the Working Group stated that:

The problem of the comparability of educational standards is extremely difficult and interchange within one single country often impossible; Machinery for the evaluation of foreign diplomas in various countries is either non-existent or not sufficiently co-ordinated; To ease the present situation of foreign-trained professionals, for the time being, it would be necessary that bilateral agreements be concluded between Universities or educational authorities of immigration or emigration countries;

To further find a long-term solution to the existing difficulties and, in view of the growing numbers of professional migrants, a general conference of experts in the matter should be convened to examine the revision of existing criteria for the recognition of the equivalence of foreign diplomas and to set more uniform requirements for the practice of a profession by migrants and refugees;

For professionals with foreign diplomas who intend to practise, special preparation courses or vocational training programmes should be organized by the competent educational authorities in immigration countries, in order to facilitate their better preparation to exercise the profession and their adaptation to new conditions;

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For refugees who have already exercised their profession for some years in the country of origin, facilities be offered both in the shape of examinations, in view of their experience, and administrative procedures, in view of their inability to produce original certificates for political reasons.

The Working Group asked the ICVA Governing Board to submit the report on Equivalence of Diplomas to the following international organizations:

- UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO).
- World Health Organisation (WHO).
- International Labor Office (ILO).
- Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
- Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM).
- Council of Europe (CE).
- Commission of the European Communities (CEC).
- Organisation of American States (OAS).


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In particular, the Working Group appealed to:

UNESCO to continue its activities regarding equivalence of matriculation certificates and higher education diplomas and degrees and to convene under its auspices a general conference of University and educational experts and to establish a central Agency for the evaluation of diplomas, which will gather all the necessary information on existing national education systems and look for solutions to existing difficulties; and to:

The World Health Organization (WHO) to stimulate similar action for the three medical professions, namely physicians, dentists and nurses.

Finally the Working Group urged ICVA member organizations to promote further studies of this matter on a national level and to associate national authorities with the efforts to discover ways and means of finding an appropriate solution to the existing difficulties.



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